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Abstract 
The thesis sets out to answer three questions: what caused the IMF's apparent crisis of legitimacy in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis, why were the subsequent reforms so limited and what does that 
apparent paradox tell us about the politics of IMF policy-making? 
Criticism of the Fund's role in Asia was largely criticism of Fund performance but the performance 
issues fed into pre-existing difficulties with the relationship between the Fund's role and its 
institutional structures. Essentially, the Fund's role had expanded in developing countries and 
contracted in developed countries but its institutions remained unchanged. The result was a 
growing imbalance between institutions designed to ensure IMF technical authority and an 
increasing need for more political kinds of legitimacy. The increasingly intrusive nature of Fund 
conditionality has also changed the audiences for Fund legitimacy claims as cooperation from 
domestic populations became more important to secure implementation. The first part of the thesis 
explores these developments providing an analysis of the logic of the ll iF's traditional legitimating 
justifications and a historical view of its evolution over time. 
The second part of the thesis examines the political consequences of these growing tensions in the 
context of the Asian crisis. Through four case studies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and the US) it 
explores the nature of the new conditionality, the politics of programme implementation, forms of 
political resistance that materialised, and the nature of the relationship between the Fund, states and 
civil society. It argues that moves to engage civil society have created some modest successes but 
are ultimately limited by the overall institutional framework within which they operate. Internally, 
the Fund remains an institution dominated by developed countries despite being principally 
responsible for developing country policy. It is also dominated by financial elites in both developing 
and developed countries. 
Legitimacy is about the credibility of authority claims but the poütical significance of those claims 
lies in the extent to which they are able to attract political support and trigger political resistance. A 
combination of modest reforms, new arguments and public ambivalence or incomprehension have 
currently reduced political dissent but the possibility of further resistance, and therefore reform, in 
the face of subsequent crises persists while institutions remain unreformed 
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1 Introduction 
The IMF's response to the financial crisis that swept through Asia in 1997 provoked a level of 
controversy that, if not wholly unprecedented, had certainly not been seen since the debt crisis 
broke in 1982. `Rarely in its 52-year history' according to the New York Times `has the fund been 
under such concerted attack from so many quarters' (NYT 1st February 1998). 
Criticism from left wing development economists and UNCTAD should not perhaps be too 
surprising (Akyuz, 1998; Kapur, 1998; UNCTAD, 1998; Wade & Venerosso, 1998a). However, 
criticism also emerged from far more conservative comers and achieved a far higher public profile. 
One of the most ferocious critics was Jeffrey Sachs, who had previously been widely credited as the 
architect of big bang adjustment in Russia (Radelet & Sachs, 1998a; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b). 
Jagdish Bhagwati, an enthusiastic long-term advocate of free trade, published a tirade against what 
he called the 'Wall-Street-Treasury Complex' arguing that pressure for free capital flows was 
undermining consensus behind free trade and giving globalisation a bad name (Bhagwati, 1998; 
Bhagwati, 2001). Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist at the World Bank, was quite critical while in 
office and positively vitriolic once he had resigned (Stiglitz, 2000). Perhaps most damming of all, 
Martin Feldstein, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors under the 
Reagan administration published an article in FonignAffairs arguing that 
The IMF would be more effective in its actions and more legitimate in the eyes of emerging 
market countries if it... [confined itself to] maintaining countries' access to global capital 
markets and international bank lending.. .A nation's desperate need for short term financial help does not give the IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgements for the 
outcomes of the nation's political process (Feldstein, 1998) 
Dissent spread from academic papers to the international financial press. The Financial Times 
published a series of highly critical editorials and op-eds about IMF intervention with titles such as 
`Capital Punishment' (Martin Wolf 17th March 1998), `IMF is a power unto itself' (Sachs 11th 
December 1997) and a `proposal' by George Soros calling for better regulation of international 
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finance (31st January 1998). Sachs was also featured in the New York Times (The Wrong Medicine 
for Asia' 3r November 1997). Even the Wall Street Journal was worried that the crisis was causing a 
policy backlash that was `the most serious challenge yet to the free-market orthodoxy that the globe 
has embraced since the end of the Cold War' (4th September 1998). Indeed it published a series of 
calls to abolish the Fund, though these were largely because it interfered with the workings of the 
market rather than because it was damaging to developing countries (25th August 1997,3^1 February 
1998). 
In the US, IMF funding was hotly debated in Congress throughout 1998. A whole host of think 
tanks and eminent figures in the Washington establishment became involved including George 
Schultz, Paul Volker, Henry Kissinger, the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Institute for 
International Economics and the Brookings Institute. There were calls for the Fund's abolition 
from both left and right-wingers. 
In Asia too, there were rumblings of discontent. Kim DaeJung, soon to be elected Korean 
president, declared the IMF's arrival a `day of national humiliation'. Suharto argued that Indonesia 
needed an `IMF plus' programme and that the IMF's policies were unconstitutional. Workers from 
the Korean Federation of Free Trade Unions (KCFTU) appeared on the streets of Korea bearing 
signs saying `I'M F ired' (Malhotra, 2002) and the New York Tunes reported that 
Almost every night in Thailand, a stream of television commentators chafe at the humiliation 
of witnessing their country's leaders negotiate every element of national economic policy -- 
from interest rates to budget deficits - with economists who work largely in secrecy out of the 
I. M. F. 's offices off Pennsylvania Avenue (NYT Vt February 1998) 
Discontent in Asia fed back into the debates in Washington. Kissinger's intervention in the debate 
was largely to warn of the potentially negative effects for international relations in Asia. Various 
Congressmen who visited the region in 1998 raised similar concerns in committee debates (see 
Chapter 8). After Seattle, protestors also took to the streets at the IMF and World Bank autumn 
meetings. The combination of these protests, violent unrest and police overreaction at the G7 
summit in Genoa, and terrorism in the United States meant that in 2001 the Fund annual meetings 
had to be cancelled for fear of violent clashes. 
The IMF was firstly accused of getting its policies wrong. The crisis involved huge outflows of 
capital from the Asian region, starting with speculative attacks on the Thai Baht in mid-1997. IMF 
analysis tended to stress aspects of domestic policy as key causes of the crisis, though there was an 
acknowledgement that the markets had overreacted. It tried to resolve the crisis by promoting 
market confidence through a wide range of structural reforms, different in each country but linked 
by a concern for `market discipline' and by enticing capital to return with tight monetary and fiscal 
policy (IMF, 1997e). 
For some, particularly but not exclusively on the left, its enthusiasm for free capital flows and the 
pressure exerted for liberalisation were the fundamental talus of the crisis in the first place 
(Bhagwati, 1998; Sachs, 1998; Wade & Venerosso, 1998a). High interest rates and tight fiscal policy 
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in the context of a huge credit shock made matters worse -a criticism raised particularly early by 
Sachs. A more appropriate solution would have dealt directly with the outflow of capital underlying 
the crisis through some form of debt work-out procedure. For others, on the right, IMF 
intervention reduced the incentives for governments to dismantle corrupt business-government 
relationships and prevented market discipline (Calomiris, 1998, W'SJ 3'' February 1998). There was 
also concern about the appropriateness and relevance of the IMF's structural policies - particularly 
those mandating further capital account liberalisation. 
However, arguments were not simply about IMF performance. More fundamentally they were 
about the IMF's legitimacy: whether it had the authority to become involved in capital account 
issues and whether it had the right to impose structural conditionality centred around good 
governance. 
The immediate IMF response was to raise its media profile significantly with key staff making 
public speeches and publishing defences in journals and the press both in Asia and the West'. 
Later on a reform process was initiated in the context of wider discussions about a new 
`international financial architecture' reflecting a growing acknowledgement that the crisis was 
caused, in part, by problems with the financial markets themselves rather than simply by poor 
domestic policy. 
It is clear that the IMF has realised it has a legitimacy problem. Managing Director Michel 
Camdessus said during his retiring press conference that his biggest failure was that in spite of 
increased transparencyT. 
We have not been able to change attitudes towards the image of the institution. There are still 
people around the world who can, without provoking an outcry, say that the IMF kills 
babies.. . we will have to continue working 
hard to explain that ... these necessarily tough 
programs serve a common good (Camdessus, 2000b) 
More explicitly, Stanley Fischer his Deputy gave a speech in Paris in which he talked extensively 
about the `need to safeguard the legitimacy of the institutions that are involved in managing the 
[international monetary] system' arguing that The Fund for example, must not only operate in the 
interests of the international common good, but be recognized to do so by the public'. He stressed 
the need for transparency, surveillance that placed pressure on all countries (not just emerging 
markets) and accountability through representative channels (Fischer, 2000). 
However, at least at the time of writing (spring 2002), the reforms that have taken place in practice 
have been quite limited. The IMF has: established an independent evaluation office; extended pre- 
existing moves towards greater transparency; expanded its surveillance to deal more explicitly with 
capital account issues; and undertaken a review of its conditionality with a view to greater focus. It 
has also been involved in a process of codifying a series of `rules of the game' for international 
capital flows. However, these rules have largely been designed to encourage developing countries to 
I All senior management speeches and press articles appear on the IMF website (ham: //www. imf. org) under the 
'speeches' and 'views and commentaries' sections respectively. 
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adapt to market preferences rather than to deal with the instability of capital 
flows more directly 
(Akyuz, 2000; G7,1999; G7,2000; Ocampo, 2001). The hope is that better crisis prevention will 
resolve the problems without the need to forge international agreement around a more radical cure. 
The reforms have been dominated by developed country `experts' and have provided little 
opportunity for developing country political input. Although there has been significant movement 
on a few issues, the concerns of the G24 have largely remained unaddressed. Several high-level 
developing country officials I interviewed in Washington privately dismissed the entire international 
financial architecture reform process as largely irrelevant: for them at least it did not address the real 
issue of unstable capital flows. 
This account suggests three questions that this thesis will address. What exactly caused the IMF's 
crisis of legitimacy? Why were the ensuing reforms so limited What does the resolution of that 
apparent contradiction tell us about the politics of IMP conditionality in middle-income countries 
and therefore about the future prospects for IMF legitimacy? 
Before going into more detail about how those questions are to be answered, I need to start by 
explaining what I mean by legitimacy and why I think it is a useful concept for analysing the IMF. 
1.1 Legitimacy and power 
The analysis is framed in terms of legitimacy for a number of reasons. 
A legitimacy crisis followed by attempts at relegitimation seems to provide a good description of 
what has been going on at the IMF over the last four years. The issues raised were not just about 
problems with particular aspects of performance. They related to far more fundamental questions 
about the Fund's appropriate role and even whether it should continue to operate at all. 
Legitimacy is also a particularly appropriate concept with which to analyse an international financial 
institution. Like all international institutions, the IMF is reliant on state cooperation to achieve its 
purposes and must concern itself with securing government consent. Thinking in terms of 
legitimacy focuses attention not just on the internal politics of institutional decision-making but also 
on the issue of actors whose interests need to be taken into account if the IMF is to continue 
operating successfully. 
In terms of political analysis, legitimacy is about both investigating the reasons actors might have 
for complying with an institution's directives and the strategic factors that determine when lack of 
conviction turns into political challenge. I will deal with these logical and more political aspects in 
turn. 
Le timary and reasons for compliance 
International relations writing from a rational choice perspective has provided useful insights about 
the circumstances in which inter-state cooperation can be beneficial (Keohane, 1984) and those in 
which it is likely to be difficult (Krasner, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1994). Writers like Keohane have 
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argued that international institutions can resolve coordination problems by providing states with 
reasons to trust each other's commitment to a cooperative strategy (the prospect of repeated 
interactions enhancing incentives to act cooperatively, greater information flow, collective sanctions 
etc. ). Realists, on the other hand, such as Mearsheimer and Krasner have emphasised the problems 
that can occur when, even if everyone is better off because of the creation of an institution, the fact 
that some states gain more than others still threatens institutional legitimacy. 
However, which impulse dominates depends to a large extent on how states define their interests - 
something that tends to be taken as a given in rational choice writing (Wendt, 1999). Uncertainty 
about economic causation means that it is particularly difficult to determine actors' interests 
objectively in the context of the international political economy2 so masons for compliance with an 
institution's directives are interesting objects of enquiry. What will reassure states that the relevant 
institution is providing a good deal? What accounts for uncertainty about that in different contexts 
and what methods of persuasion are available? What accounts for different actors' susceptibility to 
particular arguments? 
Reasons for compliance are the essence of arguments about legitimacy. Exercises of power require 
justification;. That justification will need to show that power is being used to serve a purpose 
(provide a good) that compensates actors for the loss of freedom that springs from the exercise of 
power. A fully legitimate institution would therefore be able to claim that, even if it wasn't able to 
employ some kind of coercive sanction to back up its power, actors would have good reason to 
comply with its policies. In practice, of course, legitimacy is always a matter of degree and the 
justification given will involve a number of different elements some of which will be more 
persuasive than others. 
The multi-faceted nature of legitimacy is important as it has sometimes led to confusion in the 
literature, particularly between different social sciences. Lawyers have been concerned with 
questions about whether power is exercised in a way that conforms with existing laws or rules. 
Philosophers have pointed out that this alone is insufficient and that we also need to know whether 
those rules can themselves be justified by some objective criterion of justice or right: whether an 
institution embodies a kind of power that any reasonable un-biased observer would, on reflection, 
accept as rightful. Finally sociologists and political scientists have been suspicious of this notion of 
objective moral values as both too demanding (since what matters is the views of particular actors 
that the institution is trying to control) and not demanding enough (in that the idea of acceptable 
`on reflection' can deprive justifications of their practical motivational force). They have therefore 
tended to follow Weber in arguing that all we can say is that a structure of power is legitimate if 
those subordinate to it believe it to be so (Weber, 1968). 
David Beetham argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled to some extent if we 
understand that we are looking for reasons for obedience but that those reasons will be complex 
2 On the difficulties of determining 'real human interests' more generally see (Geuss, 1981) 
3 The arguments that follow are largely based on (Beetham, 1991) and (Beetham & Lord, 1998) 
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and comprised of a number of different elements. For a political understanding of legitimacy, we 
do, as social scientists, need to investigate the beliefs of actually existing relevant actors rather than 
some kind of objective philosophical justification. However, the relevant beliefs are wider than 
simply belief in the legitimacy of the powerful. 
A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy but because 
it can be juxt 
. 
fied in terms of their beliefs (Beetham, 1991,11) 
We can still therefore investigate rrasons for obedience, albeit reasons for particular people at 
particular times and in particular places. 
What kinds of reasons are involved? Some writers make a distinction between obedience based on 
self-interest (which they do not consider indicates legitimacy) and obedience based on some feeling 
of moral duty or on concepts of `appropriate behaviour' that have been socialised. There dearly is a 
distinction here. One can imagine that obedience based on self-interest may be more transitory and 
in some respects less secure than the other two. In practice, however, these different kinds of 
motivation are likely to overlap4 and will be difficult to separate in terms of behaviour. I therefore 
take a broader view which is willing to ascribe legitimacy to an institution that actors obey simply 
because they believe it is in their best interests to do sos. 
Philosophical and ethical views about justice and right will often be important in making the 
argument as will legal restrictions on the way power is to be exercised but legitimacy is multi- 
faceted and can take different forms under different circumstances depending on the role power is 
supposed to be serving. 
Beetham argues that, since the underlying problem with the exercise of power is that it interferes 
with aspirations to freedom6, legitimating arguments are likely to have a particular logical structure 
in order to overcome this central concern. Power will be legitimate to the extent that 
it serves a purpose that is valued by relevant actors and which can therefore provide 
compensation for the loss of freedom involved in obedience (purpose and 
performance) 
4 Consider the reasons why most people broadly obey speed limits when driving - habit (appropriateness), respect 
for the law or concern over potential danger to others (duty), fear of punishment or injury (self-interest). Usually 
some combination of these is operating simultaneously. Equally any socialised consideration of 'appropriateness' 
may well rely, ultimately, on a conception of'en6ghtened self-interest' or will need to have had some such 
justification in order to become established in the first place - though in some cases it is possible for such habits 
to persist once their underlying rationale has disappeared. 
5I therefore consider the neo-institutionalist IR theories such as that of Keohane (1984) to be a subset of 
legitimating arguments. 'Best interests' is obviously a fairly wide ranging description and more or less inclusive 
conceptions of what 'interests' entail in terms of identification with other actors or concerns with a longer term 
perspective can have a strong influence on likely behaviour (Wendt, 1999) 
6I talk about 'aspirations' to freedom to signal the dangers of voluntarist approaches. In practice legitimating 
arguments will often involve discussion of the true counterfactual to compliance with an institution's directives - an 
agent's freedom is always constrained by the structures he/she confronts. Restrictions on freedom are therefore 
restrictions relative to an appropriate counterfactual - something I discuss further in Chapter 2 
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2. power holders can claim some kind of (democratic, charismatic, religious, technical, 
moral etc. ) authority which qualifies them to make judgements and wield power in a 
way that serves the relevant purpose (authority) 
3. power holders are restrained by a set of rules which ensure that their power is only 
used for that purpose (legality) 
4. positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation of 
appropriate actors and by recognition from other legal authorities (consent / 
legitimation). 
The sense in which the first 3 aspects enhance legitimacy - provide reasons for compliance - 
should be readily apparent. They are designed to ensure that the loss of freedom involved in 
exercises of power is kept to the minimum required to provide the compensating benefit. The 
fourth part, legitimation and consent, is also partly about providing reasons for compliance. To the 
extent that an institution involves reciprocal obligations, evidence of consent by others is obviously 
an important factor. Consent by others may also provide an encouraging example or at least suggest 
that there will be little support for dissent thus offering further reasons for obedience -a futile 
challenge to authority is rarely a prudent course of action. Finally the very act of formal consent 
imposes a certain moral obligation and means that later derogation will have effects on the 
reputation of the country concerned7. 
This very general conception of legitimacy is helpful when it comes to looking at international 
institutions. A key difference between these organisations and states (a more usual object of study 
in political science) is the fact that their jurisdiction is defined functionally rather than territorially. 
Since they perform particular tasks, the way they are legitimated will depend on the task that they 
perform, making it difficult to come up with a general account of the legitimacy of international 
organisations in the way that Hobbes' theory, for example, uses the centrality of security as a 
justification for political obligations at state level. Legitimacy problems may spring from changes in 
role; changes in decision-making methods; or changes in the beliefs and norms of relevant actors. 
The relationship between the tasks performed and institutional legitimacy will form a central theme 
of the thesis. 
Legitimacy, power and politics 
Ultimately the reason legitimacy matters for political analysis is that it helps us in understanding and 
ideally predicting behaviour. Why not, then, simply adopt a more traditional approach with a focus 
on power? In fact the two are difficult to separate in a context where interests are uncertain and are 
in part defined according to actors' technical views about economic causation. Here radical 
perspectives stressing the relationships between power and knowledge-as-ideology are suggestive, 
7 Reputation effects are often (but not always) underestimated by realist writers. Developing country policy makers 
I interviewed at the Fund dearly regarded breaches of international legal obligations as a very serious matter 
(though of course that may have been partly a matter of self presentation). In ertremis it is dear that states will be 
willing to breach such obligations (Krasner, 2000) but for much of the time the increasingly dense networks of 
interstate contracts make this a dangerous strategy, particularly for weaker states. 
8 Introduction 
though for reasons I discuss below, only partly relevant to the current investigation (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1997; Foucault, 1980; Geuss, 1981). Writers like Stephen Lukes who argue that power 
is a deeply contested concept tend to do so because they are concerned about how one can talk 
meaningfully about exercises of power (persuading people to do something that is not 
in their 
interests (or perhaps that they do not believe is in their interests)) when those interests are partly 
defined through structures of knowledge which themselves are partly the products of particular 
forms of power (Lukes, 1986). Attempts to persuade actors that various things are in their interests 
- the process of legitimation - is therefore itself a 
form of power. 
Similarly, the persuasiveness of `reasons for compliance' is not independent of the consequences of 
non-compliance some of which will involve the exercise of coercive power. That is very much the 
point Hobbes makes about the need for sovereign power to backup any contractual settlement 
(Hobbes, 1991). My claim that, to be wholly legitimate, an institution should be able to persuade 
actors that compliance would be in their best interests even if the institution had no coercive power 
is therefore useful from a analytical point of view but more problematic when it comes to 
separating the effects that legitimacy has from those of power calculations. 
That dose power-legitimacy relationship might appear problematic for the thesis, particularly if my 
intention was to contribute to debates in IR theory about the relative importance of 'ideas' and 
`power' in the international systems. Fortunately, my purpose is simply to come to a better causal 
understanding of the politics of IMF decision-making with a focus on the difficulties in securing 
implementation of conditionality and the implications that those difficulties may have for the 
politics of the IMF. 
My choice to explore these issues in terms of legitimacy is not an attempt to deny the importance of 
power. It is rather a way into looking at power struggles which acknowledges that they are heavily 
influenced by actors' beliefs in a context of considerable uncertainty. Analysis in terms of legitimacy 
also reflects an attempt to find a middle way between the kind of approach adopted in early 
`idealist' IR writing about institutions which placed too much emphasis on their legal constitutions 
and a reaction against that approach that has tended to focus on countries' power interests to the 
exclusion of any institutional analysis. What goes on within an institution is important in 
determining policy outcomes but analysis is insufficient without some exploration of the politics of 
implementation. That is particularly important in international institutions, which have to rely, 
largely, on outside actors to ensure enforcement and implementation. 
Legitimacy draws attention to the relationship between what goes on within an institution and 
issues about cooperation outside it, partly because legitimation is itself a strategic exercise. Setting 
up justifications for the exercise of power places restrictions on the ways in which that power can 
8 For an approach to legitimacy that does attempt to do this see (Hurd, 1999). Hurd takes a positivist approach in 
which ideas and power are largely separable and asks whether ethical considerations can persuade states to act 
against their own interests. My broader conception of legitimacy is partly an attempt to avoid this issue which I 
believe is epistemologically problematic and not particularly helpful in understanding behaviour. 
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be exercised without harming legitimacy. From the point of view of the powerK the costs 
involved can be offset by the costs saved if the quality of cooperation is enhanced or costly 
coercion can be avoided. From the point of view of those whose compliance is desired the 
justifications offered will have varying degrees of persuasiveness and the quality of compliance will 
partly depend on the potential costs of various kinds of resistance. Discussions about legitimacy 
therefore always have power considerations in the background. 
Legitimacy, methodology and the thesis 
In the thesis, I proceed by examining the reasons that the IMF suggests various actors' have for 
compliance and looking at the circumstances in which those reasons are challenged in practice both 
within the institution and outside it. I then look at the ways in which the IMF responds to those 
challenges. The implication is that challenges to legitimacy, particularly in the form of failures to 
comply with IMF directives, send strong signals that the institution has political problems that need 
to be resolved. 
What triggers this resistance can be understood to a significant degree by the relationship between 
legitimating arguments, beliefs of the audiences for legitimacy claims and institutional behaviour 
(. e. in terms of legitimacy). Legitimacy is always a matter of degree and things need not get as far as 
an outside refusal to comply with IMF policy preferences before it is possible to talk about a crisis 
of legitimacy. Legitimacy is about the resilience of an institution's authority over time and even 
dissent and challenges that are not immediately threatening may send signals that should not be 
ignored about strains on institutional authority and the potential for future problems. How much 
reform is likely to take place, though, depends on which particular audiences start to find 
legitimating accounts less convincing and the resources those actors are able to mobilise (or 
threaten to mobilise) in order to press for political change. 
. When I come to identify the most important audiences for legitimacy claims 
in the second part of 
the thesis - whose voices have most influence -I am starting to unpack the power structures 
behind struggles over legitimacy which I then use to assess the adequacy of current reforms. 
However the majority of the investigation tends to leave power considerations to one side in favour 
of understanding how actors perceive their interests to be served or threatened by the IMF -I am 
concerned to ask z by political challenges arise. 
This is an interesting question because so many issues surrounding the IMFs role remain uncertain. 
That is why persuasion is an important part of the dynamics of IMF politics. There is uncertainty 
about economic causation. That means that there is considerable uncertainty about what it in fact in 
various actors' best interests and about how much power various actors actually have to impose 
their will over the international political economy. That is one reason behind the heated debates 
over the continuing role of the state under globalisation. It is this potential for uncertainty about 
interests and power that makes legitimacy important. Reducing uncertainty and providing reasons 
to trust authority is therefore, as neo-institutionalist IR writers remind us, an important part of what 
institutions can do: a part of the aim of institutional creation. 
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It is in dealing with these issues of uncertainty that I depart from the radical approaches concerned 
with questions about ideology that I referred to earlier. Here again my political concern with 
understanding behaviour needs to be separated from more normative questions where actors' `real' 
interests are important. I accept the position that interests are not simply given and are partly the 
outcome of contest over interpretations of reality (and therefore partly determined by power). 
However, in the context of the thesis I tend to accept actors' own perceptions of their interests 
without problematising them. I am largely agnostic about whether they are `right' about which kinds 
of economic regulation will best serve their interests and leave that for the reader to decide - 
although it is obviously impossible to be entirely objective and my own views will probably become 
apparent 
What I do have to assume for the study to have some predictive power is that actors are broadly 
rational within the constraints of uncertainty - this of course is also a necessary assumption of 
Beetham's work since otherwise it would be impossible to construct rea ew for obedience from 
actors' beliefs. If this were not so, it would be impossible to make any judgements about what 
exactly it was that was making legitimating arguments more or less persuasive in particular 
circumstances. At the very least it is important to recognise that legitimation is only possible where 
legitimating arguments are broadly credible, there are therefore practical limits on what legitimation 
can do without making real compromises over interests. There are clearly problems with making 
judgements about credibility to particular actors but, particularly where the audience for IMF 
legitimacy claims is largely one of elite technocrats, they are not insurmountable. 
Overall, then, there are two central factors that make legitimacy a useful concept for exploring 
international institutions like the RAF. Firstly, the fact that the Fund has only limited coercive 
resources of its own and has to rely, at least in part, on the incentives provided by other actors to 
secure implementation means that persuasion (rather than coercion) is important and that the 
relationship between those inside the institution and those more indirectly involved cannot easily be 
ignored. Secondly, since different actors' precise interests and power resources are both unclear 
because of the technical complexities of economic causation, issues about how interests are defined 
and what kinds of power in fact exist are important objects of study. It is that uncertainty that 
provides space for various forms of legitimation: ways of reassuring actors, in the face of 
uncertainty, that their interests are being respected. 
1.2 Outline of the argument 
How are these concerns with legitimacy to be converted into a practical piece of political analysis? 
The overview provided at the beginning of this Chapter suggested that the IAMF's role in the Asian 
crisis had triggered a crisis of IMF legitimacy. That is significant politically for the reasons I 
discussed in the previous section. Legitimacy provides actors with reasons for complying with 
institutional policy. If those reasons are logically weak, political challenge is likely, though whether it 
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materialises will depend on more strategic calculations. Challenges to legitimacy have the potential 
to force institutional reform, but, in keeping with my pragmatic political conception of legitimacy, 
only if they trigger sufficient levels of political mobilisation against key audiences. 
Where those kinds of political challenge do arise, an understanding of the causes of political 
challenge in terms of legitimacy problems will provide suggestions for effective institutional 
reforms. 
Who exactly `key audiences' are in the case of the Fund is itself currently an unsettled question 
because of debates about the growing importance of `civil society engagement'. Likely candidates 
though are the officials who represent states within the IMF, those in charge of negotiating 
conditional programmes in borrower countries, and sectors of domestic populations that are in a 
position to politically influence those two sets of officials. The relative importance of these 
different actors for IMF legitimacy is something the thesis aims to investigate and is discussed, 
particularly, in Chapter 9. It will depend on the resources that different actors can mobilise in order 
to damage the IMF's ability to achieve its aims and purposes. 
We are now in a position to understand how the three questions I have set out to answer fit 
together. If the IMF suffered a crisis of legitimacy, it would be reasonable to expect significant 
pressure for change as a result. However, in the event reforms have been fairly modest. The 
question, then, is whether that was because the Fund's legitimacy crisis was a case of `sound and 
fury signifying nothing' (Shakespeare, 1606) or whether the mismatch suggests that the Fund's 
legitimacy problems have not yet been resolved. Answering that question will tell us a good deal 
about the politics of Fund decision-making. 
The starting point for the investigation must be to ask what it was that turned the IMF's 
performance difficulties in Asia into a broader crisis of legitimacy. Why did criticism erupt in 
response to those particular programmes at that particular time? Part of the explanation is that the 
Asian crises were particularly large and took place in high profile countries, threatening systemic 
stability, but there is more to it than that. To understand exactly what was at stake we need to start 
by looking more closely at the basis of pre-existing Fund legitimacy claims: the relationship between 
the Fund's avowed purpose, its institutional authority, its legal structures and evidence of formal 
consent. 
I argue that the significance of the Asian crisis was its effect on pre-existing problems with the 
relationship between the Fund's role and its institutional structures. Essentially the problem relates 
to the balance between political and technical authority as the Fund's role has evolved in the face of 
changes in the international political economy. 
When the Fund was set up at the end of the Second World War, it involved a negotiation between 
states about inter-state economic relationships. The Fund was to preside over a relatively tightly 
defined set of reciprocal legal obligations binding on all states. Within that framework there was 
some room for discretion, which was to be exercised on a technical basis by economic experts 
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representing countries in proportion to country economic significance. The Fund's authority was to 
be based on a legal framework benefiting from state consent, technical expertise within the 
Executive Board and limited claims to be a representative institution. 
I start the thesis (Chapter 2) by reviewing the logic behind this initial account of Fund legitimacy in 
terms of the four aspects of legitimacy claims I explored above (page 7). The historical account is 
important partly because public statements the Fund issues to justify its legitimacy continue to 
emphasise historical continuity. It is also helpful because the Fund's institutional structures have 
remained largely unchanged as its role has evolved and the changing relationship between the two 
goes a long way to explaining the Fund's current difficulties. The approach is to use the Fund's oven 
legitimating accounts set out on the Fund website, in speeches and policy documents as an initial 
point of comparison against which to evaluate the adequacy of Fund legitimacy on the basis of 
current performance. Obviously it should be expected that these accounts provide a somewhat rose 
tinted picture but they do provide a set of public criteria against which the Fund presumably 
expects to be judged. The further reality diverges from the justifications the Fund has been able to 
come up with the more likely it is that problems will emerge. 
While the Fund's institutions demonstrate continuity, what has changed over time (as I show in 
Chapter 3) is that, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system and the rise of 
capital flows in the 1970s, the Fund's global regulatory role has declined, its symmetrical nature has 
been9 undermined, Executive Board discretion in relation to conditionality has greatly expanded. 
In short, the Fund's role in developing countries has expanded as its political authority has become 
more problematic. During the 1980s, that role concentrated on promoting a strongly market-based 
agenda on the strength of a fairly widespread economic consensus. Essentially, Fund interventions 
were far more reliant on justifications based on technical authority. Difficulties with that market- 
based agenda and a growing willingness to question domestic political arrangements in an 
international context, both partly a result of the end of the Cold War, changed this agenda during 
the 1990s. The Fund became increasingly involved in institutional issues and `good governance'. 
That new institutional agenda made the Fund's policies more intrusive at a domestic level, raising 
problems for implementation and making it more difficult to separate the economic aspects of 
Fund policy from their social and political effects. The solution, in response to a variety of political 
pressures, has been to pay more attention to the political viability of Fund programmes leading to 
involvement with more political aspects of the good governance agenda and a willingness to 
'engage' with `civil society'. 
Prior to the crisis, then, the IhIF's authority amongst states had increasingly come to be based on 
technical authority rather than appropriate political accountability or consent to a legal framework. 
The promise was essentially that the Fund would mobilise private capital inflows in return for 
9 Previously all states were subject to Fund discipline, all lent money to the common pool and expected to borrow. 
Since the 1970s the membership has split into lenders who are weakly disciplined by the Fund and borrowers who 
suffer more extensive interventions. 
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policy change in developing countries. For developed countries the bargain was one of providing 
accompanying financial assistance, in the form of loans to borrower countries, in return for a more 
stable environment for overseas trade and investment. At the same time, below the level of the 
state, the Fund's interventions were pushing in a more political direction in an attempt to secure 
programme implementation. 
The Asian crisis was significant because it provided new information about the nature of these 
bargains and triggered political opposition at both domestic and international levels. It raised a 
number of important questions and provided some empirical basis for the answers. 
What exactly did the Fund's new role, primarily involved with enhancing market confidence to 
`catalyse' finance, entail? Given the political impact of the new measures, was the Fund an 
appropriate institution to evaluate the balance between economic imperatives and their social and 
political effects? Was its technical judgement just that or was it in fact marred by political bias given 
the Fund's institutional makeup? Was its technical judgement, in any case, reliable? If the IMF was 
to be involved in a political agenda, shouldn't that agenda also include politically progressive 
measures? Essentially, what were the costs and benefits to states of the Fund's new role under 
capital account openness? 
Secondly, given the Fund's emergent contacts with civil society and increasing overlap between the 
role of the Fund and Bank, what exactly was the balance to be between different actors within the 
new multi-level framework of Fund governance? Who would be in charge in which circumstances 
(the Fund, the Bank, states, civil society (and which parts of it), the financial markets, bilateral 
lenders, powerful states? )? What would the political consequences of that be? In what 
circumstances would it trigger resistance and from whom? What does that suggest about the 
politics of Fund policy-making, the need for reform and the future prospects for Fund legitimacy? 
Chapters 4-8 explore the answers to these questions on the basis of a general overview (Chapter 4) 
and four case studies. The case studies are: two countries that accepted Fund programmes (Korea 
and Indonesia in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively); Malaysia (Chapter 7) which refused to go to the 
Fund, adopted an alternative strategy for crisis resolution based on capital controls, and raised very 
public challenges to Fund legitimacy; and the United States (Chapter 8) as the most powerful 
creditor country and the one in which debate was most heated and public. 
Chapter 9 draws together the implications of the case studies and relates them to the post crisis 
reform process so as to answer the three questions with which the thesis began. Chapter 10 
concludes by drawing together the most important lessons. 
I argue that the crisis threatened the Fund's pre-existing legitimacy claims because the operation of 
financial markets in Asia cast serious doubts over the argument that such flows were automatically 
welfare enhancing. If the claim that free capital markets enhanced global welfare was increasingly 
untenable, an IMF role conceived of as enhancing market confidence could no longer be seen as 
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politically neutral. That immediately raised wider issues about Fund authority over developing 
country states. 
The domestic politics of implementation also raised issues about the political nature of the Fund's 
institutional agenda for both state and non-state actors. Essentially civil society engagement was 
domestically popular to the extent that it helped to undermine authoritarianism and state 
intervention in the markets to assist powerful big business interests. However, the I AFs wish to 
replace that authoritarian system of political economy with a neoliberal minimal state was far less 
popular, though how much so depended on the social structure of the relevant society and the 
nature of pre-existing state intervention. 
The IMF's role, then was highly political at both domestic and international levels. The lack of 
clarity over the nature of civil society engagement and the interests that were in practice taken into 
account when formulating IMF programmes left the Fund's political authority looking decidedly 
inadequate. Blurred lines of accountability made it difficult for different actors to tell who the Fund 
was in fact listening to and on what basis it was making decisions. Worse still, civil society 
engagement, designed to enhance the prospects for implementation at a domestic level, threatened 
to undermine the IMF's legitimacy with states while the politics of implementation suggested that 
state cooperation was in fact the most crucial factor in securing programme implementation. In any 
case, civil society accommodation seemed to take place within relatively narrow boundaries 
determined by the Fund's wider institutional framework in which developed country finance 
ministries were dominant. Without reforming that framework there were limits to what could be 
achieved through more intensive political engagement at a domestic level 
Nonetheless because of the politics of the interests involved (which I unpack in more detail in 
Chapter 9), post-crisis reforms have continued to concentrate on enhancing the Fund's technical 
authority in the interests of securing continuing capital market openness. They have not addressed 
increasing uncertainty about the nature of the relationships between an expanding network of 
actors involved in Fund decision making. They also fail to deal with the need to reassert political 
control over the financial markets, at least in developing countries. 
I argue that this reflects a mismatch between the incentives that the Fund's institutional structures 
create for listening to different audiences and the audiences it needs to listen to if its role is to 
remain viable. Particularly problematic is the dominance of personnel from an economics 
background who are not intellectually well equipped to deal with the political problems that result. 
There is also a strong feeling that, pragmatically, trying to fundamentally renegotiate the political 
settlements involved will be too difficult. Reforms therefore tend to involve informal policy shifts, 
despite the fact that, based on my analysis, the fundamental problem with the Fund's institutional 
structures is too much informality and unclear (and inappropriate) lines of accountability. Political 
obstacles to change, though, are unlikely to be overcome without the impetus of more major crises 
or greater political unrest. 
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1.3 Scope and sources 
Having reviewed the broad outline of the thesis, I want to spend some time setting out how it fits 
with existing literature. I do not aim to conduct a full lterature review' as the pre-existing work is 
cited where appropriate in the course of the argument. However, it seems appropriate to provide 
some indication of what the thesis aims to achieve, what is covered elsewhere in the literature and 
what remains to be done. I will also use this section to provide an overview and justification of the 
sources I have used in the research the thesis draws on. 
Scope 
The thesis aims, primarily, to provide new insights into the politics of the IMF. There is already an 
extensive literature on the Asian crisis and, although my accounts of country experience pay more 
attention to the political aspects than much of the pre-existing work, I am not primarily interested 
in the crisis itself, I am more interested in what the crisis experience says about the nature of the 
IMF's role in middle-income countries at the turn of the millennium. 
It is important to note that the thesis concentrates on middle-income countries rather than aiming 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the Fund's role in developing countries. Issues surrounding 
the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) countries and the new PRGF (Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility) overlap at various points but, on the whole, are significantly different. Some of the 
scepticism that will emerge about the value of NGO participation, for instance, is less appropriate 
in the HIPC context. The power relationships between low-income countries and the Fund are 
also, sadly, likely to be even more problematic than those of relatively powerful middle-income 
countries such as those in Asia. 
Nonetheless, the paucity of existing literature on the politics of Fund policy-making means that the 
politics of relationships with middle-income countries already raise more than enough important 
issues for one thesis. 
there are remarkably few studies on the politics of Fund decision-making, perhaps because of the 
economic nature of the IMF's role. There are a wide range of excellent studies of the economics of 
conditionality (Edwards, 1989; Killick, 1984; Killick, 1995; Williamson, 1983). Some radical writers 
have pointed to the political effiels of Fund programmes (Kornen et ah., 1986; Pastor, 1987; Payer, 
1977). 
When it comes to the causal factors that influence Fund policy in developing countries the 
literature is much thinner and rarely cited. There are three important studies of the politics of 
conditionality negotiations (Bartilow, 1998; Martin, 1991; Stiles, 1991) but none of them address the 
Fund's new governance conditionality. When it comes to the overall shape of Fund policy, the 
Fund's official histories and other books published by the Fund are helpful (De Vries, 1976; De 
Vries, 1985; De Vries, 1987; Horsefield, 1969; James, 1996) but are obviously not written from a 
particularly critical point of view. Ferguson (1988) is good on the events of the 1970s but, by now, 
rather out of date. 
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In any case there is no study that attempts to link these two aspects together, showing how 
conditionality fits within a wider context of Fund policy and how that context, in turn, is affected 
by the experience of particular Fund programmes. 
Putting conditionality in the context of the Fund's wider role is important for two reasons. Firstly, 
that has always been the way the Fund has tried to justify it - conditionality is portrayed as a subset 
of the wider international obligations countries enter into when they join the institution. Secondly, 
looking simply at the negotiations involved in particular countries fails to emphasize the issues that 
are not up for negotiation - the wider system of obligations that are, to some extent, determined by 
the Fund's leading shareholders but that are kept off the conditionality agenda despite the way in 
which they provide the context in which conditionality can be justified as `technical'. Although I 
concentrate on relationships with developing countries, then, I do also briefly explore the kind of 
territory covered by Pauly's (1997) work on surveillance amongst industrial countries but again I do 
not aim to add anything to the existing literature on those issues. 
It is perhaps also important to note that the thesis does not aim to make any particular theoretical 
contribution to debates in the international relations literature. I sketched some of the relationships 
between my conception of legitimacy and pre-existing IR theory in section 1.1. 
A combination of expanding institutional mandates for the IFIs and the rise of an increasingly 
vocal antiglobalisation movement has made issues around the legitimacy of international 
organisations an increasingly prominent issue but literature around legitimacy is only beginning to 
emerge in IR (Coicaud & Heiskanen, 2001; Hurd, 1999). That is partly because of the dominance of 
rational choice theorising. If actors' preferences are immutable and largely outside the realm of 
enquiry, it is difficult to understand the importance of persuasion in a context of imperfect 
information. A thorough discussion of these issues would take me too far from my primary 
purpose and is best left for another context. 
In any case, one of the lessons I wish to draw from the thesis is the importance of particular and 
local factors for the kinds of economic issues the Fund is increasingly dealing with. IR theory is 
usually concerned with attempting to extract far more general laws of international behaviour and, 
to the extent that I think that is possible at all, I believe it would need to be done on the basis of a 
wider comparative study that would, again, dilute the messages that can be provided about the ITIF. 
Overall, then, the thesis aims to provide new insights about the politics of IMF policy-making in 
relation to middle-income countries. It does so through an examination of the threats to IMF 
legitimacy that resulted from the Asian crisis. That provides useful insights into how we should 
think about IMF reform in a way that pays appropriate attention not just to inter-state politics but 
also the politics of programme implementation and popular resistance, while acknowledging the 
limits that power relationships in the international system place on the prospects for radical change. 
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Sources 
Legitimacy is fundamentally a matter of public justification. That is particularly so for justifications 
directed at actors outside the Fund's institutions. Even within them, though, there are few 
opportunities for developed and developing countries to sit around a table and discuss strategic 
policy issues with each other in private: that is why there has been so much enthusiasm from those 
invited to become involved in the G20 process, despite its limitations (Mohammed, 2001b). The 
sheer number of actors involved in Board of Governors'10 meetings makes more intense 
communication difficult. The thesis therefore relies heavily on public documents: speeches, policy 
papers, public summaries of discussions and defences of positions published in the press or on the 
IMF website and these generally provide sufficient information for my purposes. The volume of 
such documents now published by the Fund is enormous making research much easier than it has 
been in the past. 
I also conducted a small number of interviews with Fund insiders in Washington DC in autumn 
2000. The interviews with developing country representatives were largely helpful in exploring the 
issues that weizn't raised in public debate for strategic reasons. I also spoke to Fund External Affairs 
to get a perspective on their broader communications strategy as opposed to positions on specific 
issues. On the whole, though, interviews did not provide a great deal of information that wasn't 
already publicly available and merely confirmed perspectives emerging from published documents. 
The case study chapters are primarily interested in the reception of Fund policies amongst 
outsiders: the non-financial arms of governments and wider society in both borrower and lender 
countries. Since I am concerned with `key audiences' - those that are able to influence the 
implementation of Fund programmes, the policy positions adopted by elites within the institution, 
or the prospects for continued financing - it is not necessary to have detailed information on every 
aspect of `public opinion'. Rather, what matters is the kind of opposition that features in public 
debate or is expressed in high profile civil unrest and protest. The case studies therefore rely on 
government speeches and extensive searches of the local and international English language press. 
In all three Asian case study countries, there are English language newspapers that are widely read 
by elites and policymakers. Their interpretation of events needs to be read with a certain amount of 
care, as does the international financial press. The Asian papers tend to be written for prosperous 
elite audiences. The Jakarta Post in particular is also seen as a `Christian' newspaper by many 
Indonesians. However, where the Asian popular press had significantly different views on issues 
these were usually referred to in the mainstream press, if only to provide a refutation. Any concern 
that my lack of linguistic competence has coloured the analysis can also be reduced by comparing 
my interpretations with an extensive secondary literature on each country written by authors 
without my linguistic handicaps. 
In Western countries, the perception of events as reported in newspapers such as the Financial 
Times, New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal is also, obviously written from a 
10 The Fund's highest decision-making body - see Figure 2-2 on page 25. 
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particular point of view. Nonetheless, it is often only the financial press that reports on events in 
Asia in any detail and these will be the sources that many policymakers use when formulating 
opinions on Fund policy". My principal lender country case study, the United States, as well as 
being the Fund's most influential shareholder, has a particularly open political system and 
transcripts of all Congressional committee meetings are available on Congressional websites. I make 
extensive use of these to analyse the debates that took place within US political institutions. I also 
interviewed key policymakers in Washington: Congressmen, Congressional staff and key NGO 
activists. 
The only real limitation to the research is a lack of detailed information on the positions of 
developing and developed country officials from countries not used as case studies. Here, of 
course, there are limits to how much any one study can do. The approach I adopt is to build on 
general accounts of the negotiation process provided by informed observers combined with an 
analysis of the kinds of factors that influenced opinion in my case study countries to get a general 
conception of the kinds of factors influencing differences of opinion. 
II That is certainly as far as legislatures are concerned. That was evident in the kinds of articles that Congressmen 
asked to have added to the record. It was also confirmed by interviews with Congressional staff and officials. Even 
figures in the Executive told me that they principally relied on media op-eds and journals like Foreign Policy and 
Foreign Affairs. 
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2 IMF legitimacy: core principles 
In the Introduction, I argued that we could only understand the implications of the Asian crisis for 
IMF legitimacy in the context of a broader understanding of the ways the IMF had attempted to 
establish its legitimacy in the past. In this Chapter, I will set out and analyse the logic of the IMPs 
original legitimacy claims on the basis of Beetham's account of the form that such claims usually 
take (see page 7 above). 
This original account is important because IMF speeches and documents continue to stress the 
continuity of the Fund's role over time. They argue that, although the institution has evolved, its 
core role has remained constant and the fundamental reasons why states should comply with Fund 
prescriptions remain unchanged. Whether that is an entirely defensible position is something I will 
debate throughout the rest of the thesis and particularly in Chapter 3. However, to anticipate a little, 
I will conclude that, since the IMF's institutions have remained largely unchanged over time, the 
fundamental logic of the IMFs early legitimacy claims remains relevant. Historical developments 
are important in changing the relationship between these institutional continuities and the Fund's 
contemporary role rather than in providing significantly novel forms of institutional justification. It 
is therefore important to investigate in some depth the precise nature of the Fund's original 
authority claims. 
I begin by setting out a brief overview of the Fund's legitimacy claims (section 2.1). This overview 
is based on IMF publications, speeches and web-based documents. It obviously provides a 
somewhat rose-tinted picture of the way the IMF operates. It would be unrealistic to expect actual 
performance to correspond precisely to the account set out by the Fund itself. However, that 
picture is important because it embodies a set of public criteria against which the Fund presumably 
expects to be judged. The degree to which practice diverges from that picture will be significant in 
indicating the potential for political opposition and dissent to emerge. As I explained in the 
introduction, legitimating arguments need to be broadly credible if they are to be effective. If an 
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institution can only justify itself using arguments that have lost all credibility it has significant 
legitimacy problems. Which issues will lead to political problems in practice is an empirical question 
discussed in the case studies but an analysis of the logic of such arguments will provide a starting 
point for an understanding of issues that are in fact raised in practice. 
The second part of the chapter (section 2.2) goes on to analyse the IMF account, exploring its logic 
and the boundaries that logic suggests to legitimate Fund action. I argued in the introduction that 
legitimating arguments needed to establish that the limits to freedom that an institution imposed 
were compensated for by the good it served; and that its legal structure and institutions should give 
relevant actors confidence that it would serve this purpose and no other. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 
look at the way these two arguments are made by the IMF. In the context of relationships between 
states, `freedom' is closely related to the idea of sovereignty and section 2.2.1 concentrates on the 
relationship between the IMF's role and ideas of state sovereignty. Section 2.2.2 then looks at the 
ways in which the IMF's institutional framework is used to ensure that restrictions on state action 
are justified on the basis of consent, technocratic authority, reciprocity and representation. 
Between them these sections provide a fuller explanation of the logic of the IMF's legitimating 
arguments and suggest some of their limits. In particular they stress that the IMP relies on a 
combination of technical authority and authority based on state consent. The overall legal 
framework within which the Fund operates is legitimated by state consent but, because of the 
nature of Executive Board decision-making, the discretion the Board exercises must rely heavily on 
technocratic authority. The balance between decisions made by the Board and those consented to 
by all states on the basis of equality is therefore highly significant. How appropriate that balance is 
will depend on the extent to which the kinds of decisions the Executive Board makes can be 
effectively justified in terms of technocratic economic calculation. 
Finally, in the light of that discussion of the relationship between role and institutions, I bring the 
abstract analysis of the majority of the chapter slightly closer to practical issues in section 2.3 by 
exploring the ways in which the formulation of conditionality (the central interest of the thesis) 
relates to the overall logic of Ib1F legitimacy claims. Here again the relationship between voluntary 
state acceptance of programmes and Executive Board veto is important for Fund legitimacy. 
2.1 The IMF's legitimacy claims: overview 
2.1.1 Purpose 
Fund staff argue that the IMF's role must be understood as part of the response to the breakdown 
of the inter-war Gold Standard and the Great Depression that followed. The key lesson learnt was 
that the maintenance of an open international economy required international cooperation around 
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an agreed code of economic conduct. When states had attempted to pursue their own economic 
interests at the expense of other states, the result was a breakdown of the international economic 
system that was beneficial to none. The core of the IMF's role was (and is) to provide a forum for 
that economic cooperation in the monetary sphere based around a code of conduct agreed by the 
membership. The system of free payments on current account that this cooperation would 
promote was a necessary adjunct to the system of free trade to be promoted by the Fund's sister 
organisation. 
This role is at the heart of the Fund's purposes. 
The IMF is primarily a surveillance institution, and its other activities derive their legitimacy 
from the surveillance mandate laid out in the Articles of Agreement (Guitian, 1992,12). 
Its central role is to watch over the economies of its members to ensure that their economic 
policies conform to the code of conduct. Its unique role is as the only institution with a (more or 
less) universal membership that can impress on member states the interests of the global economic 
community as a whole in monetary matters (Guitian, 1992). 
If one of the lessons of the Great Depression was that cooperation was required to prevent system 
breakdown, another came from the causes of that system breakdown. The Fund's architects 
realised that there were risks attached to the maintenance of an open economy. The temptations to 
resort to protectionist and beggar-thy-neighbour policies were particularly acute for countries 
forced to pursue deflationary policies to adjust to balance of payments deficits. Surveillance would 
reduce the risks to some extent but a crucial part of the Fund's purposes was to provide greater 
incentives for maintaining a system of current account openness. 
Part of the solution was to allow greater exchange rate flexibility under IMF supervision so that 
adjustment could take place partly by devaluation rather than deflation. The other part was to: 
give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available 
to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity IMFArticles ofAgreement (Art 1 (vl)) 
' There are a number of 'lessons' from the Great Depression referred to in this section. There is still considerable 
dispute over the causes of the Depression (compare Freidman & Schwartz, 1963; I(indleberger, 1973; Temin, 
1989 and Eichengreen, 1992). However, with the exception of the dangers of speculative capital flows (Freidman & 
Schwartz, 1963) there is broad acceptance of the major 'lessons' which appear in IMF accounts. On the need for 
economic cooperation see (Eichengreen, 1998). On the unacceptable costs of adjustment under the Gold Standard 
see (Ruggie, 1983) and (Dell, 1981). Burley (1993) is also interesting on the idea that the Bretton Woods 
institutions were an attempt to project the New Deal into the international sphere. 
2 Initially intended to be the stillborn ITO (see (Gardner, 1980)) but in practice the GATT and now the WTO 
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The IMF would provide finance as a sort of insurance policy for members so that they would 
maintain an open current account3 in `normal' times in the knowledge that they could borrow funds 
to ease adjustment to any balance of payments deficits that might arise. 
However, these funds were designed for a specific purpose and came from resources that belonged 
to the membership as a whole. Once money had been lent, other members needed assurances that 
it would be repaid relatively quickly in case they needed it. Fiore importantly, the resources should 
be used in accordance with the provisions of the Articles of Agreement (Art V s. 3a) and 'without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity'. To ensure that these 
conditions are fulfilled, it is a legitimate part of the Fund's purpose to attach conditions to its 
lending, particularly as those conditions would merely be a statement of the policies which a deficit 
country would need to adopt in any case. 
In other words, surveillance conditionality and financing are all interrelated parts of the Fund's 
overall purpose of enforcing the code of conduct (see Figure 2-1 for a diagrammatic 
representation). All members are obliged to observe the code of conduct and this obligation is 
enforced by the surveillance function. 
Surveillance should minimize the occurrence of disequilibria. However, even effective surveillance 
will be unable to prevent the occasional need to adjust Deficit states will need to adjust in ways that 
do not breach the code of conduct (hence conditionality) but are provided with finance to assist 
them in doing so. 
2.1.2 Procedure and authority 
Now that we have a picture of the tasks that the Fund is supposed to perform we are in a position 
to examine the way it operates. It should be possible to show that it is qualified to perform those 
tasks; that there are procedures in place to ensure that it does not use its power to pursue other 
purposes; and that it performs them in an appropriate fashion. 
There are three overlapping types of justification that appear in Fund accounts. The first is a claim 
to be predominantly a technocratic economic institution making impartial decisions on the basis of 
economic expertise. The second is the legal one that Fund activities are carried out in accordance 
with the Articles of Agreement and are governed by the rule of law. The third is a broader claim 
that the Fund is a representative institution ultimately controlled by the wishes of its member 
governments. 
The general principles and the parts of the code of conduct contained in the Articles of Agreement 
are primarily justified on the basis of consent and the rule of law. They have been accepted by the 
3 It is important to note that there was never any similar obligation for capital account transactions and, indeed, the 
IMF was designed with the idea that capital controls were a necessary and desirable feature of the international 
economy. As we will see in chapter 3, this assumption has subsequently changed significantly. 
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Figure 2-1: The IMF's role 
membership on joining the IMF which is a voluntary act making them a legitimate part of 
international law. They also provide a set of rules that are equally binding on all member states and 
are applied uniformly to those states. Fiore fundamentally, they are rational technical principles that 
will ensure the efficient functioning of the global economy, which explains states' willingness to 
sign up to them in the first place. 
Amendments to the code of conduct, decisions on general policy, and general oversight of the 
IMF's operations are then justified by the fact that they take place within that legal framework, are 
largely technical decisions and are overseen by representative institutions: 
Far from being dictated to by the IMF, the membership itself dictates to the IMF the policies it 
will follow. The chain of command runs dearly from the governments of member countries to 
the IMF..... the IMF acts... as an intermediary between the will of the majority of the 
membership and the individual member country (Driscoll, 1998) 
There are two representative structures within the IMF (see Figure 2-2). The most senior body is 
the Board of Governors, made up of representatives (usually the minister of finance or central bank 
governor) from each of the Fund's member countries. The Board is advised by the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (a smaller group of 24 ministers - one representative for each 
Executive Director) and the Development Committee (which has similar membership, advises on 
developing country issues and is a joint committee with the World Bank). 
The Board of Governors hold annual meetings in which they exercise oversight of Fund policy at a 
very general level. The advisory committees are essentially a response to the difficulty of carrying 
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out meaningful discussion in a body with 192 members such as the Board. Most discussion takes 
place within the IMFC and IMFC proposals are rarely significantly modified by the Board of 
Governors 
Day to day monitoring and immediate policy decisions are then delegated to the Executive Board 
consisting of 24 Executive Directors. The Fund's five largest shareholders (the US, Germany. 
Japan, UK and France) have an Executive Director each. Another three Executive Directors 
represent individual countries on a rotating basis (currently China, Russia and Saudi Arabia) while 
the remainder of the Executive Directors are `elected' by a group of countries. Countries are 
grouped broadly by geographical region. The arrangements for selecting representatives vary 
between different groups. In some, one country is clearly more powerful than the others and always 
appoints the Executive Director, while in others appointments rotate. The existence of Alternate 
Executive Directors and support staff facilitates the representation of a broader range of countries. 
Executive Directors are all drawn from financial ministries or central banks providing them with 
technical authority based on their expertise in economics. Part of their role is to represent their 
constituent governments but they are also officers of the Fund and paid from Fund resources 
helping them to take an objective view of the global economic welfare. 
The Board is headed by a Managing Director who does not represent any particular country and is 
chosen by the Board from outside the IMF. Traditionally, the Managing Director has always been a 
European and his Deputy an American though there are no clear legal guidelines for the selection 
of either. The Managing Director, in consultation with the Executive Board, is responsible for 
appointing the staff who are drawn from as wide a range of countries as possible. Although the 
Managing Director has no vote in Board meetings (except in the event of deadlock) his 
chairmanship of the Executive Board and responsibility for the staff makes the role an influential 
one. 
Where voting takes place in the Boards, votes are allocated in proportion to the amount that each 
country contributes to the Fund (its `quota). These quotas, in turn, are determined by a complex 
formula intended to represent a country's significance in the global economys. This system of 
voting is appropriate, it is argued, since it means that those countries that contribute most to the 
institution and which have the greatest responsibilities for the maintenance of global monetary 
stability also have the most control. These responsibilities are demonstrated in the practice of 
surveillance where smaller countries' policies are merely required to be compatible with global 
economic conditions while larger countries are also required to take account of the effect their 
policies will have on the system as a whole (Guitian, 1992). 
In any case most decisions in practice are made by consensus and votes are rarely counted (Driscoll, 
1998). The Secretary keeps a running tally of the `sense of the meeting' and a vote is only called 
where the outcome is uncertain. 
4 Lister (1984) and author interviews with developing country Exeoitive Board members. 
S For discussions see (IMF, 2000c Lister, 1984; Mikesell, 1994) 
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The task of applying the code of conduct in the context of the Fund's surveillance and conditional 
lending activities falls to the staff in collaboration with key officials of the member government 
concerned. The IMF likes to claim that the measures incorporated in the letter of intent6 are 
chosen by the government concerned (Driscoll, 1998). The staff's job is to assist in their selection 
and to make a judgement as to whether they will produce a satisfactory adjustment within the time 
scale allowed for the programme. 
The Fund is keen to emphasize that the vast majority of decisions are purely technical ones 
appropriately dealt with by the highly qualified Fund staff (Polak, 1991; Southard, 1979). Where 
there is a need to make judgements, the staff are guided by the principle of equal treatment given 
the circumstances of the country concerned. 
The Executive Board closely monitors staff decisions and Executive Board reviews of previous 
programmes form an important body of precedent. Once programmes have been formulated by a 
6A document, signed by appropriate domestic authorities, outlining the policies that will be adopted in exchange 
for funding 
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staff mission sent to the country concerned, they are moderated against other programmes by the 
Policy Development and Review Department for equality and consistency. They are then submitted 
via the Managing Director to the Executive Board for approval The Executive Board almost 
always agrees programmes since it would be impractical for a staff mission to return to a country to 
re-negotiate conditions. However, if the Board is unhappy about a programme it will attach a 
memorandum to a letter of intent to that effect for the staff's future guidance (Stiles, 1991). 
The overall picture is one of a technocratic institution operating within a broad legal framework set 
out (quasi) democratically by its membership. Within these broad parameters, surveillance and the 
determination of conditionality are largely technical exercises. They are therefore entrusted to a 
technically qualified staff of experts. General oversight is provided by export accountability to the 
Executive Board. 
2.1.3 Legality 
IMF business is regulated by the Articles of Agreement. All countries consent to their terms when 
they agree to join the institution. Membership is voluntary and countries are free to leave at any 
time. The Articles set out members' central obligations, the purposes of the IMF and the 
procedures and practices for decision-making within the organisation. Additional rules and 
guidelines can be formulated over time through decisions of the Executive Board and Board of 
Governors. The legal framework leaves considerable room for discretion but this is necessary given 
the complexity of the economic issues involved and the importance of tailoring policy to the 
specific circumstances of the countries concerned (Guitian, 1992). 
2.1.4 Consent 
Consent to the general authority of the IMF is demonstrated by agreeing to the Articles of 
Agreement on membership. Specific IMF programmes are also voluntary undertakings and 
governments sign the documents required to enter into conditional funding agreements - 
sometimes at public ceremonies. Annual meetings of the Board of Governors provide further 
opportunities to emphasize broad acceptance of IMF policy. 
2.2 Analysis 
How convincing is this account of IMF legitimacy? Ultimately, that is a question that can only be 
answered for particular audiences at particular times in particular places. Anything like a definitive 
answer will have to wait until the end of the thesis. However, I argued that, to acknowledge the 
particularity of legitimacy is not to divorce it entirely from reason. Broad credibility can be assessed 
by examining the logical strengths and weaknesses of the claims made, even if final judgements 
need to be made in the light of more empirical evidence. 
This section will therefore explore the logic of the IMFs authority claims at quite a fundamental 
level Understanding how those claims actually work will also clarify their limitations giving us the 
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underlying logical basis for later debates about IMF legitimacy in more specific contexts. It will help 
us to see what it would be necessary to believe in order to find the IMF legitimate and therefore to 
understand some of the reasons behind dissent when we move towards more practical 
considerations in the rest of the thesis. 
As I showed in my discussion of legitimacy and power in Chapter 1, the essence of legitimacy 
arguments is the relationship between the role institutional power claims to serve and the nature of 
the restraints and safeguards in place to ensure that it does so. The analysis begins with an 
investigation of the relationship between the goals the IMF claims to serve and the restrictions it 
imposes on state freedom. These kinds of arguments are usually made in relation to the idea of 
sovereignty and the analysis follows that pattern, beginning with a discussion of the concept of 
sovereignty itself. Section 2.2.2 goes on to explore the adequacy of the procedures and authority 
structures that the IMF claims ensure it does operate in accordance with those purposes. 
2.2.1 IMF power and purpose: sovereignty and counterfactuals 
In the international realm, a state's freedom of action is traditionally referred to as its sovereignty. 
At its most fundamental, this is a claim that there should be one final site of political decision 
making for each territorial unit - the state. That state should therefore have exclusive jurisdiction 
over domestic matters and be entitled to act as the sole international representative of its citizens. 
Unfortunately, sovereignty is a complex concept and the word is often used for different purposes 
by different authors. For my purposes, it is important to distinguish between a state's legal 
sovereignty (the issues over which it could technically legislate without international interference) 
and its practical efficacy (the goals that it could realistically expect to achieve). It is also important 
to try and make a distinction between issues that are prima facie domestic - and therefore fall within 
a state's exclusive jurisdiction unless it negotiates an agreement that says otherwise - and those 
which are always international and therefore can only be regulated by agreements between states. 
I wish to argue that, in terms of my broad conception of legitimacy, it is important to understand 
what a state has given up by agreeing to be a member of the IMF. That involves identifying its prima 
facie legal sovereignty and its likely practical efficacy in the event that it had retained that prima facie 
sovereignty. 
These are in fact difficult tasks because there is no obvious counterfactual situation to use as a 
comparison. Nonetheless, this section looks at the historical evidence of the 1890s and 1930s to 
provide some idea of the relationship between the IMF's purposes and the likely consequences of a 
laissez faire attitude to international monetary policy. It concludes that states have agreed to place 
greater restrictions on their legal jurisdictions than they did in the past but that the differences are 
less obvious in terms of their practical efficacy. The IMF's purpose is potentially justifiable but the 
way in which it actually carries out its functions will determine whether it turns out to be legitimate 
in practice. 
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Sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty was developed gradually as part of a process of social and political 
change in early modem Europe. It involved a concentration of political power at the level of the 
territorial state, against the power of aristocracy below the level of the state and against the power 
of the Church and Holy Roman Empire above the level of the state (Hinsley, 1986; Spruyt, 1994). 
At the domestic level, this concentration of power was always justified on the basis that there was a 
need for a single institution that could act as the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts within a 
particular territory and which was endowed with the coercive resources to enforce those 
judgements (Hinsley, 1986; Hobbes, 1991). It was essential if the state was to be able to provide the 
security that its subjects expected of it (Bodin, 1606; Hobbes, 1991) 
At the same time, both the logic of the justification for unified domestic sovereignty (Hinsley, 
1986), and the practical advent of increasingly frequent interactions between states (Spruyt, 1994; 
Thomson, 1994) required some recognition of the claims and interests of other sovereign states. 
While claims to domestic power implied a narrow striving to maximise a state's freedom of action 
on behalf of the interests of its citizens, the imperatives of an increasingly international world 
trading system required compromise with other states in the interests of mutual security (Thomson, 
1994) or prosperity (Spruyt, 1994). In particular (given the potential for the spread of religious 
conflict through Europe) states agreed that they would negotiate international agreements with each 
other without becoming involved in each other's domestic affairs. 
Of course, the concept of sovereignty has not stood still since then in either its domestic or 
international manifestations. Internationally, the qualifications for sovereign recognition have varied 
over time. In the present context it is significant that the formation of the IMF coincided with an 
unprecedentedly generous definition. Not only were no questions asked about a state's positive 
ability to govern and defend its population, but additionally there was (only partly successful) 
pressure to extend states' formal equality (in the sense that they had to deal with each other and 
were free to contract with each other without being formally subject to any higher authority) to a 
more substantive equality under which states had a right to equal representation in international 
fora (Hinsley, 1986; Jackson, 1990). To some extent, the maintenance of the sovereignty regime has 
always been a collective project by states to enhance their internal and external power through 
international support. However, the post-war multilateral institutions with their legal structures, 
formal procedures and recognition of all states took this process to another lever. 
Domestically, the principle debates have concerned the related questions of the extent to which 
sovereignty must be constituted as popular sovereignty and of the legal limits that might need to be 
placed on sovereign power. Although the idea of popular sovereignty is theoretically accepted 
almost everywhere, in practice it is ultimately incompatible with the idea of a need for a final arbiter 
On the novelty of the post war institutions see (Reggie, 1993) and particularly (Burley, 1993) 
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that forms such an important part of the concept of sovereignty8. For liberals popular sovereignty 
also threatens the wish to protect private property from the reach of the state. Popular sovereignty 
has therefore tended to be diluted by the introduction of representative institutions and the 
maintenance of a sovereign state, albeit one that is subject to some form of popular control State 
power, even when subjected to popular control, has tended to be subjected to the rule of law and to 
various kinds of constitutional limitation to avoid the tyranny of the majority. 
Although this thesis is largely about international relations, the domestic debate is important 
because, with the advent of popular sovereignty, one of the key claims to the right to sovereign self- 
determination springs from the republican or perhaps communitarian idea that the sovereign state 
articulates the will of a particular community with its own right to self-determination. Particularly 
since the Enlightenment, there has been distinct scepticism about the ability to articulate any 
absolute conception of the human good leaving most questions of appropriate `ends' to be decided 
through debate, compromise, and political struggle within particular communities. Indeed liberal 
attempts to put constitutional limits on state power are precisely designed to limit the kinds of ends 
that the state might attempt to aim at. The authority for such goods as are articulated is then based 
on their articulation by the sovereign power at the end of such debates and struggles - their status 
as the outcome of political struggle within a community, a nation state. This kind of authority claim 
therefore adds additional weight to the claim to sovereign autonomy, something that needs to be 
overcome if an international institution is to successfully claim authority over such a collectivity9. 
Nonetheless, none of that subsequent debate alters the fundamental conclusion that state 
sovereignty is based on the mutually accepted principle that, for reasons of national and 
international security and prosperity, there must be one final arbiter of political conflicts within 
each territory. It involves asserting: 
1. a claim to be the single representative of a subject population authorised to negotiate 
international agreements on their behalf; and 
2. a claim to a right to non-interference in domestic affairs except with sovereign consent in 
return for extending the same courtesy to other states. 
8I do not wish to imply that Hobbes' theory, for example, is incompatible with democracy. There is no reason why 
Hobbes' sovereign should not be democratically accountable (although that might be problematic given Hobbes' 
epistemological convictions). The point I am making is that, in the absence of universal agreement, there is a need 
for some procedure for making a final decision between competing interests and points of view. The problem is 
most obvious for theories like Rousseau's that conceive of a 'collective will'. Representative institutions and a 
modem bureaucracy are the common contemporary solution to this problem. 
9 This discussion is fairly condensed but I hope not particularly controversial. On the idea that goods are defined by 
and within a particular context see for example(Maclntyre, 1985), though of course Maclntyre is no great supporter 
of the 'compromise' and 'political struggle' that tend to be involved in determining the 'good' in contemporary 
societies. A similar position underlies a range of modem ethical theory based around the idea of some form of 
idealised human agreement as the basis of ethics (Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1972) though other authors (notably 
Habermas) are more optimistic than me about the scale over which this sort of inclusive dialogue might take place. 
My account of the relationship between sovereignty, popular sovereignty and constitutionalism is based largely on 
(Hinsley, 1986,144-157) and (Fontana, 1994). The point about the influence of popular sovereignty on 
international authority is my own - for support see the discussion in Chapter 3 (see also Woods, 1999). 
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Economics and the national/international boundary 
This is still the basic principle enshrined in international law. 
The principal corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states are (1) a jurisdiction, p, imaBuis 
exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there, (2) a duty of non- 
intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; (3) the dependence of 
obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor (Bro i lie, 
1998,289) 
Of course, in practice the principle of non-interference has always been something of an uneasy 
compromise. As realist writers are keen to remind us, states are far from equal in terms of material 
and ideological resources. There is no overarching authority to enforce compliance with such 
principles and they are sometimes breached (Krasner, 2000). However, breaches occur against a 
background of general compliance (Hurd, 1999) and the basic principles of international law are at 
least universally acknowledged'O. 
In any case the principle itself is quite limited. States have a primafade exclusive jurisdiction in the 
domestic realm but the actual boundaries of this 'reserved domain' are constantly being re-written 
by international law. For international lawyers, the reserved domain is simply 
the domain of state activities where the jurisdiction of the state is not bound by international 
law and varies according to its development (Brownlie, 1998) 
Indeed, if we were interested in IMF legitimacy from a purely legal point of view this legal 
demarcation of jurisdictional boundaries would be sufficient. It would be clear that IMF power was 
unproblematic because both IMF membership and the acceptance of conditional finance are, as we 
have seen, voluntary activities. They are legal agreements ratified by the consent of sovereign states. 
However, given that my conception of legitimacy is broader than that and is concerned, ith the 
ways in which rules can bejurtified, we need to look a little deeper. It is obviously important that 
states can decide to limit their own freedom of action in the interests of a broader good. So the 
international court of justice 
declines to see, in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or 
refrain from performing a particular act, an abandonment of its sovereignty... the right of 
entering into international engagements is an attribute of sovereignty (the Wv vbkdox (1923) PCQJ 
SerA VoLl, 25 cited in Brownlie, 1998,290 - emphasis added) 
What is important is to establish what exactly has been given up and what has been gained when 
they decide to do so. 
10 Realist writers are keen to stress the disadvantages of the sovereignty regime in restricting states' foreign policy 
freedom. Other writers have pointed to the advantages. To the extent that a system of sovereign states becomes 
institutionalised, demonstration effects and mutual recognition can boost states' domestic legitimacy (Beet am, 
1991; Jackson, 1990). More importantly for strong states, there are dear advantages in the existence of a single 
entity capable of contracting and treaty making on behalf of the population of a given territory - as demonstrated by the difficulties in making meaningful trade arrangements with the Hansa league (Spruyt, 1994). The system can 
also facilitate arrangements for the maintenance of international security (eg. Eliminating maritime piracy Thomson, 
1994). 
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The arguments then are still ultimately about the extent to which the restrictions imposed on states' 
freedom of action by the IMF are justified in the interests of serving its wider purpose. The point 
about raising these issues as questions about roveneignty though is to make a point about the extent of 
those restrictions. It is to assert the principle that decisions made at the level of the sovereign state 
are fundamental, for the reasons I discussed in the conceptual section above. The benchmark 
position is a state's exclusive jurisdiction over its domestic affairs. Any modification of this 
jurisdiction is something that must be negotiated - it cannot legally be taken away by force and the 
assumption in the event of doubt is that an agreement does not do so (Brownlie, 1998). Since 
macroeconomic issues are (so the argument goes) domestic issues, the point of comparison for the 
relative benefits of institutional membership becomes that of a nation state free to make its own 
decisions and the MMF's mandate must be interpreted so as to minimize derogation from this 
principle. 
Apart from the importance of the fact that states can be seen to consent to IMF authority (see p36 
below), there are two principle lines of attack on this argument about sovereignty both of which in 
fact have similar implications. The first is to question the extent to which macroeconomic policies 
really are domestic policies (and therefore prima facie immune from international regulation). The 
second is to point out that any reasonable assessment of what is being given up by this 
abandonment of sovereignty (if such it is) must also take into account the full consequences of each 
state's wish to continue to order its macroeconomic affairs as it sees fit. Effectively both claims 
revolve around the importance of identifying the correct counterfactual to acceptance of IMF 
authority and compliance with its prescriptions - the implication being that the INT's intrusions are 
inevitable in the face of states' commitments to mutual prosperity. 
Sovrnignty and the monetary ystem before the IMF 
Appropriate counterfactuals are notoriously difficult to identify and are always ultimately a matter 
of contestable judgement (Hawthorn, 1991). However, the obvious place to look for what evidence 
does exist is the history of the pre-war global economy, particularly as we are invited to do so by 
the IhiF's own legitimating account that focuses on the experience of the Great Depression. 
On the one hand, it is clear that macroeconomic policy did historically fall within the formal 
domestic legal jurisdiction of sovereign states. The Gold Standard system that emerged in the 1870s 
was the outcome of the individual choices of a series of different governments - albeit to a greater 
or lesser degree under the influence of British financial hegemony" 
That is not to say that there wasn't a high level of informal international coordination and even 
cooperation. Central Banks tended to follow the lead of the Bank of England in setting overall 
levels of discount rates (and therefore economic activity). In times of crisis central banks were even 
willing to lend reserves to their international counterparts. However, there were no international 
agreements institutionalising a requirement for them to do so. 
II Except where indicated otherwise, this section relies heavily on (Eichengreen, 1998) 
32 Core Principles 
On the other hand it was a system built on a strong political eommitment12. 'Ihis was particularly 
clearly demonstrated in the inter-war years when commitment began to break down. It was a 
commitment to the importance of currency stability over the importance of domestic economic 
growth or unemployment, at least in the final instance. In a sense it was an internationalist 
commitment (in that it valued international economic relations over domestic considerations). 
More importantly, it reflected the lack of representation of the working classes that existed before 
the extension of suffrage and growth of labour parties in the early 201b century'3 (Ruggie, 1983). 
The economic instability of the interwar years was, of course, driven by a complex range of factors 
that are still not well understood. A key part of the breakdown, however, was a growing feeling that 
governments could not be absolutely relied upon to put the goal of exchange rate stability above all 
others. In the past, when countries appeared to be suffering from balance of payments problems, 
finance would flow in anticipating the inevitable rise in central bank discount rates thereby 
moderating the need for such rises. A combination of floating exchange rates, greater financial 
speculation and greater uncertainty over the adjustment process as a result of political pressure 
undermined this mechanism and made adjustment considerably more difficult'4. 
The unsatisfactory nature of 1920s attempts at floating exchange rates led to a reestablishment of 
the Gold Standard in the 1930s. The underlying political problem remained though and the 
international cooperation that everyone knew was required to resolve it was not forthcoming 
(Eichengreen, 1998; Pauly, 1997). The growth in US bond lending staved off the inevitable 
problems caused by trade imbalances between the US and a war torn Europe (aggravated by US 
protectionism) but only until the Fed moved to raise domestic interest rates in an attempt to burst a 
growing US stock market bubble in 1928. As capital was withdrawn and countries began to go into 
recession they resorted to trade and exchange controls and competitive devaluations in desperate 
attempts to preserve their own economics. The result was the Great Depression. 
For defenders of the IMF the point is clear. The maintenance of a functioning international 
economy has always relied on international political coordination - either explicit or implicit. The 
lesson of the Great Depression was that, once the international political commitment to currency 
stability over domestic politics had evaporated, the growing complexity of the compromises 
involved in the maintenance of a global monetary system required some kind of institutionalised 
cooperation to reduce the risk of another system breakdown (Ruggie, 1983). 
Although it may have been possible to run the system without any restrictions on nominal 
sovereignty during the Gold Standard period, that was only because, in practice, states could be 
12 Contrary to the nostalgia that some liberals still feel for what they believe was a golden age characterised by an 
apolitical, 'natural' self-regulating global economy. 
13 And perhaps the lack of any formal economic theory finking deflation with unemployment (Ei hengreen, 1998) 
(though the absence of such a theory was probably not unrelated to the limited political influence of the working 
dass). 
"Whether the blame should He with speculators (Nurske, 1944) or with governments for providing them with 
opportunities (Freidman, 1953) remains a matter of dispute 
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relied upon to restrict themselves to particular kinds of action. They were politically committed to 
deflationary adjustment. Once this ceased to be the case, there was no real choice but to 
institutionalise new commitments moderated to reflect the new political reality. 
Developing counlriu, acliustment and debt 
While this is the standard story about the operation of the Gold Standard prior to the Great 
Depression, it is based very largely on the experience of countries at the centre of the system in 
Western Europe and to a lesser extent the United States. Independent countries at the periphery - 
particularly those in Latin Americas - never benefited from Gold Standard international 
cooperation or the `automatic' adjustment system. 
Robert Triffin argues that adjustment in Europe in fact took place to a large degree through 
adjustments in capital flows from the centre to the periphery rather than through adjustments in 
national prices and wages. Central bank discount rate changes in Europe could have significant 
effects on these flows but capital importing countries had far less control and therefore found 
adjustment more difficult. They tended to experience pro-cyclical flows that would boom when 
European economies were strong (and export prices high) and dry up when export prices fell as 
growth slowed in Europe and capital was repatriated. 
The nineteenth century monetary mechanism succeeded, to a unique degree, in preserving 
exchange rate stability... over a large part of the world. This success, however, was limited to 
the more advanced countries ... The exchange rates of other countries... fluctuated widely, and 
depreciated enormously over the period. This contrast between the "core" countries and those 
of the "periphery" can be largely explained by the cyclical pattern of capital movements and 
terms of trade, which contributed to stability in the first group, and to instability in the second. 
(Triffin, 1964,9). 
This relationship helps to explain the fact that, although adjustment under the Gold Standard was 
theoretically deflationary, it was only after the collapse of the Gold Standard in the 1920s that 
significant wage and price declines actually took place in developed countries (Triffin, 1964, p4). 
How were the periodic crises that resulted in developing countries dealt with? The answer 
depended on the size and cause of the debt crisis; the strategic position of the debtor country; the 
type of finance involved and the broader macroeconomic environment of the time. 
At the most notorious extreme were late 19th century British interventions in Egypt and Turkey 
where debt problems were used as an excuse for virtual colonisation but these are very much the 
exception rather than the rule16. 
Overt intervention was largely unnecessary. It was reserved for the subset of cases where 
political motives dominated, providing less of a cause than a pretext. Intervention was refused 
too frequently on exclusively economic grounds to argue otherwise' (Fishlow, 1985) 
Is Conditions in the colonies were different again with domestic monetary policy often directly subordinated to the 
interests of the colonial monetary authorities - see particularly (De Cecco, 1974). I concentrate on Latin America 
here because the analogies with 'independent' developing countries today are dearly closer. 
16 Upson, in similar vein, argues that gunboat diplomacy in Latin America was usually in response to some more 
serious issue such as breaches of international law in the way that creditors were treated (Upson, 1989) 
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As Palmerston put in the 1840s 
the British Government has considered that losses of imprudent men who have placed 
mistaken faith in the good faith of foreign Governments would prove a salutary warning to 
others (Lipson, 1989,195) 
More often, sovereign debt was dealt with as an issue between a state and its private creditors. For 
what Fishlow describes as `developmental defaulters' - countries experiencing a temporary liquidity 
crisis in the context of a trend of expanding exports - the resulting settlements often involved a 
combination of temporary interest reduction combined with conditionality (Fishlow, 1985). In the 
more severe cases, that might include the hypothecation of government revenues. Nonetheless, on 
the whole continually expanding export markets, explicit sharing of burdens with creditors, the 
likelihood of a swift return to market access, and a political consensus that satisfaction of debts was 
a necessity tended to ensure that countries were willing to settle for these terms (Fishlow, 1989). 
Rather than being mediated by an international institution, issuing banks often acted as 
intermediaries between borrowers and bond-holders. Since they were not holders of the debt they 
were in a relatively neutral position with an interest in pleasing both sides so as to promote future 
business in a relatively uncompetitive market (Fishlow, 1985). 
For a minority of `revenue defaulters', governments that had largely used up loans on consumption 
and were essentially insolvent, penalties were much harsher. Negotiation was more difficult, more 
likely to be political, and could result in ceding significant national assets. However, even these 
settlements were usually coupled with significant debt write-downs. 
In the 1930s, the situation was rather different The generalised collapse of the global economy and 
the closure of US markets to imports from debtor countries made debt crises far more difficult to 
deal with provoking far more widespread defaults and economic autarchy. Debt negotiations often 
resulted in long periods of uncertainty for borrowers but default was much easier, write-downs 
were large and, after the war debts were often simply written off (Jorgensen & Sachs, 1989). 
It is difficult to come to easy generalisations as to the treatment of debt problems prior to the 
creation of the IMF since the general economic climate, the type of debt, and the political nature of 
the relationships involved all had an influence. ''hat is dear though is that the decision was (almost 
always) made by a free sovereign state on the basis of its preferred relationships to creditors and the 
financial markets at large rather than in relation to any set of politically agreed rules or negotiations 
between states. 
Conclusions 
In legal terms it is clear that countries retained a broader jurisdiction over their monetary affairs 
before the IMF was created. On the other hand, the imperatives of the global economy still placed 
considerable restrictions on what they were able to do in practice. 
The IMMF was created largely in response to a political change in which industrial country 
governments began to play i more ambitious role in economic regulation in ways that complicated 
international economic cooperation. It was designed to support those more ambitious. socially 
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directed state interventions in the economy by instituting some political control over international 
financial markets. 
Developing countries always had less control over their economic environment and were subject to 
greater restrictions. In particular they were unable to avoid periodic defaults involving painful 
economic retrenchment or negotiation with external creditors. The choices they made, though, 
were dearly choices about their desired continuing relationship with external capital markets 
weighted against various kinds of domestic cost. The relationships were by and large with the 
international economy and private markets rather than with other states. 
Again the picture is one of little inter-government interference in the workings of the market and 
therefore a wide conception of sovereignty. On the other hand, there was only very limited real 
freedom of government action and the overall position was far from satisfactory. 
The ID IF has institutionalised what were previously haphazard relati onships. In a sense, at least in 
developed countries, this is a response to efforts to increase government power over the economy, 
broadening the scope of domestic sovereignty in response to growing demands on state 
performance pressed from below. However, this could only be achieved through a cooperative 
effort: by pooling sovereignty in an international context. 
What the effects of this have been on individual governments cannot be determined without a far 
more detailed investigation of the IMF's exact powers and their effects on different countries in 
different contexts. Generally, though, it is difficult to argue that states have collectively become less 
powerful as a result of the creation of the IMF. The degree of institutionalisation of the 
arrangements set up at the end of the Second World War, with their clearly defined multilateral 
legal obligations and guarantees of representation for new nations reflected a new respect for the 
sovereignty of weaker states a ackson, 1990) and were a new departure in international regulation 
(Burley, 1993) (Ruggie, 1993). Nonetheless, as we have already seen, although there was respect for 
sovereign equality (reflected particularly in the fact that 14% of the votes in the IMF were 
distributed equally amongst member countries before quotas came into play) it was tempered by 
considerations of differential national power. 
There remains, therefore, considerable room to question the extent to which particular restrictions 
on the actions of individual states are in fact necessary to accomplish the IMF's general purpose. The 
issue is not whether states could control their economic environment without some kind of 
international agreement, it is about the extent to which the agreement that does exist provides them 
with a good deal relative to possible alternatives. The historical practices reviewed in this section 
give some idea of what those alternatives might be and therefore provide important background for 
the rest of this chapter and Chapter 3. At the same time, the world is simply different now and any 
assessment of their relevance will have to take account of these changes. 
I will return to the question of sovereignty in Chapter 3 and Chapter 9, in the meantime I will move 
on to a review of the way the IMF does in fact operate and particularly the safeguards that are in 
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place to ensure that it provides states with the maximum economic benefits at a minimum 
economic and political cost. 
2.2.2 Institutions and authority 
In the previous section, I argued that there was a strong argument for some kind of institution to 
provide a forum for the international monetary co-operation that the IRIF regards as its principal 
purpose. The question that remains is whether the institution that has been created embodies rules 
and decision-making procedures that are appropriate to ensure that it does in fact serve this 
purpose and no other. Do the IMMFs decision-making bodies have sufficient authority to give 
member states confidence that the institution does indeed serve their common interests? Do the 
institutional rules circumscribe this authority in a way that prevents IMF power from being used for 
non-sanctioned purposes? 
In the section that follows, I will examine the logic behind the legal restraints and decision-making 
procedures embodied in the IhiF. As in the previous section, I will concentrate on the unchanging 
core of IMF justifications. I will look critically at these arguments and suggest their limits - whit it 
is necessary to believe in order to find them convincing. 
Overt ew 
IMF accounts suggest three different ways in which the Fund's institutional structure ensures that 
IMF power is only used for its allotted purpose. Most fundamentally, the M IF acts within a legal 
framework which, as we saw above, is set out transparently in the I tF's Articles of Agreement and 
is consented to by all member states on joining the institution. Secondly, the majority of decisions 
taken by the Executive Board within that legal framework can be characterised as technical 
objective decisions. Thirdly, the Executive Board is a representative institution. Although, for 
political reasons and because of the differing responsibilities of different actors within the global 
system, that representation is unequal, it nonetheless provides some political oversight of the 
technical decision making process. At the margins, the Board of Governors is also in a position to 
exercise periodic oversight and to control the general direction of the institution. 
The legal frameurork and consent 
The idea of a rule-bound framework has two potential advantages for institutional legitimacy. 
Firstly, there is the procedural point that clearly established rules and limits to conduct mean that 
the boundaries of institutional power are set out so that members can make an informed choice 
about whether or not to join the institution. A set of transparent criteria are established so that any 
breach of this overarching framework can be challenged in legal terms. At first sight, at least, if 
members consent freely to join the institution and are able to leave at any time, it is reasonable to 
assume that any actions that do not breach the rules are legitimate. 
Secondly, there is the stronger claim that a multilateral legal framework can restrain abuses of 
power because even those with greatest influence over IMF policy will themselves be subject to the 
law. If all countries are likely to suffer from balance of payments problems, a rules based 
framework accepted by all is likely to be reasonably fair. 
Core principles 37 
The advantages of transparent rules in delimiting the boundaries of legitimate institutional conduct 
are undeniable and the important consequences a breach of the IMF's legal framework are likely to 
have for legitimacy should not be underestimated. However, there are some reasons to doubt how 
far compliance with a legal framework can go, on its own, in ensuring institutional legitimacy. 
Taking the stronger claim first, reciprocal obligations embodied in rules will only provide restraints 
on the powerful to the extent that countries will all be equally likely to find themselves in the 
situations that the rules are designed to deal withl7. Otherwise there is nothing to stop carefully 
framed rules from becoming instruments of exploitation, apart, of course, from the political 
consequences of legal transparency18. There is the potential for rules to embody a fair system of 
mutual obligations but there is no good reason to assume that they must do so - in other words 
reciprocity is perhaps best thought of as a question about the Fund's allotted role and about Fund 
performance rather than one about the presence or absence of a legal framework. 
The weaker claim, about a transparent framework that all members have consented to on joining 
the institution is more convincing but problems remain. These problems spring from the need to 
strike a balance between rules and discretion that is an issue with all legal systems. They are 
ultimately problems to do with uncertainty about the future - about what exactly it is that has been 
agreed to. If rules are insufficiently specified, consent to the rules will still leave considerable scope 
for doubt and dissent about the way discretion is exercised and therefore the policies that are 
adopted in particular circumstances. On the other hand, if rules are set out in great detail they may 
be unable to adapt to unexpected situations and issues of interpretation will be problematic. Here 
consent leaves room for doubt about whether the rules will be either adequate or sufficiently 
flexible to deal with future contingencies. 
In practice, the IMF framework always left room for some discretion and, as we will see in Chapter 
3, discretionary decision-making has become more important over time. Now, at one level, since 
the I11F's Articles of Agreement include procedural rules about how future decisions are to be 
made (establishing new rules), it is possible to argue that the decision to join the IMF includes an 
acceptance of future judgements made within its institutional framework. Agreement to become a 
member includes agreement about the legitimacy of the IMF's decision-making framework and so 
all IMF rules are equally binding. In practical terms, though, this is dearly inadequate. The way the 
decision-making body works in practice is bound to be an issue, hence the importance of the multi- 
faceted conception of legitimacy I set out in Chapter 1. 
The balance between rules and discretion and between fundamental rules and those created later 
through the Executive Board will also influence IMF legitimacy. The more the system shifts from 
rules to discretion, the more weight will be placed on the decision-making structures that I review 
"The arguments here should be familiar. The idea of the rule of law is closely related to Kantian ethics. The 
necessity for all actors to feel reasonably likely to be affected by any rules made is the intuition driving Rawls' 
introduction of the concept of a 'veil of ignorance'(Rawls, 1972) 
is If rules are set out dearly and publicly, it is easier to raise political challenges to those that are difficult to justify 
on normative grounds than it is to challenge obscure and ill-specified procedures. 
Pr ... 
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in the next sub-section and the less on original consent. Likewise, the extent to which the Executive 
Board is able to re-write the MOs legal mandate (the extent to which rules are made by the Board 
rather than through inter-state negotiations) will also be important because Board decisions are 
made on the basis of weighted voting rather than sovereign equality. 
Having said all that, there remains an important difference between an international institution such 
as the IMF and legal systems operating within states. The IINMFs member states are free to join and 
free to leave the institution at any time. Not only do they initially consent to membership, they also 
exercise continuing consent by remaining members over time. In other words, arguably, continuing 
state consent to the IMF regime provides a continuing ratification of the decisions and procedures 
that flow from the IMF's legal framework. The importance of consent and therefore the 
assumption that international institutions must be welfare improving is at the heart of many liberal 
institutionalist accounts of international organisations (Keohane, 1984). 
However, there are also reasons to doubt how much consent really tells us. In a recent book on 
international institutions, Gruber has pointed to the importance of what he calls `go it alone power 
(Gruber, 2000). Gruber's argument is essentially one about identifying the correct counterfactual to 
institutional membership. He points out that, once it is dear that two or more states will set up an 
institution, the range of choices open to additional countries has already been altered. They are no 
longer choosing between negotiating an institutional bargain and retaining the status quo - they 
must now choose between joining theparthukrinstitution proposed and remaining on the sidelines 
while other countries cooperate within the newly established framework. 
In the context of the IM'IF, the point is that most prospective members were not present at the 
original Bretton Woods negotiations and had little influence on the way they were conducted. The 
choice they were presented with was acceptance of the entire IMF institutional package or 
acceptance of none of it. Overall, the position is unchanged in relation to legitimacy - consent 
implies that the IMF framework as a whole is perceived as better than the alternative of non- 
membership. However, the crucial point is that the institution must be accepted as a package and 
from a limited range of possible alternatives: consent need not imply wholehearted enthusiasm, it 
may merely reflect a grudging acceptance of the best of a bad set of choices. 
Overall, the existence of a legal framework benefiting from the formal consent of all member states 
is an important base line for IMF legitimacy. There is no denying that states are free to leave and 
that they choose not to do so. Nonetheless, as Gruber points out, consent is exercised maithin a set 
of choices created in the context of the current international financial system. 
As IMF programmes become more extensive or more difficult to monitor, the quality of 
cooperation members are willing to offer will also be important. formal consent may not be 
enough for the institution to achieve its aims: states will need to be prepared to make genuine 
efforts to implement programmes rather than merely paying lip service. After a certain point, then. 
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consent like legitimacy is a matter of degree so additional factors providing incentives for 
compliance with IMF policy will also be important. 
Tecbnocrary, representation and accountability 
When it comes to decision-making, the MIF's legitimating arguments are heavily reliant on the idea 
that the IMF is a `technical' rather than a `political' institution. Decisions are officially made from an 
objective point of view aimed at maximising economic welfare within the confines of the IMIF's 
legal mandate. 
At one level the logic here is very simple. The claim is that the causal laws enshrined in the science 
of economics mean that if the desired goal is x, the appropriate policy is y. The goals have been 
defined by state consent and are set out in the Articles of Agreement. Once those goals are 
accepted there is really very little choice about appropriate policy, it is merely a reflection of what is 
actually possible. 
However, in practice the dominance of utilitarian thought within economics means that various 
kinds of utilitarian justifications tend to creep into the authority claims the Fund makes. The 
advantages ascribed to utilitarian thought are therefore also part of the `technical' self-description. 
Particularly important is the idea that utility is objective and `democratic' because it is about 
maximising aggregate welfare without making distinctions between particular people - each 
person's utility counts once and only once. That is clearly an attractive argument for an 
international institution to make if it wishes to be able to overcome `national' interests in certain 
circumstances but, as I will argue below, it is not a position that is defensible in the same technical 
terms. 
A prominent discussion on the appropriate management of capital account crises illustrates the way 
this kind of thinking works in practice. Giannini is discussing possible arrangements for dealing 
with a rapid outflow of capital - options range from attempting to entice funds back through 
market incentives to administrative restrictions on the repatriation of capital or debt cancellation 
(an issue discussed in more depth in section 4.1.2 below) 
The issue is often broached as one of achieving "a more equitable burden -sharing"... When 
resources have been misallocated, the question of who was responsible in the first place is of 
little economic relevance. What matters is that the misallocation be dealt with in the least costly 
way... the issue of moral hazard19 is logically distinct from that of ensuring equitable burden 
sharing. The real issue is whether by involving the private sector, the overall costs associated 
with foreign-exchange crises can be reduced (Giannini, 1999,37-8) 
Important here is the idea that short-term concerns with the justice of the arrangements in relation 
to particular actors detract from more important questions about the long-term causal 
consequences of the policies adopted. Achieving justice can be a pyhrric victory when it ultimately 
makes everyone worse off. Technical expertise is important in identifying the likely longer-term 
implications of particular policies. There is also a deliberate stress on the extent to which many 
problems simply are coordination problems. So, in the current context, measures aimed to ensure 
19 The sometimes inappropriate incentive effects of various methods of crisis resolution 
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that private lenders are `punished' for their mistaken investment decisions may merely prevent 
future lending, making everyone worse off. A utilitarian stress on the medium or long-term 
consequences of actions can focus attention on mutual gains rather than short-term distributional 
questions. 
This translates more generally into a reminder that 
what are the best arrangements to make about property if the state is to be as well constituted 
as it is possible to make it... is as much as question about the probable consequences of human 
actions as it is about the rational justification of particular evaluative beliefs or aspirations 
(Dunn, 1996,123-4) 
This kind of `sum welfare consequentialist' reasoning (Sen, 1987) has always been at the heart of 
economics but its attractions in the context of an international institution should also be clear. The 
salience of subjective issues that could lead to conflict (questions about justice or distribution) is 
minimized and emphasis is placed on pragmatic, objectively determined, mutually beneficial, 
solutions to the problems at hand based on the empirical evidence. The resonance of this kind of 
reasoning with neo-institutionalist perspectives in IR (Keohane, 1984) should be readily apparent. 
From the point of view of legitimacy, actors that object to the decisions made can be dismissed as 
either misguided or self-seeking, narrow minded and therefore anti-democraticm. 
Technical representation 
Not only does this technical self-perception inform IMF justifications for particular policies. It also 
lies behind the choices that have been made about the IMF's decision-making structures. 
The key decision making body in the IMF is the Executive Board. Although it is formally subject to 
the Board of Governors, in practice a forum of 192 representatives is too unwieldy for effective 
decision-making and many quite high-level policy decisions are made by the Executive Board=t. 
In my discussion of IMF institutional arrangements earlier in this chapter I pointed out that EDs 
must be economists and that most Executive Directors represent more than one country. A review 
of the debates surrounding Bretton Woods suggests that this was part of a deliberate strategy in 
keeping with the technical utilitarian notion of IMF decision-making. It was clearly necessary that 
states should feel they had input into and control over institutional decisions. However, at the same 
time, the Fund's architects were anxious to ensure that Directors would identify as much with the 
institution as with their own country. 
We want to aim at a governing structure doing a technical job and developing a sense of 
corporate responsibility to all members, and not the need to guard the interests of particular 
countries (Keynes quoted in Strange, 1973) 
According to Lister (m an account that bears the stamp of extensive conversations with Fund staff) 
part of the Executive Directors' job is to 
20 See, particularly, the discussion of 'good governance' in Chapters 3 and 9. 
21 The IMFCs role as a site for pre-agreeing issues of policy has been increasing since its role was formalised in 
the aftermath of the Asian crisis. To assist with that process the IMFC now meets in advance of Board of Governors' 
meetings. 
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keep the IMF from becoming [a] forum for political battles unconnected with [its] technical 
functions. Upon such persons falls the task of persuading their governments that the 
organizations to which they happen to be attached should be shielded from the damage that 
political partisanship always entails (Lister, 1984,198) 
The idea of full time Directors at an institutional headquarters was a deliberate strategy to 
encourage some geographical distance between Executive Directors and their political masters. 
Keynes was deeply upset when the decision was made to have Fund headquarters in the political 
capital of Washington rather than the financial capital New York as he felt the Fund would be 
taken over by politicians (Gardner, 1980). 
Weighted voting and consensus decision-making, too, can be seen as part of a strategy stressing 
representation rather than accountability. The idea is to produce a unified institutional perspective 
on issues, avoiding controversy. Consensus decision-making and limited publication of Executive 
Board minutes enables the IMF to present a united front to the outside world. Weighted voting 
determines the contribution that different country representatives will then be able to make in 
arriving at that institutional position. Those countries with the largest stake in the global economy 
and the largest financial stake in the Fund are given the greatest say in decisions arrived at. The 
model is very much that of a corporation22. 
Just as the idea of technical decision-making is particularly attractive in the context of an 
international organisation, this technical conception of directors' role also has advantages. Rather 
than having to agree some form of political authority above the level of the nation state, technical 
decisions can be portrayed simply as correct interpretations of economic reality. 
Limitations to technical utilitarian decision-making 
How persuasive is this technical conception of the Executive Board likely to be? 
The idea that, given a particular set of goals sanctioned by state consent, technical considerations 
will place limits on the possible policies countries can carry out is uncontroversial It may also be 
true in many cases that a better understanding of the economic consequences of various measures 
over the medium-term will have a profound impact on assessments of appropriate courses of 
action. The formal models of welfare economics can contribute to decision-making by clarifying the 
issues at stake, contributing to constructive debate and delineating the range of available 
possibilities (Hahn, 1982). Problems arise, however, when it becomes difficult to separate ends 
from means or when the ethical content of particular kinds of utilitarianism is consciously or 
unconsciously incorporated into the supposedly technical decision-making process. 
Perhaps the most problematic issue here is the utilitarian conception of the human good as 
entailing the maximisation of a number of individual goods. This individualistic conception makes it 
difficult to incorporate values like freedom, equity (Sen, 1987; Sen & Williams, 1982) or the 
importance of maintaining a political community (Taylor, 1982) into utilitarian calculations. It is not 
necessarily impossible to do so in the context of a very inclusive concept of utility but such 
22 Indeed the Articles of Agreement bear a marked resemblance to the articles of association of a UK company. 
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considerations are certainly unlikely to be reflected in the ways utility is normally used in economic 
calculations (ONeill, 1998; Sen, 1987). 
Economic welfare is a very important value in the modern world but it is evidently not exhaustive. 
One answer is to say that the MIF is an economic institution and that there are other institutions or 
parts of government that are responsible for taking into account different sorts of concerns. The 
problem is that policy-making cannot always be split up in this way. Economic decisions have spill- 
overs into other areas of social life. Once they have been made various social avenues are already 
closed off and other kinds of decisions made by other bodies cannot compensate. 
The wider Executive Board discretion becomes the more likely it is that there will in fact be a need 
to make choices that are hard to see as purely technical. Even without the non-economic 
consequences of economic decisions, if economic theory cannot specify a single appropriate course 
of action some kind of non-technical choice will have to be made. The Executive Board (or 
whoever else makes the decision) will effectively be choosing between sub-goals with different 
probable outcomes and therefore inevitably be making decisions about ends as well as means even 
if it does not intend to do so. 
The second issue is the extent to which utilitarian ethical concepts translate into politically 
persuasive arguments. Firstly, to re-emphasise the point about political community, arguments of 
the form `everyone in the aggregate will be better off if we do x' may not be particularly persuasive 
where there are losers as well as winners. If the differences are marginal or the distribution of gains 
and losses are uncertain such arguments may remain broadly attractive but the extent to which 
people are willing to take the risk of being a 'loser' will depend on their relationship with the 
'winners'. As J. S. Mill put it, members of a nation `cooperate with each other more willingly than 
with other people' (Mill, 1993,391). Problems that are pure coordination problems will be more 
easily dealt with than those in which there is a distributional element. People who identify with one 
another will be more willing to make sacrifices in the interests of the common good. 
Even if, theoretically, we accept the force of arguments proceeding from particular ends through 
technical calculation to appropriate policy, there remain issues about who is to make the 
calculations and how we are to be sure that they have been made correctly. This is absolutely key 
when we come to think about accountability. In situations where goals are dear and it is reasonable 
to hold people accountable for their success in achieving those goals, non-transparent decision- 
making methods of the kind enshrined in the Executive Board are not problematic. That is why, 
arguably, central bank independence need not concern us over much or why corporate 
accountability to shareholders need not involve continuous oversight. If inflation stays low, or 
investors achieve good returns, everyone is happy. If not a new set of directors are appointed or 
shares are sold. 
As decisions become more difficult and complex, and as the institution involved can only control a 
small part of its environment (failure may be due to poor policy or external factors) the quality of 
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the policies chosen and the reasons for their choice become the basis for evaluation as much as 
outcomes. A powerful consensus amongst economists may help to boost technical credentials. The 
more difficult it becomes to assess performance though and the more public disagreement there is 
amongst economists the more we need to know why particular policies were chosen and, because 
technical uncertainty easily slips into ethical decision-making, the more `political' such choices are 
likely to become. I will suggest later that, because of the economic training received by IMF staff, 
there is a marked tendency to overcome such difficulties by relying on some conception of 
utilitarianism without necessarily realising that this is itself a political choice 
Overall, technical Executive Board decision-making is most likely to be appropriate where: 
problems are largely coordination problems enabling mutual gains; there is a high level of technical 
consensus about the likely outcomes of policy; and policy issues do not have spill-over effects on 
other issues that are not appropriately dealt with by utilitarian economic calculation. 
How much the IMFs legal mandate and decision-making structures do ensure that these conditions 
are satisfied in practice is an empirical question. Generally speaking, though, the wider and less 
tightly defined the IMF's mandate becomes, the more important it will be that Executive Board 
expertise is properly scrutinised to ensure that experts are really setting out genuine limits to 
practical possibilities rather than, through conscious or unconscious bias, ruling out courses of 
action without proper public debate. 
The more complex the decisions concerned, the greater responsibility on experts to explain and 
justify the choices made. As a prominent economist has put it. 
If there's one thing I've learned in government, it's that openness is most essential in those 
realms where expertise seems to matter most (Stiglitz, 2000)23 
If the IMF is to secure its political legitimacy, its institutional structure must ensure that this kind of 
debate takes place in a way that provides adequate and appropriate opportunities for the 
consideration of issues that cannot be resolved through utilitarian calculation. A more obvious way 
to settle this type of dispute is through democratic forms of debate and struggle of the kind that I 
argued were at least supposed to take place within sovereign states, particularly where they had a 
good claim to embody some form of popular sovereignty (page 29 above) suggesting that technical 
authority will be susceptible to significant challenge under these circumstances. This is particularly 
important because economic justifications are so central to IMF thinking, particularly given the 
economic training of both the staff and Board members. There is a danger that this kind of 
personnel will be insufficiently sensitive to other forms of ethical and political justification. 
Rep esentation and aceountability 
The IMF is not solely reliant on technical utilitarian authority. It was also set up to act as an 
intergovernmental institution. The idea here is that the IMF is a tool used by states to further their 
23 For more fundamental concerns about the danger that greater understanding of causal relationships can lead to 
experts exercising inappropriate power at the expense of individual liberty see (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997; 
Foucault, 1980) 
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collective purposes and embodies a bargain between those states. Since the Fund regulates the 
international monetary system it should be responsible to states in proportion to their stake in 
decisions affecting that system. That is the justification for weighted voting. 
There are two issues here, the first concerns the extent to which weights adequately represent 
`stakes' in Fund decision-making and the second concerns the relationship between states and their 
populations. 
The idea that voting weights should be apportioned in terms of stakes in the global economy makes 
most sense if we think in terms of a coordination problem where the IMF simply provides benefits 
without imposing costs. It makes sense for authority based on expertise to be supplemented by 
giving EDs additional authority on the basis that they represent particular states, hold those states' 
interests in mind and are accountable to them. That can, potentially, compensate for the 
narrowness of purely utilitarian decision-making albeit at the risk that decisions will be, in some 
way, 'politicised'. It will also imply that states have an incentive to hold their EDs to account for 
incompetence if not necessarily for exceeding their powers. Those with the greatest potential to 
gain should logically have the greatest say in decision-making since that provides a sensible 
incentive structure to maximise institutional success. As decisions diverge from the mutually 
beneficial ideal, though, the voting system becomes more problematic. 
Underlying that vision is the idea that the task involved is one of maximisation and that decisions 
made are somehow a sum of the views of those participating. That may be the case where the 
decision to be made relates to a choice from a range of different possibilities in which compromise 
can be struck between the views of different parties (the appropriate level for a countries' exchange 
rate for example - one could imagine a decision being made on the basis of a weighted average of 
EDs preferences). 
However, not all decisions are of this type. So, for example, decisions that are about binary choices 
may produce a situation that looks more like the view of the majority being imposed on the 
minority. If alliances vary on different issues so that those in the minority on some decisions can 
expect to be the majority in others this may not be problematic but where cleavages are relatively 
permanent and weighted voting ensures the dominance of a narrow minority of the powerful there 
is clearly the potential for problems. These problems will, again, be far less acute when the issues 
decided on can largely be construed as part of the resolution of coordination problems but will be 
more problematic when questions of distribution become significant. 
In theory, consensus decision-making could also moderate these difficulties by putting increased 
pressure on the powerful to secure the support of the weak through compromise and bargaining. It 
may be that the voluntary nature of IMF membership and conditionality also exerts a similar 
pressure. However, research on the practice of 'consensus' decision-making suggests that there are 
difficulties. Discussions take place with actual voting positions in mind and 'consensus' in practice 
means the clear likelihood that a vote would be passed if one were taken (Bichsel, 1994). Since no 
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votes are actually taken and the minutes of Board meetings are deliberately silent on the views of 
particular directors it is very difficult for outsiders to determine how decisions have actually been 
made. 
This is dearly an issue when it comes to ED's accountability. Where EDs are responsible to one 
government and the decisions taken by them are legitimately seen as decisions of the Treasury 
ministry of the country concerned, the idea of EDs as representatives is relatively satisfactory. 
Home ministries can give EDs instructions and ask for reports of their activities and there will only 
be a need for a limited degree of trust in the representative concerned. When EDs represent a 
wider range of countries (as many of them do), though, consensus decision-making becomes far 
more difficult as governments cannot tell what is being done in their names. Similarly, where the 
issues debated are of wider interest and affect sections of domestic populations, the picture again 
becomes less satisfactory. Accountability is impossible without some level of transparency and 
some kind of sanction for inappropriate performance. In practice transparency is limited and the 
chain of representation from citizen to IMF begins to look very long (citizen-legislature-Finance 
Minister-Executive Director-Executive Board-Fund staff). 
All these potential difficulties suggest that the kinds of decisions that the IMF is making will be very 
important. The IMF decision-making structure seems to be designed with a particular kind of 
decision in mind. technical questions about maximising economic welfare through solving a 
coordination problem. 
Despite these concerns, it may still be possible to argue that institutional structures should reflect 
real world power, particularly in an institution that has little coercive might of its own and is 
therefore reliant on consensus. Indeed at least one commentator commends the IMF decision- 
making model on precisely these grounds. In comparison to the frequent paralysis of the UN, it is a 
system `that the IMF has been using relatively successfully in generating viable collective action' 
over a period of more than 50 years (Lister, 1984,8). However, this looks like a justification based 
more on power than legitimacy. Power is moderated to the extent that it is exercised publicly 
through an international institution on the basis of `consensual' decision-making but it is less clear 
that states' relative say in the institution can be justified in any way that is more directly related to 
the purpose the IMF is supposed to serve. 
2.2.3 Conclusions 
In section 221, I argued that IMF legitimacy was based on a claim to advance state interests by 
providing cooperative arrangements for managing the international economy. States needed to 
agree to restrict their own autonomy in the interests of making longer-term gains through greater 
system stability. Better international monetary coordination could enable them to undertake more 
sophisticated interventions at a domestic level, furthering their economic interests and securing 
their domestic legitimacy. 
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The question was whether the Fund would, in practice, provide benefits to all states involved or 
only to some of them. That is obviously ultimately a question about performance but, in the 
economic sphere, performance will often be difficult to assess. Over a long period of time, it is also 
reasonable to expect institutional performance to be weak from time to time for purely innocent 
reasons. That is where institutions are important. They can provide additional reasons to believe 
that institutional performance is directed towards institutional goals, they increase an institution's 
resilience to occasional performance problems. 
How much support do the IhMF's institutions provide in that respect? In section 222 we saw that 
the IMF's legal and institutional arrangements provided three kinds of assurances. States were given 
the opportunity to consent to the legal arrangements governing the Fund's operation. Within those 
legal arrangements, decisions would be made on the basis of technical economic expertise rather 
than more subjective political criteria. Finally, the decision-makers were also to be representatives 
of individual states and were therefore in a position to protect their interests. 
Those justifications had some potential but were likely to be more convincing under certain 
conditions than others. Technical decision-making was best suited to resolving coordination 
problems within a relatively tightly defined mandate, particularly in a context of reasonable 
consensus within the economics profession. The IMF's representative credentials were reasonably 
well suited to supporting that kind of decision but were problematic for anything more demanding 
because of weighted-voting, limited transparency, and a long chain of representation from citizen to 
Executive Director. In short the more independent and international aspects of IMF decision- 
making were the most fragile. If decisions were kept within reasonably tight parameters, and if there 
were few permanent cleavages within the membership they were capable of justifying some 
functions but only within fairly narrow boundaries. 
State consent to a legal framework looked, at first sight, like a stronger justification. At their best, 
legal rules could ensure equal treatment between countries. Even at their worst, they ensured that 
states had consented to the obligations the Fund imposed. That could, potentially, help to ensure 
that the conditions required for the IMPs technical authority would be met. States would 
presumably ensure that legal restrictions on the Fund's role would ensure that only issues that states 
were comfortable delegating to the Executive Board would in fact be determined there. That 
should provide reassurance where there are concerns about non-technical issues being incorporated 
into Executive Board decisions. 
Unfortunately, I also suggested that consent need not be freely given since states are always acting 
within a set of complex political and economic constraints. The fact that IMF membership is better 
than leaving the Fund need not imply that the institution is satisfactory, merely that it is better than 
the available alternatives. There was also a noticeable coercive element to conditionality that could 
result in acceptance of conditions because of power rather than legitimacy. 
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Overall, then, IMF institutions will provide the best support for broader IMF claims where states 
are able to pre-agree a relatively narrow framework for IMF operation that leaves little room for 
Executive Board discretion. Nonetheless there is scope for discretion to be exercised where the 
decisions made appear equally binding on all countries or where there are strong technical 
justifications available. Beyond that, claims to sovereign self-determination will be hard to 
overcome unless restraints are dearly welfare enhancing for all states over time (unless performance 
is manifestly good). The extent to which governments are seen to take part in decisions about their 
own policies will therefore be very important. Overall performance on the one hand and the 
balance between state consent and Executive Board discretion on the other will be highly 
significant for IMF legitimacy. 
2.3 The framework in practice: formulating conditionality 
Since the thesis is primarily concerned with conditionality, it is important to see how this balance 
between state consent and Executive Board discretion is struck in practice when conditionality is 
formulated. That discussion will also bring the very general, theoretical discussions of the previous 
sections closer to practical concerns, preparing the discussion for the more empirical discussions of 
the rest of the thesis. 
We saw, in section 2.1, that conditionality is supposed to be designed to ensure that adjustment 
takes place in a way that safeguards the IMF's resources and avoids breaching the IMF's `code of 
conduct'. According to IMF accounts, conditionality is primarily determined by the borrower 
country but with staff collaboration and Executive Board oversight to ensure that programmes are 
acceptable. The importance of government involvement potentially adds additional security to the 
justifications we have already examined. The country remains free to determine its policies within 
constraints imposed by the Executive Board. It is only those constraints, rather than the 
programme as a whole, that need to fit within the limitations I suggested in the previous section. 
How confident can we be in practice that this is in fact the case? 
In practical terms, the process begins when a country decides to approach the IMF for a loan. The 
Area department staff in Washington prepare a draft letter of intent based on information to hand, 
particularly that obtained as part of recent Fund surveillance. A staff mission, usually headed by a 
senior member of the relevant area department then goes to the country concerned to gather 
further information and negotiate a programme with government personnel - usually drawn from 
the finance ministry or central bank. Once negotiations are complete, the mission returns to 
Washington. The programme is then moderated by members of the I MF's functional departments 
and submitted to the Executive Board for approval. 
In terms of legitimacy, the procedure seems to rely on a combination of technical decision-making 
(m that it is primarily the staff that decide) combined with a more political element of state consent 
(since the recipient government is involved). On the basis of the discussion in section 2.2, the most 
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interesting issues will relate to the balance between government and staff input and the degree to 
which the staff are subject to Executive Board oversight or legal restrictions. 
The IMF is keen to emphasise government freedom in programme specification: 
We don't impose conditions on governments. If a program were to be imposed from outside, 
its chances to be fulfilled, to be implemented, would be minimal. For a program to have its 
chances, it has to be seen as really the program of the country, elaborated by the country 
(Camdessus, 1993 quoted in Woods, 2000b) 
However, programmes are negotiated in secret so it is difficult to know what is really going on. In 
the past, at least, the IMF has been willing to act as scapegoat for governments that wished to 
introduce programs they knew would be unpopular at home (Putnam, 1988; Southard, 1979). 
Government tendencies to portray programmes as imposed have therefore created considerable 
scepticism about this official position. 
What research there is on the question suggests that Camdessus is overstating his case. It is dear 
that countries are able to influence the nature of programmes to varying degrees depending, 
amongst other things, on: their strategic importance to the U.! F's major shareholders (particularly 
right wing regimes such as Mobutu's Zaire during the Cold War), their economic significance, the 
scale of their difficulties and the nature of the processes required to obtain domestic ratification of 
programmes (Bartilow, 1998; Stiles, 1991) 
For poorer less politically significant countries with limited expertise, however, negotiations may be 
highly one-sided (Martin, 1991). A recent external evaluation of the enhanced structural adjustment 
facility (ESAF) commissioned by the Fund was highly negative on the question of programme 
ownership 
Almost without exception, technical personnel in ministries and political leaders in the various 
countries who deal regularly with the Fund complained about what they saw as the Fund's 
inflexible attitude. They complained that the Fund often came to negotiations with fixed 
positions so that agreement was usually only possible through compromises in which the 
country negotiating teams moved to the Fund's positions... the Fund too often simply imposed 
its will, was generally insensitive to genuine constraints on policymaking... and was too quick to 
dismiss policy options favoured by government. (! PF, 1998,36) 
Obviously some IMF restrictions would be expected on programme content - the IAMF's role is to 
encourage states to exercise their economic sovereignty in ways that do not conflict with the core 
values the Fund was set up to promote. However, restrictions on policy should be confined to 
those consonant with the IMF's broader purposes as interpreted by the Executive Board. Within 
those restraints staff should presumably be flexible. I am not intending to evaluate the IMPS actual 
procedures in any detail in this Chapter - that will be done in Chapters 5-10. The point here, 
though, is that country `consent' again does not seem to be enough to ensure the legitimacy of 
conditionality. It is not difficult to understand why, since any country asking the IMP for funds is 
already in a state of crisis. 
Leaving aside questions of staff over-zealousness for now, the second set of issues concern what 
exactly does determine staff positions in conditionality negotiations. According to IMF rhetoric. 
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staff make technical decisions on the basis of country obligations under the code of conduct and of 
the need to preserve Fund resources. 
In formal terms, the legal framework for conditionality has always been rather limited, making it 
difficult to determine what exactly the `code of conduct' entails in this context. The only publicly 
available guidance comes from the Articles of Agreement and a very general set of guidelines on 
conditionality promulgated in 1979. Even these have not, in fact, been followed. At the time of 
writing the IMF was in the process of a major review of its conditionality. One of the background 
papers for that review clearly acknowledges that, at least since the late 1980s, the Board has largely 
ignored the section of the guidelines outlawing structural conditionality except in exceptional 
circumstances (IMF, 2001c). 
Informally, though, it is clear that staff have a very good idea of what the Board expects to see in 
programmes. A large number of research papers and policy reviews published by the IMF and 
academic observers mean that it is also now possible for outsiders to get an idea of Board positions, 
though this was not so for much of the Fund's existence. The lack of formal legal guidelines is 
therefore most relevant in pointing up the extent to which power has been delegated to the 
Executive Board. However, Board decisions are merely indicative of past member preferences. 
They do not provide any kind of legally binding precedent for future decisions. If the Board 
changes its mind it can simply ratify a contradictory programme. 
Executive Board opinions therefore remain extremely important but they appear only to be 
incorporated at a late stage of negotiation. In practice this is not too problematic for Board 
authority since staff are very anxious to avoid Executive Board censure and their decisions are 
made in the light of past Executive Board decisions. 
In fact, those familiar with the IMF tend to stress the Executive Board's tight control over policy 
and the institutional culture that emphasises the presentation of a common point of view to the 
outside world. My own discussions with IMF staff confirmed Stiles' earlier finding that many issues 
would simply never find their way into programmes because staff felt they were unlikely to be 
accepted by the Board (Stiles, 1991). The ESAF evaluation provides similar indications: 
A number of ministers and senior officials... felt that the effectiveness of Fund missions 
depended too much on the personality of the mission leader, and how experienced and 
confident he felt about the support of the various departments (IMF, 1998,36) 
In other words, it is possible that export review by the Executive Board actually encourages 
negotiators to be less flexible than they might otherwise be since staff are not in a sufficiently 
powerful position to exercise discretion without Executive Board sanction. 
In highly political or high profile situations, this difficulty is ameliorated by greater high-level 
contact during the negotiation process. So, for example, in the Asian context, US Executive 
Director Karen Lissakers told a Congressional committee that 
in all of these programs there has been a fair amount of input from the Executive Board and 
various member governments including the US Government in consultation with management 
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and senior staff. We try to stay in close touch to monitor the status of the negotiations and to 
secure inclusion of various policy measures that we thought were vital (} louse Banking 
Oversight Subcommittee, 1998) 
More generally Stiles found that input from the Board or Managing Director was more common 
with politically high profile programmes and, confirming the suspicion that accountability nukes 
staff less flexible, that these countries tended to receive more favourable treatment (Stiles, 1991). 
On the other hand, this political intervention takes place through largely informal channels further 
questioning the authority of the Executive Board as a whole. This is particularly important if We are 
concerned about the Executive Board's ability to impose strategic direction on IMF deliberations. 
Approval or disapproval of programmes is essentially a reactive activity raising the possibility that 
Board deliberations will tend to have a conservative bias. Rather than deciding on solutions to new 
policy problems through Executive Board debate, staff will presumably consult informally with the 
Managing Director and particularly interested EDs to produce a programme The Board as a whole 
will then be under some pressure to agree it in broad terms when it comes up for review since to do 
otherwise would undermine the institution's credibility. Changing course will then involve a 
considerable degree of self-criticism of a kind that could potentially have been avoided if 
discussions had taken place in advance. 
Internal decision-making processes remain slightly mysterious. Although the Fund is more open 
than it was in the past, few researchers have had sufficient access to dissect relationships within the 
Fund and the terrain is in any case sufficiently political and controversial to make interview 
evidence difficult to interpret. However, the account given here fits all the available evidence and 
has the advantage of explaining the two strands of argument that emerge from the available 
literature: one stressing IMF inflexibility and conformity and the other stressing limited Executive 
Board control24. 
Of course, Executive Board ratification does eventually take place though and presumably ad hoc 
decisions made in formulating programmes will be made with this in mind. So, to the extent that 
they are able to impose their views, what can we expect Executive Directors to be trying to do? 
What incentives do EDs face and do those incentives encourage confidence in the kinds of 
restrictions that the IMF will impose on national policies? 
IMF accounts emphasize the common interest countries have in it smoothly functioning 
international monetary system and to that extent we might expect Executive Board discussions to 
be based on the technical economic opinions of EDs. We can expect general preferences for an 
open international economy to secure access to export markets and either to secure or facilitate 
investment balanced by the wish for countries to maintain their own national autonomy. I Iowever, 
at the same time, EDs will also have narrower interests. 
24 This apparent contradiction is particularly apparent in the best dsansions of appropriate IMF reform (such as 
De Gregorio et al., 1999 and Woods, 2000b). Stiiles, 1991, Martin, 1991 and IMF, 1998 are also helpful. 
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The most obvious here is the interest the borrower country has in limiting the costs of adjustment. 
Those costs will be determined in the context of the borrower government's interests and may be 
political as much as economic but dearly more finance will be better than less finance and fewer 
conditions will be usually be better than more. 
Borrower countries have the ability to refuse conditionality but only at the cost of not receiving 
financial assistance. Within Executive Board discussions this may leave them in a very weak 
position indeed. Having decided to accept the program, they need to convince the other Executive 
Directors that they are keen to implement it to ensure that funding is eventually provided. They are 
not, therefore, in a position to raise public objections to aspects of the programme that they would 
have preferred to avoidu and are under strong pressure either to accept it in its entirety or reject it. 
This may be particularly relevant where they are hoping to attract additional bilateral financing from 
other countries whose representatives will be present at Executive Board discussions. That suggests 
that the Executive Board may receive little negative feedback from borrowers but, if it is doing its 
job correctly, that may not be inappropriate since borrowers can hardly be expected to take an 
objective long-term view in the midst of a crisis. 
More reliable are other countries that expect to borrow in the near future. They should have 
incentives to raise objections to conditions in an attempt to prevent similar conditions being 
imposed on them in any future programme. At the same time, the desire to maintain the benefits of 
the international economy, particularly access to export markets, and to guarantee Fund resources 
will suggest sympathy for conditionality which may offset concerns about being subjected to similar 
conditionality. Potential borrowers should have appropriate incentives to weigh up the benefits of 
internationalism against preferences for autonomy creating a balanced approach that keeps IMF 
restraints within suitable boundaries. 
Of course it is possible that countries will simply have different preferences about the relative 
importance of an open economy versus policy autonomy. As long as those preferences are broadly 
distributed that should not present a significant problem, particularly in a context where weighted 
voting ensures that those with potentially the most to gain have the largest say. 
However, other less appropriate political motives may come into play. Countries may wish to 
present an internationalist laissez-faire image for short term commercial reasons or have incentives 
related to the potential for upsetting important political allies (or potential enemies). The final 
outcome may therefore depend on a complex range of factors but countries that are either in a very 
strong position (no particular concerns about the consequences of speaking out) or a very weak 
position (expecting to be the next borrower) may have most incentive to object to policies that they 
would not like to have to implement themselves. 
25 Interviews with developing country Executive Board members and other developing country officials confirm this 
point. 
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Finally, and most potentially problematic, any country that does not expect to borrow will not have 
the same incentives for restraint Countries in this position 'will therefore have incentives to push 
for as much market access as possible with the minimal amount of committed finance. 
The number of countries in this position will therefore be highly significant for IMF legitimacy 
since it will have an important effect on the incentives present in Executive Board discussions. 
However, even here restraints remain. Conditionality does remain voluntary and even quite large 
amounts of finance will not compensate for policies that are obviously well beyond the IDMF's 
mandate. In other words the need to maintain IMF legitimacy will itself suggest the need for 
restraint even for these countries since, without the IMF structure, they would have no formal 
means to pursue their foreign policy goals. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Overall, then, it is possible to imagine a legitimate institution that could act in the way the Fund 
describes. 
" It would promote international coordination in the interests of the common economic 
good. In particular, it would allow for greater political control over financial markets in the 
interests of domestic social priorities 
" That would involve placing constraints on state action in certain circumstances. It would 
be costly for states at that point but over all they would gain 
" States would pre-agree the kinds of constraints that would be acceptable and the goals the 
institution could pursue. Compliance with the resulting legal framework would ensure 
policies were supported by state consent. 
" Legal frameworks can never deal with unforeseen consequences though so there would be 
a need for decisions to be made about particular cases. These decisions could be made by a 
technically qualified Board, held to account by member states. 
" Conditionality, the most coercive aspect of IMF authority, would be determined in a way 
that maximised recipient consent within the constraints set by staff negotiators under 
Executive Board supervision, whose task it was to enforce the legal restrictions the Fund 
was authorised to impose. 
The IMF's role, then, was originally to be one ofglobal regulation of the international financial 
system in the interest of enhancing states' ability to fulfil their social and political obligations, whilst 
continuing to enjoy as many of the benefits provided by an open international economy as possible. 
In a sense, the Fund was charged with legitimating the international economic system by providing 
states with incentives to stay internationally engaged. It is also important to note that the Fund was 
designed to be a global regulatory institution as well as simply a provider of a kind of financial 
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insurance. The way that regulatory role was originally constituted left the Fund with a relatively 
tightly defined mandate that could be portrayed as embodying a series of reciprocal obligations, the 
majority of which were agreed to by states on joining the institution. 
The Fund's institutions were designed with a very particular role in mind. Outside that role, the 
legal and institutional guarantees enshrined in the Articles of Agreement begin to look problematic. 
The content of the IMF's legal framework in practice will be important in determining the balance 
between state consent and Executive Board authority which is more problematic (at least in non- 
technical areas) because of weighted voting and limited transparency. The wider the Fund's 
discretion becomes and the less secure its technical underpinnings the more problematic legitimacy 
will become. 
Given the doubts about this framework, it is important that the balance between state and IMF 
input in conditionality can be properly assessed so that state responsibility for particular 
programmes can bolster IMF credibility. It is only the restraints on state activity imposed by the 
Fund, rather than everything a country does in response to crisis, that need to be legitimated. If the 
balance between Fund authority and state consent is blurred that could create difficulties for the 
Fund's legitimacy. 
Finally, I have also argued that even the Fund's most fundamental justification based on continuing 
state consent is less secure than it might look at first sight. In normative if not legal terms, state 
consent is only helpful to the extent that it is made from a genuine set of choices. Once the Fund 
has been set up, at least, states are left with the choice of accepting or rejecting the institution in its 
entirety. Negotiating specific provisions is not an option. That may significantly reduce the benefits 
that consent can contribute in terms of legitimacy. 
Of course, none of these failings are necessarily drastic. If performance is adequate there is no strong 
reason to question IMF legitimacy. However, where performance is wanting there is the potential 
for difficulties to arise. More importantly the specific weaknesses of IMF authority claims will mean 
that some kinds of performance failure will be more significant for IMF legitimacy than others as 
they will feed into weak points in the IMF's justifications. The resilience institutional structures can 
potentially provide for institutional legitimacy may then go into reverse as institutional weaknesses 
re-enforce questions about performance. 
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3 From Bretton Woods to the 1990s 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the IMF portrays itself as an institution charged with 
resolving what is largely a technical problem of coordination. The maintenance of the international 
monetary economy is in the interests of all states but it requires some degree of inter-state 
cooperation. The experience of the inter-war years drove home the importance of institutionalising 
this coordination and of providing some form of political control over the operation of 
international finance. That, in turn, was the driving force behind the creation of the IrMF. 
In this chapter I want to explore the role the IMF actually carried out shortly after it was set up and 
the way it has evolved since then. I can then assess the extent to which the vision of technical 
coordination within a relatively narrow legal framework underlying justifications for the Fund's 
institutions provides an accurate portrayal of its operations in practice and whether its operation 
continues to provide the promised benefits in terms of state economic management. Exploring the 
changes that have taken place in the I1,4F's role over time and the factors driving those changes will. 
help us to propose some reasons why, by the late 1990s, the IMP had become vulnerable to the 
crisis of legitimacy that took place after the Asian financial crisis. 
In the Introduction, I argued that legitimacy changes are likely to be either the result of changes in 
the way an institution operates that undermine its legitimating claims or of changes in public norms 
that affect the extent to which previous justifications are acceptable. This chapter will review major 
changes in both the IMF's role and in relevant public norms such as those relating to sovereignty 
and to the importance of markets for development. 
The chapter begins with a simple explanation of international monetary economics to give an idea 
of what a technical coordinator of the international monetary system might look like. It goes on, in 
section 3.2, to explore the extent to which this ideal was embodied in the original Bretton Woods 
system. I then review the major changes that took place within the Fund in the 1970s and 1980s in 
section3.3 and some of the ways that the Fund has both extended and tried to relcgitimate those 
changes in the 1990s in section 3.4. 
The overall argument is that changes in the IMMF's role over time have tended to polarise the 
institution into debtors and creditors. The IMP has, perhaps unsurprisingly, never been best seen as 
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a purely apolitical technical institution. What is important though is the extent to which that 
position has become increasingly untenable over time. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates, greater discretion in monetary management has actually resulted in a 
far broader role for the IMF. However, its enforcement powers have been limited to borrower 
countries. Its enforceable policies - those involved in conditionality - have broadened into areas that 
are more difficult than ever to justify in purely technical terms. These same developments have 
made its representative structures less appropriate than they were before. 
There have been some modest compensations though. Increased capital flows and integration into 
the global economy may (arguably) mean that the IMF can provide greater benefits to some 
middle-income countries than it could before. There have also been tentative moves to give the 
IMF a wider, more democratic appeal both in terms of the types of policies it adopts and in terms 
of its openness to outside influences. The question for the rest of the thesis is whether these 
compensations are effective enough to counteract the problems. 
3.1 The political economy of monetary coordination and the 
Bretton Woods system 
Monetary polcy 
In simple terms, 1 the purpose of money in an economy is to provide a convenient means of 
exchange between a wide variety of goods of different types in different quantities without having 
to resort to barter. It is a master commodity that can be exchanged for all others. But, like any 
commodity, its value depends on the laws of supply and demand. Extra money in circulation (an 
increase in supply) will, in the long-term, result in a reduction in what can be bought for each unit 
of currency (a decline in demand). In theory this should mean that monetary systems are self- 
adjusting. So, for example, there is no point in the mercantilist attempt to collect large quantities of 
money within national borders because the result will be an increase in national prices and an 
automatic compensatory outflow of money (Hume, 1752). 
In fact, because price adjustments of this type can be difficult for market participants to detect, and 
because they may be slow or `sticky', the amount of money in circulation in a particular context can 
have important (though complex) effects on economic output. Decreasing liquidity impairs 
economic growth and causes unemployment Increasing liquidity causes inflation, which leads to 
uncertainty about future price levels discouraging investment and economic activity, and may also 
result in unemployment. Inflation and deflation also have complex distributional effects between 
savers and borrowers, those on fixed incomes and those with better economic bargaining power, 
wage earners and profit earners. 
' The issues in fact cover most of modem macro-economic theory. The interested reader might wish to consult one 
of the standard text books. Mankiw (1999) is good on domestic policy. For international implications the best 
introduction is probably (Krugman & Obstfeld. 1997) 
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For these reasons, countries wish to maintain control of their monetary policy. I lowever, in a world 
of freely exchanged currencies, changes in monetary policy in one country can have spill-over 
effects in other countries. 
One important international example involves the relationship between exchange rates and a 
country's current account balance. If a country devalues its currency, it can buy less foreign goods 
per unit domestic currency and other countries can buy more of its goods per unit of their 
currency. The result is a short-term increase in exports and decrease in imports - at least until 
domestic prices adjust to compensate. 
This adjustment affects other countries, as they find themselves importing more goods and 
exporting fewer goods. As we saw in the previous chapter, a series of competitive devaluations as 
countries attempted to boost their own exports at the expense of competitors is widely viewed as 
one cause of the Great Depression. 
The point of international monetary coordination is to try to ensure that countries take into 
account the effects of their monetary policies on other countries. This is important because it will 
enhance overall economic efficiency. More importantly, too much disruption caused by the policies 
of others may make countries decide to reduce their interaction with the outside world, disrupting 
the system of global free trade. 
In terms of the technical economic conception of the IMF, the overall level of liquidity in the 
system and the way that liquidity is distributed between countries should be designed to maximize 
the efficiency with which economic resources are being used. This can be done by controlling 
overall levels of liquidity; regulating exchange rate policies; and making rules determining which 
countries should adjust their monetary policies and how that adjustment is to take place. 
In simple terms, when countries have large quantities of money sitting unproductively in bank 
vaults or if other resources are not being used productively (there is high unemployment or large 
parts of domestic productive sectors are running below full capacity) they should pursue a more 
expansionary monetary policy. On the other hand, countries that are importing more than they can 
produce or suffering from inflation should be encouraged to pursue contractionary measures. 
Disputes arise because adjustment is always costly, at least in the short term. Equally, the 'correct' 
monetary policy for a country is always partly uncertain. It depends, amongst other things, on the 
relative importance attached to growth and employment on the one hand and monetary stability on 
the other. Those preferences, in turn, reflect differences of technical opinion over likely effects of 
changes in liquidity. Additionally, since there can only be one level of global liquidity, it is likely that 
this will be more appropriate for some countries than others. 
Negotiating the Bertton Woods gstem 
For Keynes, part of the problem with the Gold Standard was that it had a deflationary bias because 
liquidity was determined by the rate at which new gold deposits were discovered and because it a as 
deficit countries that were required to adjust. 
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It has been an inherent characteristic... [of the system] that it throws the main burden of 
adjustment on the country which is in the debtor position... thus it has been an inherent 
characteristic of the automatic international metallic currency (apart from special 
circumstances) to force adjustments in the direction most disruptive of social order, and to 
throw the burden on countries least able to support it, making the poor poorer (Moggridge, 
1992, Vol 25,27,29) 
At the time of the Bretton Woods negotiations, it was dear that the United States would be a 
creditor country for the foreseeable future and that European countries would be debtors. Much of 
the argument therefore revolved around the extent to which creditors as well as debtors would be 
made to adjust. Keynes, partly because of technical and political preferences, and partly as 
representative of a debtor nation, wanted a symmetrical adjustment system in which both debtors 
and creditors had incentives to adjust (Gardner, 1980). 
The Americans, on the other hand, were only willing to ensure that debtor adjustment would be 
facilitated by providing what Cooper later described as a `double screen' to cushion domestic 
economies from balance of payments problems (Cooper, 1975). The Fund would allow countries to 
devalue their exchange rates in the event of a `fundamental disequilibrium' and, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, provide funds to ease adjustment in the event of balance of payments problems. 
Keynes attempted a rearguard action by introducing a `scarce currency clause' which provided that, 
where `demand for a member's currency seriously threatens the Fund's ability to supply that 
currency' other countries could institute exchange controls against it (Gardner, 1980). In practice it 
was never successfully invoked Games, 1996). 
Once the provision of funding to ease adjustment had been agreed, there was a further dispute over 
how far the IMF (or more accurately the creditor countries) would be able to control the way in 
which resources should be used. Keynes had believed in automatic access to IMF resources, subject 
to minimal constraints to ensure that money was not frittered away for consumption. On the other 
hand, White had assured the US Congress that they would retain control over the way Funds were 
used. The wording of the Articles of Agreement left the situation ambiguous. 
The US Executive Director, conscious of White's assurances to Congress, and restrained from 
approving unconditional lending by the laws passed to approve the Bretton Woods system, insisted 
that the IMF should impose conditions. The Europeans, on the other hand, were concerned that 
they would be forced to adopt US Treasury policy. Conditionality would increase the IMF's 
discretion and `politicise' it. By the early 1950s, the result was a stalemate in which the Europeans 
would not accept conditions and the US would not allow the Fund to lend (Dell, 1981; Horsefield, 
1969). 
Eventually a compromise was adopted, under which the first 25% of a country's quota could be 
drawn automatically but further drawings would be subject to increasing conditionality. Repayment 
had to be made within 3 years (Gardner, 1980; Horsefield, 1969). What Keynes conceived of as 
primarily an additional source of liquidity had become much more closely linked to the adjustment 
mechanism. In practice, in the name of maintaining Fund resources, countries were only allowed to 
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borrow if they could demonstrate commitment to policies designed to solve their balance of 
payments problems. 
3.2 The IMF's role in the Bretton Woods era 
3.2.1 The code of conduct, symmetry and liquidity 
During the Bretton Woods period, the Fund had a good claim to be regulating the monetary system 
from a global perspective. Exchange rates were fixed to the dollar, with the dollar tied to gold. The 
fixed exchange rate system provided a clear rules-based constraint over all countries'2 policy in a 
context where the inter-war experience had meant the Fund's architects were suspicious of 
international capital flows and encouraged countries to maintain capital controls. 
Many high-level policy issues where the Fund exercised discretion also had clear global scope. The 
central issue concerned the overall level of liquidity. With all currencies tied to the dollar, US 
monetary policy played a key role in regulating global liquidity. In the early years, the vast need for 
liquidity in a Europe engaged in post-war reconstruction meant that there was widespread 
enthusiasm for loose US monetary policy and direct transfers in the form of Marshall Plan aid. This 
eased the freeing of exchange controls on current account in Europe which was a key achievement 
of the 1960s (and incidentally protected European countries from conditionality to some degree). 
Over time, though, this became problematic, since dollars were supposed to remain convertible 
into gold. The more dollar supply outstripped that of gold the less confidence there was likely to be 
in the system as a whole. 
During the 1960s, a number of measures were put in place to protect the dollar. Along with various 
types of central bank cooperation(Eichengreen, 1998), the G10 set up a special line of credit, the 
General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) in case the Fund's supply of dollars proved insufficient. 
Potentially more significantly, the IMF created a system for producing its own currency - SDRs (or 
Special Drawing Rights) which were a truly international currency that could be produced more 
symmetrically than the dollar. 
Negotiations over the SDR and GAB reflected a shift in the balance of power between the US and 
Europe. Europeans were increasingly concerned over what De Gaulle was to call the `exorbitant 
privilege' the US enjoyed to print money3. Transformed into creditor countries, it was the 
Europeans' turn to fight for control rather than automaticity in the provision of liquidity though 
the GAB. The IMF's managing director, Jacobson, had to remind them that they too might need its 
resources in the future. The Fund was also struggling to ensure that negotiations continued under 
its auspices and that the benefits of the GAB were extended to developing countries (Ferguson, 
1988). In the end, the GAB could only be organised on the principle that even when the Fund had 
I Though the constraint was often avoided in practice - devaluations were frequently presented to the Board as a fa/t accompli (lames, 1996) 
3 These concerns were partly fuelled by increasing US multinational investment in Europe 
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approved the use of resources, the G-10 had a further veto: a clear setback for the principle of 
universality. Disquiet over G-10 dominance led to developing country attempts at organisation 
through the formation of G-24 and the UNCTAD (Ferguson, 1988; James, 1996). 
In negotiations over the the Europeans again asserted their dominance by requiring an 85% vote in 
the Fund before issuing SDRs, giving them a veto. There were further moves to conduct these 
negotiations within the OECD or G10 and to distribute liquidity only to the industrial nations. 
However, the US favoured the Fund, since developing country support for the SDR would provide 
expansionist allies against the Europeans. The SDR was kept within the IMF but developing 
country attempts to provide a `link' between SDR distribution and development were unsuccessful, 
with SDRs distributed in proportion to IMF quotas (Ferguson, 1988). 
Ultimately, there were limits to cooperation in support of the dollar. The gradual re-emergence of 
capital flows was making industrial country adjustment increasingly difficult. Disputes between a 
debtor US and creditor Germany in the mid 1960s resulted in two reluctant German revaluations 
(the only forced revaluations in the whole Bretton Woods period). However, dollars continued to 
flow out of the US. The last straw was a massive capital flight from the US to Germany and Japan 
in 1971 combined with a US refusal to acknowledge any responsibility (`it's our currency but it's 
your problem' as Connolly famously put it). It became clear that cooperation was not merely 
delaying American adjustment but allowing the Americans to avoid it completely. 
The dollar was cut free from gold and European currencies allowed to float, signalling the end of 
the Bretton Woods period. 
3.2.2 Adjustment and conditionality 
In contrast with questions about overall liquidity, conditionality was far less controversial during 
this period than it was to become later. 
Balance of payments adjustment in theory 
In simple terms4, a country that has a balance of payments deficit has two choices - it can attempt 
to reduce demand (spend less) or to increase supply (produce more). Demand side measures 
(essentially credit ceilings and fiscal constraints) work more quickly and are more certain to 
eliminate deficits, at least in the short term. They are also more clearly within government controls 
and leave governments some freedom in determining how the costs of adjustment will be 
distributed (Polak 1991). On the other hand they are more likely to be damaging to the domestic 
economy and to induce recession. 
Supply side measures are aimed at increasing earnings rather than reducing spending. This would 
appear preferable. However, they are also more uncertain. There is more argument about which 
measures are likely to be most effective in achieving these results and production is less likely to be 
4 For an excellent and readable review of IMF conditionality see (IGllick, 1995). For the classic technical critique of 
the IMF approach see (Edwards, 1989) 
5 Although not necessarily with the precision that IMF quantified performance targets might suggest (see Killick 
1995 chapter 4) 
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within government control Perhaps more importantly, many of the measures concerned involve 
removing subsidies and privileges from particular groups that may be politically powerful 
(particularly the urban working class). Finally, the effects of supply side measures are likely to be 
slower to materialise. 
The balance between the two types of measure may be determined by "a number of factors. In 
terms of economic theory, it can be argued that a deficit that is produced by over-expansive 
domestic macro-economic policy should be corrected by demand side measures. A structurally 
caused deficit (e. g. resulting from declines in commodity prices or terms of trade shocks) should be 
financed if it will correct itself, or resolved by more structural measures if it will not (Bird 1984). 
In more practical terms it may be that the availability of finance is the central constraint. Where 
there is limited finance and time is short, it will be essential to adopt demand compression policies 
to remove the deficit, as this works more quickly. Where more finance (and therefore time) is 
available, supply side measures become possible. Borrowed money must be repaid, though, and it 
is imperative that supply side measures are effective and that finance is used productively or 
problems may reappear in a worse form later. 
Balance of payments adjustment during the Bretton lVoodr period 
During the 1950s, the combination of limited private finance and the discipline of the par value 
system meant countries could only run up limited deficits before being forced to go to the Fund. 
Since problems were relatively small, IMF conditionality was largely confined to demand side 
measures. 
[structural reform] insofar as the concept existed at the time, was not seen as a legitimate matter 
for international concern (IMF, 2001c, 3) 
Although these measures were not entirely popular6, they were relatively straightforward, with little 
room for IMF discretion (Guitian, 1992) and left considerable scope for government choice in the 
details of implementation. IMF staff look back on this era as a time when relationships with 
developing country governments were, by and large, positive (Finch, 1989). 
A review of developing country representatives' statements at annual meetings reveals little general 
concern with conditionality, although there were some issues about the extent to which 
conditionality was equally applied (Ferguson, 1988). The disputes about overall levels of liquidity 
discussed in section 3.2.1 were far more significant. 
3.2.3 Conclusions 
The agreement negotiated at Bretton Woods that operated from 1944 to 1971 dearly cannot be 
defended as a purely technically driven system. The power of those with resources (surplus 
countries) over those without (deficit countries) has continued to mean that the question of who 
6 As early as the 1950s Prebisch had developed his structuralist critique of the orthodox economics favoured by 
the IMF. It was not until the late 1960s, however, that academic criticisms of the IMF as acting against the interests 
of developing countries began to appear (See for example Krasner, 1968) 
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adjusts is determined by criteria that are more political than economic. Continuous disputes 
between debtor and creditor countries as the relative economic power of different nations 
fluctuates make this clear. 
Indeed the existence of the Fund was partly a response to political imperatives. White, in particular, 
was heavily influenced by the liberal views of Secretary of State Cordell Hull who believed that 
`unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic 
competition with war'7. 
These concerns with global stability, particularly after the beginning of the Cold War in the late 
1940s, facilitated international economic cooperation. The most significant example being the 
Marshall Plan, which largely replaced the use of Fund resources in the early period (again 
emphasising European countries' reluctance to be subject to the conditionality regime). Disputes 
over who would meet the costs of US Cold War priorities in Vietnam were one of the factors 
behind the disputes that led to the breakdown of the system in the early 1970s. 
On the other hand, although rules for adjustment were partly determined by power considerations, 
they were institutionalised in a way that made adjustment easier than under the Gold Standard. 
Countries had an internationally sanctioned right to devalue their currencies, albeit with the need 
for international consent. They also had a right to finance to facilitate that process. Finance was 
limited and came attached to conditions that required demand side, deflationary adjustment. Once 
that principle was accepted, however, the precise content of conditionality could be determined by 
criteria that could credibly be viewed as largely technically determined. 
Finally, although some countries were clearly more likely to find themselves borrowing from the 
Fund, it was also clear that, over the longer term, all countries were at least potential borrowers. 
Although the adjustment mechanism was, as always, biased in favour of creditors, the fact that all 
countries were potential debtors could be expected to have a moderating influence on the way 
conditional financing operated. 
Overall, the IMF's self-perception as a technical institution presiding over a symmetrical set of 
mutual obligations embodied in a rules based code of conduct, though not wholly accurate, 
provided a broadly credible description of its operation in this period. The most obvious deviation 
from technical rationality, political considerations about overall levels of liquidity (indirectly, about 
who should adjust), were resolved through the IMF's more politically accountable institutions - the 
Board of Governors and the Executive Board. More obviously technical matters - the 
determination of conditionality -were carried out by Fund staff. 
7 Hull's memoirs quoted in Gardner, 1980,9 
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3.3 After Bretton Woods: the 1970s and 1980s 
3.3.1 Surveillance and symmetry 
Under the system of flexible exchange rates that emerged in the 1970s, the obligation to maintain a 
fixed parity was replaced by a less specific obligation to `collaborate with the Fund and other 
members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange 
rates' under the IMFs `firm surveillance (Art IV sl, s. 3). The IMF became interested in any aspects 
of a member's policy that might influence the exchange rate (Guitian, 1992; Pauly, 1997). On the 
other hand, given the greater freedom involved, it became less clear when the limits of acceptable 
policy had been reached, undermining IMF discipline. 
As Guidan (1992,11) puts it 
In contrast with the Bretton Woods regime, under which nations agreed with the constraint 
and the international community administered the discretion, the current system puts into 
effect exactly the opposite framework: members have underwritten the predominance of 
discretion, while the international community is left with the task of administering the 
constraints to which this discretion is made subject. 
The practical consequence was that it became even more difficult for the IMF to exert discipline on 
the policies of industrial countries. This didn't mean that they were free to do as they pleased. 
Increasing interdependence (particularly as a result of the growth in capital flows) meant that 
occasional policy coordination was essential but this usually took place within the auspices of the 
G7 or the OECD, with the Fund's role mainly reduced to the provision of information (Guitian, 
1992; IMF, 1999a; Pauly, 1997) 
The other key development also sprang from the growth in capital flows. After the first oil crisis, 
increased availability of finance in the Euromarkets meant that industrial countries could finance 
their balance of payment deficits without recourse to the Fund (the last loans to industrial countries 
were those to the UK & Italy in 1976). The effect was to undermine the Fund's role in regulating 
liquidity and further emphasize the separation of the Fund membership into more or less 
permanent groups of creditor and debtor countries with the middle-income countries alternating 
between the two depending on their creditworthiness at the time. 
3.3.2 Adjustment and conditionality 
Polity content 
The oil crisis also affected the size and nature of balance of payment problems. Balance of 
payments difficulties for oil importing countries were on a far larger scale than those experienced 
before. 
Initially the response was to finance these deficits, since they were clearly the result of structural 
problems rather than over expansive macro-economic policy. For middle-income countries this 
usually involved increased borrowings on private capital markets (particularly in the form of 
syndicated commercial bank loans). 
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For lower income countries, who were not so creditworthy, it involved going to the IMF but at this 
stage the Fund too was relatively supportive of attempts to finance deficits. It adopted two low 
conditionality facilities and the Extended Fund Facility that allowed for longer-term programmes 
(De Vries, 1987). On the other hand, conditionality was already beginning to expand during this 
period to include more specific conditions on fiscal matters such as the removal of food subsidies. 
By 1976, attitudes in the industrial countries were beginning to harden and combating inflation 
became a major concern. It became more difficult to secure finance. Pressure from the industrial 
countries and a change of heart from the managing director resulted in a considerable tightening of 
conditionality (De Vries, 1987). The result was a noticeable loss of Fund legitimacy as an 
increasingly powerful and relatively united developing country group (Ferguson, 1988) protested 
publiclye and increasingly sought funding outside the IMF (De Vries, 1987). The central criticisms 
are by now familiar from the literature on adjustment. Economically, they were that conditionalityT. 
(a) involved making too many policy changes in too short a time 
(b) was too heavily geared to deflationary demand restraint, harming growth and resulting in 
political unrest 
(c) was too heavily based on monetary targets which suggested monetarist thinking and which 
were not sufficiently tailored to individual country circumstances 
(d) tended to have regressive distributional consequences 
(e) concentrated on exchange rate depreciation which was ineffective (as the inflationary 
response outstripped the effects of incentives to increase supply) and would work better 
with trade controls (to encourage raw material imports rather than luxury goods) which the 
Fund would not allow9 
Politically it was argued that the measures were ideologically anti-socialist because of their 
distributional impact and because of their stress on the reduction of state control in the economy'O. 
It was also suggested that there was favouritism in the application of conditionality with industrial 
countries and their Cold War allies receiving more lenient treatment. 
The controversy forced the IMF to conduct a limited (De Vries, 1987; Ferguson, 1988) review of 
its lending procedures. The result was the 1979 Guidelines on Conditionality, the only broad policy 
statement on the appropriate contents of conditionality produced before 2001. These guidelines 
included a number of provisions designed to ensure that countries' preferences would be respected 
8A representative selection of criticism from this period is contained in Development Dialogue No. 21980 - See 
particularly (Nyrere, 1980) and (Arusha Initiative, 1980) 
9 The list is taken from (De Vries, 1985) but the same criticisms can be found in other reviews (eg. Bird, 1984, 
Williamson, 1983) 
10 The impact of IMF programmes on the poor is a consistent theme in critical appraisals of the Fund's role, 
see(Pastor, 1987) 
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and that conditionality would be kept to a minimum. There was also some evidence of a relaxation 
of conditionality over the next few years (Dc Vries, 1987). However, developing country strength 
was short lived" and, as we will see, the guidelines ultimately had little influence on the 
development of conditionality. 
The second oil shock in 1979 was met with attempts at adjustment rather than financing. The result 
was a combination of high interest rates which raised borrowing costs, and recession in industrial 
country export markets. The eventual consequence was the outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982 and 
balance of payments problems of a magnitude which dwarfed even those of the mid-1970s. 
Not only were the problems on a different scale, they were of a different'nature. They resulted in 
the IMF becoming more involved with debt rescheduling. In the late 1970s first the Paris Club and 
later the commercial banks began to rediscover that, like the League of Nations in the 1920s and 
1930s (Pauly, 1997), the IMF could perform a useful role in renegotiations of sovereign debt. The 
central difficulty with sovereign debt is what economists describe as the `willingness to pay' 
problem. A sovereign debtor's ability to service debt will depend on the economic and fiscal 
policies it adopts. It is politically difficult for groups of banks or even official creditors to dictate 
policy to a sovereign state. On the other hand, without some assurances it is difficult to have 
confidence in repayment. The solution was to involve the I14F. This would result in greater 
creditor confidence and, therefore, a better deal for the country concerned (Finch, 1989). 
This arrangement was satisfactory while it was reasonably likely that debts would be repaid. When, 
later in the 1970s, debts expanded to the point where they were dearly unsustainable, things 
became more difficult. When the debt crisis first struck in Mexico in 1982, the problem was so 
large that the banks themselves were under threat. The IMF said that it would refuse to lend (and 
therefore apply its strict conditionality to Mexico) unless the banks could come up with a large 
enough financing package to make the programme viable. Since the banks too were in danger of 
collapse if the package failed, funding materialised (Kraft, 1984). Mexico gained additional funding 
while the banks gained the assurance of conditionality. 
The problems came later when the banks were no longer under threat of bankruptcy if the 
programme proved unsuccessful. They began to use the IMFs insistence on adequate funding to 
press for tighter conditionality and greater concessions from debtors (Finch, 1989). 
Given the size of the debt overhang it became difficult to justify conditionality as a statement of the 
policies required to overcome balance of payments difficulties, since this was not a realistic goal. It 
looked more like an attempt by the banks to recoup as much as possible without having to 
reschedule their loans or for aid agencies to maximize aid effectiveness (Finch, 1989). Although not 
a purely zero-sum game (since lenders still had an incentive to value long term growth for its effects 
on repayment), there clearly was a relationship between how much repayment the IMP could 
II So much so that by 1990, Polak's review of the 1979 conditionarity guidelines concluded 'these restraining 
provisions have not prevented the intensification of conditiona1ty in every direction that the guidelines attempted to 
block' (Polak, 1991,53-54) 
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squeeze from a borrower country and how much debt needed to be written down or rescheduled. 
It also became more difficult to see the IMF's role as part ofglobalregulation of the international 
economy. The IMF was acting rather as an intermediary between particular groups of debtors and 
creditors in the context of crisis management. 
As far as the development of conditionality is concerned, this massive increase in the size of 
balance of payments problems without any appreciable increase in available funding also led to a 
change of direction. The IMF's traditional policies of demand compression were no longer viable 
and, with increasing collaboration with the World Bank (Polak, 1994), the IMF began to become 
much more interested in supply side measures, since the problems involved could only be resolved 
through increasing production as well as shrinking demand. It is important to note, however, that 
supply side measures were in addition to demand side measures rather than a replacement for them 
(Kilick, 1984; Killick, 1995). 
I have already pointed out that, although supply side measures are theoretically a more desirable 
way to resolve balance of payments problems, the choice of particular measures is more 
controversial than it is for demand side measures. They also tend to be more intrusive and to have 
more direct political consequences. The measures included in IMF programmes were heavily 
influenced by the new free market development orthodoxy that emerged in tandem with the rise of 
the New Right in the UK & US (Toye, 1993). 
They tended to emphasize the withdrawal of the state from the economy (in the form of the 
removal of price controls, privatisation, the decontrol of interest rates) and the importance of 
export orientation (Killick et al., 1998). There is obviously scope for choice amongst measures 
adopted to promote production and, as critics were keen to point out, there are alternative 
strategies available12 to those adopted by the IMF. 
Later in the period, growing NGO criticism of structural adjustment and concerns at the adverse 
effects of conditionality on political stability led to additional, less market based, extensions to 
conditionality. Until the late 1980s, the IMF argued that its mandate was to set macroeconomic 
targets but it was for governments to decide how those targets would be met. Whether the 
government cut back on military expenditure or health care was none of the IMF's business 
(Nowzad, 1982). 
However, the resulting perception was that the IMF encouraged cuts in expenditure on the poorest, 
leading to extensive public criticism. By the end of the 1980s, an increased focus on social safety 
nets was apparent and the IMF had begun, in a few cases, to question levels of military expenditure 
in borrowing countries (Polak, 1991). How significant these changes were is somewhat 
questionable- There is no doubt that there was some shift in both policy and presentation. Left 
wing critics maintain that the changes were cosmetic while some at the IMF even describe them as 
revolutionary (Polak, 1991) 
12 For example the idea of the 'developmental state' discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 below 
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Institutional changes 
This expansion in the size of balance of payments problems and the scope of conditionality was not 
matched by increased finance. Fund resources have been declining steadily in proportion to the 
volume of world tradel3 (Bird, 1995; Dell, 1981) tipping the fnancing/conditionality balance 
further towards conditionality. 
The IMF's decision-making structures remained broadly unchanged. The number of developing 
country members and their economic significance expanded over the period so that developing 
countries as a group had a larger share of the votes and more Executive Directors by the end of the 
period (Ferguson, 1988; Krasner, 1985). Viewed individually, though, many developing countries 
found their voting shares decline. That was because, when the IMF was set up, each country was 
allocated an equal number of `basic votes' to reflect the principal of sovereign equality as well as the 
votes they received in proportion to their quotas. Over time basic votes have remained constant 
while quotas have increased substantially to the detriment of smaller states - they were originally 
14% of total voting rights and are now less than 3% (Gerster, 1993a; Lister, 1984; Woods, 2000a; 
Woods, 2000b). 
The number of IMF decisions requiring special majorities also increased during the period as 
compromises on quota changes were struck by providing the losers with vetos over particular types 
of decision (Gerster, 1993a; Lister, 1984; Woods, 2000a) 
3.3.3 Summary 
Over this period, the most important decisions made by the IMF began to relate to conditional 
adjustment rather than to questions about overall liquidity. The scope of conditionality expanded 
significantly while the IMF's leverage over non-borrowing countries declined. 
For critics, the main concern over the new structural measures included in IMF programmes was 
that they were essentially additions to the standard programmes resulting from a gap between the 
size of balance of payments problems and the amount of available finance (De Vries, 1987; Killick, 
1984; Killick, 1995). They did not indicate a new more growth-friendly turn but did indicate a 
broadening of conditionality. Given the difficulties of justifying supply side measures in purely 
economic terms, the result was a dear danger of political favouritism. The influence of Cold War 
strategic purposes on IMF lending during this period did little to reassure14. 
At the same time the availability of private finance meant that some countries could be virtually 
certain that they would no longer need to use the IMFs financial facilities. These were also the 
countries that had the largest influence over IMF decision-making. The IbfF's voting structure was 
not reformed to reflect the increased obligations placed on developing countries. It continued to be 
13 Much of the increase in finance that did take place was in the form of IMF contingent borrowing under the 
general agreements to borrow. These funds were subject to a 'double-lock' so that the G10 countries contributing 
the funds could veto IMF decisions to tend, further undermining the cooperative nature of the Fund. 
"The most commonly cited examples in this respect are Zaire, Egypt, Sudan and Argentina see also (Bartilow, 1998; Finch, 1989; Polak, 1991; Stiles, 1991) 
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based on the amount of finance contributed and a country's overall power within the global 
economic system 
Increasing involvement with debt and capital account issues created a new role for the Fund and a 
new relationship between it and the financial markets. During the Bretton Woods era, the finance 
that accompanied adjustment programmes came entirely from IMF resources. Negotiations took 
place solely between the borrower country and the IMF as representative of the membership as a 
whole. 
Once adjustment also began to involve debt renegotiation, mobilising finance became a more 
strategic exercise. It involved a power struggle between banks' wish to maximise their returns and 
developing countries' desire for a pain-free adjustment with the IMF in a position to influence 
(though not control) the outcome. Fund resources themselves were a crucial part of the bargain. 
There was a danger that they were being used to pay overseas creditors rather than fund domestic 
adjustment -a problem acknowledged by those generally supportive of the Fund (Polak, 1991). 
Again there was some common interest - if the banks pressed too hard for deflationary responses 
the long-term prospects for debt service would be poor. However, it was also far from a purely 
positive sum game and the IbMF's position as mediator was potentially problematic - it raised 
questions about whether the IMF had been overly generous to either creditors or debtors. The 
IMF's limited direct control over the markets made the role particularly difficult and the fact that 
the majority of lenders were based within the Fund's controlling major shareholder countries raised 
questions about its impartiality. 
3.3.4 Characterising the changes 
The IMF tends to stress the ways in which the changes that took place over this period were 
responses to changing economic circumstances and developments in economic theory. Critics, on 
the other hand, point to changes in the balance of power between developing and developed 
countries and variations in the ideological dispositions of the IMF's largest shareholders. 
Economic explanations 
From an economic point of view, changes were firstly responses to the changing state of the global 
economy (De Vries, 1987). Guitian (1992) draws a parallel between the greater scope of 
surveillance resulting from the demise of the par value system and the expansion of the range of 
conditionality that was also required as a result of greater country flexibility. De Vries emphasises 
the importance of increasingly large balance of payments problems in the face of tight financing 
constraints in driving the shift to supply side measures (De Vries, 1987). 
Changes can also be seen as a response to changing perspectives amongst economists and to some 
of the issues raised by the INIF's critics. The decision to press for more adjustment to the second 
oil shock was part of a growing recognition amongst economists that inflation was a key problem 
for the world economy. The inclusion of supply side measures was part of a move to include 
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economic growth as a specific objective of IMF programmes in response to some of the criticisms 
of the late 1970s. 
A powerful argument for conditionality to indude growth as a direct objective is that without 
such an approach medium-term viability (and the revolving character of Fund resources) may 
be elusive (IMF, 2001c) 
The greater detail on fiscal provisions can be justified as an attempt to ensure that government 
expenditure cuts are directed towards greater efficiency rather than to declining investment (Polak, 
1991) In the IMF's terms there has been a greater focus on the 'sustainability and quality' of fiscal 
adjustment (IMF, 2001c). 
The market oriented nature of the measures included in structural adjustment programmes can be 
seen as a reaction to what was generally recognised (at least by the late 1970s) as the failure of 
import substituting industrialisation in Latin America. It was a response to the new 'Washington 
consensus' amongst the economics profession at large -a counter revolution against the 
Keynesian inspired excesses of the 1970ss. 
Later, IMF experience with low income countries and transition economies whose problems were 
largely structural in origin enhanced the focus on supply side measures (IMF, 2001c). 
Political explanations 
Others argue that this purely economic explanation ignores the influence of clear changes in the 
balance of power between developed and developing countries during this period and of the 
differing ideological preferences of the IMFs main shareholders. 
The first oil shock in the early 1970s resulted in growing economic power of oil exporting 
countries. The availability of finance on the international capital markets also meant that some oil 
importing countries had the opportunity to obtain their funds elsewhere. This meant that they 
could, and did, use this to put pressure on the Fund to make its resources more attractive (De 
Vries, 1985). Developing countries' ability to use Cold War strategic concerns to press for resources 
and the fact that US post-war dominance was being replaced by a more balanced relationship in 
which Europe and Japan also needed to be considered all contributed to developing country 
strength. The result was a period in which developing countries were increasingly assertive in 
intemational politics. 
In an influential book based primarily on the experience of this period, RobertJackson argues that 
developing countries were pressing to extend the changes that had taken place in the international 
sovereignty regime as part of the process of decolonisation (Jackson, 1990). 
During the period of classical liberalism in the 19th century, sovereignty was largely the result of 
positive criteria. States became recognised on the basis that they were there - that they were 
sufficiently organised and powerful to demand recognition from their fellow states. Arguably, some 
'S On the'Washington consensus' see (Williamson, 1983). On the importance of Latin American experience in 
shaping that consensus see (Stigritz, 1998a). The characterisation of these events as a counter-revolution follows 
the critical account provided in (Toye, 1993). 
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degree of "civility' such as the possession of a constitution was also a key factor. States that failed to 
achieve these standards were either ignored - not made party to international treaties - or were 
absorbed as various kinds of colony or protectorate. 
During the process of decolonisation, this positive requirement was replaced by a negative 
assumption of the right to self-determination for all peoples. Sovereignty moved along a continuum 
towards a normative requirement of recognition and away from a positive requirement of self-help 
and self-assertion16. 
From this incontestable right to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter, some Third 
World jurists in the 1970s attempted to extrapolate a `right to development'. 
The right to development flows from this right to self-determination and is of the same kind. 
For it is pointless to acknowledge self-determination as an overriding and pre-emptory 
principle if we do not simultaneously acknowledge a right to development for the people which 
has determined its own future. Mohammed Bedjaou cited in (Jackson, 1990) 
For Jackson, 
the result is a dual system of international legitimacy and legality. This is revealed in the 
concurrent practice of acknowledging the special claims of marginal Third World governments 
to preferential and non-reciprocal assistance while respecting a universal and reciprocal right of 
non-intervention. States should extend active assistance while respecting a universal and strict 
respect for the sovereign equality of states and free of any conditions derogating from that 
sovereignty. 
In similar vein, Krasner argued that developing countries in the 1970s adopted strategies designed. 
to limit the market power of the North by enhancing the sovereign prerogatives of the South, 
either through universal international organisations in which each nation has a single vote, or 
by widening the scope of activities exclusively subject to the unilateral sovereign will of 
individual developing states. (Krasner, 1985,7) 
The aim was to use political criteria - the right to sovereign self-determination and the equality of 
all peoples - to claim the right to a transfer of resources without undermining the sovereign right to 
non-interference in domestic affairs. Developing countries tried to use the idea of a right to 
development to argue that resource transfers such as IMF finance were closer to a right (and so 
should be condition free) than to a commercial transaction (where the historical experience 
reviewed at the beginning of chapter two would suggest quite intrusive conditions were the norm). 
Calls for a New International Economic Order were heard throughout UN institutions in the 
1970s. Success in the IMF was modest - though the relatively generous response to the first oil 
shock and success in forcing a review of conditionality in 1979 are indicative of developing country 
strength (Krasner, 1985). However, the period in which these efforts looked likely to have a 
significant impact were short lived. 
Rather than disengaging from international institutions (as Krasner predicted) developed countries 
were able to reassert control in the 1980s. As we have seen, this was in part a result of the impact 
16 See also Hawthorn, 1994; Krasner, 1985 
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that the developed countries' response to the second oil shock had on what were, at least in 
retrospect, highly vulnerable developing country finances. Under these circumstances, the trend 
towards a loss of control of the international financial institutions could begin to be reversed. 
Unprecedentedly large balance of payments problems, the need for debt rescheduling and the fact 
that the debt crisis took place in a context of developed country recession, exacerbating industrial 
countries' reluctance to agree transfers, had two consequences. Most obviously it meant that 
developing countries found themselves back in a far weaker position as market access disappeared. 
In addition the size of the financing gap meant that the response to the debt crisis involved far 
more coordination of lending than had taken place before. The IMFs new role as coordinator of 
the rescue gradually transformed it into the gatekeeper to finance from the World Bank, bilateral 
donors (who were in turn increasingly coordinated through bodies such as the OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee) and arguably for the financial markets17. This clearly added 
leverage to IMF power at a time when developing countries were in no position to argue about the 
terms on which lending was provided. 
The way that new-found power was exercised was heavily influenced by the neo-liberal policies of 
the Thatcher and Reagan governments. A consensus on the overriding importance of free markets 
made it easier to legitimate interventions in developing countries that would previously have been 
seen as unacceptable. 
Conclusions 
The changes were, of course, a combination of political and economic factors. Changes in IMF 
policy were economic adaptations to the world the Fund found itself dealing with but that world 
was in part a political creation. It would be wrong to portray the changes as entirely controlled by 
all-powerful developed countries. Apart from anything else, that would underestimate increasing 
dissatisfaction about aspects of state-led development within developing countries (Boughton, 
2001). Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that changes in the Fund's role were partly driven by the 
shifting balance of power, a fact that must undermine any claim that the IMF is a purely 
technocratic consensual institution. To talk about larger financing gaps' as though they were purely 
natural developments is disingenuous given that the amount of finance available to the IMF and 
through bilateral contributions (though not so clearly through the financial markets) is politically 
determined largely by developed country choices. 
3.4 The 1990s market confidence and good governance 
Two key changes took place during the 1990s, one largely economic and the other largely political. 
The first was a resurgence of capital flows in a context of international moves towards financial 
deregulation and the second was the end of the Cold War. 
17 The rink between IMF programmes and inflows of private capital is discussed below. 
Bretton Woods to the 1990s 71 
The IMF's role in Eastern Europe is largely beyond the scope of this thesis. For our purposes it is 
sufficient to note that IMF staff were heavily involved in technical assistance and structural 
interventions to create market economies in the post-communist countries and that this reinforced 
the IMF's pre-existing tendency to become involved in structural policies (IMF, 2001c; James, 
1998). However, a more relevant consequence in the context of the Asian crisis is a growing 
willingness for bilateral and multilateral institutions to become involved in issues of `good 
governance. 
These changes in policy have also been reflected in gradual institutional adaptation towards an 
operating style more in keeping with the liberal international norms of the 1990s. 
3.4.1 Capital flows, market confidence and the 'catalytic effect' 
By the 1990s capital flows to developing (principally middle-income) countries were, again, 
expanding rapidly. Between 1988 and 1995, total net LDC external funding increased from US$37 
billion to US$235.8 billion of which US$90 billion was direct investment and US$100.2 
`other'(IMF, 1989; IMF, 1996). This began to provide a further justification for IMF conditionality 
that was distinctively different from its original purpose as bridging finance for current account 
balance of payments problems. 
Since the value of financial assets is heavily dependent on expectations about their future value, 
market confidence can have a large impact on asset values, capital inflows and therefore a country's 
balance of payments. For some time now18, the IMF has been arguing that IMF conditionality can 
enhance market confidence and have a `catalytic effect', inducing capital inflows (Dhonte, 1997; 
Masson & Mussa, 1995). 
The idea is that IMF conditionality can provide a sort of commitment technology to enhance 
confidence in a governments' willingness to follow through on announced policy changes19. The 
negotiation process can provide the IMF with superior information about a country's commitment 
to economic reform than is available to the markets. The fact that the IMF is willing to commit 
finance in support of a programme, and the fact that the country stands to lose that finance if its 
adjustment effort falters, means that conditionality can provide valuable assurances to official 
lenders and the markets. The IMF's objectivity and superior technical knowledge may add 
additional credibility. 
conditionality outgrows its traditional posture as a frequently obtrusive means of enforcing 
creditors' views and becomes an instrument of governments to establish the predictability of 
their policies. (Dhonte, 1997,7) 
18 Dhonte argues that this began with the IMF's role in encouraging concerted lending during the debt crisis. It is 
therefore a trend that began with the IMF's growing involvement in debt issues reviewed in the previous section. 
19 A loose analogy is the widespread view that central bank independence can reassure the markets that monetary 
stability will not be sacrificed to short-term political gain. Once this becomes the expectation, measures that are 
taken to fight inflation will in fact be more effective than they would be if taken by government because they will not 
trigger speculative tests of government resolution. 
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The IMF's role in debt negotiations and its relationship to official creditors already meant that it 
was: 
committed to provide a credible assessment of the member's financing needs and to muster 
appropriate financing to cover them... [and] to fulfil an audit function, to verify the 
books, to 
assess the feasibility of policy adjustments, and to secure a reasonable measure of commitment 
by the authorities (Dhonte, 1997,8). 
If it is also to enhance credibility with private markets it must make a: 
judgement not only on the technical aspects of the policies, but also on the policy-makers' 
determination to sustain them. The Fund puts its own credibility at risk in vouching for this 
determination, most visibly by the commitment of its own resources... Markets do not, 
obviously, take Fund assurances at face value; but program conditionality can nevertheless 
help 
the member signal its determination to act in a restrained manner (Dhonte, 1997,8). 
The importance of credibility and the Fund's new role in enhancing private confidence also provide 
a justification for its gradual adoption of a concern with `good governance - questions about the 
political and institutional structures through which policies are determined and implemented. Since 
market confidence is crucially related to the predictability of policy, the way in which policy is made 
becomes as important as the policy itself: 
it is not only necessary to rely on a core team of national coordinators; in many cases, there 
must also be a strengthening of the whole civil administration, in particular the judiciary. An 
efficient civil service, backed up by a competent judiciary, is necessary for the solution of the 
authorities' time consistency problems and for the establishment of the rule of law, and thus 
for the creation of an economically secure environment. In this specific sense, "good" 
governance is an integral component of Fund programmes (Dhonte, 1997,11-12). 
In fact, once market confidence becomes the crucial determinant of balance of payments viability 
because of its effects on the capital account, the range of policies that may have an influence on the 
exchange rate is vastly expanded. In a sense this is merely to underscore the significance of capital 
market opening, welcomed by some as ensuring that governments will be subjected to `market 
discipline and deeply unpopular with others as government goals become more subordinated to 
`market sentiment'. 
3.4.2 Good governance 
The IMFs new interest in questions about the predictability and certainty of policy was in part a 
response to the relationship between market confidence and capital flows. However, that 
development was only a small part of a far wider agenda. 
In technical terms, this new agenda reflected another period of learning' within the economics 
profession. As we saw in the pervious section, the increased focus on structural conditionality in 
the 1980s was accompanied by a political focus on the benefits of markets over states. Limited 
government was a central plank of approaches to development economics and, therefore, of IMF 
conditionality. 
The Washington consensus held that good economic performance required liberalized trade, 
macroeconomic stability and getting prices right. Once the government dealt with these issues 
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- essentially once the government `got out of the way- private markets would allocate 
resources efficiently and generate robust growth. (Stiglitz, 1998a, 1) 
In the late 1980s, though, it was possible to observe another shift in emphasis within the IFIs. The 
World Bank's experience with structural adjustment in Africa had made it increasingly conscious of 
the importance of government for development (World Bank, 1989). 
The contrast between East Asian and Latin American development was also important. Much of 
the Washington consensus was a reaction to Latin American experiences (Stiglitz, 1998a) . Initially 
economists had argued that East Asia had `got it right' by its focus on export promotion rather than 
import substitution and by its less state centred approach to development (Krueger, 1979). In the 
early 1990s a concerted academic attack was launched on the second half of this view, pointing out 
the extent of state intervention in fostering growth, particularly in the North East Asian NICs20. 
Under pressure from the Japanese, the World Bank produced a grudging and somewhat half- 
hearted acknowledgement of the importance of state policy for East Asian development in 1993 
(World Bank, 1993), paving the way for its increasing interest in the state in the late 1990s. 
By the time of the Asian crisis the focus had changed dramatically. In 1997, the World Bank's 
World Development Report took The State in a Changing World' as its theme (World Bank, 1997) 
and the IMF published a pamphlet and a guidance note on `good governance' (IMF, 1997a; IMF, 
1997d). 
Although questions about the way government institutions operate dearly have the potential to be 
highly political, the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and World Bank prevent them from 
becoming involved in political issues21 so their approach has tended to be couched in technical 
terms. Indeed World Bank president James Wolfensohn is apparently particularly proud of the ways 
in which he has been able to redefine issues that were previously thought of as political, such as 
corruption, as technical issues affecting growth and macroeconomic balance (Hawthorn, 1999). 
The IMF was slower to become explicitly involved in governance than the World Bank. The first 
official mention came in the Interim Committee's Autumn1996 declaration Partner b0 for Sustainable 
Growth which argued that `promoting good governance in all its aspects including ensuring the rule 
of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption' 
was an essential part of a framework in which economies could prosper. This triggered Executive 
Board discussions leading to the publication of the IMF's governance guidelines in August 1997 
(IMF, 1997a). 
20 For the debate on the 'developmental state' see (Amsden, 1990; Wade, 1990) and the case study discussions in 
Part 2 of this thesis - particularly chapter 5 on South Korea 
21 The IMF, for example, is required to 'respect the domestic social and political policies of its members' (Article IV 
Section 3 (b)) 
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The guidelines acknowledge22 that `it is difficult to separate economic aspects of governance from 
political aspects'. They try to deal with this issue by concentrating on `economic' issues and 
explicitly stipulating that `the IMF's judgements should not be influenced by the nature of a political 
regime of a country nor should it interfere in the domestic or foreign politics of any member. ' (7) 
The overarching criterion is that `the staff should be guided by an assessment of whether poor 
governance would have a significant current or potential impact on macroeconomic performance in 
the short and medium term and on the ability of the government credibly to pursue policies aimed 
at external viability' (9). Within that limit, the IMF should concentrate on economic aspects of 
governance -'improving the management of public sector resources' and `supporting the 
development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment. ' 
(5) 
However, the guidelines go on to include a number of stipulations that it is difficult to imagine 
being implemented without interference `in the domestic politics' of any member. For instance it is 
clear that the IMF is committed to `providing a level playing field to foster private sector activity' 
(10) and `limit['ing] the scope for ad hoc decision making [and] rent seeking... [through] 
liberalization of exchange, trade and price systems and the elimination of direct credit allocation' 
(2). Similarly, staff are told that `IMF policy advice should ... be based on broadly agreed best 
international practices of economic management and on the principles of transparency, simplicity, 
accountability and fairness' (13) 
In fact it should not be surprising that this separation can be difficult to maintain. In parallel with 
the IFI's development of a `technical' interest in `good governance', these issues had been playing a 
more important and far more explicitly political role in the agenda of bilateral donors since 1989. 
There were a number of reasons for this renewed focus on the importance of state institutions in 
development. The fact that bilateral donors began announcing the new agenda in 1990, just after 
the collapse of the Eastern Block, is no accident. Douglas Hurd gave a speech in 1990 calling for 
`good government' and political pluralism. Later in the month Mitterand declared to the biennial 
French-African summit that `France will link its financial efforts to the efforts made towards 
liberty'. By the mid 1990s, this political aid agenda had been adopted by almost all the bilateral 
donors and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)u. 
This was not only a simple reflection of-the kind of post Cold War liberal triumphalism exemplified 
by Fukuyama's The End of History. The end of the Cold War had created a new environment for 
foreign aid. In the past, Cold War priorities had provided a security justification for extending aid 
budgets but the competition for influence that was involved had placed restrictions on what could 
be done as part of the aid process. After 1989, `Western governments felt freer than before to 
22 The quotations that follow are all from (IMF, 1997a). The numbers in brackets indicate the paragraph numbers 
in that document. 
23 For a an extended review of this process and a comparative analysis of the policies adopted by bilateral donors 
see (Crawford, 2001) 
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pursue basic political concerns vis-ä-vis the governments of the South' (Stokke, 1995, p9). At the 
same time, appeals to democracy and human rights could be used to bolster flagging public support 
for aid budgets once more direct security justifications had disappeared (Lancaster, 1993). 
This was particularly dear in the rhetoric24 of Clinton foreign policy. An article published by 
Secretary for Defence Strobe Talbott in the run up to the 1996 presidential elections is a prime 
example: 
As president, [Clinton] has ... [made] support 
for democracy a priority of his administration's 
diplomacy in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union 
(p47)... This conviction reflects the political realities on the home front of US foreign 
policy ... The American people want their country's 
foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well 
as realpolitik. (p49) ... To sustain the support of the American public 
for international 
leadership, American foreign policy must continue to be based on the nature of our society and 
on our character as a people as well as on our interests as a state. (p63) (Talbott, 1996) 
The bilateral agenda was less economistic and more explicit about the type of institution that was 
desirable. A new orthodoxy began to replace the conviction of 1950s and 1960s modernization 
theorists that authoritarian regimes were a necessity, at least in the early stages of economic growth 
(Cammack, 1997). In the post Cold War 1990s, (partly in response to the experience of transition 
economies Games, 1998)) democracy became compatible with economic growth or, for some 
authors, an essential prerequisite for it. 
While the IMF and World Bank have generally been careful to keep some official distance from this 
more explicitly political agenda, the boundaries are often blurred. So, for example, IMF external 
affairs' own publication (Finance & Development) includes an article arguing that interest in good 
governance reflects: 
a realization increasingly shared throughout the world that the world economy, and world 
institutions, can be a better guarantee of rights and of prosperity than some 
governments... economic reform and the removal of corrupt governments are preconditions 
both for the effective operation of markets and for greater social justice Games, 1998). 
3.4.3 Institutional change 
As early as 1994, Peter Burnell suggested that the IFI's new enthusiasm for good governance 
should be reflected in their own operations (Burnell, 1994). Although change has been limited, the 
second half of the 1990s have shown a shift in focus. This change has had two aspects: a greater 
focus on the importance of `ownership' and more transparency about IMF operations. 
Ownership 
A growing body of academic and internal research was pointing to problems with implementation 
in IMF programmes. So, for example, Tony Killick at the ODI in London had noticed, while 
carrying out different research, that breakdown of programmes (an indicator of serious non- 
implementation) was running at over 60% in the early 1990s (Killick, 1995). He and his colleagues 
went on to suggest, using insights from agency theory, that the fact that it was difficult to enforce 
24 In reality, the distribution of funds between countries did not provide much evidence of a change in priorities in 
the US (Hook, 1998) or indeed in Europe (Olsen, 1998). Strategic and economic concerns remained priorities. 
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conditions that governments really were strongly opposed to was hardly surprising given the 
relative costs that the IMF and domestic populations were able to inflict on decision makers. This 
was particularly problematic given that there is considerable evidence of IMF reluctance to use the 
sanction it does have at its disposal - refusal to disburse further fundsu (Killick et al., 1998). 
The IMF too was aware of the difficulties. The Policy and Review Department had observed that `a 
substantial proportion of program interruptions are attributable to policy disagreements between 
governments and Fund staff (cited in IMF, 1998,21) and the ESAF evaluation carried out in 1998 
(IMF, 1998) was asked to offer a particular focus on ownership. 
These concerns about the effectiveness of conditionality, combined with a growing recognition of 
the possible benefits of participatory development on small scale projects lead to a greater focus on 
the importance of `ownership' or `partnership' at the IMF and a wide range of other development 
institutions. This new focus, of course, also had a certain resonance with the growing international 
importance of democratic norms. 
Though the principles are widely acknowledged, they have been more difficult to realise in practice. 
At the IMF there clearly have been moves to widen the audiences that the IMF contacts in 
borrower countries. Under Camdessus' leadership the IMF began to reach out to labour unions in 
recipient countries26. Fund staff more generally are far more likely to talk about ownership and 
there have clearly been changes to the operation of staff missions from the traditional model in 
which negotiations took place largely within finance ministries27. 
For some this is still largely a matter of ensuring government support -if governments don't have 
a solid base of support for an IMF-sponsored programme, it won't work- but for others it also 
includes the need for `a broad-based social consensus' behind programmes28. 
To date the principal practical manifestation of this change has been a broadening of the contacts 
between IMF missions and broader sectors of the domestic population. Mission leaders have 
increasingly had contacts with non-core ministries (i. e. other than the central bank, the Ministry of 
. 
Finance and its associated agencies such as planning ministries or State Owned Enterprise 
ministries). In some cases they have also spoken to business, labour and NGO groupings. 
Questions remained, however, over the extent to which these consultations would constitute a 
genuine input into the policy process rather than merely an attempt to explain and justify the IMFs 
views to a wider audience. 
25 The results of this research were communicated to the IMF at high level seminars in Washington (IGllick et al., 1998) 
26 Management issued instructions to resident representatives in 1995 to cooperate with the ILO and foster rinks 
with local unions. (O'Brien et al., 2000). 
n See for example IMF 1998 
28 Quotes are from interviews with Jan Arte Scholte in 1996 cited in O'Brien et al., 2000,187 
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Tranrparen y 
The other main development involves an opening to a wider audience at the level of scrutiny over 
general policy in the form of greater transparency about Fund operations. 
Some Washington based NGOs29 had been campaigning for greater transparency at the IMF since 
at least the early 1990s. When the Mexican crisis struck in 1994, strong opposition in the US 
Congress to the way the crisis was dealt with30 triggered pressure towards more openness as a 
condition for providing the $100 million the IMF that was required to replenish ESAF in the same 
year. This pressure towards transparency was particularly difficult to ignore when the IMF's 
response to the crisis was to press for more fiscal and financial transparency in developing 
countries. 
The result has been a release of a great deal of information on the content of IMF conditionality 
that had previously been confidential. Since 1994, the Fund has issued press releases concerning the 
approval of stand-by credits including a summary of the conditions involved. In 1990 Argentina 
began to publish its letters of intent and other countries have increasingly followed suit. Since 1996 
a number of ESAF policy framework papers have also been published. `public information notices' 
summarising some key Executive Board decisions and a wider range of staff papers have also 
become available on the IMF's website. 
3.4.4 Conclusions 
During this period, the IMF's role in developing countries continued to expand but, more than in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the IMF also began to look for new ways to justify that expanded role. 
The IMF's role in regulating capital account transactions that started with its role in debt 
rescheduling, particularly after Mexico's crisis in 1982, became more explicit in the 1990s. The idea 
that the IMF could help to support capital account balance by enhancing market confidence in turn 
provided a justification for intervention in an ever wider range of policies and began to create a far 
more explicit link between the IMF and the private financial markets. 
The increasing separation between developing and developed country interests that took place 
during the 1980s, combined with longer running programmes and a move to supply side measures 
had already begun to make the IMF look like a development institution rather than a global 
regulator. The added adoption of `good governance' in the 1990s and the trends towards an 
increased focus on poverty and social welfare that began in the late 1980s and became more 
prominent during the 1990s reinforced this perception. 
This meshed well with the changing rationale for foreign spending in the wake of the Cold War. At 
least at the level of rhetoric, there was a return to a more humanitarian conception of aid and public 
evaluations of government aid budgets reflected this. 
29 Particularly Friends of the Earth - US, Centre for Concern and the Bretton Woods Project (O'Brien et at., 2000, 
183). 
30 For more details see Chapter 8 below 
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The `third wave' of democratisation and the IMF's moves towards greater openness and 
accountability to an emergent global civil society began to dissolve the contradiction that Jackson 
described in developing countries' claims to sovereignty during the 1970s. In a world that was 
increasingly seen as constituting a liberal global order, states found it more difficult to use 
arguments about sovereignty to obtain international resources unless they could at least argue that 
those resources had a reasonable chance of improving the livelihoods of their populations. That 
this change should be seen as part of a broad change in international norms, rather than merely an 
extension of IFI conditionality, is apparent in concurrent changes in the international security and 
human rights regime authorising foreign military intervention in defence of human rights (Mayall, 
1996). 
Nonetheless institutional change at the IMF remained modest and questions remained about to 
whom the institution should and would become more accountable - those questions will form a 
key part of the discussions in the rest of the thesis. 
3.5 IMF evolution and legitimacy 
There are both continuities and differences between the Bretton Woods conception of the Fund 
and the institution as it exists today. The IMF has never been best characterised as a purely 
apolitical technocratic institution - most obviously the extent to which creditor countries meet the 
costs of adjustment has always been the result of power struggles. This shouldn't surprise us too 
much. As I argued at the beginning of chapter two, legitimating accounts are always somewhat self- 
serving. 
What is important is the degree to which that account is credible, and particularly the way its 
credibility has changed over time. The evidence I have reviewed in this chapter suggests that a 
number of developments have seriously weakened technocratic claims and undermined the 
reciprocal relationships that originally underpinned Fund legitimacy claims. On the other hand 
changing international norms (particularly in terms of conceptions of sovereignty and attitudes to 
the market) and a gradual move to enhance the IMFs representative legitimacy have provided 
modest compensations. 
The collapse of gmmetg 
The Fund never embodied a completely rational, neutral and symmetrical set of obligations. Power 
considerations were always present. Debtor countries have always been in a weaker position and 
strategic considerations have determined how well they are to be treated. European countries have 
been more successful throughout than developing countries in avoiding conditionality. 
Nonetheless, the IMF as originally conceived did embody a series of reciprocal obligations, at least 
to some degree. All countries could be expected to borrow from the IMF. Even the Europeans had 
to accept conditionality from time to time. All countries (with the possible exception of the United 
States) were also subject to some IMF discipline even when they were not borrowing. 
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The changes that began in the early 1970s greatly undermined this symmetry, as many 
internal and 
external commentators have noted (Guitian, 1992; Polak, 1991). This has had quite 
fundamental 
effects on the incentives facing different participants in the organisation. Two clear examples relate 
to the tendency towards debtor adjustment and debates over appropriate levels of IMF financing. 
When early critics pointed to the tendency for the IMF, too, to press adjustment on debtors rather 
than creditors (Dell, 1981) the IMF could point to the system of reciprocal obligations within which 
conditional adjustment was embedded. 
By the 1990s this argument was becoming particularly hard to sustain. So, for example, Guitian's 
classic 1992 defense of the Fund argues that the IMF should concentrate on each individual 
country's obligations 
the IMF looks at `the soundness of a country's balance of payments, or to put it differently, of 
the country's skill in keeping within the budget constraint it faces' (Guitian, 1992,15). 
When the surveillance process is working properly, the cumulative effect of each nation's policies 
will be a global economic equilibrium. However, he is forced to admit that, under contemporary 
conditions, surveillance simply doesn't work effectively as there are no effective restraints on creditor 
countries. In a context where countries no longer fluctuate between debtor and creditor position at 
the IMF, this change clearly has difficult political consequences. 
More honest was an earlier Fund defence that simply accepted the injustice but challenged the 
IMF's critics to come up with a politically feasible alternative (Nowzad, 1982). This focus on an 
appropriate counterfactual is more credible but it seriously undermines the IMF's claims to provide 
objective support for a global liberal economy in the interests of all - it is an argument more in the 
language of power than of legitimacy. 
The issue of creditor adjustment was always going to be problematic but even issues that might 
have been resolved more amicably in the past such as levels of Fund finance have the potential to 
be far more problematic following the decline of symmetry. In the past, all countries could expect 
to borrow from the Fund so IMF resources could be genuinely regarded as a common revolving 
fund (Kenen, 1986). Even then, greater developing country vulnerability to commodity price 
shocks and the fact that quotas were linked to voting rights meant that a quota increase would have 
the greatest adverse effects on those most able to oppose it implying some downward bias. 
However, once some countries began to perceive themselves as lenders and others as borrowers 
the problems were greatly exacerbated. To the extent that financed adjustment can promote 
common goals -a rapid return to growth and therefore re-emergence as a trading partner in the 
global economy - there are still incentives to provide finance. However, there is an inevitable 
tendency to see finance as a down payment on policy reform rather than a mutual insurance policy 
under conditions designed to promote common goals. Since finance will only be used to promote 
reform in one group of countries there is bound to be a suspicion that, while some reform is in 
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everyone's interest, other proposals may be designed to benefit the 
interests of finance providers 
against those of finance consumers. 
The decline of aglobal vision 
Closely related is the decline of a clear role for the IMF as a global regulator. The move to floating 
exchange rates has meant that the IMF no longer has a role in setting clear global rules or 
in 
monitoring international liquidity. It concentrates far more on the monitoring of individual country 
policies in the context of both surveillance and conditionality. Worse still, in practice surveillance 
has little influence on developed countries who negotiate monetary arrangements with each other in 
the context of the G-10 or OECD. They use the Fund more as a way to negotiate their 
relationships with developing countries 
The Fund is at pains to stress its continuing role as a central site for international negotiations and 
the provision of information on an international scale. The Fund's two flagship annual publications 
- World Economic Outlook and International 
Capital Markets - are significant here but even they contain 
little genuinely regional or global analysis. Indeed the recent external evaluation reports on 
surveillance and research commissioned by the Fund have pointed to this issue (IMF, 1999a; IMF, 
2000a). At any rate, a role as global information provider is very different to one charged with 
global regulation, particularly as a key part of the Fund's role was to provide political control over 
the markets so as to reduce the need for adjustment, as well as merely providing finance and advice 
to ease adjustment when it became necessary. 
Expanded conditionality 
The very core of the logic of conditional finance also remains in place. The Fund mobilises finance 
to ease adjustment and, in return, imposes conditions on borrowers to ensure adjustment takes 
place without breaching international obligations. 
What has changed is that conditionality has clearly become far more extensive than it was intended 
to be when the Fund was set up (if it was intended to exist at all). As it has been extended, it has 
come to address issues that are far more significant for domestic politics. In the 1980s this agenda 
was largely to do with economic liberalisation and rolling back the state. In the 1990s it has begun 
to embrace transparency, accountability, judicial institutions, and dismantling industrial policy. It 
has also evolved to deal with longer-term policy in developing countries, attempting to pursue 
structural measures to boost production. 
The IMF has tried to legitimate this change largely by portraying conditionality as a residual 
category - what is left once surveillance and the availability of finance have been dealt with 
(Guitian, 1992). If we are prepared to bracket those issues, the IMF's arguments that changes in its 
scope have been driven by technical changes and developments in economic knowledge look a little 
more credible though they still rely on a conception of economics as objective science that is highly 
questionable. 
However, these attempts to confine debate can plainly be seen as a strategy to restrict the issues 
that are on the agenda when conditionality is being discussed or negotiated. It is designed to 
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displace controversy rather than to deal with it. In doing so signals are sent out about the hierarchy 
of decisions involved with some issues more willingly discussed than others. Lowest level and 
easiest to change are arguments about the content of conditionality conceived within the narrow 
context in which the Fund portrays it, then comes the availability of private and public finance and 
finally the overall framework of the global economy. 
Even if we do bracket larger issues, though, and accept that conditionality's development has been a 
technical matter it is clearly increasingly difficult to justify its content as technically determined as the 
agenda of potential conditions grows ever wider. That has highly problematic implications for the 
Executive Board's technocratic authority. 
More intrusive conditionality is also more likely to mobilise domestic political groups since it will 
have direct effects on a wider range of individuals. This in turn makes it far clearer that negotiating 
conditionality must be seen as a `two-level game' (Putnam, 1988) in which government negotiators 
(and therefore IMF staff) have to pay more attention to how programmes will play with domestic 
audiences. 
If we don't `bracket' the more fundamental issues, though, we again see the importance of declining 
symmetry for IMF legitimacy. Conditionality used to be justified in part by its status as one part of a 
broader reciprocal rules based framework designed to reduce the potential costs of engagement 
with the international economy and provide incentives for continuing engagement. With the 
declining influence of surveillance in developed countries, and the Fund's difficulties in pointing to 
a truly global vision, the separation between debates about the content of conditionality and about 
much broader issues in global monetary regulation becomes more difficult to maintain. Those 
debates are not going on elsewhere and, therefore, a key part of the justification for conditionality 
(the conditions countries are obliged to adjust to) is not up for debate. Without justifications based 
on the rule of law or consent, the Executive Board therefore needs to carry far greater authority. 
From cumnt account to capital account 
Underlying many of these changes has been a gradual shift from an exclusive interest in current 
account issues and towards an interest in capital account issues: effectively a reduction in the extent 
of political control over the international economy as a whole. The rise in privately financed 
sovereign debt was a key factor in undermining symmetry, producing larger crises, and justifying 
expanded conditionality. 
The shift towards private funding also diminished IMF control over balance of payments financing 
and, gradually, over the content of conditionality as the Fund began to need to enter into complex 
strategic relationship with the markets over the contributions that would be made towards resolving 
balance of payments crises. It was no longer in complete control of the relationship between 
conditions included and funds provided. In a way it is therefore possible to read all the changes that 
took place between Bretton Woods and the Asian crisis as consequences of a gradual shift towards 
capital account openness. 
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By the mid-1990s, under pressure from the G7 (and particularly the US (see Chapter 8)) capital 
account liberalisation appeared to have become an implicit Fund goal. In that context 
it is 
important to note that the original assumptions underlying the Bretton Woods agreements included 
a strong expectation that international capital flows would be regulated. 
In fact the IMF's involvement in capital account crises was deliberately outlawed by Article VI of 
the Fund's Articles of Agreement which prevents the Fund from providing resources to a country 
experiencing a large or sustained outflow of capital'. Polak argues that this issue was 
dealt with in 
Asia as it had been in the past using `fancy legal footwork' arguing that more generally, 
When the membership has agreed that the Fund should perform a new task ... the Fund 
has 
usually found a way to do so without recourse to amendment (Polak, 1998,49) 
The footwork required to justify intervention in Mexico and Asia was particularly fancy" and even 
Polak acknowledges that some formalisation of the new position would be desirable. Giannini 
argues more forcefully that 
Rule-bending is a common practice in real-world institutions and can even be viewed as healthy 
to the extent that it is a response to a new challenge... (but]... if it is protracted or applied to a 
core, rather than to marginal functions, it risks putting the legitimacy of the rule bending 
institution at great peril (Giannini, 1999,23). 
As Polak's discussion makes clear, the IMF has dealt with this issue on the strength of member 
consent. However, that consent is only exercised within the context of the IMF's weighted voting 
decision-making structures which offer weaker veto options to weaker states (and to various 
sanctioning institutions at domestic level) than the formal procedures for amending the Articles. 
Finally it is worth pointing out that developing countries have yet to make any explicit legal 
undertakings to maintain capital (as opposed to current) account openness, something that will be 
significant when we come to look at the Asian crisis in Chapter 4. 
Changing public international norms and new justifications? 
Although the picture presented so far looks very negative for IMF legitimacy, there have also been 
developments that may make conditionality more acceptable, at least for some players in developing 
countries. 
The IMF's claim that developing countries have begun voluntarily to adopt more market-based 
policies has some credibility (Boughton, 2001). The reasons for this change are the cause of much 
speculation and are not well understood (Bierkersteker, 1992; Stallings, 1992). Possible factors 
include: 
 a reaction to the failures of earlier state led policies (particularly those in Africa and Latin 
America), 
"a growing recognition of the potential benefits of trade and foreign investment -a 
conversion to economic orthodoxy. That may be under the influence of overseas education 
31 See (Gannini, 1999) for a discussion 
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or the hegemonic research output of the IMF and World Bank but it will also have been 
influenced by the renewed availability of private finance in the 1990s, 
  an acceptance that the balance of power in the contemporary international economy simply 
leaves little choice but to adopt the new market friendly measures. 
For countries that have access to capital markets, the resurgence of global finance in the 1990s 
dearly does provide incentives towards more orthodox macroeconomic policy in the same way that 
the promise of future finance facilitated debt negotiations in the 1890s (see section 2.2.1 above). 
For these countries IMF arguments about credibility and a potential `catalytic effect' have clear 
attractions, at least in theory. 
In practice questions remain about the extent to which IMF policies actually do enhance market 
confidence and induce capital inflows: something I will discuss further in Chapter 4. However, 
increased economic internationalisation and a growing developing country conversion to more 
orthodox economics are dearly significant trends that could theoretically make the IMF's task 
easier. 
The second new set of justifications, those relating to good governance, are more unambiguously 
political. From a developed country point of view their logic is clear. If the IMF has long term 
involvement in countries designed to promote growth, it is difficult to regard it as anything other 
than a development institution - even though that is still emphatically not the official position at 
the Fund or at least some of its major shareholders32. As a post Cold War development institution 
its legitimation must be humanitarian and it is therefore logical to include a concern with poverty 
and governance issues - particularly to the extent that these issues too can be redefined as mere 
technical requirements for development. 
In developing countries, a focus on potentially popular issues such as democracy, human rights and 
poverty reduction may also reduce some sources of popular resistance to the Fund, helping it to 
overcome its old dependenda image as the promoter of foreign capital at the expense of domestic 
welfare (Payer, 1977). This was an image that the Fund sometimes allowed states to perpetuate 
through scapegoating strategies in which the IMF was blamed for unpopular policies favoured by 
domestic governments. This may be particularly important as more extensive programmes with 
more direct effect on domestic populations become more common. A new focus on `ownership' 
then both reflects new international norms and the need to legitimate a broader agenda. 
The new agenda also reflects a significant change in the international sovereignty regime. We saw 
above that Jackson identified a shift in the Post War era towards states that were preserved 
internationally for moral (self determination) and strategic (Cold War) reasons despite limited 
domestic legitimacy (see page 69 above). During the 1990s, that shift began to be challenged. In the 
32 So, for example, both the US Treasury and USAID confirm that USAID have no involvement in determining IMF 
policy because the Fund is 'not a development institution' (personal communications, October 2000). In contrast, 
DFID has dearly had a significant input into UK policy during Gordon Brown's chairmanship of the IMFC 
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new liberal world order, states are to be held responsible by `the international community' 
for the 
interests of their domestic populations. 
This, of course, has profound implications for the legitimacy of international institutions such as 
the IMF. In this Chapter and Chapter 2I have talked, predominantly, about states as unitary actors. 
One consequence of the new agenda is that it is no longer practical to do so. This is a complex 
issue and will receive more discussion in Chapter 4. 
3.6 IMF legitimacy in the mid-1990s 
The core of the Fund's role has remained constant over time and retains considerable potential 
attractions. It continues to provide an international forum for negotiation, exchange of information 
and regulation relating to the international monetary system in the interests of promoting openness. 
Conditionality has the potential to ease adjustment, mobilising considerable resources for 
developing countries. 
However, within that broad framework the Fund's role has been significantly reinterpreted. The 
`code of conduct' in support of openness has become much more flexible and that flexibility seems 
to have been particularly beneficial for developed countries: essentially there is less control over 
financial markets implying a greater need for adjustment to market behaviour. As a consequence, 
the Executive Board has taken on a much more extensive and controversial role in developing 
countries and that role is less easily tied into a more fundamental set of rules enshrined in law. 
Relationships around finance, too, have become less symmetrical. Only some countries now expect 
to have to borrow from the Fund. Others are merely lenders and this will inevitably affect attitudes 
towards the institution 33. Equally, the Fund now has a far more marginal position in providing 
finance. Private markets have become more important and the Fund has entered into a difficult 
strategic role with those markets. It hopes to catalyse lending but has sometimes been accused of 
serving the interests of private markets rather than those of states. By allowing the genie of private 
capital back out of the bottle, states have made a significant dent in the post war idea of embedded 
liberalism which was one of the principal inspirations behind establishing the Fund. 
On the other hand, large capital flows to developing countries are potentially very attractive and 
their rise also provides new incentives for agreeing conditionality, at least if crises are not too 
frequent and the `catalytic effect' materialises in practice. 
The more extensive and more political agenda that the IMF seems to feel is required for 
conditionality under contemporary conditions provides additional challenges. It raises questions 
about the Executive Board's technical competence and an additional set of issues about consent of 
actors below the level of the state that I will look at more thoroughly in Chapter 4. On the other 
hand, emerging international norms around the ideas of democracy and human rights may have 
33 See also section 2.2.2 above 
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facilitated political interventions. Some aspects of the good governance agenda adopted by the IMF 
also have the potential to make the IMF appear more attractive to non-government groups in both 
developed and developing countries. 
The rest of the thesis will explore political responses to the balance between the costs and benefits 
of the changes that have taken place. First, though, I want to re-incorporate these complex changes 
explicitly into the original account of IMF legitimacy I gave in Chapter 2 so as to clarify the links 
between this part of the thesis and the case study discussions that follow. 
Purpose and performance 
IMF conditionality has largely been divorced from the framework of reciprocal obligations that 
originally underpinned the Bretton Woods agreements. International political control over the 
financial markets in the interests of state economic management for social and developmental 
purposes has become far more limited. On the other hand, common interests still exist. The basic 
coordination problem where most states want most other states to maintain economic openness 
remains and provides a justification for institutional restraints. The obligations to current account 
openness remain in place in the background - they are just less visible as current account openness 
has become more widely accepted. Conditionality still promises finance in return for policy change, 
offering the potential for mutual benefits. What has changed is that the connections between these 
two aspects of the Fund's role have become less secure as symmetry has declined. 
Conditionality increasingly looks like a bargain between states with some common and some 
opposed interests, rather than part of a broader framework of mutually beneficial reciprocal 
obligations. Developing countries still wish to attract foreign investment and ensure that `emerging 
markets' remain attractive investment locations for developed country financial institutions. Policies 
that encourage the smooth functioning of financial markets and investment are therefore mutually 
beneficial. The difficulties concern potential conflicts of interest between the wishes of the 
providers and recipients of investment. What are the costs of market-friendly policies, what are the 
benefits and how much freedom should developing countries be granted to choose where to strike 
a balance? Worse still, there is a danger that developed countries will press for policies to be 
included in conditionality that serve ends other than simply continuing market access - particularly 
as the IMF comes to be seen as a `development' institution and as its funding comes under closer 
political scrutiny in developed countries. 
Performance is increasingly likely to be assessed differently by different states. Countries that do 
not expect to borrow from the Fund will be interested in the extent to which they get value for 
money (policy change per dollar) without triggering too much developing country animosity. Some 
actors will also be assessing the results in terms of development goals which are far broader than the 
IMF's original mandate. Borrower countries, perspectives will remain more similar to those I set 
out towards the end of Chapter 2 (page 51). However, they will realise that developed country 
interests have changed and may therefore be more sceptical about what is included in 
conditionality. They will also have less good reason to see conditionality as an attempt to support 
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the obligations all countries take on when participating in the international monetary system and 
more reason to see it as a set of costs imposed by developed countries. The question is whether the 
flows of finance mobilised by the Fund are sufficient to compensate for those costs. 
Legality 
The issues here have been covered on page 82 above. The Fund's legal framework is looking 
increasingly weak and considerable efforts have been made to push decision-making through the 
Executive Board using weighted voting. The balance between individual state consent and weighted 
decision-making has shifted toward the latter. 
Procedure and authority 
The collapse of symmetry and expansion of conditionality has placed far greater weight on 
Executive Board authority but Executive Board decision-making has not adapted to help meet the 
changes. 
Voting rights at the IMF are still determined on the basis of overall economic and political power, 
despite the fact that stakes different countries have in the way the institution operates have changed 
significantly (Woods, 1998; Woods, 2000b). Although the developed countries still contribute most 
finance and have the largest stake in the global economy, it is by no means dear that they are most 
affected by the Fund's decisions. 
The Fund would find it difficult (though perhaps not impossible) to operate without the resources 
developed countries provide. However, since its primary regulatory function is now in developing 
countries, it is equally clear that it cannot continue to perform a useful function without developing 
country cooperation. The decline in symmetry and reciprocity makes this more serious still. Now 
that developed countries are unlikely to borrow the restraints provided by the `rule of law' cannot 
be expected to operate to limit conditionality and in the absence of mutual benefits, there are fewer 
good reasons to expect adequate funding. 
At the same time, the Executive Board's technical credentials are less well suited to the decisions it 
is asked to make. I explored the logic of technocratic authority in Chapter 2. I stressed the need for 
narrow and dearly articulated goals for technocrats to aim at. Obviously, the decline of the legal 
framework has been problematic in that respect. Instead, during the 1980s, the Fund was 
increasingly reliant on the political and economic rise of market-oriented policies reflected in the 
Washington consensus (Boughton, 2001; Polak, 1991). The rise of capital flows in the 1990s may 
have prolonged this policy convergence. 
However, if the IMF is right about the far wider range of policies that are brought into play under 
its new functions, there is room for considerable technical and political uncertainty about 
appropriate policy. There has been a marked tendency to substitute utilitarian conceptions of 
welfare for state agreed goals (something I will discuss further in the rest of the thesis). Of course, 
claims about welfare were always one of the means that were used to persuade states that they should 
offer consent but they were not the only consideration. States would presumably weigh concerns 
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about economic welfare with other values before agreeing to an expanded Fund role. That 
opportunity has only been offered within the context of weighted voting in the Executive Board. 
I also argued that technical legitimacy is distinctly fragile where it is unsupported by institutional 
structures that ensure mistakes in determining policy are genuine mistakes rather than political 
opportunism. It is that reassurance which current arrangements fail to supply. 
The compensatory reforms in this area, prior to the Asian crisis, were distinctly modest. The Fund 
had begun to release more data, making external assessments easier but not paving the way for any 
external accountability except within the context of domestic political systems. There was also a 
move to consult broader groups of people than the Fund's traditional focus on finance ministry and 
central bank personnel. These moves represent a gradual recognition of the need for some kind of 
broader representation but they were tentative moves and their import was difficult to assess prior 
to the crisis. 
IMF authority will therefore be based largely on the effectiveness of past performance rather than 
on institutional reassurances. 
Consent 
In terms of consent, the limited legal framework and enhanced Executive Board discretion mean 
that consent to the particular programme that comes out of negotiations will be particularly 
important in demonstrating continuing commitment to the IMF. 
In the context of increasingly prominent democratic rhetoric at an international level and more 
intrusive IMF programmes there may also be concerns that consent by state personnel is no longer 
sufficient for IMF legitimacy. 
This will, of course, depend on the domestic legitimacy of the state the IMF is trying to deal with 
and the extent to which that state is willing to work actively to legitimate the programme. There are 
also important questions about the extent to which it is legitimate for states to delegate negotiating 
authority to the financial personnel who usually negotiate IMF programmes or whether that has too 
great an effect on the balance of power within the domestic political system. 
In a context of increasing concern about IMF legitimacy it will also be important to use the case 
studies to assess the quality of consent achieved. The kind of formal submission to IMF authority 
Beetham talks about (see Chapter 1) is an important baseline but evidence of compliance or public 
resistance to the programmes will also be important in assessing IMF legitimacy. 
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4 IMF legitimacy and the Asian 
crisis: introducing the case 
studies 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the Asian crisis became a crisis of IMF legitimacy because of its 
implications for wider pre-existing debates about the future of the Fund. I spent the rest of 
Chapters 2&3 exploring the logic of the IMF's legitimacy claims and the ways in which that logic 
had been affected by the Fund's historical evolution so that we could understand those debates. We 
are now in a position to return to an investigation of the Asian crisis itself and a discussion of its 
implications for IMF legitimacy. 
The Asian crisis was significant for many reasons. Most fundamentally, although there had been an 
emerging market capital account crisis before in Mexico in 1994, that crisis had been partly the 
result of government overspending (a current account issue) and, in any case, was dismissed by 
most economists as a one off event The Asian crisis proved beyond doubt that Mexico would not 
be one of a kind and confirmed that such capital account crises could take place even when 
macroeconomic fundamentals remained sound. It therefore triggered debates about an ongoing 
role for the Fund in managing capital account crises and a related debate about the costs of such 
crises (and of capital account openness more generally). It was also the first major opportunity to 
apply the IMF's new guidelines on good governance, published in 1997. 
The crisis therefore provided a good testing ground for the issues I raised at the end of the last 
chapter. whether the potential benefits of the IMF's new roles in capital account regulation and 
social issues outweigh their disadvantages in terms of legitimacy and authority for particular actors. 
The fact that the crisis took place in countries with economic and strategic significance makes for 
particularly useful case studies. The Asian countries were in a good position to bargain with the 
Fund and should have been able to secure less rather than more intrusive programmes - problems 
in Asia would therefore indicate difficulties with the entire IMF approach. Their importance also 
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meant that the issues were the subject of public debate both in Asia and elsewhere providing good 
quality evidence of the positions important actors took on controversial issues. 
The discussion so far has concentrated on general arguments about the relationships between states 
and the logic of IMF authority claims from various possible state perspectives. The first part of this 
chapter (section 4.1) will begin to move the thesis towards more empirical questions by introducing 
the specific technical controversy surrounding the Asian crisis, though still at a fairly abstract level. 
That will provide a useful theoretical background for the four case studies that follow (South 
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the United States in Chapters 5-8 respectively), setting out the core 
debates with some of their implications for IMF legitimacy, and minimising the need to repeat 
arguments that recur in different contexts. 
As with the more general arguments about legitimacy raised in the previous chapters, the technical 
questions remain contested. There is universal agreement that the economies concerned did not 
respond well to the IMF programmes but the reasons for that remain controversial and different 
interpretations have very different implications for IMF legitimacy. For some, the crisis 
demonstrated an important market failure, which draws into question the current policy of a hands 
off attitude to the regulation of international financial markets. For others it demonstrated the 
inappropriate nature of politically motivated intervention by states in domestic economic 
management, suggesting a need for greater Fund promoted `technical' regulation. 
In terms of the IMF's political legitimacy, the technical debates surrounding the crisis are unsettled 
and are therefore not by any means decisive in themselves. What will ultimately make them 
important is the kind of political support that can be mobilised behind the different interpretations. 
That is the connection between the theoretical discussions up to this point and the case studies that 
follow. Section 4.2 links theoretical discussion of the crisis to specific questions about the political 
reception of the crisis that will be addressed in the case studies which seek to combine technical 
and normative arguments with political analysis about the reception of Fund programmes and the 
sources of political opposition. 
When I introduced my conception of legitimacy at the beginning of the thesis, I argued that 
legitimating arguments needed to be assessed in terms of their credibility for particular actors at 
particular times and in particular places but, so far, I have left the question of who those actors 
might be in the IMF context ambiguous. The discussion in the first part of the thesis was based on 
the IMF's original accounts and therefore tended to follow the original inter-governmental 
conception of the Fund in which states are the relevant actors. However, towards the end of 
Chapter 3, I began to suggest that issues such as good governance and problems with non- 
implementation were making other domestic actors increasingly significant. By the end of section 
4.2 it will be clear that this is the case and that it raises important issues for the nature of IMF 
legitimacy. 
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In section 4.3 I therefore start to extend the discussion to look at the three-way relationship 
between domestic groups, their states, and the IMF. That discussion indicates a further set of 
questions about the institutional politics of programme negotiation and implementation, 
particularly in the light of increasing IMF interactions with `civil society', that form the second set 
of issues to be addressed in the case studies. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the 
agenda for the remainder of this part of the thesis. 
4.1 The Asian crisis 
As I showed in Chapter 1, the IMF's response to the crisis proved highly controversial It is helpful 
to see the technical controversy in terms of two overall issues. The first concerns the extent to 
which the IMF made appropriate choices about how the costs of the crisis were apportioned 
between foreign private lenders, Asian private borrowers, Asian governments (and therefore Asian 
tax payers) and foreign governments (through IMF contributions). This is a question about the 
relative advantages of market-based and administrative measures in resolving capital account crises. 
The second concerns the extent to which structural measures in the Fund programmes, designed 
(broadly) to address questions of banking supervision and good governance, were necessary for or 
helpful in resolving the crisis. There was also a third controversy over the IMF's chosen macro- 
economic remedy but, in many ways, this choice was determined by the IMF's solution to the first 
set of issues. 
These controversies are, at one level, technical issues about IMF performance. However, the issues 
turn out to be highly controversial in ways that raise important questions about IMF legitimacy. 
They raise issues about the potential financial costs of capital account openness and also about the 
kinds of policy that are in fact necessary to support openness. Indirectly, that also raises questions 
about who is to have the right to decide how the costs are to be distributed and even whether they 
are worthwhile. In short they have an impact on all of the aspects of legitimacy that I analysed in 
the first two chapters. . 
Debates about the appropriate solution to a crisis are often about understanding what caused the 
problems in the first place. This was certainly true of the Asian crisis. In particular the discussion is, 
at least implicitly, about apportioning blame - were financial markets acting irrationally and in need 
of better regulation, were the problems driven by Asian or international financial institutions, how 
much were Asian governments to blame? What, therefore should be done to resolve the crisis and 
who should pay? 
This section, then, will begin by reviewing the debates about crisis causation to provide a better 
understanding of the reasons and interests behind the controversy about IMF crisis resolution. That 
will set the stage for a discussion, in section 4.2, of the significance of the issues and the questions 
that need to be answered by the case studies. 
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4.1.1 Crisis causation 
The crisis essentially involved a massive withdrawal of capital from the Asian economies. Radelet & 
Sachs' early estimate was that the difference between peak capital inflows and peak capital outflows 
to the five most affected countries was US$105 billion in 1997 or 9.5% of their combined GDP 
(Radelet & Sachs, 1998b). These massive outflows of capital resulted in massive exchange rate 
devaluations, stock market collapse and widespread insolvency of banks and corporations'. 
All commentators agree that there were some rational economic reasons for investment to flow 
into Asia in the early 1990s and to leave again in the late 1990s. In particular, a weak dollar relative 
to the yen in the early 1990s boosted Asian exports to Japan at a time when interest rates in Asia 
were far higher than they were in most industrialised countries. In the late 1990s, the exchange rate 
position was reversed and interest rates in industrial countries rose as their economies strengthened. 
Rising wage costs relative to productivity and increased competition from China and Mexico in the 
late 1990s were also factors in making the crisis economies less competitive2 (IMF, 1997e; World 
Bank, 1998a). 
However, these events were not dramatic and all commentators agree that they are insufficient to 
account for the huge swings in capital flows that took place during the crisis3. The additional factors 
that explain this situation are the subject of some controversy. 
Poor banking regulation 
What is clear in retrospect is that, at the time of the crisis, the banking systems in the affected 
countries were in a highly vulnerable position. Asian banks had large amounts of short-term foreign 
debt4 which they were lending on to fund longer term domestic projects. Much of this debt was not 
hedged against exchange rate shifts. 
To make matters worse, Asian banks' risk management practices were often suspect. There was a 
tendency to rely on the collateral provided on loans without any supplementary assessment of likely 
income stream (Corsetti et al., 1998; World Bank, 1998a). This was particularly problematic as high 
savings rates and weakly developed equity markets meant that corporate finance was much more 
debt based than it is in most developed countriess. The collateral often consisted of financial assets 
such as shares (particularly in Malaysia) or property (in Thailand) adding to vulnerabilities. 
' Exchange rate movements for the case study countries can be found at Figure 5-1, Fgure 6-1, and Figure 7-1 on 
pages 137,175, and 213 respectively 
2 Export growth in Korea declined from 30% in 1995 to 4% in 1996. In Thailand the figures were 20% to - 
1 %(Radelet & Sachs, 1998a) 
3 For a cross section of opinion that concurs on this point see (Corsetti et al., 1998; IMF, 1997e; Radelet & Sachs, 
1998a; Wade & Venerosso, 1998a) 
" BIS data suggests that short-term debts exceeded reserves in all three countries (ratios of 213% in Korea, 
181 % in Indonesia and 169% in Thailand). Bank's foreign assets also exceeded their domestic assets by 297% in 
Korea, 1103% in Thailand and 424% in Indonesia (Corsetti et al., 1998). 
S Estimates vary. (Corsetti et al., 1998) put the average debt-equity ratio for the top 30 top Chaebol at 333%. In 
(Lane et al., 1999) the figure for Korea is 395% and for Thailand 450%. The equivalent figure for the US is around 
100%. It is also important to note that while high debt equity ratios appear perverse in a context of free capital 
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The resulting levels of short-term foreign denominated debt, often lent on for high risk domestic 
projects, left countries vulnerable to a rapid withdrawal of capital broadly analogous to a domestic 
bank run (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b). Inadequate bankruptcy legislation in 
crisis countries exacerbated the problems. Uncertainty over creditor priority meant that there were 
incentives to attempt to grab assets before they could disappear. 
While this much is clear, a number of key questions remain controversial. For such large flows of 
capital to take place, financial assets must either have been over-valued before the crisis or, 
alternatively, the crisis must have involved a panic resulting in an unnecessary and in some sense 
irrational withdrawal of capital. If assets were over-valued prior to the crisis we are left wondering 
what led to that over-valuation and why investors were unable to spot it. 
The empirical evidence does provide some indications that assets were over valued in Korea and 
Thailand but very little in Indonesia (Radelet & Sachs, 1998a). These indicators include boom and 
bust patterns in stock markets and property prices (Thailand), declining returns on capital (Korea 
and Thailand) and high levels of non-performing loans (all three countries, though levels were 
declining in Indonesia). 
Government policy 
How did this over-investment and asset over-valuation come about? A combination of factors 
seems to have been involved. Korea and Thailand had recently liberalised their financial sectors. 
Past experience suggests that financial liberalisation often results in a temporary sharp inflow of 
capital (Palma, 1998) (McKinnon & Pill, 1996). 
Government policy had also encouraged short-term borrowing. For political reasons, Korean 
liberalisation had favoured short-term rather than long-term borrowing (Chang et al., 1998). The 
Thai government had set up the Bangkok International Banking Facility in 1993 which involved a 
series of incentives designed to encourage Thai banks to raise money from non-residents and lend 
it on to other non-residents (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). In practice the interest rate 
differentials between foreign and domestic loans meant that foreign borrowing was lent on 
domestically at high profits. Even if exchange rate risk had been taken into account, borrowing 
abroad was still cheaper than domestic loans (World Bank, 1998a). 
Public government commitments to exchange rate pegs also encouraged banks to disregard 
exchange rate risk. The combination of fixed exchange rates and liberalised capital accounts also 
left countries unable to use interest rates to cool the domestic economy6. In any case, the high debt 
nature of Asian corporate finance would have made governments reluctant to raise interest rates. 
flows, form a key part of the logic of the 'developmental state' system in East Asia and appear far less 'irrational' in 
that context - see (Rajan & Zlngales, 1998; Singh, 1998) and Chapter 5 below 
6 In technical terms, the Mundell-Flemming model showed long ago that countries can only ever have two out of 
three of fixed exchange rates, free capital flows and domestic control over monetary policy -see for example (Krugman & Obstfeld, 1997). 
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Even so, markets should have recognised what was going on. Even if Asian banks were poorly 
controlled and regulated, international lenders should have become concerned with asset 
mismatches and over-valuations. 
At this point competing explanations all rely on some kind of market failure. The most market 
friendly explanations concentrate on lack of transparency and information shortages while the least 
market friendly argue that cycles of `mania, panic and crash' (Kindleberger, 1978) are a persistent 
feature of financial markets. In between come explanations emphasizing various kinds of `cronyism' 
and `moral hazard'. These different explanations are difficult to separate on the basis of available 
data but choosing between them is important because different accounts of crisis causation support 
different approaches to crisis resolution. 
Lick of transparency 
For those who remain confident in the markets, `external shocks revealed weaknesses in the Thai 
economy that until then had been masked by the rapid pace of economic growth and the weakness 
of the US dollar to which the Thai currency, the Baht, was pegged' (Fischer, 1998a)7. In other 
words it was only when growth slowed and the Thai stock market began to collapse that the 
weaknesses became visible. Previously, lack of transparency delayed public realization of the scale 
of the problems' (IMF, 1997e, 10) 
The argument is perhaps strongest in Thailand. Current account deficits were regarded as 
sustainable in the context of high growth and low consumption. It was only when property prices 
began to fall and the insolvency of a large non-bank financial institution - Finance One - alerted 
investors to the links between the property and finance sectors that borrowers realised there was a 
problem and began to reduce exposure. 
In Korea, occult cbaebol accounting practices and complex systems of cross guarantees between 
subsidiaries may also have made it difficult to tell how serious debt problems actually were. Three 
high profile corporate bankruptcies in early 1997 (Hanbo Steel, Sammi Steel and Kia motors) may 
have begun to change perceptions and terms of trade shocks resulting from regional currency . 
devaluations as the crisis spread later in the year were then sufficient to trigger the crisis. On the 
other hand, these financing patterns were well documented at least in general terms (Woo, 1991). 
Figures on corporate debt were also difficult to obtain. This was particularly significant in Indonesia 
where the majority of foreign borrowing had been carried out directly by the corporate sector. 
Official figures on non-performing loans were also highly unreliable with, for example, analysts 
estimating that the true figure for Korea was 10-20 times greater than the 0.8% government 
estimate. 
Finally, unreported off balance sheet transactions conducted in 1997 by the Thai and Korean 
central banks disguised the extent to which they had run down their reserves in attempting to 
protect their pegged exchange rates in the immediate run up to the crisis. 
(Corsetti et al., 1998) and (World Bank, 1998a) discuss the situation in similar terms 
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However, there was also a good deal of data available that revealed considerable problems if the 
markets had taken the time to look for it. The IMF points out that its 1996 World Economic 
Outlook had warned of growing vulnerability to changes in investor sentiment, excessive narrowing 
of risk premiums for emerging markets and the dangers of fundamental weaknesses in financial 
sectors (IMF, 1997e, 40). As Wade (1998) points out, investors need only have read the first 
sentences of the January 1996 BIS report to be alerted to the problems: 
Claims on Asian countries continued to expand at a brisk pace in the first half of 1995... The 
predominance of primarily short-term inter-bank funds helped to push the proportion of the 
`up to and including one year' maturity band in outstanding claims in the region to 64% at mid 
1995. 
And in June 1996 the report argued that the volume of flows to emerging markets was adding to: 
Concerns related to the sustainability of the rallies seen in securities markets, the instability of 
short-term bank flows, and the spreading of the market tiering faced by Japanese banks to a 
broader spectrum of participants. 
(Akyuz, 1998) notes that UNCTAD had also issued warnings of slowing growth in Thailand and 
Indonesia, though not Korea. 
The task force of eminent economists put together by the Council on Foreign Relations sums up 
what is probably closest to a consensus position: 
None of this is to say that lack of information was the key factor in the Asian crisis. Faulty 
analysis and plain euphoria probably were more important. (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2000) 
Others go further with (Stiglitz, 1998b) arguing that `Most of this debate has just been blame 
shifting' and (Wade, 1998) claiming that investors didn't wish to see the evidence that recently 
liberalised financial systems were functioning incorrectly. 
Mania panic and crash 
Other writers have suggested that the crisis demonstrates deeper problems with the operation of 
financial markets. At the root of the problem is the fact that the valuation of financial assets is, at 
least in part, determined by estimations of the future income stream that they will provide. Keynes 
famously described the result as like a beauty contest where contestants were to be judged, not by 
their attractiveness, but by how attractive each judge thought they would be to the other judges. 
Under these circumstances, asset prices rise partly because market participants expect them to rise 
further in the future. Expectations lead to greater demand which push up prices further confirming 
the initial optimism. Eventually, however, prices reach a point where the fact that they are over 
inflated can no longer be doubted and collapse rapidly. There are a number of different economic 
models based on this broad principles but the general pattern of `mania, panic and crash' remains 
and has recurred throughout history (Kindleberger, 1978). 
8 In relation to the Asian crisis, compare (Griffith-Jones et al., 1998; Kregel, 1998a; Wyplosz, 1998 and Akyuz, 
1998) 
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There are two of these models that are special cases and which require some further investigation. 
They are important because one, the bank run model (Radelet & Sachs, 1998a), suggests that the 
major problem was capital withdrawal, which could imply, at its most extreme, that there was 
nothing fundamentally wrong with the Asian economies at all. Alternatively, the other, the moral 
hazard model (Krugman, 1998b), argues that the problem was one of moral hazard caused by 
government interference in the markets before the crisis which could imply that markets were 
acting entirely rationally. 
The bank run model 
I have already briefly discussed the bank run model in the section on banking supervision above. In 
more detail, the argument is that banks (or in the current context whole economies) involved in 
converting short-term funds into long-term projects are always in a vulnerable position. In the 
normal run of events, the better returns that can be achieved by the long-term projects ensure that 
sufficient incentives can be provided for the short-term loans to be rolled over. However, if market 
confidence in the institution (or economy) concerned should falter enough for some investors to 
withdraw their capital, it becomes rational for all other investors to do so too. This is because the 
long-term projects will cease to be viable if they are not fully funded. 
What is important about this model is that a crisis can occur even when there is no good overall 
reason for it to do so. Market panic can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Taken to its limit, this 
model might imply that the Asian financial crisis was an entirely unnecessary event caused by a 
collective action problem. 
Moral hazard and avnj capitalism 
The moral hazard argument provides an alternative explanation that concentrates on over 
investment in the run up to the crisis. Krugman (1998b) argues that a number of factors led 
investors to believe that they would reap the full rewards of successful investments without having 
to pay the costs if things went wrong. 
High debt-equity ratios and an absence of effective bankruptcy legislation might be enough on their 
own to have this effect. More importantly, Krugman argues that there were reasons for the markets 
to believe that failing firms would be bailed out. In particular he cites close business-government 
relationships, banks that are `too big to fail' and the possibility that the IMF would bail out foreign 
creditors as it had during the Mexican peso crisis. These factors all provided incentives for investors 
to invest without taking sufficient account of the risks resulting in a build up of excess capital in the 
economies concerned. A crisis occurred when it became clear that such assistance was not 
ultimately going to materialise. 
Taken to its limit this approach could imply that the crisis merely corrected a set of over valuations 
encouraged by faulty incentive structures in the Asian economies concerned. It wasn't that the 
markets judged wrongly, rather they acted in the expectation that they would gain while prices went 
up and be bailed out when they went down. 
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Choosing between the models and auigning responsibility for the aisit 
Each model has different implications in assigning responsibility for the crisis. That is obviously 
important politically when it comes to justifying the costs that are imposed on different parties in 
the process of crisis resolution. 
Unfortunately, the various models are difficult to separate on the basis of the (often disputed) 
evidence. In any case they are not mutually incompatible. Moral hazard could have supplied some 
of the reason for over inflated asset prices with simple `mania' supplying the rest. The dramatic 
collapse of prices after the crisis could have involved some rational adjustment and some panic 
induced overshooting. 
The strongest supporting evidence for the moral hazard model comes from Thailand. Right up 
until late June, the government had promised that it would not devalue the Baht and the Thai 
central bank's Financial Institutions Development Fund had been pouring liquidity into Thailand's 
troubled finance companies. A shift in Thai investment away from productive sectors and into real 
estate and other financial assets may have provided a further indication. The crisis was precipitated 
by the failure of Finance One which might have indicated to the markets that no more bail outs 
would be forthcoming. 
Some analysts have argued that a history of heavy government support for the Korean chaebol may 
have raised similar expectations. Chang et al (1998) disagree, pointing out that recent government 
support for cbaebol subsidiaries had always been accompanied by a change of management and that 
three large groups had been allowed to fail between 1990 and 1996. However, examples of corrupt 
relationships between Hanbo Steel and figures with high-level connections in the Korean 
government (see chapter 5) may have sent inappropriate messages, particularly to overseas 
investors. 
The argument is very difficult to sustain in Indonesia because the majority of the debt was to the 
corporate sector. Some companies dearly did have some kind of political guarantees because of 
corrupt relationships with the Suharto family (see chapter 6 below) but it is difficult to argue that 
many were in this position (McLeod, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998a). 
Even if investors were not consciously investing in the hope that they could rely on government 
guarantees, many official accounts of the crisis argue that Asian bank lending had been less efficient 
than it should have been because non-market factors had entered into lending decisions. There was 
insufficient market discipline exercised in financial markets. Government involvement in financial 
markets (everywhere) and banks that with high concentrations of loans extended to individual 
companies (especially in Korea) could have been put under pressure to `gamble for redemption', 
continuing to lend to companies that were in trouble in the hope that more money would promote 
a recovery (Greenspan, 1998a; IMF, 1997e; World Bank, 1998a; Yellen, 1998). 
Those favouring bank runs, on the other hand, point out that the markets were not behaving as 
though they knew there was a risk but expected to be bailed out. Based on evidence from the rating 
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agencies and on interest rate spreads, they were behaving more as though they did not foresee 
significant problems. They add that government interference in markets and many of the other 
problems cited as `causes' of the crisis had been well known to all market actors for years before the 
crisis took place (Radelet & Sachs, 1998a; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b). Perhaps more importantly, few 
would deny that the `correction' of asset prices that took place was way beyond anything reasonably 
justifiable, a point made by Krugman himself in a later article (Krugman, 1998a). What is more 
controversial is the extent to which the correct conclusion to draw is that there weren't really any 
major problems in the first place. Few would go this far but opinion differs greatly on how serious 
the problems actually were. 
Summary 
Overall, it is difficult to come to firm conclusions about the causes of the crisis. Most economists 
would accept that all the models have some potential validity. They would differ in the emphasis 
given to different factors. In particular, some are more inclined to blame market failures while 
others are more inclined to blame government failures. Within the market failure camp there is also 
room for disagreement over whether failures were to do with the actions of Asian or foreign 
investors. 
In terms of IMF legitimacy, it is important to acknowledge that there was genuine uncertainty in the 
economics profession about appropriate courses of action. The IMF was forced to make a swift 
decision on the basis of the limited information available at the time. On the other hand it is also 
clear that there were a number of alternative approaches that could have been taken on the basis of 
that available information. In practice IMF accounts tend to emphasize domestic causation with 
some limited acknowledgement of global factors while the G24 have taken the opposite position. It 
is important to consider the possible political and economic reasons for the particular choices that 
were made. 
4.1.2 Debating the IMF response 
Despite controversies over aspects of causation, it is clear that once the crisis was set in motion it 
took the form of a cycle of declining confidence inducing asset withdrawals which induced further 
declines in confidence. To halt the crisis, this cycle had to broken so that capital would begin 
returning to the economies concerned. 
The IMF's solution was initially a largely market based one in which interest rates were raised to 
provide incentives for the return of foreign capital, money was leant to improve the prospects for 
debt repayment and various micro-economic policies were implemented to restore investor 
confidence. Fiscal policy was also tightened to cover the costs of increased debt service and 
financial sector restructuring (Fischer, 1998a; IMF, 1997e). Each part of this solution was 
controversiaL 
Macroeconomic polity 
High interest rates are the traditional remedy for balance of payments crises as they slow down the 
economy, dampening demand for imports and thereby easing balance of payments constraints. The 
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Asian crisis was primarily a capital account crisis but it did leave countries with related current account 
cash flow problems that needed to be resolved. More importantly high interest rates can also 
be 
justified on the grounds that they make holding domestic currency more attractive and therefore 
help to strengthen the exchange rate. 
In the context of a capital account crisis, however, they may have ambiguous effects. High interest 
rates exacerbate the problems with corporate debt that are a key part of the downward cycle. This 
in turn has an impact on the banking sector as non-performing loans decrease cash flow in a 
context where exchange rate devaluations have already put banks under pressure in repaying their 
own foreign currency debts9. The argument here is that the credit risk effects of increased 
interest 
rates outweigh the incentives that they provide (Kregel, 1998a; Kregel, 1998b; Radelet & Sachs, 
1998a; Stiglitz, 2000). If lending is often denominated in foreign currencies, as it had been in Asia, 
there are additional questions about how effective changes in domestic interest rates will be in 
encouraging capital flows when interest rates are more likely to be based on international rates. 
On the other hand, the IMF has been unrepentant, arguing that without raising interest rates 
exchange rates would have continued to fall which would have had largely the same effect (Lane et 
al., 1999). 
The fiscal policy element has come in for even more stringent criticism. If the problem was one of 
government overspending, there might have been some justification for fiscal retrenchment. In a 
capital account context, though, the result would simply be a recessionary economic slow down 
that would impair the chances of debt service without producing significant benefits. Stiglitz (2000) 
argues that 
Quite frankly, a student who turned in the IMFs answer to the test question "What should be 
the fiscal stance of Thailand, facing an economic downturn? " would have gotten an F. 
The IMF later acknowledged that its policy had been a mistake and began to ease the fiscal 
elements of its programmes in early 1998 (Boorman, 1998; Lane et al., 1999). 
Underlying these technical questions are some political considerations. Imposing tight fiscal policy 
could be seen as an attempt to ensure that the crisis countries kept as much money as possible back 
for debt service - the debate is therefore partly about who pays for the crisis. Some early comments 
by IMF staff suggest that attempts to please the Executive Board in this way were a consideration 
(see comments by Mussa in (Chote, 1998)) though Executive Board members have argued that the 
staff were responsible (Stiglitz, 2000). One possible explanation is that staff were acting on what 
they thought were Executive Board preferences and the Executive Board were accepting what they 
thought were staff technical judgments (see the discussion on page 50 above). 
Most economists agree that the interest rate decision was probably unavoidable if market measures 
were going to encourage the return of capital. As we will see later though, this market-based 
strategy itself has been the subject of considerable controversy. 
9 See espedally (Kregel, 1998a) 
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Micro-economic interventions and restoring confidence 
The Fund argues that the rnicroeconomic parts of its programmes were necessary. because they 
addressed problems that had been a key cause of the crisis; and / or because they were required to 
boost investor confidence and secure capital inflows; or in the interests of good governance. 
Obviously the IMF's understanding of the causes of the crisis will be crucial here in determining the 
appropriate measures. While all the elements of crisis causation discussed above feature 
in the 
IMF's interpretation to some degree, the emphasis is on government policy, moral hazard and lack 
of transparency - in keeping with the IMF's traditional faith in markets and very much 
in line with 
the guidelines on good governance reviewed in chapter 310. 
The key domestic factors that led to the present difficulties appear to have been first the failure 
to dampen overheating pressures..., second the maintenance for too long of pegged exchange 
rates..., third lax prudential rules and financial oversight ...... (IMF, 1997e, 40). 
Which is not, of course, to say that the Fund account implies markets were acting perfectly. 
... although the roots of the current 
difficulties lie mainly in the countries most affected 
developments in the advanced economies and global financial markets contributed 
considerably to the build-up of the imbalances that eventually led to the crisis.. gMF, 1997e, 
40). 
and 
the amount of exchange rate adjustment that has taken place far exceeds any reasonable 
estimate of what might have been required to correct the initial [currency] overvaluation[s]... In 
this respect, markets overreacted (Fischer, 1998a). 
Still, ultimately the IMF concluded that 
The main responsibility for taking appropriate measures lies with the countries concerned 
(IMF, 1997e, 41). 
Specifically, financial sector problems included: 
Limited experience among financial institutions in the pricing and managing of risk, lack of 
commercial orientation, poor corporate governance, and lax internal controls... [leading to] 
imprudent lending including lending associated with relationship banking and corrupt practices 
(IMF, 1997e, 12). 
In Korea central problems were high debt-equity ratios. Cbaebol in trouble had been helped to stay 
afloat by `unwise further extensions of credit, often at the behest of the government' (IMF, 1997e, 
12). In Thailand the key problem was over exposure to the property market and foreign currency. 
In Indonesia it was a combination of finance - excess foreign exposure with high levels of non- 
performing loans - and anticompetitive practices -'trade restrictions, import monopolies and 
regulations' (IMF, 
'1997e). More generally, Fund accounts tended to talk of lax market discipline 
meaning that, for various reasons, there were insufficient incentives for the efficient allocation of 
capital. The picture is one of over-investment caused by moral hazard and various kinds of poor 
regulation that reduced the incentives for proper credit assessment and market discipline. 
10 See for example (Fischer & Griffith-Jones, 1998). On the good governance guidelines see page 74 
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The response was to implement a series of reforms designed to reduce the role of the state in the 
economy of each of the countries concerned in an attempt to enhance competition and market 
discipline. Other measures were also introduced to `improve the legal framework for the relevant 
economies by insulating the economy from state interference, making it easier for investors to 
monitor short-term performance and improving bankruptcy provisions so it would be easier to let 
inefficient firms fail. These reforms included increasing corporate transparency and accounting 
requirements; improving banking regulation, extending bankruptcy regulation and enhancing 
central bank independence. In some countries they also involved new competition laws and 
consumer protection regulation. 
Criticisms of the microeconomic parts of the IMF programmes spring from two questions. The 
first one relates to causation. Were the structural factors identified by the IMF: 
(a) actually causer of the crisis; 
(b) merely problems with the relevant economies that needed to be fixed at some point; 
or 
(c) not problems at all ? 
Secondly, was it addressing those structural issues necessary and / or sufficient to solve the crisis? 
The two questions are closely related but actually independent. Even if structural problems weren't 
a cause of the crisis, they might still need to be resolved to restore market confidence if the markets 
believed they were a cause of the crisis, regardless of the truth of the matter. Alternatively, whether 
they were a cause of the crisis or not, their resolution might not be sufficient (or even necessary) to 
resolve the crisis - particularly if another approach (such as a debt moratorium or capital controls) 
were possible. 
Since IMF advice is supposed to allow countries maximum flexibility within the constraints of the 
`code of conduct', and since (as we will see later) the issues are highly political, the answers are 
obviously important for IMF legitimacy. If the structural reforms weren't technically necessary did 
they represent an improper use of Fund power to serve the purposes of its leading shareholders, 
indicating political bias? If they were necessary because of market sentiment but not for any more 
fundamental reason (if the markets had `got it wrong' in some way) what did that say about capital 
account openness and the role of the Fund? In either case, were the domestic political implications 
of the reforms properly considered? 
I will start off with a critique of the rationale behind preventing state intervention in the markets, 
since this is central to technical justifications of the structural policies, and go on to explore the 
question of the Fund's role in enhancing market confidence. 
What are the justifications for the IMF's structural interventions? 
As we have seen the micro-economic sections of IMF programmes in Korea, Indonesia and 
Thailand concentrated on altering the relationship between the state and business to eliminate state 
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intervention in credit markets (particularly in Korea) and to reduce both internal and external 
barriers to trade (particularly in Indonesia). They were attacks on various kinds of `industrial policy'. 
There are two arguments behind Fund scepticism about industrial policy. Firstly, as we have seen 
there is an argument based on economic efficiency, which suggests that state protection and 
intervention in credit markets (the creation of `rents) channels capital to un-productive uses 
undermining the overall efficiency of the economy and harming growth. In addition, the wish to 
secure these rents provides incentives for companies to spend resources in attempting to capture 
them involving anything from presentations and lobbying to outright corruption where state 
officials and businesses conspire to divide up resources between them'. 
These twin economic and normative justifications are combined in the IMF's concern for good 
governance. As we saw in Chapter 3, part of the governance agenda involves 
limit[ing] the scope for ad hoc decision making [and] rent seeking... [through] liberalization of 
exchange, trade and price systems and the elimination of direct credit allocation (IMF, 1997a). 
The arguments have historically been based around state-market relationships. In the Asian context, 
firm-bank relationships are also important. Firms and banks were tied together in a long term and 
interdependent relationship very different from the Anglo-Saxon arms-length model. Under the 
Anglo-Saxon system, equity finance is more important and firm-bank relationships are conducted at 
arm's length on the basis of strict rules on the disclosure of information. In Asia, where the 
majority of finance is debt finance, capital costs are constant regardless of the state of the economy 
and banks have large exposures to individual firms. Those exposures provide incentives to support 
companies in time of need in return for asking for greater returns in times of surplus - the 
relationship takes place over longer time horizons. Loans become a form of quasi-equity and banks 
have far more influence over their debtors. There are clear analogies with the efficiency and 
corruption criticisms of rent-seeking. Banks are working on `non-market' criteria limiting incentives 
towards static efficiency and raising the possibility of relationship lending (perhaps on the basis of 
bribery). 
While very much the orthodoxy in the international institutions, particularly since the neo-liberal 
turn in the early 1980s, these arguments are far from unassailable even from relatively main-stream 
economic perspectives. Since the critique is less frequently set out, it is worth providing a fairly 
thorough (if still brief) discussion. 
In terms of direct effects on efficiency, critics acknowledge that industrial policy may be inefficient 
in the short-term but point out that real world economies differ very significantly from the neo- 
classical paradigm. 
The static models of neo-classical theory take no account of the role of information and innovation 
in fostering growth over the longer term. Unfortunately, it is difficult for particular businesses to 
capture the full benefits gained from discovering (or in developing countries, acquiring, adapting 
" Two of the classic accounts are (Krueger, 1974) and (Posner, 1975) 
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and implementing) new techniques since knowledge can easily be copied and transferred. In any 
case the returns will only materialise over the longer term. Where `market discipline' is operating by 
threatening the withdrawal of capital if short-term returns are less than optimal, investment in 
technological upgrading may never take place. This is acknowledged in industrial countries, for 
example, by the practice of granting patents to innovators, giving them breathing space to market 
products and producing an immediate asset to calm investors (Khan & Jomo, 2000). Some Western 
economists have also questioned the short-term bias in equity-based systems of finance (Hutton, 
1995; Porter, 1992). 
Industrial policy is a sort of ex ante version of these `Schumpeterian rents'. Governments provide 
entrepreneurs with various incentives for innovation such as tariff protection, tax breaks or 
subsidised credit. In a broadly analogous way, relationship banking can also be used to extend 
investment horizons. 
If implemented correctly such policy can help to overcome investors' reluctance to take on the risk 
and illiquidity involved in investment in industrial upgrading. (Chang, 1999; Khan &Jomo, 2000; 
Vartianen, 1999). There are a number of ways of achieving this in practice. The most widely cited 
model is the idea of the `developmental state' originally used to describe Japan (Johnson, 1982) but 
also highly relevant for Korea (Amsden, 1990) which I will look at in more detail in Chapter 5. For 
now it is enough to point out that both government policy (Amsden, 1990) and the relationships 
between corporations and banks (Singh, 1998; Woo, 1991), criticised by the IMF in Korea, were 
part of a deliberate state strategy to reduce the influence of certain forms of market discipline in the 
interests of longer term manufacturing investment. 
Although creating rents may create inefficiency and encourage corruption, there is no reason to 
assume that it will do so. At the same time certain kinds of appropriately administered rent creation 
can be enormously effective in accelerating technological upgrading. If rents are administered by 
bureaucrats with sufficient skill and integrity, rent-seeking and corruption can be minimised. 
Of course, it would be wrong to suggest that rent seeking is never a problem. The costs in terms of 
corruption will vary depending on the political and economic circumstances in each country (Khan 
& Jomo, 2000). In some cases (eg. South Asia) decentralised political systems have made corruption 
so pervasive that it has undermined any attempt at industrial policy. In Malaysia, on the other hand, 
the institutionalisation and centralisation of transfers has reduced the scope for informal influence. 
The costs and benefits may also vary over time. The strategy of picking sectors to subsidise is 
always a risky one requiring high levels of bureaucratic competence and independence. As 
industrialisation progresses, and a country reaches the limits of learning' and embarks on 
innovation, it may become more difficult. It may become necessary to shift from state industrial 
policy to a more orthodox system based on patent protection. 
In any case, arguably even quite large sums spent on rent seeking may pale beside the social benefits 
produced in the form of broad based economic growth where rents are used skilfully to promote 
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technological change. For many, Korea has been the paradigm developing country case of this sort 
of strategy. The point is that the benefits as well as the costs should enter into the assessment. 
These technical arguments in favour of rent seeking are the strongest reason for questioning the 
neoliberal rent seeking paradigm but even other varieties of rent creation and resource distribution 
may not be wholly destructive. Economies of scale and scope, as well as short time horizons, may 
be significant barriers to industrialisation. It may therefore be necessary for resources to be 
channelled to a limited segment of society to create a class with sufficient capital to get 
industrialisation under way. This process took place in Europe too (for example in the form of the 
enclosure acts in the UK) albeit usually over a far longer time scale and in conditions where 
domestic populations were less able to offer resistance. 
During either process (capital concentration or industry promotion), political considerations will be 
key in determining the distribution of resources. The state must try to channel resources to 
situations in which they will be used productively but it will also have to buy off powerful political 
opposition and may need to use resource transfers to secure political stability. Indeed in some cases, 
securing broad political and social harmony may itself be an important part of the development 
process (Khan & Jomo, 2000). In Southeast Asia (particularly, for our purposes Indonesia and 
Malaysia) there have been attempts at fostering industrialisation through state intervention but 
these have been less significant than attempts to redistribute resources to encourage greater ethnic 
harmony (Malaysia) or political stability (Indonesia). If rent creation is an essential part of 
development, some injustice in resource allocation may be unavoidable, even if that is difficult to 
accept from a neo-liberal ideological perspective12. 
In short, rent distribution can cover a wide spectrum from the kleptocratic economic `management' 
of Mobutu's Zaire to the kinds of interventions undertaken by the Korean government that, for 
many, can be characterised as quite legitimate economic management tools. There is room for 
considerable dispute about the point at which policies cross the line into `corruption'. From this 
perspective the IMF's good governance guidelines tend to gloss over the distinctions by treating all 
state discretion as a potential source of corruption. 
In the Asian context this is particularly important because the crisis countries have been at the 
centre of a debate over the appropriate role of the state in development that has been raging since 
the late 1970s. I have already reviewed the progression of Bretton Woods thinking from the market 
friendly early 1980s to a growing recognition of the state in the late 1990s (section 3.4.2 above). As 
we will see in more detail in the case studies, the nature of IMF interventions in the crisis reopens 
this debate again with the Fund account suggesting state intervention is to blame for the crisis while 
12 The creation of a market economy may be rather different from its maintenance. For a reading of fluctuations in 
modernisation theory along these lines see (Cammack, 1997). This ambiguity is reflected in fluctuations in the 
literature on corruption which is sometimes more willing to accept corruption and sometimes less so (Szeftel, 
1998). 
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critical economists see too much liberalisation during the 1980s with insufficient attention to 
appropriate regulation as the cause of the problems. 
According to this perspective, the point is that the rent seeking paradigm has tended to 
underestimate the costs involved in and preconditions for a functioning market economy, reflecting 
a liberal tendency to see markets as `natural'. The growing awareness of the need for government 
regulation reflected in the rise of good governance during the 1990s is an important corrective. 
Economists are more likely to accept that both states and markets are necessary for an economy to 
function. Still, there remains a tendency to overlook the extent to which liberal economies require 
particular kinds of political underpinnings (Fine, 2000; Robison & Rosser, 2000). There is also little 
recognition of the costs of (for example) effective banking supervision, data collection (to enhance 
transparency), a technically competent legal system and the recourse to law more generally13. In this 
context relationship banking, in particular, may be seen as an appropriate `second best' option on 
these grounds alone14. The point is that there is a need to compare the real world of liberal markets 
with the real world of rent driven systems in the context of what is politically possible. 
Finally, it should be clear that the issues are not simply economic. They relate to questions about 
the available strategies for political management, the balance of power between the state and 
business, inter-ethnic wealth distribution and social choices between faster growth and greater 
fairness in resource allocation. The IMF programmes therefore had very significant political and 
social consequences, underlining my assertion that the IMF's expanded role was moving it into 
areas where domestic consent and domestic cooperation would become increasingly significant. 
I have suggested that the mechanisms for and purposes behind rent distribution vary from country 
to country. Although the issue of rents was central to debates about all three of my Asian case study 
countries, the strength of the arguments needs to be assessed in relation to the political economy of 
particular countries. Understanding the relevant domestic issues will have to wait for the case 
studies. 
In more general terms, though, criticisms of the rent seeking approach overlap with debates over 
the moral hazard versus market panic conceptions of crisis causation. The moral hazard and rent- 
seeking interpretations are necessary partners, while the bank run model would tend to reduce the 
salience of the rent-seeking issue. At the same time in an international context, the developmental 
state concept in Korea and Japan has been the long standing object of Congressional animosity as 
the system is believed to create barriers to foreign trade and investment, adding an overtly political 
angle to the debate (see, particularly, Chapter 8). 
13 On the costs of the preconditions for economic openness see (Rodrik, 2001 a). 
14 Mick Moore has pointed to the far lower legal costs of doing business in Japan where recourse to the courts is 
far less frequent (Moore, 1993) 
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Market confidence and the catalytic effect 
I reviewed the Fund's arguments about market confidence and the catalytic effect briefly above 
(section 3.4.1 on page 71). There are actually strong and weak versions of arguments about the 
relationship between IMF involvement and market confidence. 
In the strong argument, merely signing a letter of intent should enhance market confidence because 
conditionality acts as a commitment technology. The IMF is risking its money and reputation on 
the policies concerned and the threat of credit withdrawal and public embarrassment ensures that 
the country concerned will implement the agreed policies. In the weak argument, good policies 
implemented under IMF advice will restore market confidence through their expected beneficial 
economic effects over the medium term as policies are implemented. 
Graham Bird has mounted a concerted assault on the logic of the stronger version (Bird, 1997; Bird 
& Rowlands, 1997). He argues that the markets, rightly, take limited notice of announced policies 
unless there is some evidence that they will in fact be implemented. Without evidence, or at least 
the likelihood of implementation the IMF's `seal of approval' is unlikely to make much difference, 
particularly given that over 50% of IMF programmes are never completed. It is even possible that 
conditionality will be a negative indicator in some cases. The fact that the Fund felt the need to 
include measures in a coercive programme may imply that the government does not in fact want to 
implement them. Equally, on the historical evidence, agreement of a Fund programme is often an 
indicator of the need for future programmes - it is a lead indicator of trouble ahead rather than 
imminent recovery. 
Finally, even the weak version will only be successful if Fund policies are actually likely to achieve 
results that foreign investors are looking for. Here Bird points out that different types of investors 
will have different requirements. High interest rates will attract currency traders and inter-bank 
loans (though since many such loans are denominated in LIBOR their effects may be limited) but 
may repel FDI since they have the potential to induce recession15. 
In other words the catalytic effect is likely to be most successful where the Fund's self-image 
proves an accurate description of what is going on: where its policies are better than those a 
country would suggest and where conditionality is genuinely owned. That suggests that enhancing 
IMF legitimacy may be able to start a virtuous cycle of greater ownership and improved 
performance. 
In the context of the Asian crisis, these criticisms were raised informally by Jeffrey Sachs who 
argued that the arrival of the IMF gives all the comfort of seeing an ambulance outside one's door 
(Radelet & Sachs, 1998a, 33). Sachs added another plank to the argument by suggesting that where 
market confidence is key, including large numbers of issues in a Fund programme may create 
problems that did not exist before. Once the Fund has told the markets these issues need to be 
15 Bird has attempted empirical tests to evaluate the catalytic effect. He found different types of effect with different 
sources of finance. Fund approval did have a modest effect on public sector finance but there was no evidence of a 
positive effect on private finance (Bird & Rowlands, 1997) 
106 The crisis, IMF legitimacy and the case studies 
resolved, the markets will not be satisfied until they have been regardless of whether they caused 
any objective problems. The longer the programme the more bad news is given to the markets. The 
IMF was `screaming fire in the theatre' (Sachs, 1998). 
The issues are highly controversial in both cases. What is important is that highly respected 
economists raised a coherent critique of the Fund approach in a variety of public fora. In the light 
of my discussion of the logic of technical authority in Chapter 2, we can see that technical 
uncertainty had the potential to be very damaging to IMF legitimacy. 
Empirically the issues are difficult to resolve as there are a number of possibilities. If market 
confidence returned quickly it is possible either that the Fund's structural policies were appropriate 
or that the markets believed (wrongly) that they would be. If confidence did not return it could be 
because poor implementation undermined confidence; because the markets were waiting for results 
rather than merely efforts at reform (after all such policies would take a long time to implement); or 
because the markets were not impressed by the Fund's technical diagnosis. 
In the event confidence did not return quickly, at least relative to the IbMPs public expectations at 
the start of the crisis. However, why that was will need to be explored further in the case studies. 
Politically both issues are also highly charged. Rent seeking provides a justification for market 
liberalisation which is in the interests of foreign business, since it makes it easier to operate in the 
country concerned. The catalytic effect is important because it is a crucial justification for the 
Fund's market based approach to crisis and for the extent to which the size of Fund resources has 
fallen behind volumes of world trade and capital flows. If the Fund's justifications for structural 
reform are weak, that raises the suggestion of political bias. If the catalytic effect is less powerful 
than the Fund would like to believe that raises questions about market based approaches to crisis 
resolution and undermines the arguments for structural reform. 
Lender of last resort, international bankruptcy and moral barard 
Perhaps the most fundamental issue is the Fund's overall strategy for dealing with capital account 
crises. If, as most commentators agree, the best analogy for understanding the crisis is with some 
kind of systemic bank failure, what were the available options? 
The `correct' solution will depend on whether the crisis was best seen as a crisis of liquidity or one 
of solvency. If it is only a liquidity crisis, if there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the 
economies concerned save for market confidence, a market based solution, combined with an 
injection of liquidity is a sensible solution. It is ultimately costless as the loans provided can simply 
be repaid (although there are issues about the appropriate charge for such high risk lending). The 
Fund is playing a role analogous to a lender of last resort in domestic banking systems (Calomiris, 
1998; Fischer, 1999a). 
If, however, market confidence does not return, the lender of last resort role becomes very 
problematic. If the situation ultimately ends in bankruptcy, then the liquidity injection will have 
been transferred to banking system creditors who should in fact have incurred heavier losses than 
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they did. A lender of last resort operation becomes a `bail-out'. Creditors escape the consequences 
of their risky sovereign lending and the government is left with even higher debt owed to the IMF 
instead of private creditors. 
The classic solution is to mitigate the risk by lending only at a penalty rate (so that the LLR is only 
called on in need) and on good collateral (so that something can be seized if things go wrong) 
(Bagehot, 1873). It is also important that there is a good domestic bankruptcy system in place, both 
so that liquidation is a realistic option (preventing the moral hazard that springs from banks which 
are immune to failure) and to assist in recovering some of the last resort lending if a bad decision 
has been made to attempt a rescue. 
The problem with the IMF's operations in Asia is that there did not seem to be any sensible exit 
option in place. Domestic bankruptcy legislation was poor and there is nothing equivalent on an 
international scale. The IMF's injection of liquidity was not sufficiently large to eliminate risk to 
foreign lenders (and was in any case slowly disbursed in order to keep some leverage over the 
reform process). The idea behind the intervention was that the added effect of policy reform would 
compensate for the shortage of funds but this did not seem to work in practice. 
What might the alternatives have been? There are difficulties with anything that really approaches 
an equivalent to bankruptcy at a domestic level since creditors cannot seize large parts of national 
assets to maximise their returns (although that was a solution occasionally adopted in the 1890s 
(Fishlow, 1985)). Instead solutions involve either an extension of more private funds while the 
country grows out of the liquidity crisis, some kind of debt rescheduling or write-down, or a 
combination of the two. 
The difficulty is that there is a collective action problem involved. Assuming that the country is 
going to recover eventually, it is in everyone's interests to provide the finance or debt forgiveness 
required in the short term. However, ex ante the results can never be certain and individual lenders 
may wish to avoid being exposed to the relevant risk. There is therefore a need for some kind of 
administrative solution capable of forcing creditors to come to the negotiating table. There are a 
number of possible options from sharing clauses in loan contracts, to `moral suasion' from 
regulators (the option eventually adopted in Korea), to a legally sanctioned moratorium on debt 
repayments combined with supplies of interim working capital and probably with some form of 
capital controls. 
The political controversy over the Asian crisis springs from the different distributional implications 
of these various possible approaches. The lender of last resort approach is always costless to 
creditors and either relatively costless or extremely expensive to crisis countries depending on the 
outcome. The more administrative measures are all cheaper for the crisis country in the short term 
and more expensive for foreign creditors but may impair future market access, costing crisis 
countries more over the longer term. 
As Ginanini points out the lender of last resort role creates: 
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An enormous problem of legitimacy, because the lender of last resort function inherently 
involves redistributing resources. Up to a point, this may be done on a purely technical 
basis.. . Beyond that point ... there is a tendency [domestically] for political institutions to 
become involved. There are also good grounds for believing this is desirable, at least up to a 
point, insofar as it helps to protect the legitimacy of the agent ... within its technical realm 
(Giannini, 1999,16). 
There may ultimately be reciprocal benefits involved (everyone gains from greater financial stability) 
but there is a great deal of uncertainty and they are hard to quantify. In view of the incentives 
involved, it is hardly surprising that the institution charged with acting as LLR finds itself with 
either insufficient resources or insufficient discretion to carry out its role with the necessary speed 
and commitment. 
The political problems are clear from the widespread criticism that the Fund's solution to the crisis 
ultimately bailed out foreign creditors at the expense of Asian governments (and therefore tax 
payers) (Kapur, 1998; Krugman, 1998b; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b; Wade & Venerosso, 1998a). For 
others, though, the Fund was making a difficult choice about the relative costs of short-term crisis 
and longer-term penalties from reduced market access. 
The counterfactual problems involved in assessing the likely consequences of different courses of 
action mean that this issue, like the others, remains contested16. 
Of course, since the measures to restore market confidence that the Fund hoped would assist its 
liquidity injection were the structural and macro-economic measures reviewed above, the two sets 
of issues are also deeply interwoven. The structural measures were required to restore market 
confidence so would they have been necessary if an administrative solution had been adopted 
earlier? Would that solution also have avoided the problems caused by high interest rates? In 
practice, market confidence failed to materialise. Was that because the structural measures were 
ineffective, because the Fund's diagnosis of a liquidity crisis was mistaken, or because funding was 
inadequate or disbursed too slowly? 
4.2 Issues for the case studies 
What is the significance of all this and what issues does it raise for the case studies? 
We have seen that the Asian crisis raised a number of technical controversies which are connected 
with concerns about the Fund's role and which have a significant political impact. 
The IMF's overall strategy involving a market based rather than administrative solution to the crisis 
demonstrated faith in the international capital markets. It suggested a diagnosis of the crisis that 
blamed domestic policy rather than international investors. It would be costly in the short-term for 
16 The historical experience is in any case mixed. There seem to have been few lasting penalties for non-payment in 
the aftermath of the Great Depression but then default was relatively widespread. Renegotiating bond contracts was 
nonetheless a very lengthy process leading to considerable uncertainty (Eichengreen & Portes, 1989; Jorgensen & 
Sachs, 1989) 
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the domestic government, though over the long-term it might be beneficial in demonstrating a 
commitment to debt repayment. Nonetheless, the approach raised questions about institutional bias 
in favour of the Fund's major shareholders and a more general tendency to be suspicious of states. 
The macroeconomic issues are closely related. Again they can be interpreted as attempts to favour 
foreign rather than domestic interests. High interest rates would attract foreign investment at the 
expense of the domestic real economy. Tight fiscal policy would maximise the chances of 
government assistance in debt repayment and reduce the need for debt rescheduling. On the other 
hand monetary policy, at least, seems to have been largely inevitable once a market-based strategy 
had been chosen. 
Finally, the IMF's structural measures were highly controversial. There were questions about 
whether such extensive measures really had a chance of restoring market confidence or were even 
necessary. More importantly that raised issues about the extent to which Fund policies could be 
justified economically and about whether the IMF was taking sufficient and unbiased account of 
their social and political consequences. At a more practical level that led to the concerns that I aired 
in Chapter 1, that the IMF was moving into overly political territory and that the programmes 
would lead to significant popular domestic discontent 
The most immediate questions raised for the case studies are empirical and technical issues about 
IMF performance. Why was the crisis so costly? Was that because the IMF's market based, market 
confidence approach was misguided? If so, was that because it was wrong about what would boost 
market confidence, or because the markets were acting irrationally? If, as I have argued, assessing 
rent creation is a complex business involving economic and social considerations, how should one 
make that assessment in the crisis countries? 
At a fairly abstract level, it should already be apparent that these issues have implications for IMF 
legitimacy. Most fundamentally, if IMF performance was poor does that threaten Fund claims to 
exercise an internationally valuable role in capital account regulation? Should the new aim of capital 
account convertibility be formally adopted? Alternatively, would that role have been more viable if 
an alternative approach had been adopted - particularly one that involved a more administrative 
approach to crisis resolution? 
If it was the IMF approach that was wrong, why was it wrong and what does that say about the 
IMF's institutional structures? There seem to be particular grounds for concern about the IMF's 
technical legitimacy given the increasingly political consequences of Fund interventions but what 
exactly was the problem? Were IMF policies broadly correct but difficult to implement domestically 
given the additional actors that have become involved in programme implementation? In that case, 
should the Fund be reforming its institutional structures in a way that would provide it with greater 
popular domestic legitimacy in borrower countries? Would clearer state consent help that process? 
Is there a need to re-establish a transparent legal framework to provide greater legitimacy for 
problematic policies? Alternatively were IMF policies fundamentally flawed? If so does it need 
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better technical input or is the problem one of political bias? Again could institutional changes 
resolve those difficulties? 
Since we are concerned with politicallegitimacy though, what is most important is the way that these 
debates feed into actual political pressure for IMF reform and it is here that the case studies are 
particularly significant. 
There are likely to be two sources of such pressure. Most immediately, if IMF programmes are not 
in fact implemented that will suggest that states are not being provided with sufficient reasons for 
compliance - or that the IMF is attempting a role that is too ambitious. All states will have an 
interest in taking note of non-implementation. For borrower countries there will be concerns that 
borrower states may have good reasons for non-implementation or that, where market confidence 
is important, programmes that cannot be implemented will be very costly. For lender states the 
point of the IMF is largely to secure policy change. Non-implementation implies that it is not 
performing its allotted role. 
Secondly, regardless of implementation, if other countries not immediately involved in the crisis are 
concerned about IMF policy they may offer dissent in the IMF's two Boards either over the 
specifics of the programme or in relation to the appropriate course of future Fund policy. 
That suggests that we need to look at a variety of different countries. We need to investigate at least 
one crisis country that accepted an IMF programme. In fact I have chosen two so that a 
comparative approach can be adopted. Korea was the most successful programme and was also 
significant because, prior to the crisis, it was regarded as the purest example of a `developmental 
state' making the IMF's technical arguments about structural policies particularly controversial. 
Indonesia was the least successful programme and the country in which issues of corruption (the 
other strand of the rent-seeking arguments reviewed in section 00) were most significant. 
We also need to look at onlooker countries that might raise issues at the Fund's two Boards. Here I 
have chosen one borrower country, Malaysia, and one lender country, the United States. Malaysia is 
important, partly because Mahathir articulated the most public criticism of IMF policy and partly 
because Malaysia was faced by a similar crisis but adopted a very different solution. It implemented 
capital controls. The Malaysian case can therefore provide us with both a case study of the reasons 
why some borrower countries objected to Fund programmes and a potential counterfactual. 
The United States is important partly because of its enormous influence in the Fund. Additionally, 
it was the lender country in which there was most public debate about IMF interventions making 
an analysis of the politics of lender country relationships with the Fund much simpler to carry out. 
I now turn to an examination of the exact issues that the case studies need to address. The issues 
will be easier to understand if we begin with questions about the kind of dissent that might be 
raised by onlooker countries. 
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4.2.1 Issues for onlooker countries 
Malayria 
For borrower countries like Malaysia, which we will look at in Chapter 7, the issues are about how 
costly IMF interventions appeared to be and what should be done about that. 
That raises a set of questions about Malaysian interests. Would IMF policies that were politically 
problematic in crisis countries be difficult to implement for Malaysia? Given what went on in the 
crisis countries, how much flexibility could Malaysia expect from the IMF under what 
circumstances? What does performance in Asia therefore imply about the political and economic 
costs of capital account openness for Malaysia? What are the politically feasible alternatives? 
From those questions about interests, more strategic political questions follow on which emphasise 
the link between interests and legitimacy. How much support can Malaysia expect from others if it 
raises objections? What are the costs of raising objections in terms of market perceptions and 
Malaysia's relationships with political allies? 
Legitimacy is important here because the more convincing IMF justifications are, the more difficult 
it will be to muster political support. The IMF is intended to resolve a coordination problem. That 
will inevitably impose occasional costs on states. Narrow self-interested arguments that simply 
reject those costs to the detriment of the entire international community are not only less likely to 
capture the moral high ground, they are also less likely to attract broad international political 
support. Arguments about the relationship between IMF policy and the interests of large groups of 
statesthough - arguments that attack IMF legitimacy - are more likely to be successful. Questions 
about the relationship between IMF interventions in crisis countries and the IMF's broader 
legitimacy claims will therefore be particularly significant. This is where perceptions of the crisis 
countries are important. How can evidence in crisis countries be used to support broader questions 
about Fund legitimacy that have the chance of attracting political support to push for reform? 
The Malaysian case study will be about analysing the objections Mahathir raised to IMF 
interventions in Asia. However, it will also need to look at the reasons behind those objections, 
partly to understand the politics of IMF intervention but also because those reasons will have 
implications for Mahathir's credibility and for his ability to mobilise broader support. The domestic 
impulses behind Mahathir's decision to adopt capital controls will suggest circumstances in which 
other countries will be tempted to object to IMF policy. They will also provide valuable 
information about what made Mahathir's opposition more or less credible. Was it purely self- 
seeking and anti-social -a rejection of the IMF's aims of economic cooperation - or did it raise 
genuine issues about the balance between state autonomy and the benefits of economic 
cooperation that were of interest to other countries? 
Differences with the IMF approach, of course, revolve around Mahathir's decision to adopt capital 
controls. The analysis of the politics of that decision will also be independently relevant to other 
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countries' evaluation of IMF policy in Asia since they provide a potential counterfactual to IMF 
policies for crisis resolution. 
The United States 
For lenders like the United States, which we will look at in Chapter 8, the questions will be slightly 
different. Three issues are key. How much pressure did the crisis place on Fund (and therefore US) 
resources? What were the consequences of IMF intervention in the form of desirable policy 
change? How much political resentment was triggered and what will the effects be in terms of 
future IMF efficacy and political relationships with affected countries? 
Arguments about the cost issues and policy change issues will be directly relevant in assessing crisis 
performance and justifying Fund involvement to domestic audiences. Issues about political 
resentment and therefore IMF legitimacy will be less immediate but will become increasingly 
important as challenges appear from borrower countries (such as Malaysia). Here the difficulty will 
be in marshalling justifications for maintaining desirable aspects of the Fund's role (from a US point 
of view) that can expect to have a broader international appeal despite concerns about 
performance. Again, interpretations of crisis country experience arc important at this point. 
The central questions for the US case study are about the way the balance is struck between these 
self-interested national and more strategic international considerations. As the IMF has become 
more visible in American politics there are important issues about the way these considerations are 
resolved through US political institutions. Who decides where the balance is struck? Which groups 
are involved? How much democratic control is there over the outcomes and what might we expect 
to happen if that democratic control was enhanced? 
4.2.2 Issues in crisis countries 
Korea and Indonesia, the crisis countries, are likely to find it more difficult to take part in these 
international debates. Firstly, their need for finance makes them deeply reliant on IMF assistance 
and on market confidence that programmes will be implemented. They are not in a good position 
to offer public resistance (see the discussion in section 2.3 above). Secondly, the IMF it supposed to 
place some restraints on state freedom and arguments about that from countries in the process of 
borrowing will look self-interested undermining their broader credibility. 
Nonetheless, crisis country experience is important in those debates because we saw that later 
arguments raised by outsiders are based on perceptions of crisis country experiences and those 
arguments will rely on evidence from those experiences. 
There is obviously room for divergent interpretations of what actually went on in the two case 
study countries. I will attempt to provide a relatively balanced account that enables one to 
understand the basis of those different interpretations. I attempt to indicate where evidence is 
controversial and to make it clear when I am putting forward a disputed point of view. I also 
indicate points where it is likely that outside perceptions may have differed from what, on the basis 
of later information, seems in fact to have been the case. This is obviously a difficult enterprise in 
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such contested territory and readers will inevitably disagree from time to time My account should at 
least be sufficient to provide the basis for an assessment of the evidence that can be marshalled in 
support of the debates that arise in the context of the onlooker country case studies (Chapters 7& 
8) and my broader review of the politics of IMF reform (Chapter 9) even if many will ultimately feel 
that my account is biased towards or against the IMF. 
I have three particular concerns in the crisis case studies. I will: summarise the evidence relevant to 
the technical debates about IMF performance as it arises in the two countries; explore the politics 
of negotiation and implementation of the programmes; and draw conclusions about the nature of 
IMF interventions in the context of the political economy of the countries concerned. 
The rationale and issues surrounding the first concern need no further elaboration. My concern 
with the nature of IMF interventions relates principally to the structural part of the IMF 
programmes and has obvious connections with legitimacy. I set up an opposition between technical 
and political aspects of decision-making in Chapter 2 that has implications for IMF authority. One 
of the key questions for the Indonesian and Korean case studies, that will then be significant in the 
debates reviewed in Chapters 7,8 & 9, concerns the relationship between these kinds of decisions in 
the context of IMF structural policies. To what extent are technical understandings of what went 
on adequate? What sort of political issues were involved? And what are the implications of that for 
IMF legitimacy, particularly in terms of the decision-making process? 
The politics of negotiation again relate to institutional questions discussed in Part One. How much 
were the programmes prepared by the government and how much were they imposed by the IMF? 
What does that tell us about the IMF's interpretation of its `code of conduct' at the turn of the 
millennium? Equally importantly, how much of that negotiation process was visible from outside 
and how did transparency (or lack of it) influence domestic and international perceptions? 
Secondly there are related issues about implementing programmes once they have been agreed. 
Which groups were enthusiastic about which aspects of the programmes? Where was dissent 
offered and why? To what extent was such dissent able to influence implementation? 
Those questions clearly overlap with debates about the nature of IMF conditionality. What kinds of 
interest were at stake? They are also important in their own right. If IMP legitimacy is important 
because of its influence on programme implementation, understanding the implementation process 
in particular countries is clearly highly significant for any assessment 
Particularly important, given the issues raised in Chapters 2&3 are questions about the groups that 
turn out to have an influence on implementation either directly or indirectly through their influence 
on the broader political process. The growing importance of domestic politics both for 
implementation and in oversight of lender country policies was a theme that began to emerge at the 
end of Chapter 3. Since the discussion of IMF legitimacy so far has tended to be carried out in 
terms of state interests, the final remaining task before the case studies is to explore some of the 
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theoretical implications of this development for the nature of IMF politics to provide a framework 
for analysis of these issues in the case studies. 
4.3 The importance of domestic populations 
The discussion in section 4.2 began to suggest the importance of domestic politics in arguments 
about IMF legitimacy. Discussions in Chapter 3 suggested some of the historical and theoretical 
reasons why this was likely to be the case. In particular Fund policy has become more wide-ranging 
and, since the Cold War, the boundaries between domestic and international politics have become 
less well defined. 
Domestic interests are in a position to influence programme negotiation and implementation in 
borrower countries and, since the rise of structural adjustment in the 1980s, political economists 
(often with IFI or OECD support) have been studying the politics of programme implementation 
(Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; Haggard et al., 1995; Killick et al., 1998; Williamson, 1984). 
In lender countries there are significant questions about the extent to which non-financial arms of 
government and civil society are able to influence Fund policy. Reluctance to accept strategic 
justifications for aid in developed countries and the rise of NGOs since the 1980s has also meant 
increasing public scrutiny over developed country policies towards the IMF. This has led to a 
complex set of questions about who should be able to hold the IMF to account and who is able to 
do so in practice. 
So far I have tended to talk about the IMF in terms of relationships between states and the Fund. 
That is in keeping with the way the original institution was set up. It should be clear that this 
narrow focus is no longer entirely adequate. In this section, I want to expand it to include domestic 
interests as an additional axis of influence. How significant domestic voices are in fact is something 
that will be looked at empirically in the course of the case studies. However, it is useful to have an 
analytical framework through which to carry out that discussion and providing such a framework is 
the purpose of this section. 
4.3.1 The old model 
Interactions with the IMF have always been, using Robert Putnam% familiar terminology, a `two- 
level game' in which what finance ministers were prepared to negotiate depended on their domestic 
`win set' - the set of policies that could be successfully implemented without provoking an 
unacceptable level of domestic opposition. The position of negotiators was special, in that it was 
always possible for them to veto arrangements that were within the domestic win set but that 
conflicted with their own priorities, but they remained ultimately subject to the constraints of 
domestic politics (Putnam, 1988). In keeping with the post-war sovereignty regime, the extent to 
which negotiators' preferences were compelled to conform to the popular will would depend purely 
on the nature of those domestic politics. 
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An account of programme negotiation in Houphouet-Boigny's Cote D'Ivoire is typical of standard 
procedures: 
Standby arrangements were typically negotiated by a small technical group within the Ministry 
of Finance and then cleared by the President sometimes without even full-fledged cabinet 
discussion (IMF, 1998,70). 
Other countries did operate alternative procedures so that in Haiti, for example, IMF programmes 
could not be implemented without legislative consent but this is purely a domestic arrangement. 
Similarly, in the United States, Congress has retained a veto power over any attempt to increase 
Fund resources or change the Articles of Agreement. In the UK, in contrast, there is no need for 
such parliamentary consent, though the Treasury Select Committee does periodically review UK 
policy towards the Fund17. 
Different policies and decision-making procedures are likely to arouse different levels of domestic 
interest. In the past, the secrecy with which the IMF conducted its business and the relatively high 
level technical decisions that it presided over - issues that were implemented by central government 
with little obvious effect on populations - limited domestic influences, giving ministers 
considerable room to manoeuvre. 
Under those circumstances, it was possible for internationally minded governments to make deals 
amongst themselves and then legitimate them to domestic populations in the way that they saw fit. 
Particularly important was the well-known scapegoating strategy where government ministers 
would negotiate austerity programmes that they knew were necessary but unpopular domestically. 
They would then portray programmes as an IMF imposition - using the Fund as a scapegoat. 
This was not an ideal strategy for governments because they were forced to appear ineffective in 
pressing their domestic population's goals internationally. Given that, as we saw in chapter 2, 
domestic sovereignty is partly legitimated on the basis of efficacy - on the ability it gives 
governments to serve the interests of their populations - this is clearly undesirable. However, if the 
government is seen to protest in a sufficiently public and robust fashion the worst domestic effects 
may be ameliorated. 
For many authors this scapegoating function has been a key part of the IMF's (unofficial) purpose. 
For Louis Pauly, for example, the fundamental problem that the IMF is designed to deal with is 
that 
Citizens continue to hold their own states responsible for the effects of capital market 
integration. The integration project is, however, an interstate project... Multilateral surveillance is 
based on the principle that states are accountable to one another for the external implications of 
their internal policy decisions... [it] is not based on the principle that states are responsible to one 
another... they remain responsible only to their citizens (Pauly, 1997,141). 
Pauly, who is largely interested in Fund surveillance in developed countries, produces a vision in 
which state leaders appreciate that sacrifices need to be made in the interests of a more integrated 
17 For some now slightly out of date information about other jurisdictions see (Gerster, 1 993b). 
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global economy but that they find it difficult to explain this to their populations. 
The IMF, rather 
than an instrument of global governance, is largely a `buffer' between states and global markets. 
It 
allows states to make the necessary compromises while obscuring the political nature of the choices 
that have been made. So in describing the US role in the 1994 Mexican crisis, Pauly argues that 
Domestic reactions to the exigencies of increasingly integrated capital markets dearly came into 
conflict with broad and deep foreign policy goals significantly associated with those markets. 
The costs [for the US Treasury] of too clear a choice were high. The IMF was available to help 
forestall that choice and to obfuscate it (Pauly, 1997,125). 
The problem of course is that over the longer term, and particularly when more public cooperation 
is required to implement more extensive conditionality, this strategy undermines the effectiveness 
of the IMF18. It is only an effective strategy where IMF involvement is expected to be occasional 
and short-lived and where it is unlikely to mobilise a broad strand of domestic opinion. Even then, 
the effect over the longer-term can be to build up cumulative international resentment, particularly 
in an era of increased cross border information flows". Greater global communications and the 
importance of `market confidence' in an environment of free capital flows may, in any case, make it 
more difficult to portray different messages to different audiences, telling overseas investors one 
thing and domestic audiences another. 
The difficulty of implementing expanded conditionality in developing countries and greater post- 
Cold War scrutiny of aid budgets in the developed world (see Chapter 3) have made the strategy 
particularly difficult. In an international context where liberal norms are increasingly important, at 
least at the level of rhetoric, strategies deliberately relying on limited transparency are increasingly 
problematic. 
There is also a risk for the IMF that scapegoating strategies may not really form part of a good faith 
attempt to implement agreements made internationally. Governments (particularly those that do 
not require election) may also have an incentive to deliberately whip up some level of popular 
opposition. This is because a narrower domestic win set means a stronger negotiating position 
(Putnam, 1988). If it can dearly be demonstrated that the IMF's preferred policies will result in 
riots, it is easier to put pressure on the Fund and other donors to come up with more resources to 
ease the pain -a strategy that Stiles argues has been deliberately used in Latin America (Stiles, 1991). 
As I indicated in Chapter 3, evidence on programme implementation collected during the 1990s 
suggested that the politics of implementation was not simply an academic issue. The Fund has 
therefore become increasingly concerned with the question of broader `ownership' of programmes, 
underscoring the limitations of conditionality as a means of coercion (Killick et at, 1998). 
18 I should perhaps point out that this is not exactly a criticism of Pauly who is primarily interested in the 
relationships between industrial countries where IMF coordination generally occurs over less intrusive issues such 
as exchange rate alignments. In the context of good governance Pauly is considerably more sceptical (Pauly, 
1999). 
19 See also (Woods, 1999) for an argument that, while having potential drawbacks in short term efficiency, greater 
attention to accountability, transparency, shared decision-making etc. (as opposed to mere obfuscation) is 
essential for the longer-term legitimacy of international institutions. 
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4.3.2 Towards a new model 
A combination of concerns with programme ownership, the increasing importance of `good 
governance' in the aid rhetoric of developed countries, and a growing conviction about the 
compatibility of free markets and liberal democracy provide the inspiration behind an emergent 
new model designed to address these concerns. 
I have already discussed the way in which good governance has been incorporated into the IMF's 
role as both a technical and a political device (section 3.4.2). The idea is that democratic (or at least 
`good) government and free markets are mutually supportive. Transparent, (sometimes even 
democratic) decision-making procedures based on the rule of law provide a more predictable 
institutional environment for economic growth. Anti-corruption measures and attempts to limit the 
role of the state in allocating resources are also `democratic' in the utilitarian sense that they prevent 
the capture of economic policy making by the politically (or economically) powerful at the expense 
of everyone else. 
Implicitly at least it appears that there is an assumption that any effectively functioning democracy 
will endorse traditional IMF market-friendly policies. Overall, the existence of democracy and the 
rule of law will not only have direct domestic benefits but will also reassure the markets that policy 
will be implemented predictably and in a way that ensures free competition without discriminating 
between domestic and foreign investors20. 
The problem is that many states are not in fact democracies and, in any case, populations are not 
always sufficiently expert to understand the long-term implications of IMF policies. Populations, 
even in democracies, cannot therefore be relied upon to ensure that the IMF's correct policies will 
be implemented. The solution is to try and forge links with a wider range of groups so that the IMF 
is no longer so reliant on borrower country states for its legitimation and has a chance to explain its 
policy preferences more directly to `civil society'. 
Interactions with a wider range of government agencies will compensate for any shortages of 
expertise that have become important in the context of the IMFs expanded mandate. Consultation 
with NGOs will help the IMF to take into account the interests of those who are not well 
represented by government - again compensating for the limited information provided by 
government personnel. At the same time these wider contacts will provide the IMF with greater 
opportunities for explaining its policies thereby providing it with greater public support. Greater 
consultation appears to be about a better exchange of information to ensure that technical 
calculations of economic welfare are better informed and are then better explained to those who 
must implement them. 
20 For an extended argument to the effect that new found enthusiasm for democracy in the 1990s was largely a by 
product of a new found faith in capitalism see (Cammack, 1997). 
1 18 The crisis, IMF legitimacy and the case studies 
These more democratic procedures will also provide reassurance to concerned publics in developed 
countries that the IMF is not merely using their taxes to further security interests and those of big 
business. 
IMF resident representatives are therefore expected to make wider contacts with `civil society' and 
particularly the labour movement21 and presumably to take account of their views when advising 
negotiating missions. The IMF is also to work more closely with the World Bank to ensure that the 
institutions' advice is compatible and that adequate social safety nets are in place. This need to be 
concerned with broader audiences obviously makes the negotiation process considerably more 
complex (see Figure 4-1). 
The central problem with all this is the underlying assumption that the IMF's policy prescriptions 
are in everyone's interests and that any derogation from them is likely to be the result of taking a 
narrow politically biased view rather than a broader, objective technical one. Looking back to my 
discussion of technical authority in section 2.2.2, strong utilitarian type arguments have come into 
play that are difficult to see as simply technical decisions about meeting pre-agreed international 
aims. 
If that utilitarian view was acceptable, and the problems involved were largely problems of 
information and understanding, the IMF's new approach would be appropriate. What the new 
procedures leave less dear are questions about how disagreements and conflicts are to be resolved 
where there is doubt about the adequacy of the IMF's technical judgement. Here the sheer 
multiplicity of actors involved in IMF decision-making immediately raises concerns (see Figure 4-1). 
The probability of forging consensus between such a wide range of actors is very slim raising 
important questions about whose interests are to prevail in the event of conflict. 
4.3.3 Questioning the new model: multi-level governance and three 
visions of the'new' IMF 
The academic literature on multi-level governance (MLG) is helpful when it comes to thinking 
about the relationships involved. 
Based on the experience of the European Union, theorists have described a concept of multi-level 
governance which points to: the emergence of institutions with flexible jurisdictions based round 
particular issues rather than particular territories; the increasing importance of non-state actors; and 
a move from hierarchical rules-based systems of power centred on the nation state towards less 
formal negotiated arrangements (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; White, 2002). 
21 The Fund issued specific instructions to this effect in 1995. These developments are discussed more fully in 
(IMF, 2001 b) 
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The parallels with the IMF should be clear. We have already explored the flexible, functional nature 
of the IMF's jurisdiction. The rise of market confidence and moves towards greater engagement 
with civil society have begun to involve a far wider range of actors in IMF decision-making and the 
precise nature of the relationships remains unclear (Figure 4-1). 
For some, particularly with a political economy background, there has been considerable 
enthusiasm for the more fluid arrangements involved in multi-level systems. The focus is on 
flexibility and inclusiveness. A wider range of actors operating within a less rigid framework 
provides the opportunity for a more effective decision-making process as more stakeholders are 
involved. Working through negotiations rather than rules assists in producing flexible solutions to 
the problems thrown up by a rapidly changing world. 
However, there are also doubts. Most saliently, Peters & Pierre argue that 
multi-level governance appears incapable of providing clear predictions or even explanations 
(other than the most general) of outcomes in the governance process.. . It is very nice to say 
that a range of actors were involved and negotiated a solution but we would argue that a more 
definitive set of predictions are needed (Peters & Pierre, 2001). 
The danger of multi-level institutional arrangements is that they blur lines of accountability and 
impair decision-making transparency. If it is important to know why decisions were made and 
evaluation is complex, these kinds of institutions can leave outsiders feeling powerless when it 
comes to holding them to account. 
In terms of the Fund, then the question is how exactly civil society is to be involved and whether 
there will be clear guidelines to avoid these difficulties. Will direct civil society-Fund interactions 
threaten the power of sovereign states? If civil society wishes to protest particular measures will it 
know who to hold to account: the Fund, the World Bank or domestic governments? 
At the moment, Fund strategy for civil society engagement does not seem to be dearly established 
the Board has yet to articulate clear objectives for greater involvement with civil society (Scholte, 
1998). Documents that do address the issue tend to concentrate on exchange of information: 
we value our interchanges with civil society. These contacts have enhanced the effectiveness of 
our programmes and contributed to an effort in many places to encourage democratic 
governance. At an international level they can push sound macro-economic and structural 
policies... At the grassroots they can mobilise civil society to have a voice in economic policy 
debates, monitor government programmes, help explain the benefits and costs of various 
policy options and offer first-hand experience and expertise (Camdessus, 2000a)22. 
The idea appears to be that civil society can help to bring issues to the Fund's attention and that the 
Fund can use contact with civil society to explain its policies better. In particular civil society would 
seem to offer a counter-weight to economists' continuing concerns about `vested interests'. Exactly 
what the expected political consequences are though is (perhaps unsurprisingly) left unclear. How 
will this new information affect decision-making? 
22 In similar vein see (Larsen, 2001) 
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I want to suggest that these kinds of statements and the IMFs current practices suggest three 
possible idealised visions with three very different conceptions of the basis for Fund authority and 
of the actual nature of the multi-level relationships involved. 
The first option is basically business as usual but with an expanded conception of the decisions that 
can be regarded as technical utilitarian calculations designed to resolve coordination problems 
between states and with better communication of the resulting policies. 
I have already mentioned this attempt to expand the scope of what is to be considered `technical' in 
relation to corruption but that is only one part of a wider trend in which a broader range of issues, 
particularly questions about political institutions, social capital and corporate governance, have 
begun to be incorporated into the practice of economics. In the context of development, the best- 
known statement is Stiglitz's argument for a `post-Washington consensus' (Stiglitz, 1998a). Stiglitz 
himself is clearly aware of the dangers of viewing this as a purely technical matter to be determined 
by economists (Stiglitz, 2000) but it is not clear that his caution is universal (Fine, 2000). 
The purpose of greater openness to and consultation with civil society in this vision is largely to 
provide an opportunity to explain why these policies are the appropriate ones in particular 
circumstances in the hope that civil society understanding will lead to public acceptance. Contacts 
may also provide information to the Fund and assist with export evaluation. It is largely, then, an 
exercise in persuasion. 
The underlying vision of IMF authority remains heavily technocratic and the problem to be 
overcome by engagement is that the political process harms the IMF's ability to get the technical 
message across, or perhaps to a lesser extent to gather the appropriate information for technical 
decision-making. 
A second approach is to extend this business as usual approach by taking more account of the 
preferences of new actors. Here the IMF's calculations begin to involve a greater degree of 
explicitly political calculation in evaluating the likely reactions of domestic groups. The IMF's wider 
agenda, particularly poverty reduction and good governance, may provide it with more scope to 
produce packages with something for everyone aiding domestic implementation. This is essentially 
a `two-level game' approach where states remain in charge but the IMF is more willing to work with 
them (or even assist them in political management) in the interests of policy implementation. 
The involvement of more actors increases the flow of information both in and out of the Fund. 
Greater transparency should result in more confidence that IMF decision-making is genuinely 
designed to serve Fund purposes and isn't captured by other agendas. This second approach puts 
considerable pressure on the accountability aspects of Executive Board decision-making. Decisions 
are now less purely technical and involve explicit bargaining and trade offs between the 
`international interest' and what is politically feasible in borrower countries. It also puts a lot of 
pressure on state cooperation, expecting governments to have a good idea of their domestic 
political situation and working honestly with the Fund to achieve programme implementation. 
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The third approach puts even more emphasis on the role of civil society. In this vision, the Fund is 
to work primarily on behalf of domestic populations. If states are unwilling to do so, the Fund 
should be willing to put pressure on them from below. It should specify programmes that will serve 
the interests of domestic populations with the expectation that popular pressure will mobilise 
around those programmes forcing states to implement programmes even where they attack the 
interests of powerful elite supporters. Here the IMF's technical decisions concern the welfare of 
civil society groups and its goal is, effectively, to maximise welfare within countries as well as in 
their interactions. Civil society groups are charged with identifying the `national interest' and 
applying pressure to ensure that it is realised in cooperation with the IMF against the state. 
The three visions dearly overlap. At least in the light of the Fund's original institutional 
relationships, some version of the second approach would seem to be the most promising. The 
question is how much of the first and third visions will be incorporated into Fund policy-making in 
practice. In interactions between the Fund, civil society and states, how much is technical authority 
(or perhaps the will of the markets) to be the determining factor and, where the Fund's technical 
view is unacceptable to states, civil society, or both, whose view is to prevail? What effect will that 
have on IMF legitimacy to different groups of actors? 
Those questions about the nature of the system of multi-level governance centred on the IIviF are 
the second set of issues to be explored through the empirical evidence of the case studies. 
4.4 Conclusions: the agenda for Chapters 5-8 
The debate about the Asian crisis fundamentally springs from questions about Fund performance, 
market failure and Fund technical authority. That was particularly significant because of the 
historical context in which it took place. As we saw in Chapters 2&3, prior to the crisis, the Fund's 
regime was increasingly moving in a direction of limited political control over financial crisis and of 
authority that was based on the technical ability to prescribe policies that would mobilise capital 
flows. 
Normatively, if there were growing doubts amongst economists about the Fund's technical 
authority and if the rationality of markets were to be doubted, what reasons did developing 
countries have to comply with Fund policy? That was particularly problematic since the alternative 
interpretations of Fund intervention in Asia raised by reputable economists also suggested 
considerable political bias in Fund operations. A market-based approach to crisis favoured foreign 
creditors over Asian economies. High interest rates threatened to allow fire-sales to foreigners. 
Tight fiscal policy was designed to ensure repayment of the IMF at the expense of the domestic 
poor. On the other hand, though raised very publicly, these critical perspectives were not 
universally accepted. There was an alternative point of view that was much more sanguine about 
IMF intervention and only implied the need for moderate reform. 
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Politically, then, the question is whether these kinds of doubts would trigger increasing state 
resistance in the form of higher levels of non-implementation and protest within the Fund's 
institutional structures? 
Additionally, the Fund's new role involving issues of good governance meant that interactions at 
the domestic level would become more important in developing countries. The Fund regime was 
moving closer to the kind of system described by theorists of `multi-level governance. From a 
Fund point of view, that raised issues about how to assist in securing domestic implementation but 
they were complicated by questions about whether it was states or citizens that were most likely to 
object to Fund policy and how such objections should be dealt with. From a citizen point of view, 
the Fund's interventions were becoming increasingly significant and complex. How much of what 
was being done in the Fund's name was actually imposed by the Fund and how much by the 
domestic government? Who should be held to account and what was to be done where the Fund or 
states proved unresponsive? In short, how would the Fund's new agenda be regarded domestically 
and what messages would the politics of implementation send out about Fund legitimacy. 
In summary, the case studies aim to address four sets of issues. Firstly, they explore any additional 
evidence concerning the technical debates surrounding the crisis. Secondly, they ask how political 
the Fund interventions were. Thirdly they explore the politics of implementation to try and 
determine the balance of authority exercised by states, the Fund, the markets and civil society. In 
particular it will be important to investigate forms of resistance to the Fund framework to 
determine whether they are challenging to Fund legitimacy and, if so, to suggest options for re- 
establishing Fund legitimacy. Finally, it will be important to look at reactions outside the crisis 
countries to assess the political prospects for Fund reform. 
In short the case studies will link together the issues about the normative persuasiveness of Fund 
authority claims and the politics of challenge to legitimacy. 
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5 South Korea 
This chapter, like the one that follows, is concerned with the three sets of domestic case study 
issues outlined in Chapter 4. I am interested in: empirical evidence that sheds light on the technical 
controversies set out in section 4.1; information about the nature of IMF interventions, particularly 
the balance between their economic and non-economic effects; and information about the politics 
of negotiation and legitimation, particularly in relation to the three visions of the IMF that I 
explored in section 4.3. 
The economic and political impact of the IMF programmes needs to be assessed in relation to the 
pre-existing political economy in the crisis countries. Given the nature of IMF structural policies, 
the historical relationship between the state and the economy is particularly crucial and I begin the 
chapter with a brief review of the role of the state in development. I then go on to provide a short 
chronological account of the crisis that serves as the basis for subsequent discussions. 
The first task concrete task is to explore how the technical debates I reviewed in section 4.1 are 
relevant to the Korean context and to see what the Korean experience has to contribute to them. 
I then go on to look at the politics of the crisis, firstly by identifying interests that could expect to 
gain or lose from the IMF programme. I use that analysis to analyse and explain the process of 
programme negotiation and implementation. Looking at negotiation and implementation in terms 
of underlying interests helps to clarify what kind of interests are involved - addressing questions 
about the nature of IMF intervention. The negotiations themselves then provide information that is 
helpful in evaluating the implications of the crisis for arguments about the contribution of IMF 
institutions to IMF legitimacy. The conclusion to the chapter draws together the various lessons. 
What we find is that the IMF programme in Korea came in for trenchant criticism from academic 
economists and the international financial press. In the end, though, it was largely accepted by the 
Korean people. 
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Criticism came from enthusiasts of the `developmental state' who felt, correctly, that the IMF was 
attempting to destroy and discredit the very system of political economy that they believed had 
been responsible for Korea's phenomenal economic growth since the 1960s. Others, on the other 
hand, saw this as a positive development They felt the developmental state had outlived any 
usefulness it may have had in the past. In other words, international debate revolved around the 
controversies over rent-seeking and the role of the state that I reviewed in section 4.1.2 
Domestic acceptance, despite technical controversy, is best understood as the result of political 
factors. The IMF programme was highly compatible with Kim Dae Jung's agenda to `democratise' 
the Korean economy by breaking the relationship between state and big business that he saw as a 
key factor behind post-War Korean authoritarianism. Although he had reservations about other 
aspects of the programme (high interest rates and unnecessary foreign opening), he seems to have 
decided that it offered a unique opportunity for undermining the power of the Korean chaebol. 
Once converted to the programme his considerable political skills and credibility, particularly with 
labour, were harnessed to ensure the programme's acceptance by the population at large. 
In terms of my three visions of Fund engagement with civil society (page 119), the results initially 
look positive for the second vision: limited IMF responsiveness to the domestic political situation 
as articulated by domestic civil society. On loser inspection, though, there is also some room for 
concern. The IMF and Korean government seem to have had quite different motivations for the 
reforms suggesting a happy coincidence more than the result of IMF flexibility. The United States 
had a third agenda and appeared to exercise more influence than should have been possible in 
terms of IMF multilateral rhetoric. In short, the sceptical could still argue that performance may 
have been relatively successful but it seems to have been so despite, rather than because of, the 
nature of Fund institutional arrangements. 
5.1 The state and development in South Korea 
The case studies in this part of the thesis are concerned with the way IMF programmes were 
received in practice. It is therefore important to review the systems of political economy that IMF 
programmes were designed to change so we can see how IMF interventions interact with previous 
economic and political debates within the countries concerned. 
Most issues around post-War Korean economic policy are best understood in terms of the set of 
institutions compromising what has come to be called the `developmental state'. That is either 
because they were designed to create or maintain those institutions or because they represent 
attempts to dismantle them. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the structural aspects of the IMF programme were designed to dismantle 
what was left of that system in order to foster good governance and eliminate `rent-seeking'. The 
issues raised about the economic and political advantages and disadvantages of those kinds of rent 
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creation (inefficiency versus a long-term view, corruption versus stability and control) in Chapter 
4 
are all significant in the Korean context. 
The discussion that follows is designed to explore the political and historical reasons behind the 
positions various Korean actors ultimately took on the future of the developmental state and the 
IMF programme more generally. That will involve reviewing the claims made on behalf of the 
developmental state; its political underpinnings and political consequences; and a series of attempts 
to reform it, culminating in Kim Young Sam's seg iehwa policy at the eve of the crisis. 
5.1.1 The concept of the developmental state 
A key factor in the controversy over IMF intervention in Korea springs from Korea's 
categorisation as perhaps the paradigm case of an East Asian `developmental state'. Explanations 
for Korea's phenomenal post-War growth are the subject of considerable controversy focussed on 
the precise role played by the Korean state in promoting that growth. 
There is widespread agreement that the state was responsible for ensuring macro-economic stability 
and encouraging an export-led growth strategy. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of neo- 
liberal commentators saw these as the primary reasons for Korea's success (in contrast with Latin 
American attempts at ISI). 
The developmental state literature, however, argues that the Korean state went much further, 
deliberately encouraging economic upgrading, initially through pressurising firms to enter new 
industries and later by facilitating the drive to technologies identified by business (Amsden, 1990). 
Others argue that it is more accurate merely to point to the state's attempts to boost companies' 
profits artificially in domestic markets so as to ensure resources for investment (the 'profit- 
investment nexus) and to prevent conspicuous consumption and speculative investment to insure 
that these super-profits were re-invested for productive purposes (the `export-investment nexus') 
(Akyuz et al., 1998). At any rate, the 1980s minimalist conception is now very much a minority 
opinion and most accounts point to the influence of some form of the rent distributions strategy I 
explored in Chapter 4 (Rodrik, 1995; World Bank, 1993). 
The Korean government deliberately encouraged the creation of a limited number of large 
conglomerates (the chaebol who were encouraged to compete with each other in the context of a 
highly protected and very profitable domestic market. Competition was to be on the basis of 
quality, distribution and market share rather than price (Amsden, 1990; Singh, 1998). In addition to 
the domestic carrots offered (tariff protection, limited competition, subsidised credit), the 
government also applied a stick of forced export quotas. Companies were encouraged to take part 
in continuous technical upgrading of export production and, if they failed to meet targets, faced the 
threat of withdrawals of subsidised credit or tax investigations (Amsden, 1990; Woo, 1991). 
Government discipline and the need to compete internationally provided incentives to improve 
efficiency avoiding the potential anti-competitive consequences of a pure ISI strategy. 
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The banking system was an important part of the set up. It worked on very much the pattern I 
described in Chapter 4 (section 4.1.2) though early on the government directly controlled bank 
lending decisions enhancing the relationship between classic rent-seeking arguments and those 
based on market discipline. Later on government influence was reduced but didn't disappear 
entirely. 
Less visible in the literature, but also important, was the state's willingness to keep industry 
competitive by disciplining labour and its ability to justify concentrating resources on the cbaebol at 
the expense of a wider range of potential capitalists. 
5.1.2 The politics of the developmental state 
The level of political and bureaucratic management of the economy required for this kind of 
developmental strategy is clearly highly demanding on the state, raising questions about the political 
pre-requisites of the system. The symbiotic relationship between state and business also has 
significant political consequences in terms of the sort of society it implies. 
Political prr-requisites 
To carry out the developmental tasks I have identified, the state needed to be: highly competent; 
committed to technological upgrading; and able to insulate itself from both the danger of elite 
capture and of popular pressure (Evans, 1995). 
A complex array of factors account for the Korean state's satisfaction of these requirements. 
Chalmers Johnson has argued that: 
The successful capitalist developmental states have been quasi-revolutionary regimes, in which 
whatever legitimacy their rulers possessed did not come from external sanctification or some 
formal rules whereby they gained office but from the overarching social projects their societies 
endorsed and they carried out Qohnson, 1999,52) 
The project of technological upgrading in Korea was driven by the twin nationalist aims of avoiding 
renewed subordination to Japan and defence against the communist North. The threat from the 
North secured huge US aid transfers in the 1950s. The US aim was to promote a liberal free market 
Korea in a subordinate role as supplier of primary products to Japan and consumer of more 
technologically sophisticated Japanese goods (Cumings, 1998). Rhee subverted this goal, 
channelling US aid to a select band of proto-capitalist political supporters. USAID disapproved but 
security considerations overrode any anxieties (Amsden, 1990; Haggard & Moon, 1993; Oh, 1999). 
Even at this stage, the Korean bourgeoisie' was effectively a creation of the state. Korean capitalist 
development was a state led project owing its inspiration to List and Hegel, rather than a project led 
by an independent middle-class rebelling against traditional authority and drawing its inspiration 
from Locke and Adam Smith (Cumings, 1998; Kohli, 1999). That dependence on the state was a 
' In this section I use bourgeoisie to indicate the capital owning dass (particularly chaebolowners and senior 
managers) and 'middle-class' to indicate a rather looser notion of the relatively well off (white collar workers, 
professionals, medium-sized business owners etc. ) 
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key facilitating condition for the state's ability to maintain its independence from capture by 
particular business interests. 
The most dramatic illustration of this dependency came with Park's early determination to 
demonstrate to the Korean bourgeoisie that it owed its past and future existence to the Korean 
state. Laws passed by the ill-fated Chang Myon administration to deal with illicit wealth 
accumulation under Rhee were used to nationalise the banking system through confiscation. 
Korea's leading businessmen were then summoned by Park and offered exemption from further 
prosecution in return for a pledge to cooperate with his developmental projects (Haggard, 1990; 
Haggard & Moon, 1993). Later, the combination of high corporate debt-equity ratios and 
government controlled credit allocation were used to perpetuate the dependent relationship (Woo, 
1991). 
A key inspiration for the state's power and economic competence was the Japanese experience 
itself. Park was an explicit admirer of the Japanese state of the Meiji restoration era (Amsden, 1990; 
Cumings, 1984; Kohli, 1999) and, on coming to power, quickly went about dismantling the chaotic 
bureaucracy inherited from Rhee, replacing it using military organised technocratic selection 
procedures (Moon & Kim, 1996). He also concentrated state, and particularly economic, power in 
an imperial presidency with direct control over the powerful Economic Planning Board (EPB) 
based in the Blue House (Cheng et al., 1999). The system was authoritarian, dominated by the 
Executive and based on results-oriented administrative discretion rather than process-oriented 
administration under the rule of law -a pattern that persists to the present day (Woo-Cummings, 
1999). 
Park's developmental state acquired what social legitimation it had through an appeal to the twin 
ideologies of anti-communism and nationalist industrialisation (Choi, 1993b). He promised a wider 
distribution of the fruits of development than had taken place under Rhee and a more stable 
political system than that of Chang Myon's democratic republic. Building on the US sanctioned 
land reform, Park channelled significant resources to the countryside (the most likely site of 
political resistance) (Choi, 1993b; Moon & Kim, 1996). He encouraged the chaebolto pay reasonable 
wages and provide employee welfare but also helped them control any more significant labour 
demands through the threat of repression exercised by the ubiquitous KCIA in the name of anti- 
communism (Choi, 1993b). The middle-classes were expected to value political stability and the 
potential gains springing from rapid economic growth. 
Political consequences 
The political underpinnings of the developmental state also had significant political consequences 
that remain important to the present day. 
Most obviously, what was created was an authoritarian state in close alliance with big business. The 
state was successful in avoiding capture by individual chaebol but, the more successful the 
developmental project became, the more difficult it was for the state to keep control of the chaebol 
collectively (Amsden, 1990). At the same time, powerful business support for a state clearly 
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committed to its interests made it difficult for any social group to mount effective opposition to the 
state-chaebol alliance (Choi, 1993b). 
As industrial transformation began to make urban labour and the non-cbaebol owning middle class 
more politically significant than Park's traditional agricultural supporters, political strains mounted. 
Labour and student unrest has been a persistent feature of Korean political culture2 that even 
extreme repression was unable to stifle completely (Choi, 1993a; Cumings, 1997). However, anti- 
communism and a preference for political (and therefore economic) stability meant that the largely 
conservative Korean middle-class was often reluctant to join with more radical student and labour 
protest, preventing a broad-based popular alliance (Choi, 1993b). 
Indeed, the fact that the bourgeoisie was largely a creature of the state meant that the kind of 
middle-class opposition to the state expected by much Anglophone political theory was slow to 
emerge. It was a long time before any considerable economic power base could emerge that was 
independent from the state. The chaebol owning bourgeoisie, rather than legitimating itself on the 
basis of freedom and equality of opportunity, tended to claim that it was an essential part of the 
national developmentalist project. This is one reason behind the 'profit-investment nexus' side of 
Korean political management. There has been a marked unwillingness to celebrate the profit motive 
in Korean society. Eckert argues that Korean business still constitutes a `class in search of 
hegemony' pointing to the way Korean leaders continue to blame economic downturns on 
conspicuous consumption and the tendency for Korean companies to produce executive 
hagiographies stressing their company chairman's commitment to the national good (Eckert, 1993). 
Nonetheless, the chaebol do perform important and valuable functions within Korean society in 
addition to their material and ideological support for the state. They are clearly the most 
technologically and economically dynamic section of the Korean economy. They are also large 
employers and carry out an important welfare function. 
The typical Hyundai worker drives a Hyundai car, lives in a Hyundai apartment, gets his 
mortgage from Hyundai credit, gets health care from a Hyundai hospital, sends his kids to 
school on Hyundai loans or scholarships, and eats his meals at a Hyundai cafeteria (Woo- 
Cummings, 1999,134). 
5.1.3 Attempts to reform the developmental state in the 198Os3 
As political opposition to the authoritarian state-chaebol alliance grew with the social changes 
resulting from Korean industrialisation, economic criticisms of the system also began to be 
articulated. Critics claimed that the high debt nature of Korean corporate finance left cbaebol 
vulnerable to small interest rate changes during economic downturns. Indeed the government was 
frequently called on to bail them out, most dramatically by cancelling all debt to the unofficial `curb 
2 Even Park was unable to silence student demands for 'democracy, higher wages, egalitarianism, eradication of 
poverty, and protection of the small scale firm' (Amsden, 1990,148). 
3 This section is heavily condensed, the best source on legislative attempts at reform is (Lee, 1997). 
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market' after a downturn in 1971. Arguably it was the economic consequences of one such episode 
that eventually brought down the Park regime in 1979. 
The sheer economic might of the chaebol was also criticised. They monopolised credit preventing 
the emergence of a more egalitarian (particularly as most cbaebol remained family owned, so 
economic concentration in a few firms also implied concentration of wealth) and entrepreneurial 
small business sector. There was also a suspicion that chaebol size and business diversification owed 
more to the political imperatives of obtaining government patronage than it did to any economic 
rationale. 
The history of the developmental state after Park is therefore one of repeated, and often 
unsuccessful, attempts at reform. Chun Doo-Hwan (1979-1987) seized power after Park through a 
military coup. He engaged in a fairly orthodox structural adjustment plan to try and deal with the 
excesses of the heavy industry push that characterised later economic policy under Park (Haggard & 
Moon, 1993). US pressure for trade and financial sector liberalisation was also a significant factor 
(Mo & Myers, 1993). However, for reasons explored below, structural reforms were ultimately only 
partial. 
Although these policies might have been expected to produce benefits for the middle-class, by this 
time opposition was largely political in nature reacting against military authoritarianism. As early as 
1980, the military had to put down a virtual rebellion in Kwangju using live ammunition and killing 
at least 200 people. Korean students finally succeeded in uniting with an increasingly militant labour 
union and, crucially, also obtained broader middle-class and professional support in the interests of 
freedom and democracy forcing elections in 1987 (Oh, 1999). 
Roh Tae-Woo (1987-1992) inherited a relatively healthy economy but political opening quickly led 
to difficulties. The recently liberated labour unions used their freedom to push for rapid wage rises 
to make up for past injustices and business responded by talking up fears of recession in the late 
1980s, successfully recreating the traditional split between the conservative middle-class and more 
radical student and labour activists. 
Like Chun before him, Roh too seems to have intended to reform the state-chaebol relationship. He 
put pressure on chaebol to dispose of investment assets (particularly land, long a bone of contention 
in an increasingly crowded Korea) and to diversify ownership through equity offerings. He added 
further reforms to Chun's competition and investment regulations and attempted to use them to 
press for a reduction in chaebol internal diversification. Like Chun, he also introduced measures to 
prevent cbaebol abuse of sub-contractors and to promote small businesses (through SME lending 
quotas imposed on the banks). 
However, like Chun he too was caught on the horns of a dilemma. Attempts at reducing cbaebol 
domination through liberalisation (particularly under foreign pressure) often in fact resulted in 
further economic concentration as the chaebol were best placed to profit. So, for example, 
privatisation of banks ran the risk that they would be bought by chaebol who could then take direct 
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control of credit allocation. The tendency was then to resort to legislation which proved difficult to 
enforce given the chaebols mammoth political influence. 
The result was a regulatory albatross that, in the end, did not achieve its purpose... almost all 
major reforms of the last two decades ... not only moved at a snail's pace, 
but went hand in 
hand with proliferation of more regulations to obtain an economically desirable outcome. And 
few of the measures really worked (Woo-Cummings, 1999,126). 
Politically, a more liberal political climate under Roh not only gave labour greater opportunities for 
self-expression. It began to erode the taboo on middle-class conspicuous consumption. It was also 
clear that money politics was either becoming more important as democratic political parties started 
to compete for funds or was merely harder to conceal with the rise of democracy. Overall, 
observers started describing Korea as the `golf republic' (Cotton & Van Leest, 1996) something that 
Kim Young-sam, Roh's successor, was keen to react against 
5.1.4 Kim Young-sam and the background to the crisis 
Kim Young-sam came to power in 1992 on the basis of a `grand conservative coalition' in which 
Kim, long considered a radical critic of the ruling party, joined forces with it and Kim Jong-pips 
conservative New Democratic Republican Party. On the left of the coalition, and having received 
little support from his conservative `allies' prior to election, Kim began his term with an attack on 
the corruption of old-style Korean politics. He released political prisoners, dismantled notoriously 
powerful political organisations within the military, instituted a `real name' system for finance and 
real estate transactions, voluntarily declared all his assets and persuaded his ministers to do likewise, 
and promised to live frugally and not profit from his office. He also took some steps to 
institutionalise appropriate political behaviour by passing new electoral laws that seemed to have 
more coercive bite than those of the past (Haggard, 2000). 
However, this was only one part of the necessary agenda. The problem of cbaebol dominance 
remained, coupled now with concerns at declining competitiveness resulting from rising labour 
costs under Roh. This left a complex circle of demands that were difficult to resolve. Cbaebol 
wanted more independence from government and the ability to fire workers both of which, they 
argued, were essential for competitiveness if they were to lose government support. Labour wanted 
more autonomy from both management and government but without ending the Korean 
equivalent of the `iron rice bowl'. Foreign trade partners, particularly the US were again pushing for 
greater trade liberalisation. 
Gills & Gills argue that Kim Young-sam had three broad strategic choices available to him. 
" Deconcentration first - domestic reform of the chaebol and measures aimed at encouraging 
SMEs could be carried out in conjunction with selective external opening so that domestic 
firms could adjust over time without the risk of external shocks. 
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" External opening first - particularly given US pressure, an attractive path would be to 
encourage domestic competitiveness through external competition. It would also force a 
transition from state direction to market regulation, again gradually reforming the cbaeboL 
" Democratisation first - social goals should take priority over growth, at least for a limited 
period. An increase in welfare spending, redistribution of income from capital to labour 
and focus on social inclusion. Particularly important would be reforming the system of 
industrial relations to create less adversarial relationships (Gills & Gills, 2000). 
Kim Young-sam appears to have been attracted to all three options for different reasons. His early 
moves (real name system and anticorruption) suggested a deconcentration and democratisation first 
approach. He also pursued further attempts at regulating the usual cbaebol abuses: a focus on core 
businesses was encouraged, limits were placed on holdings in private banks, limits on the expansion 
of subsidiaries, attempts to separate ownership and management through limits on family equity 
holdings and restrictions on cross payment guarantees4. However, after this first round of reforms, 
the chaebol began to assert themselves. Investment rates in Korea fell, overseas branches were set up 
instead and growth faltered as a result. 
Some foreign opening was encouraged at this point in an attempt to substitute for chaebol 
investment. More importantly, though, the fear of unemployment and an emerging conservative 
middle class backlash against reforms caused political concerns for Kim. The business community 
used this opportunity to press for further foreign liberalisation as the way to encourage Korean 
competitiveness and for a return to more growth oriented policies. The `external opening' approach 
was beginning to triumph. 
It was at this point, in early 1994, that Kim announced his segyebwa (or globalisation) policy. It was 
something of a catch all term potentially compatible with all three strategic goals. In addition to 
trade and financial liberalisation it officially included: greater participation in multilateral institutions 
(including OECD membership), education, the rule of law, human rights, market transparency, 
enhanced labour-management relationships, ecological sustainability, etc. (Ha, 1999). 
Of course, in practice in statements about se iebwa 
Some purposes are thought to be better left unheralded, and some may be put in mostly as 
decoration (Bobrow & Na, 1999). 
In keeping with the gradual political shift towards the interests of the cbaebal and an external 
opening strategy, highest priorities were trade and financial liberalisation which meshed well with 
the new enthusiasm for mutilateralism in the OECD and W TO. 
4 Various techniques of corporate finance were used by the chaebo/to maximise control over companies for a 
minimum capital stake. Subsidiaries would own each others' shares and would guarantee each others' liabilities 
making it easier to raise finance but also causing vulnerabilities as the failure of one firm could bring down the 
whole group 
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However, there were other aspects. Greater multilateral involvement was also intended to further 
foreign policy goals by weakening dependence on the United States. OECD membership also had 
complex implications for labour relations. Although it would encourage a more flexible labour 
market, OECD rules would also require greater political rights for unions to accord with ILO 
standards. Both chaebol and labour were therefore enthusiastic but in fact inevitable conflict was 
merely delayed. 
The multilateral aspects of the agenda would also enable Kim Young-sam to portray the changes as 
part of a strategy to ensure Korea's global prominence, overcoming likely resistance to greater 
foreign interaction from an isolationist population. Participation in international organisations 
might also fend off foreign pressure in some areas by appearing to offer concessions in others. So, 
perhaps, accepting moves to encourage liberalisation and SME growth while working with other 
developing countries against the labour and competition elements of WTO programmes. Finally, 
external pressure could be used to provide external support and even scapegoats for awkward 
domestic reform (Bobrow & Na, 1999). Foreign pressure towards competition could be used as a 
catalyst to resolve the domestic deadlock between labour, the state and the cbaebol that had 
characterised Korean politics throughout the 1980s Qwa & Kim, 1999). 
Overall, though, the tendency for segiebwa to incorporate so many different agendas made it difficult 
to criticize. As we will see in the next section, it was only when the government was forced to 
choose between priorities that problems began to emerge. 
5.1.5 Conclusions 
There is little doubt that in their heyday the chaebol made a huge contribution to Korean prosperity. 
By the 1980s, though, increasing international pressure and domestic discontent over state-chaebol 
relationships was creating a social consensus around reforming state-business relationships. At a 
popular level, this seems to have been driven by political and distributional concerns while 
policyrnakers were concerned about economic inefficiencies. 
The problem was that chaebol economic dominance made it difficult to change the situation through 
liberalising legislation since any liberalisation merely gave the chaebol greater room to manoeuvre. 
Their political power was also growing allowing them to oppose any legislation that would have a 
serious impact on their market dominance. Particularly important was their ability to provide 
financial resources that could be used to maintain political support through patronage and, after a 
democratic transition, for campaign funding. However, they were also key employers and, because 
of the nature of the employment relationship, a central welfare provider. 
At the same time popular discontent with the chaebol was growing and the cbaebol themselves were 
becoming increasingly critical of the returns they were getting for their financial support to 
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politicians. Overall the state-chaebol relationship was increasingly becoming one of both mutual 
dependency and mutual animosity. 
International consensus around neo-liberal policies, together with a certain domestic political logic 
seems to have encouraged Kim Young-sam to see liberalisation and internationalisation as the 
solution to this impasse. As we will see in the second part of the chapter, the problem was that, in 
keeping with the weaknesses of the neoliberal paradigm itself, he underestimated the importance of 
the legal, institutional and political underpinnings of a market economy with disastrous 
consequences for the Korean economy. 
IMF structural policies, aimed at dismantling the state-chaebol alliance, fed into pre-existing political 
controversy in Korea. 
That controversy was partly about economic views: were the cbaebol becoming increasingly 
inefficient, relying more on patronage and less on technical expertise than in the past? Should 
Korea therefore embrace international trends towards `flexible specialisation': smaller, leaner more 
flexible firms competing in high technology sectors? Or would that destroy the Korean giants that 
were so important to Korean export performance? 
It was also deeply political. Were the cbaebol responsible for increasing wealth differentials? Was 
`real' democracy possible in Korea without attacking the chaebol ? Would attacking the cbaebol put a 
stop to money politics? Who would gain and lose as part of the reform process? 
5.2 The Crisis in Korea 
Korea experienced a surge in investment between 1994 and 1996 driven by: the exchange rate 
factors described in Chapter 4, impending OECD membership, and particularly by related efforts at 
financial liberalisation. Unlike previous investment surges, this one was fuelled by foreign rather 
than domestic debt. 
During 1996 Korea began to experience a marked deterioration in its terms of trade (about 12% 
(Balino & Ubide, 1999)) due to the reversed trend in the yen-dollar exchange rate and a collapse in 
key export prices, noticeably semi-conductors and steel The inevitable current account deficit was 
largely funded by short-term capital inflows. 
This did not initially raise significant concerns since: 
Internal macro-economic fundamentals, such as GDP growth, the fiscal position, CPI inflation, 
and interest and exchange rate stability indicated strength. (Balino & Ubide, 1999,6) 
Kim's response demonstrated his increasing political dependence on the chaebol and a political 
preference for growth oriented policies. Rather than reducing investment, or allowing the exchange 
rate to decline, Kim pushed ahead with legislation to increase labour market flexibility. He set up a 
5 This was most dearly demonstrated by Chung Ju-yong of the Hyundai group's decision to stand in the 1992 
presidential elections 
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presidential `Commission on Labour-Management Reforms' with representatives of government, 
business and NGOs. Employers wanted to make it easier to fire workers, to introduce substitutes 
and stop pay during strikes and to adjust working hours at will. The unions wanted greater political 
rights, legalisation of multiple unions and greater bargaining power for public sector workers, 
particularly teachers. 
No real compromise was reached but a series of NGO proposals were eventually submitted to the 
government. When it became dear that there would be legislative opposition to the new legislation, 
Kim arranged for it to be passed at a dawn session in the absence of any opposition MPs. The 
legislation itself was heavily biased towards employers but widespread public support for the 
general strike that followed was as much about legislative tactics as about the substantive content of 
the `reforms'. Kim was ultimately forced to back down in the face of protest from the Korean 
public and international bodies such as the OECD and ILO (Kim & Moon, 2000). 
By early 1997, it became clear that slowing exports were having serious cash flow consequences for 
highly leveraged medium sized chaeboL The first to fail was Hanbo steel on 23rd January 1997. It later 
emerged that large-scale corruption had been involved in lending decisions involving Kim Young- 
sam's son (amongst others). The government nationalised Hanbo and the management were 
dismissed. The Hanbo crisis was hugely significant politically, particularly given Kim Young-sam's 
self-promotion as a frugal President fighting corruption partly by personal example. From this 
point on, Kim was something of a lame duck and increasingly attempted to distance himself from 
Lee IIoi-chang - the ruling New Korea Party candidate for the upcoming presidential elections. 
Economically, it raised questions: 
How could major banks have lent such vast sums and gone on lending apparently with no 
proper appraisal of either the steel mill's viability or the true creditworthiness of the borrower 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997b). 
but was still generally regarded as an isolated incident. 
When two further cbaebol, Sammi Steel and Jinro, went bankrupt in March and April respectively, a 
more concerted response was called for. Concerned that knock on effects throughout the economy 
might damage the banking system, the government arranged an anti-bankruptcy pact, announced 
on 18th April, under which major banks would continue lending to troubled companies. The banks 
would in turn receive support from the `Korea Asset Management Corporation' (KAMC) set up by 
the government for this purpose. 
Market reaction was largely positive in the short term. Some suggested Jinro should have received 
harsher treatment (it was bailed out by the KAMC on the basis of management personal guarantees 
of new debt and some concessions on restructuring) but most feared the knock on effect on other 
cbaebol. Externally, the international rating agencies started to downgrade credit ratings on major 
Korean banks citing directed lending, over regulation, too many financial institutions and concerns 
over bad loans (Economist' Intelligence Unit, 1997b, 32). 
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At a popular level, pre-existing anti-luxury and `buy Korean' campaigns began to become more 
prominent around this time, privately run but with the cooperation and even enthusiasm of some 
bureaucrats (FT 6th October 1997) The nationalistic element in this was, if anything, encouraged by 
EU efforts to raise complaints over the issue at the WTO. 
By the middle of the year, concern over the fragility of the Korean banking system was mounting 
although there was still no suggestion of imminent crisis. Doubts were moderated to some extent 
by the fact that the government was dearly aware of the problems and a Financial Reform 
Commission was working on a reorganisation of the regulatory system. 
The proposal was to consolidate supervision of banks, securities and insurance within a single body 
- the Financial Supervisory Commission reporting to the 
Prime Minister. However there were 
political difficulties with the proposals. The Bank of Korea (BOK), which has traditionally been 
subordinated to the Ministry of Finance (and now MOFE) was resentful of its proposed loss of 
regulatory capacity and strongly opposed the reforms. BOK control over monetary policy would be 
strengthened in return but would still be subordinate to MOFE's ability to set the overall thrust of 
macro-economic policy and BOK staff regarded this as little consolation. 
Meanwhile, the first big test of the anti-bankruptcy pact occurred when Kia found itself in 
difficulties in late June. The government was inclined to let Kia fail but the issue rapidly became 
politicised. There is a history of conflict between Kia and Samsung over entry into the automobile 
industry (Oh, 1999). Kia has a large factory in Cholla province and Kang Kyong-shik the minister 
in charge of making the final decision was closely connected with Samsung (based in Kim Young- 
sam's Kyangsong province)'. Kia executives used this to whip up political opposition to the closure 
and the issue dragged on until October 22^d, creating considerable uncertainty in the markets and a 
steady decline in stock prices and the exchange rate. The final decision was to nationalise Kia. 
6 Regionalism has had an increasingly important influence on Korean politics with conservative Presidents Chun, 
Roh and Kim Young-sam all coming from Kyangsong Province. Regional affiliation is by far the most important 
determinant of voting behaviour everywhere outside Seoul, where the only competition on issues takes place (Oh, 
1999). 
South Korea 137 
2100 
1900 
1700 
J2 1500 
ö 
C 
1300 
1100 
900 
700 
Source OANDA 
Figure 5-1 Won-dollar exchange rate 
Market reaction was hugely negative (see Figure 5-1 ). 'Me Financial Times' view is representative7: 
Until yesterday the signs were encouraging. Two troubled ehaebol, Hanbo Steel and Sammi Steel, 
were allowed to fold earlier this year ... At last the government appeared to be retreating from 
its all-powerful role at the head of the economy ... The banks swiftly took heed, and called in 
loans from other chaebol heading for problems. The painful shift from a centrally planned 
economy to one based on the market had begun. With the bailing-out of Kia... the government 
has returned to the bad old days (FT 23, d October 1997). 
Standard and Poor downgraded Korea's sovereign credit rating two days later triggering a further 
round of capital withdrawal leading to credit rating downgrades for major Korean banks (FT In 
November 1997). 
Shortly afterwards, the final straw came when parliament failed to ratify the financial reform bill in 
mid-November. By now, market analysts were saying that Korea had no choice but to go to the 
IMF (FT 19th November 1997). A final attempt was made to calm the markets by announcing a 
package of consolidating bank mergers and greater foreign access to the Korean bond market but it 
7A survey of 100 foreign investors carried out by the Korea National Economic Institute at around this time found 
that poor management of Korean companies, and government rescue of troubled conglomerates instead of 
allowing them to go bankrupt were key reported reasons for withdrawal from Korea (cited in fT 19th November 
1997) 
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had little impact. In fact, IMF managing director Michel Camdessus had already been smuggled into 
Seoul for preliminary consultations on the 16th. Negotiations were formally announced on 23rd 
November and the first programme was announced on 5th December. 
The first programme was broadly welcomed by the markets and triggered a brief rally in the 
exchange rate but enthusiasm was short lived (see Figure 5-1 on page 137). Domestic popular 
reactions were highly negative. Opposition politicians and union leaders raised public criticisms of 
the programme and there was some highly negative press coverage. Despite public commitments 
to the IMF programme eventually extracted from the presidential candidates by Kim Young-sam 
on 12th December, analysts began to question Korean political commitment and the political 
feasibility of reform: 
Its like walking through the looking glass ... there is a frightening disconnection between how 
Koreans and foreigners see the situation (a 'US analyst' quoted in FT 12th December 1997) 
nobody has any confidence that the politicians are going to be able to deliver [the IMF 
programme] (Chris Tinker of ING Barings in Hong Kong, quoted in FT 12th December 1997). 
Given the history of unsuccessful attempts at chaebolreform, the markets were nervous that the 
IMF programme contained no concrete deadlines. Worse still, IMF pressure forced the central 
bank to issue a statement outlining the true position of its reserves. Figures up to that point had 
ignored extensive forward contracts in the currency markets and the true position was that Korea 
was virtually bankrupt. 
In the end the Won's fall was only halted on Christmas Eve after US and European officials 
managed to persuade international banks to roll over short-term credits in return for the extension 
of Korean government guarantees on all domestic debt bank debt (again, see Figure 5-1 on page 
137). A more permanent solution was arrived at after tough negotiations between the banks and the 
Korean authorities. Morgan Stanley had proposed a `market based' solution in which the Korean 
government would issue a series of bonds that banks would bid for, expecting interest rates to be in 
the region of an exploitative 7% above US Treasury bonds. Eventually the Korean government, 
advised by Goldman Sachs, agreed floating rates of 225%, 2.5% and 2.75% above LIBOR for one, 
two and three year loans guaranteed by the Korean government8 (Callaghy, 2000). 
The exchange rate then began to recover gradually and attention turned from crisis to recovery. 
5.3 The economics of the crisis: theory and evidence 
I provided an overview of debates surrounding the Asian crisis in Chapter 4 which suggested that 
the issues were both technical and political. It also discussed the technical arguments in fairly 
abstract terms. Before looking at the political aspects of the debates in section 5.4, it is important to 
review the technical arguments developed in the Korean context and to review the evidence the 
8 See the joint press release by the Government of Korea and the Creditor Banks Negotiating in New York issued 
28th January 1998, reprinted in (Sohn & Yang, 1998) 
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crisis provided to support different points of view. We can then see how different technical 
perspectives interacted with political interests (section 5.4.1) to structure the process of negotiation 
and policy implementation (section 5.4.2). 
5.3.1 The IMF Response 
The IMF programme announced on 5th December followed the broad parameters I described in 
Chapter 4: tight monetary and fiscal policy to support the exchange rate and induce capital inflows; 
structural reforms of the corporate and banking sectors; trade and capital account liberalisation; and 
social safety net provisions. However, the structural aspects were particularly tailored to the Korean 
situation 
Structural reforms 
IMF documents make it very clear that the Fund saw structural problems as the key to the crisis in 
Korea (Balino & Ubide, 1999; Boresztein & Lee, 1999; IMF, 2000d; IMF Asia and Pacific 
Department & Gobat, 1998). Limited market discipline within Korea meant that there were 
insufficient incentives to ensure the efficient allocation of capital. Historically, banks had largely 
been a channel through which the state provided capital to the chaebol. There had been some limited 
financial liberalisation and the government had reduced its influence over the banking sector. 
However, a combination of factors conspired to limit market influence over credit allocation. 
Concentrated family ownership, occult cbaebol accounting practices and an absence of independent 
board directors meant that it was difficult for shareholders to control management. A limited equity 
market, a lack of institutional investors and regulations preventing mergers and acquisitions further 
reduced the scope for shareholder discipline. Nonetheless, implicit government guarantees to 
support the chaebol, together with their sheer size and market dominance meant that they continued 
to receive large amounts of bank credit. Poor prudential regulation and the importance of 
relationships in compensating for limited transparency resulted in bank portfolios that were heavily 
weighted towards particular chaebol making it hard for banks to exert market discipline. In any case 
the history of state interference meant that credit control expertise was in very short supply - loans 
were often made on the basis of collateral rather than cash flow predictions. 
The overall result was highly leveraged, low profit conglomerates that starved the rest of the 
economy of credit and whose inefficient management faced few market incentives to improve 
performance. The economic downturn in 1996 gradually brought these issues to light as a series of 
high profile bankruptcies began to put pressure on the highly exposed banking system. 
The solution was to reintroduce market discipline. The programme therefore promised to9: 
" limit the scope for chaebol owners to control large numbers of companies with limited 
equity stakes by outlawing cross shareholdings and cross guarantees 
9 For the sake of simplicity I have provided a single account of programme contents. I review some indicators of 
variation between programmes in the section on the politics of the crisis below. Transcripts of all the programmes 
are reproduced in (Sohn & Yang, 1998) 
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" make the chaebol more transparent by instituting consolidated audited accounts 
" improve competition by removing limits on foreign equity ownership and by permitting 
mergers and acquisitions 
" enhance banks' prudential regulation by placing all banks under the supervision of a single 
Financial Supervisory Commission and implementing Basel core principles 
" open the banking sector to foreign competition 
" secure central bank independence. 
Overall it was clear that the intention was to remove any possibility of government interference in 
capital markets and to undermine the traditional system of relationship banking. Officially, then, 
this intervention was largely about the technical, efficiency aspects of rent-seeking but in the 
context of the Korean political economy, it also had implications relating to the more political issue 
of corruption. 
The evidence in support was largely low chaebol profitability, particularly in the run up to the crisis 
(Boresztein & Lee, 1999). 
Macro-economic policy 
Macro-economic policy was apparently designed simply to support these reforms: 
Financial sector restructuring, rather than macro-economic stabilisation, is at the core of the 
IMF programmes (Fischer in FT 17th December 1997). 
High interest rates would combine with structural reforms to revive market confidence in the 
returns to investment in Korea and trigger capital inflows. Fiscal tightening was designed to show 
government commitment and to cover the expected costs of financial sector restructuring. 
After February, the IMF began to press the government to institute greater fiscal stimulus and 
permitted a gradual reduction of interest rates as it became clear that Korea would suffer a far 
greater recession than initial IMF estimates had suggested. 
Market opening 
Capital market opening was required to facilitate the capital inflows Korea would require for 
recovery. It would also remove the temptation for future government interference in the capital 
markets and, through the entry of more sophisticated foreign banks, enhance market discipline in 
the Korea economy. 
Trade liberalisation was not specifically justified, except to point out that it merely reflected an 
acceleration of previous WTO commitments. Presumably it could also be justified on the grounds 
of a further signal of government commitment to free markets. 
Labour market reform 
Foreign investors would be reluctant to invest in Korean companies unless they could be sure that 
it would be possible to lay off excess workers. At the same time, social considerations (and the 
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militancy of the Korean unions) meant that it was important to establish a social safety net for 
those who would lose their jobs. 
5.3.2 Economic critique 
Causation - moral hazard or inappropriate liberalisation? 
The central moral hazard versus irrational market panic debate manifests itself in Korea as an 
argument about the extent to which chaebolover-investment is best seen as a result of moral hazard, 
foreign investor ignorance or of faulty financial liberalisation under the Kim Young-sam regime. 
For those (like the IMF) who favour moral hazard'O, low chaebol profitability and high borrowing are 
best explained by non-market lending practices. Directed lending in the past and more recent 
corruption, (Hanbo being the prime example), together with strongly held perceptions that the 
government would not let chaebol fail explain what otherwise look like incredibly lax lending 
procedures by domestic and foreign firms alike. Rent creation and lax market discipline are at the 
root of the crisis. 
For others, the `market discipline' discourse tends to reflect a total inability to understand the logic 
of the developmental state model. Assessments of chaebol profitability compare shareholder returns 
for chaebol and Western companies. This is simply not a comparison of like with like. If loans are to 
be seen as quasi-equity, the correct comparison is a combination of interest payments and profits 
(as more traditionally defined). Here the contrast is far less stark" (Chang, 1998; Wade & 
Venerosso, 1998a). 
It is also important to take a long-term perspective in which investment is not purely assessed in 
terms of static profitability but also in terms of longer-term growth. This has always been the key 
benefit of the developmental state model and is a factor that does not appear to be considered by 
those who favour the IMF approach. 
For critics the problem was that Kim Young-sam's segyehwa drive had undermined state control over 
the chaebol and market liberalisation had merely boosted their power. The results, overcapacity as 
managed competition is abandoned financed by a short-term borrowing binge, merely demonstrate 
the extent to which markets cannot be trusted to allocate capital rationally and therefore to which 
the developmental state was responsible for Korea's past success (Wade & Venerosso, 1998a; Wade 
& Venerosso, 1998b; Weiss, 1998). 
An intermediate view which emerges from some of the later literature on the crisis is that Korea 
was clearly in a state of transition before the crisis (see section 5.1.4 above). The developmental state 
had few remaining supporters. The question was one of managing the transition appropriately. 
Here blame still attaches to the pace and nature of financial liberalisation but there is also an 
'° Corsetti et al. (1998) are supportive of the IMF here, as more generally. Their views are also shared by some 
Korean specialists. 
" Here, as in many other important issues in the Asian crisis, there seems to be a marked discrepancy between 
different economists' figures - compare (Chang et al., 1998) with (Boresztein & Lee, 1999). 
142 South Korea 
acceptance that the developmental state is incompatible with full engagement 
in the international 
economy and that the choice to abandon it had already been made. 
The problem was that the Korean state and financial system were not capable of managing the 
transition effectively. A combination of domestic political factors (cbaebol political dominance) and 
an international neoliberal orthodoxy that had a tendency to see liberalisation as a good 
in itself 
meant that the state failed to provide the legal and regulatory frameworks that were required 
for a 
transition to a more liberal economy (Lee & Kim, 2000). Kim era reforms: 
accelerated the kinds of deregulation demanded by the chaebol without promoting real 
competition and efficiency (Kang, 2000). 
Were structural reforms necessary? Could the IMF restore market confidence? 
Another debate reviewed in Chapter 4 concerned whether capital should be enticed back through 
market incentives and confidence enhancing structural reforms or whether some kind of work-out 
procedure was important. 
I pointed out that this was largely debated as a question about crisis causation with those blaming 
moral hazard for the crisis preferring market resolution and those blaming panic being more open 
to work-outs. Macro-economic preferences, at least in terms of monetary policy, were then largely 
determined by the resulting choice. However, these distinctions could easily be blurred. A panic 
which began as a result of moral hazard might still overshoot and call for more drastic means of 
control. At the same time, even if structural weaknesses were not a cause of the crisis, once 
perceptions had taken hold they might have to be addressed to resolve it. 
The account of the crisis in section 5.2 suggests that the markets were concerned about market 
discipline in the run up to the crisis. On the other hand responses to the IMF package were less 
than euphoric. There are several possible interpretations. 
One is that market discipline was only a minor factor - it was an issue but did not cause the crisis - 
in which case the IMF diagnosis was plain wrong. 
Alternatively there may have been insufficient evidence of government commitment to the 
programme - after all Kim Young-sam was having significant difficulties in getting legislation 
through and the situation improved once Kim Dae-jung took power. Here one can either conclude 
(supporting the IMF) that the government should have tried harder or (along the lines of Bird's 
critique - section 4.1.2 above) that government commitment could only be demonstrated over time 
making a swift return of confidence highly unlikely (and therefore undermining the Fund's market 
based strategy). 
Finally even if one accepts the strong IMF position, it is still possible to argue that the structural 
measures were wrong if the markets' diagnosis of what was best for the economies concerned was 
itself flawed. Declining returns on investment may have reflected a loss of government control and 
market failure rather than a lack of competitive market discipline. In which case, again, relying on 
market sentiment would be a harmful strategy. 
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These arguments have particular significance in Korea because of the `concerted' roll over of short- 
term credits that took place on December 24th. It was only after the roll-over that the exchange rate 
began to stabilise. Media and academic comment saw this as a significant deviation from previous 
US and IMF strategy. For IMF enthusiasts the roll-over was necessary because of poor government 
implementation and its success was helped by Kim Dae-jung's election. For detractors it was an 
inevitable result of flawed programme design or simply an over optimistic assessment of the IMF's 
ability to enhance market confidence. If the latter was the correct view, criticism of high interest 
rates and tight money naturally followed on and there were powerful implications for the 
appropriate strategy to deal with future crises. 
Further liberalisation? 
Finally, questions were raised about whether the capital and trade liberalisation measures served any 
purpose in the context of the programme (I have indicated IMF justifications above) or whether 
they were merely designed to ensure lender country support by providing market access - 
particularly given a long history of US pressure for market liberalisation in Korea (see chapter 8 
below). To the extent that justifications for them looked weak, the stigma of political bias might 
also have an impact on the debate about market discipline. 
5.3.3 Summary 
The evidence fails to distinguish decisively between the different technical approaches. There were 
problems with returns on investment in the Korean economy prior to the crisis and the markets 
were worried about market discipline. On the other hand markets did not respond positively to the 
IMF programme and it is arguable that investment decline was due to insufficient government 
control. It remains possible to make arguments for or against the IMF programme. The question is 
how much political support the different arguments were able to attract and how that influenced 
negotiation and implementation of the IMF programme. 
5.4 The politics of the crisis 
Having reviewed some of the technical arguments about crisis causation and IMF policy, we need 
to look at the various economic, social and political interests that would have been served by the 
different measures on offer to uncover potential support for and opposition to the IMF 
programme. 
5.4.1 Issues and interests 
Corporate sector reform 
Given the history of attempts to reform the chaebol reviewed in section 5.1, it should be no surprise 
that the parts of the IMF programme designed to reduce the power of the chaebol were popular with 
large sections of the Korean population. Data from a large-scale survey conducted in 1998 (Figure 
5-2) indicates that chaebol-government relationships were by far the most popular explanation for 
the crisis (Shin & Rose, 1998). 
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However, the motivation behind reform was not necessarily identical with the IMF's concern for 
efficiency through market discipline. Kim Dae-jung's central concern was with the political aspects 
of the state government relationship (though expected efficiency gains were also an issue). Since he 
wrote Mass Participatory Democracy in 1971, he has been arguing that the chaebots market power and 
the tendency for patronage relationships to develop between business and government are anti- 
democratic. 
He was labelled as an anti-business leftist when in fact he has always been closer to a classic free 
marketer with a preference for small and medium sized enterprises engaged in competition (Kim, 
1985)12. The confusion came from the fact that, by Korean standards, his criticism of state control 
of the economy made him a radical. Since concern with state intervention in the market extended 
to state repression of the labour market, it was politically convenient for incumbent Presidents to 
label him a communist. 
In fact mainstream Korean politicians have always been far more conservative than the radical 
student and labour movements and Kim was merely supported as the most radical politician 
available (Choi, 1993b). 
Which two things on this card do you consider have contributed 
most to the big economic problems facing our country? 
Cozy relationships between 
government and chaebols 
American government pressure to 
open up our market 
Economic troubles of other Asian 
countries Conditions imposed as part of the IMF 
bailout 
Replacement of military rule by elected 
governments 
Japanese banks lent too much to our 
banks and enterprises 
Don't Know 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Source (Shin & Rose, 1998) 
Figure 5-2 - Opinion poll on crisis causation 
While popular opinion in Korea was in favour of restricting the chaebol, there were a number of 
countervailing interests. The Ministry of Finance and Economy stands to lose considerable 
12 Some of the more astute foreign press commentary did realise this. The Financial Times and Economist 
Intelligence Unit reports both argued that a better comparison in some ways was with Margaret Thatcher rather 
than a radical union leader. 
South Korea 145 
influence in a thoroughly deregulated economy13 and civil servants were, in any case, threatened by 
crisis induced government cut backs. The chaebol themselves, organised as the Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI) were inevitably going to offer resistance. Finally, workers employed by the chaebol 
were in an ambiguous position. Extensive restructuring would inevitably mean job losses even if it 
ultimately suggested a weaker relationship between employers and government. 
Market opening 
As we have seen, financial sector liberalisation was the area of se&yehwa reform that received 
strongest chaebol support as it enabled them to free themselves from state control over credit 
allocation. However, broader market opening was more problematic given a history of protection 
for domestic industry. There was therefore a reformist strand within the Korean bureaucracy that 
had long favoured greater market opening with the expectation that it would force the cbaebol to 
downsize or at least subject them to greater competition (Gills & Gills, 2000; Matthews, 1998). 
In terms of the general public though, there were also important issues of national identity. The 
ideology of the developmental state has always been one of revolutionary developmental nationalism. 
The state-chaebol relationship was justified as a way to ensure national strength guarding Korea's 
independence from the North and Japan. To some extent Kim Young-sam's espousal of successful 
globalisation as the mark of a strong nation in the new millennium had counteracted these views 
but the process was by no means complete. 
From the beginning it was clear that selling off considerable chunks of the Korean economy to 
foreigners was a deliberate intent of the programme (albeit in response to post-crisis capital 
shortages and in an effort to protect Korean jobs and economic growth). In an atmosphere in 
which asset values were deeply uncertain it is not surprising that there were real concerns that 
Korean assets would be sold to foreigners at knock down prices. 
Labour issues 
Unemployment was, to some extent, an inevitable feature of the crisis. Labour was willing to accept 
job losses but wanted assurances that outstanding issues about political exclusion would be dealt 
with, that there would be a social safety net, that employers would suffer too and that efforts would 
be made to avoid job losses. It is important to note, however, that unionisation in Korea is still very 
low and there is a tendency for Korean unions to speak, largely, for chaebol employees rather than 
for the labour force more broadly. 
Macro economic policy and debt roll-ovens 
I addressed the national / international dimensions of the various options for crisis resolution from 
debt moratoria and repudiation at one extreme to complete government foreign bailouts of foreign 
investors at the other in Chapter 4. The initial IMF programme adopted a market-based approach. 
The second programme on Christmas Eve, though, included some concerted lending in return for a 
government guarantee. How hard (if at all) Korea had originally pressed for this solution in the first 
13 As far back as 1993, there were bureaucratic disputes about the pace and extent of liberalisation between a free 
market EPB and a protectionist MOF and BOK (Gills & Gills, 2000) Although the MOF and EPB were merged by Kim 
Young-sam, internal rivalries persisted. 
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round of negotiations is unclear and the precise politics of negotiations on this issue are unknown 
though there are some broad indications which I will look at more thoroughly when we return to a 
more international perspective in Chapter 9. 
What is more important in the context of this chapter, which focuses on domestic debates, are the 
narrower choices made about 
" the period of time over which the fiscal costs of the crisis would be met 
0 the speed at which interest rates would decline 
" the political management of the inevitable negative economic consequences of high 
interest rates 
and the way those choices were justified and received domestically. 
The potential advantages of tight money were that it would encourage a swifter return to market 
access and provide banks with stronger incentives to force through corporate sector restructuring - 
limiting further waste of resources on trying to rehabilitate ailing corporate interests. 
The disadvantage was that it would produce a deeper recession, greater corporate bankruptcies, 
more unemployment and generally have a more adverse impact on the poor. 
As the crisis progressed it became clear that the credit rationing that tight money inevitably 
produced would encourage banks to direct what lending they were still doing towards larger 
corporate groups that had a stronger capital base and were more likely to receive government 
support. Bankruptcies and job losses were therefore concentrated in small and medium sized 
enterprises. 
That left a difficult dilemma, at least from Kim Dae Jung's political perspective. High interest rates 
would encourage cbaebol restructuring but they would also undermine the SMEs that Kim wanted to 
support as the heart of his new participatory economy. The strategy was akin to treating diseases 
with mercury: would the disease or the organism die first? For the opposition, tight money 
encouraged sales to foreigners, undermined the cbaebol and had a negative impact on Korean 
workers. 
It should be no surprise, then, that the IMF's tight monetary and fiscal policies were heavily 
criticized throughout the crisis in the domestic and foreign media and by government ministers. 
Nonetheless, foreign political interests clearly favoured a continuation of the status quo. The 
influence of high interest rates on corporate restructuring was a key factor in negotiating the second 
programme. Later, alliances were reported between the BOK and IMF on one hand and MOFE 
and the World Bank on the other. Politicians seem, on balance, to have been pushing for faster 
interest rate cuts. 
Summary 
Some groups, directly affected by the programme, had strong reasons to offer resistance - the 
chaebol being the prime example. 
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For many other Koreans, though, interests were mixed. Labour hoped to undermine employer 
power by discrediting the chaebol but also wanted to avoid job cuts. Small businesses could also 
expect to benefit from reduced chaebol dominance but the IMF's method of achieving that - market 
incentives through high interest rates - threatened to bankrupt them first. On the other hand, 
taking a longer-term view, they would be better off if they could survive. 
For the rest of Korean society, there was political enthusiasm for reducing chaebol dominance, 
particularly if that put a brake on money politics. However, that enthusiasm was tempered by 
economic nationalism and a reluctance to see the chaebol sold to foreigners at knock down prices. 
The overall effects on the economy would also be important but the extent to which the average 
Korean felt qualified to judge is doubtfUJ14. Preferences are likely to have been determined 
principally by the extent to which other aspects of politicians' programmes were capable of 
ensuring trust in economic claims. 
Overall there was the potential to mobilise popular support for the programme but there were also 
significant obstacles. 
5.4.2 Negotiation and legitimation 
If there were interests both supporting and opposing different aspects of the IMF programme, how 
was the final programme determined? What was freely negotiated and what was largely imposed by 
the IMF? How was the deal that was agreed on justified to the Korean population? Does that 
suggest that there are limits to what the IMF can legitimately achieve and if so what is the nature of 
those limits? 
Negotiations and initial reactions 
Negotiations between IMF staff missions and government teams go on behind closed doors but 
the level of media attention on the Korean crisis means that press reports do provide some 
assistance. There were indications that negotiations did not involve a total meeting of minds. They 
took several weeks and one `Western diplomat' told the Financial Times that `these are adversarial 
negotiations. Korea has no concept of a win win outcome' (FT 2nd December 1997). The IMF 
accused the Korean government of releasing details to the press in an attempt to whip up public 
opposition to the programme while the government retaliated by claiming that the IMF mission 
under Hubert Neiss had made agreements only to have them overruled by Camdessus (FT3rd 
December 1997). 
Camdessus' involvement may reflect increasing political pressure from the United States. More 
generally there is clear evidence of extensive US involvement in the negotiations. According to 
Bruce Cumings, `even mainstream pundits found the International Monetary Fund to be the mere 
creature of US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Deputy Secretary Summers' (Cumings, 1998, 
52). It is certainly clear that high level US officials including Summers went to Seoul at the same 
14 The Korea barometer survey was modified when pilots suggested (unsurprisingly) that many Koreans didn't feel 
qualified to answer the more technical questions about the crisis (Shin & Rose, 1998). 
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time as the IMF mission and that Rubin personally held up negotiations for 10 hours while insisting 
on new accountancy standards's (New York Times (NYT) 8thDecember 1997, Cumings, 1998,53; 
Mathews, 1998). Academic writers were quick to point out the extent to which the IMF programme 
conformed with a long term US agenda to open Korea markets and undermine the developmental 
state (see chapter 8 for more details). 
In terms of public statements by Korean politicians, considerable reservations were expressed 
about certain aspects of the programme. Opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung, perhaps 
opportunistically, declared 5th December a day of `national humiliation' but all three candidates 
suggested that they would like to renegotiate aspects of the deal. Lee Hoi Chang, the ruling GNP 
candidate said the IMF was behaving like an `economic conqueror'. All three presidential candidates 
conceded that corporate restructuring was necessary but, while Lee was in favour of foreign 
opening, Kim and Rhee both felt that further capital account liberalisation was inappropriate. They 
were unanimously critical of the IMF's fiscal and macro policy prescriptions and their likely impact 
on growth (Business Korea (BK) VoL14 No. 12). 
Matthews suggests that there were three overlapping agendas in the negotiations. The IMF's calls 
for tight monetary and fiscal policy were largely non-negotiable. A second US agenda was focused 
on securing greater US market access in Korea, particularly capital account opening, access for 
foreign banks and related measures to improve corporate accounting. According to Mathews' 
contacts in the Korean Ministry of Finance, the Koreans traded concession on this agenda (after all, 
as we have seen, there were elements in Korea that largely supported it) for the inclusion of an 
agenda of their own: the labour market flexibility and corporate governance reform that successive 
Korean administrations had been attempting to implement for years (Mathews, 1998). 
Mathews probably underestimates the IMF's own preference for a broader agenda. Although much 
of the package was, as he points out, atypical of past programmes, it did correspond well with the 
recently adopted good governance agenda and with the measures already implemented elsewhere in 
Asia. The details of which exact parts of the structural reforms were supported or resented by the 
government also remain unclear. The overall point, though, still stands: the Korean government 
was probably unhappy with the macro aspects of the programme and with some elements of 
structural reforms but it was also willing to use the IMF and US as scapegoats for other aspects of 
the structural agenda that it supported. 
Negotiations with the IMF are important for the IMF's legitimacy with implementing governments 
but its popular legitimacy in Korea and elsewhere is also dependent on the impressions that these 
negotiations left with broader publics. 
Here initial signs were not good. As I have already indicated, Korean politicians voiced public 
discontent. More worryingly, there was considerable negative media coverage and anecdotal 
'5 Cummings claims that 'sources in Washington' admitted that several reforms had been specifically demanded by 
US Treasury officials. Later, US officials trying to persuade Congress to renew quotas reinforced this impression - 
see chapter 8 below. 
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impressions suggested that Koreans, if not blaming the crisis on foreigners, at least felt that it was 
being exploited by them. A newspaper editorial of the time is typical: 
A senior US Treasury official backhandedly manipulated IMF negotiations to push for market 
opening while Japan used financial aid as a weapon to prop open the [Korean] domestic market 
for their goods (Doug a I1bo 3fd December 1997)16. 
This point of view was unsurprisingly particularly popular with the chaebol's trade association, the 
FKI (Korea Herald 4th December, 5th December). 
At the same time, Korean union leaders, aware of the likely implications for jobs, also issued 
warnings - `it is the workers, not the government officials who will have to bear the brunt of the 
IMF measures' (KCFU leader Yoon Young-mo cited in FT 8th December 1997) and the Financial 
Times talked darkly of social and political unrest. 
However, this was never the only response. Even in December, according to Business Korea, 
`many Koreans are positive about the package' as it could have encouraging effects on Korea's 
international competitiveness. For others `it seems like Korea has been seen by some as an 
untrustworthy country in international society and it is believed that many Koreans are ashamed of 
such a reputation' (BK Vo114 No. 12). The question was whether enough Koreans could be won 
round to this point of view. 
Kim Dae Jung's conversion 
The most important convert was Kim Dae Jung himself. His initial opposition to the IMF 
programme seems to have helped his election campaign (FT 116, December 1997,20th December 
1997), though other factors were probably more important17. 
Under (strongly resented) pressure from the IMF Kim Young-sam called a meeting of the 
presidential candidates on 12thDecember (before the elections) at which he persuaded them to put 
their support behind the IMF programme. 
What went on at that meeting is unknown. However, given the lack of transparency about the 
actual position of the Bank of Korea at this point and Kim's later claims to have been 
`flabbergasted' at the scale of the problems he inherited, it seems likely that it was largely concerned 
with conveying the seriousness of Korea's position. 
By the time Kim had won the election it is clear that he was, publicly at least, an enthusiastic 
supporter of the programme. 
Legitimation and forging consensus 
With Kim behind the reforms, the central question was whether he would be able to forge a 
sufficient social consensus to drive them through. In the end he did so through a combination of: 
16 See also Business Korea Vol 14 No 12, fT81" December1997,120, December 1997, Korea Hera/d4th and 5th 
December 
"For example, forging an alliance with Kim Jong Pil to widen his regional support, Kim Young-sam's involvement in 
the Hanbo scandal and minor incidents that tarnished Lee Hoi-chang's 'Mr Clean' image see (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1997a; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997c) 
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public speeches harnessing Korean nationalism and emphasizing the connection between reform 
and democracy; a tripartite negotiation with the most powerful sources of social opposition; and 
some side payments to affected parties. 
Early market and diplomatic assessments were largely negative with outsiders suspicious of his 
`populist' credentials: 
We could be in a position in which Kim Dae Jung takes office in the midst of a financial 
emergency that is going to require a lot of pain and downsizing of South Korean businesses. 
Almost no-one thinks he will command the authority to pull it off. (`US diplomat' quoted in 
New York Times 20th November 1997, cited in Cumings, 1998)) 
In fact, this proved to be Kim's chief asset. His popularity with labour gave him far greater 
credibility than any previous Korean leader, all of whom were tarnished by relationships with the 
chaebol. This popular trust, combined with the weak political position of the cbaebol who were 
increasingly blamed for the crisis enabled him to set up a tripartite commission comprising 
representatives of labour, industry and the government. 
By the time the commission met on 15th January Kim had already succeeded in forcing the 
previously stalled financial supervision regulations through the national assembly. He had also 
summoned chairmen of the top 5 cbaebol to agree `5 principles of corporate restructuring' (the next 
30 chaebol were then summoned in early February). This gave Kim credibility in brokering a deal in 
which labour would accept lay-offs and reductions in wages and working hours in return for 
assurances that the government would vigorously prosecute any illegal labour practices by business 
and press for further corporate restructuring. 
In more detail, the agreement contained the following provisions: 
"5 trillion won for unemployment protection 
" teachers unoins and employees' associations for government employees to be legalised, 
union's political involvement to be legalised, legalisation of non enterprise specific unions 
" legalisation of layoffs where there are `urgent managerial reasons' including consequences 
of mergers and acquisitions but with assurances that business would endeavour to 
minimize downsizing and that it would be carried out on a rational and transparent basis 
Equally interesting, though, is the language of the Commission's announcements. Its full name was 
the Tripartite Commission on Fair Burden Sharing' and that was very much the spin put on the 
announcement. It argued that the crisis sprung from a failure to adapt to the `new economic 
environment' and that 
In particular, the government and business should be held accountable for their mistakes and 
for their inability in preparing against the economic crisis... all three representative parties of 
this tripartite commission will fairly share the unavoidable and inevitable burdens 
incurred 
... 
(Tripartite Commission, 1998,165). 
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Although no measures on corporate restructuring were actually included in the Commission's final 
proposals, since these had been agreed elsewhere, specific reference to chaebol restructuring was 
made in the document: 
The government will implement a general policy for enhancing the transparency of corporate 
management including the elimination of debt guarantees for affiliated companies and the 
issuance of consolidated financial statements (Tripartite Commission, 1998). 
It is dear, then, that some effort had been made to meet the criticism that labour made throughout 
- that it was being asked to pay the price of management and government mistakes. 
Having dealt with the strongest centres of likely opposition (labour and the chaebol) it became 
important to convince the wider general public. Again, the Tripartite Commission statements 
provide indicators of government strategy. The crisis was portrayed as the result of a failure to 
adapt to the new international economy and as an opportunity for `a second economic leap'. 
We understand that we must bear painful burdens, which we have never experienced 
previously. Nevertheless, if we cooperate and share the hardships resulting from these difficult 
times, we believe that we can overcome the upcoming challenges and create another "Miracle 
of the Han River" (Tripartite Commission, 1998,165). 
This was also very much the language used in Kim's other speeches. There are interesting echoes of 
some of the characteristics of the ideology of Korean capital that I noted in the historical section at 
the beginning of this chapter. There is a focus on resolving the crisis through hard work centred on 
reasserting national pride - even clearer in the conclusion to the statement: 
We also appeal to the people to participate in our joint effort to conquer the current economic 
crisis by maintaining a diligent and frugal lifestyle. We ask that you conserve energy, refrain 
from taking overseas leisure tours, and engage in other like activities (Tripartite Commission, 
1998). 
While of dubious economic value, this sort of rhetoric clearly struck a chord in the Korean people. 
A Korea Development Institute survey found that 38% of Koreans saw a `nation wide frugality 
campaign' as the best way to raise confidence in the Korean economy in the international financial 
markets (official press release 16th January 1998 - reproduced in Sohn & Yang, 1998). By mid 1998 
the Financial Times argued that Korea was dealing with the crisis by national mobilisation resembling 
a war economy (FT 35th February 1998). Koreans had donated a staggering US$2 billion dollars in 
gold to replenish central bank reserves and a sense of national pride was returning. 
The question was whether, through the kinds of rhetoric used in Kim Young-sam's seg'ehwa drive, 
this nationalism could be harnessed to an open economy Korea in a globalised world in the same 
way that it had been in building an industrialised `Hermit Kingdom'. 
The second major theme in Kim's other speeches was the relationship between economic 
restructuring and democracy. His inauguration speech blames the crisis on democratic deficits 
springing from the collusion between politics and business and concludes that `political reform 
must precede everything else'... 'we can overcome today's crisis by practising democracy and a 
market economy in parallel' (Sohn & Yang, 1998). 
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A further strategy was to ensure that government money was used to protect important political 
constituencies that had been adversely affected by the crisis 
I have already referred to government spending on social safety nets18. This was particularly 
important for semi-skilled workers in smaller enterprises since the far more powerful chaebol unions 
managed to contain the majority of job losses in larger firms. These lower paid workers are 
amongst the poorest people in Korea and constituted the overwhelming majority of unemployment 
which peaked at around 9% in February 1999. 
Historically, welfare in Korea was provided through very low unemployment (around 2%), family 
support mechanisms and the lifetime welfare and employment system provided by the chaebol. 
Urbanisation in Korea, an ageing population and chaebol pressure for more flexible labour markets 
was beginning to undermine this compromise before the crisis set in. Unemployment has stabilised 
at around 4% - double the pre-crisis levels. 
Kim's response was limited, reflecting a widespread concern in Asia about the dangers of adopting 
a Western style welfare state given its inevitable negative consequences for recently emerged 
internationally competitive businesses. Nonetheless, it did involve some long lasting changes - 
particularly an extension of the unemployment insurance to all firms with 5 or more employees. 
Temporary relief was also provided in the form of workfare programmes and a'temporary 
livelihood programme'. 
The second group the government was anxious to protect were small and medium sized 
enterprises. As I explained earlier, smaller businesses were particularly badly affected by the credit 
crunch resulting from high interest rates (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998a). They were also 
Kim's key political constituency and the government made special efforts to channel funds in their 
direction. Loans were rolled over twice and a variety of SME support funds (credit insurance, 
central bank credit line, funding for trade finance and four SME restructuring funds) were 
introduced (Haggard, 2000,155-6). 
Finally, Kim made a conscious effort to secure foreign support - both to encourage reinvestment 
and to provide support and a scapegoat for reform. The IMF fulfilled both roles. Camdessus' 
reassurance that `the workers will not be alone in paying the price' delivered publicly and to union 
leaders in private was apparently a key factor in bringing unions to the Tripartite Commission (FT 
14th January 1998) while, at the same time: 
the international financial institutions could run political interference for the new regime: every 
unpopular policy and outcome could be blamed on the IMF (Woo-Cummings, 1999). 
Particularly significant was Kim's tour of the Unites States winning him much praise in the 
international financial press: 
11 The section on safety nets relies heavily on the relevant chapter of (Haggard, 2000) 
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No South Korean leader has ever told his people so many uncomfortable home truths, let 
alone made as much of an impression overseas as Mr Kim (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1998c). 
Overall, then Kim portrayed the reform agenda as one in which: big business will be forced to 
become more transparent while gaining greater autonomy from government; small business will be 
encouraged as the backbone of the new economy; labour will accept the costs of 
lay offs in return 
for greater political representation, expanded social safety nets and more democratic enterprise 
relations; the Korean people will accept temporary hardship in the interests of creating a nation 
with the national image, competitiveness and globalised culture to compete in the 21st century 
world order, and foreign investment will be encouraged for the sake of competitiveness, offset by 
expanded exports to maintain national wealth'9. 
5.5 Results: legitimacy and implementation 
How successful was the strategy? And did that translate into implementation? 
The initial public dissent described above was certainly moderated as time went by. 
Public anger has died down and Koreans are beginning to take a cool look at their economic 
problems (FT 18th December 1997). 
A government survey in January 1998 found that 60% of 1,000 Koreans asked felt the IMF 
programme would have a positive impact (Sohn & Yang, 1998,296) and the Korea barometer 
survey, carried out later in the year produced broadly similar results (Shin & Rose, 1998). 
On the other hand pockets of dissent remained. If the overall emphasis on breaking up the chaebol - 
government relationship was popular, there was less enthusiasm for the IMF's proposed 
mechanisms for doing so - preventing government bail outs of the chaebol and attempting to 
introduce market discipline through foreign entry. It is noticeable that, in the survey on crisis 
causation reviewed earlier (Figure 5-2) US pressure for market opening was a very popular first 
choice for crisis causation. In terms of crisis resolution, the same survey found that government 
subsidies were the second most popular solution to the crisis, considerably ahead of market 
liberalisation. 
This was reflected in Kim's approach to corporate restructuring. Although the official position was 
that the government has 
no intention to play a coercive role in forcing the break up of the chaeboL We will leave it up to 
creditors and institutional investors to force reforms (Finance Minister Lee Kyu-sing quoted in 
Fl 23rd November 1998), 
in practice, there was a great deal of government intervention in the restructuring process. The new 
FSC set up under the legislation passed in December and responsible to the Prime Minister's office 
19 See speeches reproduced in (Sohn & Yang, 1998) 
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had overall responsibility for restructuring and, despite rhetoric to the contrary, remained 
heavily 
involved. 
Government intervention was clearest in Kim's enthusiasm for the `big deals' which were designed 
to force the 5 largest chaebol to concentrate on core businesses through exchanges of non-core 
subsidiaries. Chaebol were also encouraged to submit plans for eliminating cross guarantees and 
reducing debt-equity ratios to below 200%. 
This process was deeply confrontational with sharp differences over appropriate asset valuations. 
A 
public relations battle between the chaebol and the Blue House raged throughout 
1998. The 
government accused the chaebol of obstruction. It threatened to encourage 
banks to withdraw credit 
from miscreant chaebol and implemented a far tighter monitoring system in 1999 - undermining any 
claims that the process was a product of informal dialogue. The chaebol meanwhile encouraged 
nationalist rhetoric (concerned about the possibility that foreign takeovers of 
banks would lead to 
tougher debt negotiations (Haggard, 2000)) and made it clear to the government how important 
they were for the overall Korean economy. Much debt restructuring actually took place through 
accounting manoeuvres involving re-writing asset valuations on balance sheets rather than debt 
write-downs or asset sales. 
For the second tier chaebol, Korean banks were entrusted with the responsibility for organising debt 
workouts and corporate restructuring. This looks closer to the IMF's preferred strategy of creditor 
discipline (Balino & Ubide, 1999) but even here the FSC exercised tight oversight of the process. 
So, for example, the first list of 20 `target companies' prepared by the banks was sent back to them 
by the FSC who asked for a longer list (eventually 55 companies) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1998b). Foreign purchases were relatively disappointing and much of the restructuring involved 
interest rate reductions more reminiscent of the traditional Asian banking model (Haggard, 2000; 
Singh, 1998) 
Over all, significant changes took place, particularly in enhancing transparency and restructuring 
bank and corporate debt. Indeed Korea's resolution of these issues was the swiftest in the region 
(Callaghy, 2000; Haggard, 2000). At the same time, the government's approach was highly 
interventionary invoking criticism from the IMF academic commentators: 
Kim Dae Jung has preferred informal procedures to formal ones ... as an arena for negotiations 
and consensus building and negotiation, instead of the formal legislative body (Moon & Mo, 
2000). 
The persistent government presence in the reform process is important because it suggests a 
significant gap between the mechanics of the reform process and the IMF's vision of the way a 
market economy functions. The whole rationale behind the IMF programme was to introduce 
market discipline. The important role of the state in pushing market reform both emphasises the 
political aspects of the reform programme and leads to questions about the extent to which the 
Asian model has actually been transformed. Policy-making continues to demonstrate considerable 
continuity with the past. 
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There was also continuing resistance from the labour movement, particularly as job losses began to 
spread from SMEs to larger businesses in 1998. The most high profile dispute resulted in a 
prolonged strike at Hyundai in the summer of 1998. At the height of the action workers occupied a 
closed plant in Ulsan and riot police were about to go in when MPs intervened. They negotiated a 
settlement which cut planned redundancies from 1,500 to 277 (mostly female cafeteria staff) 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998a). The KCTU also attempted to stage a `general strike' in June 
1998, though they only achieved rather limited support. Both unions walked out of ongoing 
Tripartite Commission talks in summer 1998 and again in February 1999. 
The record of implementation, as far as the structural aspects of the programme are concerned, was 
mixed. Trade and capital account liberalisation went through relatively easily. However, labour 
resistance and chaebol evasion have limited the extent of corporate restructuring. There have been 
significant changes but chaebol efforts to revalue assets and debt rescheduling have reduced the need 
for cuts in capacity, downsizing and asset sales, potentially storing up trouble for the future (Moon 
& Mo, 2000). Both market minded outsiders and the IMF regard the reform process as incomplete. 
It may be that it will merely take more time. However, there are also signs that in the aftermath of 
the crisis, reform fatigue is setting in with resistance growing particularly to further divestment to 
foreign businesses. So, for example just over half the Korean population polled were against 
General Motors' take-over of Daewoo (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000b). During the April 
general elections the opposition Grand National Party campaigned (only partly successfully) on the 
basis that Kim Dae-jung was transferring wealth to foreigners and that liberalisation measures 
should be put on hold or reversed. A late 1999 article by Kenichi Ohmae (of Borderlesr World fame) 
accusing Kim Dae-jung of being an American puppet and abandoning Asian capitalism also 
circulated widely to popular acclaim (Moon & Mo, 2000). 
Incomplete reforms have two potential long-term implications for IMF legitimacy. If the Korean 
economy recovers successfully without being fully reformed, developing countries may question the 
extent to which the micro-economic aspects of the IMF programme were necessary in the first 
place. At the same time, developed country interests will have questions about IMF effectiveness, 
particularly, but not only, if another crisis follows. 
5.6 Conclusions 
Returning to the three sets of questions the case study set out to address, what have we learnt? 
How strong were the technical justifications for IMF interventions, what were their political 
consequences, and what did the politics of implementation suggest about the emerging framework 
of multi-level governance of which the IMF is a part? 
The economic evidence is not sufficiently compelling to force acceptance of any particular point of 
view on crisis causation and appropriate solutions although it is informative. Most interesting on 
the one hand is evidence supporting the relationship between IMF structural policies and market 
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confidence in that international financial analysts were evidently concerned about `market 
discipline'. On the other hand confidence did not respond well to the first programme 
(undermining the strong catalytic effect argument). It was the December debt roll-over that 
improved the Korean exchange rate. 
That raises doubts about the IMF's preference for market-based solutions to crisis but tells us little 
about the advantages or otherwise of the IMF's structural policies. The markets may have been 
suspicious about implementation (leaving the weak catalytic effect argument unproven). In any case 
market opinion need not necessarily have been right. The whole point of the developmental state 
was to reduce financial market pressure over the short-term and it is still possible to argue that the 
correct response is to question capital account liberalisation in Korea rather than press for more. 
Even in terms of the debt roll-over, the counterfactual question remains. Would a more concerted 
approach have been better in October? Even if it had been, would it have had negative knock on 
effects in other emerging markets? 
If the technical credentials of the IMF approach are in doubt what was its domestic political 
content? IMF structural policies need to be seen in the context of pre-existing debates about 
Korean political economy. There was considerable opposition to the chaebol on both economic and 
political grounds. The corruption revelations that took place during Kim Young-sam's presidency 
had created deep discontent about authoritarian money politics and the chaebol were seen as part of 
that system. Aspects of the IMF's good governance policies therefore had significant domestic 
resonance. 
On the other hand, the situation was more complex. The chaebol played a crucial role in the Korean 
economy and, despite their inefficiencies, remained dominant in Korean production and as key 
employers. If liberalisation meant fire sales to foreign companies that would offend Korean 
nationalist sentiment. For other groups, labour and small business, the idea of limiting chaebol power 
was attractive but the IMF's methods (involving job losses and high interest rates) would be 
unpalatable, raising greater opposition as time went by. 
Although IMF policies are about economic issues, then, and differing opinions about the relative 
efficiency of the chaebol were a central part of the debate, they also had an impact on a wider range 
of issues. The debates in Korea were also about political issues such as: the link between state- 
chaebol relationships and political power, the nature of the employment experience in Korea; the 
balance between short and long-term investment preferences; the appropriate role for foreign 
business in the Korean economy and appropriate forms of social welfare. 
These kinds of issues could be expected to divide the Korean public. The chaebol would clearly be 
opposed to them but for many Koreans the costs and benefits were harder to determine. What 
then swung the balance in favour of broad popular support for the programmes? 
The first point is the importance of state consent. Kim Dae Jung's support for the programme was 
invaluable in securing implementation. That support, in turn, seems to have been built by a 
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combination of pre-existing political purpose (ideological objection to the state-business alliance 
and limited access to the benefits) and persuasion from pro-reform bureaucrats. Although, as we 
will see, the Fund's willingness to consult with a broader range of actors provided valuable 
assistance, its credibility with financial bureaucrats was clearly crucial. 
Once Kim had decided to support the programme, a combination of astute political management 
and IMF assistance on social issues seems to have been key to making the most of potential 
support. In terms of concrete compromises, he made sure that labour got something out of the 
crisis. In terms of presentation, Kim's Tripartite Commission, and the support it was given by the 
IMF, helped to create the impression that labour's voice was being heard, even if the majority of 
demands were not met. He also managed a successful appeal to important Korean political values: 
democracy, nationalism (adapted in this context to take the form of frugality and enthusiasm for a 
strong Korea in the era of globalisation) and clean government. 
In terms of the three visions for IMF engagement in domestic politics that I discussed in Chapter 4, 
the situation provides some initial support for the second approach in which the IMF is reasonably 
flexible about working with the authorities to secure the political legitimacy of the programme. 
On the other hand, despite a political environment that was predisposed to reform and 
considerable state support, the reform process did not go entirely to the IMF's plan. Bureaucrats 
involved in economic administration and cbaebol owners remained powerful forces with interests in 
opposing change. Labour, with its mixed interests in cbaebol downsizing and a habitually 
conservative Korean middle-class then had the potential at least to be won over by playing off the 
dangers of foreign take-over and the ill effects of high interest rates against the potential benefits of 
democracy and clean government 
In a democracy, it is not only politicians who can use appeals to technical arguments and political 
values to harness support. The cbaebolin particular actively harnessed critical economic arguments 
(market panic, recessionary macroeconomic policy, etc. ) to their cause, particularly in relation to 
high interest rates. They were also able to point to question marks over American (and Japanese) 
interference in the negotiation process. As we saw, there were some justifications for those queries 
and partial use of the scapegoating strategy helped to obscure the true position opening the 
opportunity for opposition groups to attack elements of the strategy that were in fact government 
policy. There is some evidence that these strategies had at least limited success in mobilising wider 
dissent at least as time went by. 
That dissent showed up in state calls for lower interest rates, an interventionary rather than market- 
based approach to debt restructuring and, eventually, in limits to the overall reform process. 
What do the politics of implementation tell us then about the relationships between the IMF, the 
Korean state, and Korean civil society: about multi-level governance within the Fund framework? 
For many observers questions about authority need not concern us too much in the Korean 
context. After all, the Korean government dearly was behind the reform process. If that was a 
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mistake, at least it was a democratically sanctioned one. That is essentially a point about the balance 
between state and IMF decision-making. The IMF does not seem, at least initially, to have had a 
huge impact on the political process. 
However, from the point of view of a future potential borrower, or from a committed domestic 
opponent of the reforms difficulties remain. If the policies were wrong, IMF intervention remains 
problematic in that it could be expected to have effects on the political choices made by ordinary 
Koreans: providing external expert authority for the need to promote a particular liberal vision of 
economic management. 
That is particularly problematic as a relatively coherent alternative technical position on appropriate 
remedies for the crisis was articulated both internationally and by sections of Korean `civil society'. 
It was not by any means certain that the IMF approach was wrong but the existence of a widely 
held alternative view does suggest that the ultimate decision about policy must have been made on 
criteria that could not be completely specified in economic terms, raising questions about what 
those criteria were. That is particularly significant for states' perceptions of Executive Board 
technocratic authority given the important domestic and international political consequences of the 
programme. 
Although Kim seemed enthusiastic, lack of transparency surrounding negotiations, extensive US 
involvement in the negotiation process and similarities between the programme in Korea and the 
IMF's programmes elsewhere suggest, at the very least, that the fortunate outcome owes more to a 
convergence of views than to a high level of IMF flexibility. In fact a key problem in assessing the 
precise nature of IMF interventions is that no-one does know exactly what went on in negotiations. 
There is at least some evidence that the `scapegoating' strategy is not wholly dead. Certainly, various 
political actors in Korea were still able to use the potential for that kind of dynamic to attack the 
IMF programme. 
It is fair to conclude, though, that the `second vision' approach did involve the IMF in some 
flexibility about domestic political issues. On the other hand, that flexibility was limited and took 
place within relatively narrow pre-determined boundaries (a largely market confidence based 
approach and structural reforms in the interests of market discipline). Is the IMF's democratic 
rhetoric vindicated, then, or is good governance more a matter of assisting the state in political 
manipulation? 
Here the role of `civil society engagement' is interesting. Kim's legitimating strategy suggests that 
the details of technical arguments are less important in convincing domestic groups than more 
concrete political benefits. Good governance policies then have the potential to be used to win over 
popular support. However, that is a very different thing from a programme that is proposed and 
owned by civil society. 
Overall, the Korean state was only given limited room to manoeuvre within IMF preferences that 
had significant political consequences and clearly corresponded closely with the wishes of the 
South Korea 159 
Fund's leading shareholders (especially the United States). Civil society engagement was closer to 
the top down management of potential dissent than it was to some process of genuinely 
participatory decision-making and involved choosing between different elements of non-state 
organisations in Korea. In the context of Korean democracy, a consideration of state enthusiasm 
for the overall IMF project and an emergent social consensus against the chaebolled to a reasonably 
legitimate programme. The question is whether the limited concessions the Fund made to domestic 
interests in Korea will be enough to secure implementation in a more difficult environment such as 
Indonesia. 
The IMF's more formal institutional framework places significant limits on the scope for flexibility 
in response to demands made by borrower country civil society. Pragmatically, it is also clear that 
state consent is very important in securing programme implementation and can be crucial in 
managing what civil society opposition does materialise. In Korea the state was very much behind 
the IMF programme and that was partly a reflection of pre-existing social and political factors that 
favoured a shift in the direction of the kind of liberal economic management the Fund prefers. 
Even so, the need for significant state involvement in pressing that move unnerved the Fund and 
served to emphasise the extent to which liberal economic systems are political creations rather than 
natural self-regulating technical systems. It may also have sent worrying messages to less 
sympathetic states about the Fund's willingness to involve itself in domestic political issues in an 
attempt to secure its policy preferences: about the increasingly blurred boundaries between 
economics and politics. 
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6 Indonesia 
This chapter broadly follows the pattern of the Korean Chapter. It aims to answer the same three 
sets of questions. The major difference is that Suharto was very reluctant to implement the 
Indonesian programme. Implementation was poor, recovery is still uncertain 5 years on and the 
crisis triggered a political crisis and very serious social unrest If the programme in Korea was, with 
some reservations, a success it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the programme in Indonesia was 
a failure. Much of what needs to be explained, therefore, is what prevented implementation and 
what the alternatives might have been, rather than the factors that supported IMF implementation. 
I begin the chapter in the same way, with an overview of the historical background, designed to 
assess the nature of state-business relationships in Indonesia, a chronological overview and a review 
of the evidence on technical issues. 
The section on the politics of the crisis, though, takes a different format In Korea I concentrated 
on how state support was obtained and how the political elite then managed to convert that into 
popular acceptance. In Indonesia state support did not materialise until much later. The questions 
then concern: why that was the case; the extent to which the New Order state was acting in the 
interests of the domestic population; and, given programme failure, what the alternatives might 
have been. I start with an explanation of Suharto's actions and then attempt to assess the 
consequences of Suharto-IMF struggle over Fund legitimacy. What did the struggle tell us about the 
nature of IMF intervention and about the IMF's emerging role? 
IMF interventions were ultimately very radical, calling for a wholesale transformation of the 
Indonesian economy. For some that was necessary and inevitable. For others it was a reflection of 
IMF over ambition. For a wide range of observers, it was certainly very difficult to see IMF 
interventions as purely economic. The problem springs from the very large gap between pre-crisis 
Indonesian political economy and the Fund's idealised liberal vision. For enthusiasts a move 
towards that vision must be a good thing. For opponents, a more pragmatic assessment is required 
of the realistic political possibilities in the Indonesian context. 
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The last section of the chapter looks at reforms after Suharto's fall to provide some information on 
what such prospects were. That is obviously an exercise that is only possible with the benefit of 
hindsight. Its implications for what the IMF should have done in 1997 are unclear. On the other 
hand the discussion is important for subsequent debates on IMF reform. 
I argue that the IMF was faced with genuinely difficult choices in Indonesia. The programme it 
attempted to impose on Suharto was never going to achieve his full support. A more pragmatic 
programme, though, risked making it look like the Fund was soft on corruption and 
authoritarianism (bailing out a dictator). Non-implementation meant that the Fund could claim it 
was Suharto's intransigence, rather than IMF technical failure, that was primarily responsible for the 
crisis. On the other hand, that also draws attention to the extent to which IMF policies conflicted 
with domestic political preferences. The fact that the programme proved very difficult to 
implement even when Suharto had left suggests that lack of `political will' was by no means the only 
problem. The Indonesian case, then, raises very difficult issues but it is hard to ignore the fact that 
many of them are fundamentally political rather than technical in nature. 
6.1 The state and development in Indonesia 
The Indonesian nation was formed from a collection of territories encompassing large 
geographical, historical, cultural, ethnic and religious variations. It also inherited a distribution of 
wealth and opportunity that was skewed towards European and Chinese ethnic groups'. Much of 
Indonesia's political history has involved a gradual concentration of political power legitimised by 
the difficulties of forging national unity. 
A key official economic goal has been the advancement of pribumi7 economic interests through 
industrial upgrading with microeconomic policy, in particular, harnessed to the goal of nation 
building since independence. That policy has taken the form of more or less genuine attempts at 
industrial policy as well as direct measures to channel resources topribumi and to those whose 
support was required to maintain the political status quo with the three goals often merging into 
one another. It does not, by any means, correspond to the `developmental state' model. On the 
other hand, since the collapse of the chaotic Sukarno regime in the mid-1960s macroeconomic 
policy has been fairly orthodox and Indonesian growth has been impressive. 
IMF attempts to reduce state intervention in the Indonesian economy are more easily justified in 
economic terms, though even here they have some weaknesses so the nature of Indonesian 
economic management still needs to be examined. More importantly, though, they were designed to 
I Historically, political control over labour, rather than economic control over land had been the key to wealth and 
status in lava (Tarling, 1992). Pnbumiwere therefore incorporated into the colonial state, if at all, as civil servants 
rather than land-owners or capitalists. Chinese Indonesians were granted economic privileges on the grounds of 
expertise and political impotency even under the Dutch colonial regime (Robison, 1986): a pattern that has been 
remarkably consistent in Indonesian history ever since. 
2 Indigenous (or perhaps more accurately non-Chinese) Indonesians. 
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dismantle a system of political patronage and convert it rapidly into an orthodox liberal market 
economy. The historical experience in Indonesia is perhaps most important in determining the 
political prospects for such an ambitious programme. 
6.1.1 The'New Order' before the 1980s 
The New Order and its origins 
Suharto promoted his New Order by highlighting its contrasts with the experience of the 1950s 
under Sukarno. He came to power promising economic stability and growth (in comparison with 
1950s hyper-inflation), political stability through benevolent authoritarianism (in contrast with 
faction fighting and coup attempts), and an end to the ideological strictures imposed by the 
communist part of Sukarno's communist - nationalist - Muslim political support. 
In some ways prefiguring the New Order, Sukarno's economic policies reflected attempts to 
harness economic policy to the cause of nation building;. In the early years, various economic 
sectors were reserved for pribumi businesses, corporations in strategic industries were nationalised 
with a view to later divestment to pribumi and exclusive import licences were issued (under the 
Benteng programme) to encourage private capital accumulation. Some of these favoured businesses 
did transform themselves into successful import businesses in their own right or diversified into 
distribution or machine assembly but the majority continued to be reliant either on political 
connections (including expanding networks of political patronage) or partnerships with more 
experienced and better connected Chinese businessmen. 
In the late 1950s, the failure of these efforts to produce a significant pr bumf business class led to a 
radicalisation of nationalist economic strategies and a large-scale nationalisation of foreign owned 
businesses. The majority of nationalised industries suffered from incompetent, politically appointed 
management, limited commercial incentives and a broader environment of poor macroeconomic 
policy, which was also harming private business. The economy gradually slipped into chaotic 
hyperinflation. 
Politically, there is also some truth in later portrayals of the political chaos and factionalism of the 
1950s4. Post-independence parliamentary politics was troubled by a four way split between two 
Muslim parties, Sukarno's nationalists and the Indonesian communist party. Coalitions were 
difficult to form and unstable. Meanwhile the constitutional process was stalled in debates between 
a broadly liberal position, an `integralist' position stressing the need for a strong central state in the 
interests of national unity, and a faction representing Indonesian Muslims and calling for some 
recognition of Sharia as binding on the Muslim community. 
During the struggle for independence Muslim leaders thought they had succeeded in incorporating 
such provisions into the 1945 constitution only to have them removed at the last minute under 
pressure from Christians and nationalists fearing their consequences for national unity. In the post- 
3 The economic parts of this section rely on (Robison, 1986) except where otherwise indicated. 
4A good overview is provided by (Schwarz, 1999). 
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independence constitutional debates of the early 1950s, they were determined not to let the same 
thing happen again and the debates became deadlocked. A variety of political disturbances around 
the archipelago gave Sukarno the excuse to intervene decisively, banning Masyumi (one of the 
modernist Muslim parties) on the basis that it had been involved in a coup attempt, and reinstating 
the centralist pre-independence constitution of 1945. 
This was portrayed as a move for national unity against Islamic sectarianism but it was also clearly 
an authoritarian response to the threat of national disintegration. The integralist view of the 
Indonesian state based on the doctrine of Pancarila or five principless, had triumphed over the 
Muslim or liberal alternatives. 
Sukarno's improbable political support -a coalition of communists, military nationalists and 
moderate Muslims - inevitably proved hard to hold together though, particularly in a context of 
economic collapse. It unravelled into an orgy of military-supported popular anti-communist 
violence throughout the country in response to a still somewhat mysterious military coup. The New 
Order emerged out of that crisis. 
Although Suharto emphasised the differences between the New Order and the Sukarno regime 
there were also significant continuities. Under Sukarno, Pancasila was initially seen as an enlightened 
compromise between the different perspectives involved in framing the constitution but rapidly 
came to be used as a justification for `Guided Democracy': 
In guided democracy, the key ingredient is leadership. The guide... incorporates a spoonful of 
so and so's opinions with a dash of such and such always taking care to incorporate a soupcon 
of the opposition. Then he cooks and serves it with a final summation wave "OK now my dear 
brothers it is like this and I hope you agree... " (Sukarno cited in Schwarz 1990) 
In a similar way, the promise of cultural freedom under the New Order once the communist party 
was eliminated was only briefly fulfilled. Suharto, too quickly moved to centralise political power. 
All pre-existing political parties were merged to form the nationalist Parti Demokrari Indonesia (PDI) 
and the Islamic Partia Perratuan Indonesia (PPP). In addition he founded `Golkar' - not technically a 
political party but rather an umbrella organisation incorporating a huge array of pre-existing social 
groups (peasant groups, labour groups, bureaucrats, businesses etc). It was very much a stale- 
corporatist institution designed as a vehicle for maintaining government support rather than a 
channel for the articulation of social interests (MacIntyre, 1994). It was also clear that the 
bureaucracy and military would be the dominant `social groups' in the organisation. 
The two legislative bodies, the Parliament (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
charged with electing the president were restructured so the government could appoint 20% and 
33% of the respective representatives. Finally, under the doctrine of `floating mass' the rest of 
5 Belief in God, justice and civility amongst Indonesia's peoples, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through 
deliberation and consensus, social justice for all. For more details of the original intention behind Pancasila and 
adaptation in its meaning over time see (Ramage, 1995). 
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society was to be depoliticised so that their only involvement was in 5-yearly elections. Civil society 
was almost entirely absorbed into the Indonesian state (Schwarz, 1999). 
The promises of economic stability, order, economic growth and the end of communism were 
broadly met but, as we will see in the next section, despite far more rational macroeconomic policy, 
microeconomic measures continued to be directed towards a variety of non-economic goals. 
Economic policy under the New Order 
Economic policy making under the New Order has been the outcome of tensions between three 
different but overlapping imperatives: the drive for current economic efficiency; the nationalist 
desire over the longer term to create a modem integrated industrial economy owned and controlled 
largely by pribumi; and the need to supply resources for political patronage (Robison, 1986; Robison, 
1997). As economic and political circumstances have changed, groups representing these different 
programmes have been able to exercise different levels of influence over the bureaucracy and, more 
importantly, over Suharto. 
In the late 1960s, restoring economic order in the midst of a debt ridden, inflationary economy, was 
a political priority. Aware of his limited economic expertise, Suharto gave a group of Western 
trained economists based in Bappenas, the state planning ministry a relatively free hand to negotiate 
with the IMF and creditors, introduce a series of market friendly reforms, and draft a new, investor 
friendly foreign investment law (PMA)(Robison, 1986; Winters, 1996). 
The reforms were extremely successful in restoring foreign investment and economic stability (Hill, 
1996)but were the subject of growing opposition throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The incentives 
under the PMA and its subsequent domestic counterpart tended to favour larger businesses. Two 
thirds of investment during this period went into oil and gas. Of the remaining third less than half 
was domestic, leaving pt bumf capital as far behind as ever. Foreign investment, largely market- 
seeking in an effort to avoid high tariffs, had tended to compete directly with pre-existing domestic 
industry fuelling unrest (Jomo et al., 1997; Robison, 1986). 
This environment provided support for nationalist intellectuals looking to the Japanese state-led 
model for economic inspiration and politico-military figures such as All Moertopo who were 
attracted by the allied vision of the kind of authoritarian politics I described in Park's Korea. 
Crucially this vision also had the support of Ibnu Sutowo who possessed the twin assets of 
Suharto's confidence and control over Pertamina's (the state oil company) vast resources. He used 
Pertamina's funds (which the technocrats could not control) to invest in a variety of large industrial 
ventures and obtained funds from Japanese investors on the basis of pledges over future income. 
These activities were economically disastrous over the longer term triggering a massive debt crisis 
later in the 1970s but, in the interim helped create some of the large Indonesian conglomerates 
(often with Chinese-Indonesian partners) that would later add their support to nationalist policies in 
the hope of securing greater state assistance. 
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Political protests beginning in the early 1970s and culminating in the Malari incident in 1974 added 
fuel to these economic nationalist inclinations. In fact the protests had wider and more complex 
sources including liberal middle-class concerns over restricted political freedom and the effects of 
the liberal economic turn on equity and rural poverty. However, the government response was to 
crush liberal protest about political rights while shifting economic policy in a more nationalist 
direction(Schwarz, 1999). 
The measures announced included. a greater emphasis on directed credit for smallpribumi 
businesses; regulations on foreign investment including a 51% domestic equity requirement; more 
areas of economic activity reserved for pribumi, and measures to promote industrial deepening. The 
latter took the form of investment, usually through state industries, and regulations designed to 
restrict foreign investment in businesses that Indonesians were capable of conducting. Regulation 
was also used to prevent textile overcapacity, maintain state dominance in the banking sector, and 
promote technological upgrading in the logging industry through export restrictions Qomo et at, 
1997; Maclntyre, 1993). 
While the stated aims of policy were ethnic redistribution and industrial deepening, the effects were 
often more complex. The largest uses of preferential credit were to fund Pertamina's debts, 
springing from Sutowo's over-ambitious projects and to fund BULOG, the agricultural marketing 
board. BULOG acted to ensure both stable prices and the supply of key commodities and, 
independently, was a vital dispenser of patronage in the form of monopoly distribution and 
processing contracts (particularly, as we will see later, cloves and flour milling). 
Unusually for developing countries, the agricultural sector more generally was the most consistent 
beneficiary of state credits, along with rural education and health care facilities. This was perhaps 
partly because of concerns about communist influence in the countryside but it also provided a 
contact between technocrat and nationalist agendas since agriculture was an indigenous based 
industry with comparative advantage (MacIntyre, 1993). 
While some credit did go to promote pribumi industry, it is also widely acknowledged that large 
amounts were diverted to serve patrimonial interests, securing political support by providing 
economic favours, and that much credit was never repaid (particularly by smaller borrowers). 
Maclntyre suggests that poor performance by smaller borrowers may have provided further 
incentive to divert credit to larger well-connected businesses. 
Pressure on foreign companies to form joint ventures with Indonesian firms also had mixed results. 
Large Chinese firms or indigenous firms with good political connections were dearly more 
attractive partners than small indigenous business. Often domestic equity holders had their stakes 
financed by foreign partners. Given the limited skills and capacity of Indonesian business it was, 
again, often large Chinese firms that benefited from restrictions on foreign investment (Robison, 
1986). 
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Politically, the nationalist turn provided the state with enormous influence over the domestic 
economy and over foreign investment approvals. Even the private sector was heavily dependent on 
spin-offs from these huge state owned projects. This provided enormous scope for patronage, 
particularly in the late 1970s when the majority of investment decisions were delegated to Team 10' 
operating under the control of Sudharmono, a key economic nationalist (Winters, 1996). Political 
support was increasingly dependent on this expanding network of economic relationships. The 
system was facilitated by growing oil revenues which offset the negative effects regulations had on 
foreign investment. 
Results: Indonesia in the early 1980s. 
Suharto's concentration of political power was remarkably successful. After the Malari incident, 
debate and opposition in the media and academia were stifled with the Campus Normalization Law 
of 1978 and a series of press bannings in the 1970s and 1980s. Political scientists at the time 
described Indonesia as a patrimonial state, almost completely independent of society and interested 
only in serving itself (Anderson, 1983; Crouch, 1979). 
Later writers have suggested that this portrayal is in need of minor modification. Although there 
was little potential for organisation independent of the state, `structural pressures' (such as the 
needs of the capitalist class) did force responses. Liddle has added that the appearance of 
invulnerability was also a mark of astute political management with the state taking action to pre- 
empt possible sources of dissent or social pressure (Liddle, 1992). Maclntyre has shown that certain 
business pressure groups were able to press their wishes on the state where circumstances were 
favourable (MacIntyre, 1994). 
Nonetheless, the 1970s and 1980s were a time of consolidation and centralisation. At the same 
time, the patrimonial system of politico-bureaucratic interests sustained by Suharto's economic 
policies were becoming increasingly capable of influencing state spending if not broader financial 
policy. MacIntyre has concluded that 
The seemingly strong state of Suharto's New Order -a state that is remarkably insulated from 
organised social pressures - reveals itself to be surprisingly weak in terms of developing and 
implementing coherent strategies in [financial policy]. Patrimonial imperatives and sheer 
bureaucratic incapacity have been the principal stumbling blocks (MacIntyre, 1993,161). 
In economic terms, the nationalist turn of the mid-1970s had mixed results. Some large indigenous 
owned conglomerates did emerge during this period but, with the exception of the few that 
managed to convert Sukarno era privileges into joint ventures with foreign companies, the majority 
of Indonesian capitalists were either Chinese or emerged from within the state itself. Most notable 
was the emergence of large business groups owned by the Suharto family and Suharto's dose 
political associates. This is perhaps unsurprising given that: 
For most domestic corporate groups ... the springboards to business success were the state 
allocated monopolies, which gave access to crucial sectors of economic activity. Forestry 
concessions, import licences, distributorships for basic commodities and contracts for 
construction and supply were allocated by the state (Robison 1992,40) 
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Political rhetoric notwithstanding, Chinese business groups were, if anything, able to consolidate 
their hold on the economy during this period particularly through the foreign joint ventures 
mandated by local equity requirements. 
Despite the increasing influence of patronage over economic policy, and resulting declines in 
foreign investment, the story was not all negative in terms of growth and technological upgrading. 
Import substituting industries expanded strongly and GDP growth per annum was 7.7% between 
1973 and 1981. Jomo et al (1997) also argue that `Indonesia succeeded in avoiding the worst 
consequences of financial `Dutch disease' by rapidly developing non-oil production and expanding 
non-oil exports'. Between 1970 and 1980 agriculture declined as a share of GDP from 47.5% to 
24.3% with industry increasing from 19.8% to 43.1%. Much of this was the result of growth in oil 
revenues but manufacturing industry also increased from 10.9% to 13.4% GDP in the same period 
and total factor productivity also improved by a modest 0.9%. 
Economic policy then, clearly had its unsavoury eccentricities. On the other hand, Suharto's 
corruption was astute corruption. The need to keep the economy moving to provide further 
patronage resources and in the interests of broader social legitimacy placed limits on how far 
corruption was allowed to go and ensured prudent macroeconomic management (MacIntyre, 2000). 
The result was considerable growth, though that growth might have been faster if resources had 
been allocated with greater economic rationality. 
6.1.2 The 1980s and 1990s: economic liberalisation and political 
centralisation 
Economic liberalisation in the 1980s and its limits 
The oil price fall of 1982 was a second turning point in New Order economic policy. It signalled a 
shift in power to the technocrats (Winters, 1996) at a time when international pressure was growing 
for more liberal economic policies (Bierkersteker, 1992; Toye, 1993). At the same time, some of the 
larger Indonesian conglomerates were becoming less reliant on the state and had begun to see it as 
restricting their activities, at least in some areas. While wishing to retain state protection, they were 
anxious to make it easier to attract foreign investment and to obtain access to sectors that had 
previously been state monopolies (Robison, 1997). 
These priorities were reflected in the reforms that took place. Financial deregulation and relaxation 
of restrictions on foreign investment (both in terms of closed sectors and domestic equity 
requirements) were a key part of the reforms (Robison, 1997; Winters, 1996). Trade reforms were 
aimed, particularly, at removing import monopolies on upstream inputs to export-oriented industry. 
State monopolies on power generation, telecommunications, ports and road construction were 
opened to domestic and foreign investment. The state divested parts of some state enterprises 
(usually as public offerings on the Jakarta Stock Exchange set up in 1988) and all of others. 
On the other hand, some reforms that were potentially less popular - notably tax reform and the 
privatisation of the customs service to boost state revenue - were also achieved, echoing the 
pattern of limited restraints when patronage threatened to get out of hand. 
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The reforms were successful in mobilising large amounts of capital. The private banking sector 
grew rapidly so that by 1996 there were 200 domestic banks, domestic private banks accounted for 
12 of the 20 largest Indonesian banks, and the private banks commanded 53% of funds in the 
banking sector (World Bank, 1995). Foreign investment, particularly from East Asia, increased 
rapidly in both low wage exports and more sophisticated upstream production of products such as 
chemicals, paper, pulp, power generation and construction Qomo et al., 1997; Robison, 1997). 
Contrary to the expectations of liberal reformers, though, the conglomerates' domination of the 
economy actually increased as a result. The politico-business families that had emerged during the 
late 1970s were best placed to take advantage of economic opening. The enthusiasm of foreign 
investors for politically well-connected conglomerates meant that the stock market was a cheap 
source of funds. In addition, `inadequate rules and enforcement capacity allowed companies to go 
public without adequate disclosure, insider trading was rife and fake share scandals occurred 
frequently' (Robison, 1997)6. 
While considerable liberalisation did occur in export sectors, cartels, price controls, entry and exit 
controls, exclusive licensing and public sector dominance remained for many areas of the domestic 
economy (World Bank, 1995). BULOG retained its central position in controlling access to 
domestic food and even allocated new monopolies during this period - notably the economically 
perverse clove monopoly awarded to Tommy Suharto amidst much controversy in 1990' and a 
monopoly on fertilizer pellets granted to Suharto's grandson. Equally important was the state's 
ability to grant contracts for the construction, supply and maintenance of state `mega-projects'. 
Finally the rise of Habibie as Suharto's political protege ensured that industrial policy was not dead. 
Habibie had an unorthodox vision of a direct leap into hi-tech industries, the most prominent 
example being his personal aircraft manufacturing project. Production was successful in that the 
plane was a reasonable product but it was by no means economically viable. 
Politics- embracing Islam, suppressing democracy, 8muring discontent 
The 1980s and 1990s can be seen as a period in which the influence of a rapidly expanding middle 
classe first began to be felt in Indonesia. In particular, at least with the benefit of hindsight, secular 
liberal opposition and growing Muslim assertiveness began to emerge - both signs of growing 
political activity outside the narrow confines of the Indonesian state. 
Muslim disappointment when the rewards for participation in the extermination of the P1CI failed 
to materialise in the late 1960s had gradually been transformed over the 1970s and 1980s into a 
change of tactics for the majority of Islamic activists. NU, which had always been more sympathetic 
to a restricted political role for Islam (Feillard, 1997; Ramage, 1995) had staged a strategic 
withdrawal from politics in 1984. After bitter opposition, Muslim organisations had also succumbed 
6 See also (Kwik, 1993) and Tempo 101" April 1993. 
7 See (Schwarz, 1999) for more details. 
8 For early academic responses to this development see (Tanter & Young, 1990) - particularly (Dick, 1990) and (Lev, 1990). 
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to Suharto's mid 1980s drive to make Pancasila the sole basis (alas tunggal of all mass organisations 
in Indonesia. Paradoxically, the result, aided by the growth of a better-educated Muslim middle 
class (Mahasin, 1990), and the channelling of much student political energy into Islamic groups in 
the universities (Hefner, 1997), was a resurgence in the political influence of Islam. 
With the Muslim threat to Pancasila in decline as a result of this shift from political to cultural 
advocacy of Islam, Suharto felt able to turn the Muslim community for support against rising 
military opposition in the late 1990s. The most significant manifestation of this change was the 
establishment, under Habibie (then Minister for Technology) and with Suharto's blessing, of the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals (ICMI). 
Indonesian Islam is highly diverse and this diversity was reflected within ICMI. For a relatively 
academic minority (the `real' ICMI) it represented a welcome forum for public debate about the 
future of Indonesian Islam. For many others, though, it was a vehicle with the potential to harness 
popular political support. It provided a power base for Habibie and a group of bureaucrats close to 
him It was also an opportunity for the resurgence of political Islam of various varieties. 
Key groupings were right wing Muslims based in KISDI, and two groups of more moderate 
Muslims based around Adi Sasono, and Amien Rais. KISDI saw Suharto's renewed enthusiasm for 
Islam as an opportunity to push for further advances in the position of Muslims. This view was 
strengthened by Suharto's appointment of key Muslim generals (Hartono, Feisal Tanjung, Hamid 
and Prabowo) and the aim was to use ICMI as a vehicle for the Islamization of Golkar and the 
military. 
Sasono was closely connected with the NGO movement and in some ways represented the 
opposite extreme. He was a champion of small-scale business, appropriate technology and the 
cooperative movement. Adi's Islamic politics was centred on egalitarianism and human rights. In 
the late 1990s this had crystallised into concern with pribumi economic marginalisation, providing 
some potential for links both with Habibie's economic nationalism and more conservative `crony' 
figures like Probosutedjo, Suharto's brother-in-law. This unity was reflected in calls for (religious) 
pmportionalism in politics and business. Sasono too supported Suharto, believing that the 
establishment of ICMI indicated the potential for further pro-Muslim support but wanted the 
military out of politics and had longer term ambitions to turn ICMI into a mass political opposition 
movement. 
Rais was more moderate. He was critical of the regime but felt that concerns for political stability 
required gradual reform with a continuing role for the military and Suharto over the short term, but 
with greater openness and some electoral reform. For Rais and others, ICMI was a platform for 
political pressure but no more. On the other hand some reforms went further than others. Sri 
Bintang Pamungkas was a much more outspoken critic about human rights and corruption and was 
eventually expelled from ICMI in 1996. 
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Finally the largest Muslim movement, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama under the leadership of 
Abdurahman Wahid, was concerned by the reconfessionalisation of politics and refused to have any 
part in ICMI, concerned that there was a danger of becoming a pawn in Suharto's political games. 
In the secular realm, the PDI was also becoming increasingly assertive, carrying out a highly 
successful (in terms of media coverage if not vote winning) campaign for the 1992 elections under 
the leadership of Suryadi. This clearly unnerved Suharto who resorted to a heavy handed removal 
of Suryadi from PDI leadership. This move backfired when Megawati Sukarnoputri was elected 
in 
his stead on the back of unprecedented mass demonstrations of support (Heryanto, 1997). 
Tensions grew as an alliance between the PDI and NU began to look possible. Suharto's response 
was to use a think tank close to the regimist wing of KISDI and sponsored by `green' generals 
(Feisal Tanjung, Hartono and Prabowo) to conduct a dirty tricks campaign against both Wahid and 
Megawati -a notable shift away from Habibie's bureaucratic 
ICM! and towards more radical 
conservative support. These events culminated in the forced expulsion of Megawati 
from PDI 
headquarters in July 1996. Under increasing pressure, Wahid established a temporary 
rapprochement with Suharto by agreeing to distance himself from Megawati9 but the incident 
demonstrated that Suharto's grip on power was weakening and that conservative Islam was 
becoming an increasingly important part of his political support 
During the same period, the media was temporarily allowed to play a larger role. Presumably 
conscious of growing middle class pressure, Suharto flirted with a policy of keterbukaan or openness 
in 1989 and again in 1993 but was unable to deal with the consequences in the form of outspoken 
criticism of the regime's corruption. This was clearest when Suharto banned three newspapers 
in 
1994 (including Tempo - the leading current affairs weekly) in response to critical reporting of 
Habibie's less than transparent use of state funds - including the purchase of a number of East 
German Warships which particularly angered the military. 
In both cases, Suharto's overt repression turned what were probably minor threats into major 
public issues. 
Finally, underlying the issues underlying these political tensions were a mixture of liberal issues such 
as human rights and political freedom but also economic issues particularly corruption (from all 
sides) and continuing pribumi economic marginalisation (within ICMI). 
6.1.3 Conclusions - background to the crisis 
The creation and maintenance of an Indonesian nation has been central to Indonesian political 
discourse since independence. The Indonesian nation was formed from a collection of territories 
encompassing large geographical, historical, cultural, ethnic and religious variations. It also inherited 
9 Apparently the strategy was to outflank his more radical Muslim rivals, who were orchestrating the attacks on him, 
by securing Suharto's favour. At the same time, Hartono, one of the key CPDS funders was wavering between 
support for Suharto's daughter Tutut and his earlier Muslim allies. Tutut saw Habibie as her chief rival for the 
presidency and Wahid as a potential ally. 
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a distribution of wealth and education that was skewed towards European and ethnically Chinese 
groups. Much of post-independence Indonesian political history has involved a gradual 
concentration of power legitimised by the difficulties of forging national unity. Nation building 
through the advancement of pribumi economic interests has also formed a key legitimating rationale 
for much of Indonesian economic policy. 
Of course, threats to national unity provide convenient legitimation for a military authoritarian 
regime. Nationalist economic policies can also provide a convenient justification for the direction 
of funds to the politically well connected, particularly when encouraged by the imperatives of 
authoritarian patrimonial political regimes. It is clear that both of these dynamics have been at work 
in Indonesia. 
On the other hand, as I argue throughout this thesis, legitimating arguments are only likely to be 
successful to the extent that they are broadly credible. The experience of the 1950s and early 1960s 
clearly showed that the question of national unity was a genuine one. The current of pribumi 
discontent and anti-Chinese resentment that can be seen throughout Indonesian history also 
demonstrates the need for some measure of re-distribution of economic resources. Arguably the 
relative absence of rural dissent may also demonstrate the success of Suharto's strategy of 
funnelling resources to rural areas to prevent communist resurgence or other forms of political 
dissent. Overall there was considerable evidence that the majority of Indonesians did accept the 
general New Order bargain of economic development and national unity at the price of 
authoritarianism and patronage, albeit in the context of considerable attempts by the state to 
depoliticise the population. 
However, in the 1990s there was growing evidence that this compromise was beginning to unravel. 
Economically, the combination of deregulation that transferred power away from technocrats in 
the bureaucracy and towards big (crony) business interests, and of increasing incorporation into the 
world economy undermined general and big business support (respectively) for government 
economic management. At the same time Suharto's moves towards ICMI driven by suspicion of 
the military, together with an rapidly expanding middle class led to increasing space for political 
expression outside the confines of the state. These increasingly dissenting voices were then 
amplified by a series of heavy-handed attempts to control them to the point where Heryanto could 
talk of `the final countdown' by the end of 1996 (Heryanto, 1997). 
The IMF apparently saw patronage as the key to the crisis. Removing monopolies and inefficiencies 
would soon reinstate confidence in the Indonesian economy triggering a return of capital. The 
danger was that this conviction would react explosively with increasingly complex and fractious 
Indonesian politics. 
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6.2 The Crisis in Indonesia 
The rupiah began to come under pressure in the wake of the Thai devaluation. The government 
responded quickly by widening the rupiah intervention band on the 11th July and allowing it to float 
on 14th August. The exchange rate immediately fell but recovered as the central bank drastically 
tightened monetary conditions pushing overnight interest rates to 81% (World Bank, 1998b). 
Despite widespread praise for this response from the media, World Bank (World Bank, 1998b) and 
IMF (IMF, 1997b), the rupiah began to fall again in late August and continued to do so throughout 
September (see Figure 6-1). 
As conditions continued to worsen, Marie Muhammed, the Finance Minister, announced a package 
of measures including fiscal control through the cancellation of a number of infrastructure projects, 
removal of import tariffs on 150 items, and the removal of the 49% limit on foreign ownership of 
listed companies. Market commentary was that this was a good sign but not enough, particularly as 
the negative impact of high interest rates was a greater concern than the government budget (PT 
17th September 1997). Behind the scenes, the technocrats had pushed for a more extensive 
programme but had had it rejected by Suharto, setting a pattern in which it became clear to 
Indonesians that the president was more eager to take advice from his children than from the 
technocrats (Haggard, 2000; Nasution, 2001; Soesastro, 2000). 
Negotiations began with the IMF on October 13th. The first programme was signed on October 
31st and officially announced on November 5th. It was met by a brief improvement in the exchange 
rate (Lane et al., 1999; World Bank, 1998b). However, implementation commenced with the 
mismanaged closure of 16 Indonesian banks on November 1st resulting in a widespread panic in the 
Indonesian banking sector (Lane et al., 1999; McLeod, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b; World Bank, 
1998b). 
The programme was later undermined further by two swift failures in implementation. Bambang 
Trihatmojo (Suharto's second son) and Probosutejo (Suharto's step-brother) refused to close their 
banks (Asia Wall Street Journal (A WSJ) 5th November 1997, Jakarta Post (JP) 2^d, 5th and 6th 
November 1997). Both eventually succeeded in staying in business under different names (JP 26th 
November 1997,31st December 1997). Suharto also reinstated 15 previously postponed 
infrastructure projects, some of which provided clear benefits to the Suharto family without having 
any other obvious economic rationale (%P 8th November 1997, AIVSJ 5-6th November 1997, 
Robison & Rosser, 2000). If insiders had already had signals that led them to question Suharto's 
ability to put the interests of the economy above those of his children, everyone now had 
significant cause for concern. 
As withdrawals from private banks accelerated, the central bank began issuing emergency credits in 
large numbers. The inevitable inflationary consequences of these moves (combined with political 
uncertainty) lead to further attacks on the rupiah. Indeed, it later emerged that many of these credits 
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were used to buy further foreign exchange - Bank Indonesia was effectively subsidising attacks on 
itself (Haggard, 2000; Soesastro, 2000). 
Up to this point rupiah depreciation was broadly comparable with that in other Southeast Asian 
countries. On December 9th, though, it began to go into freefall, parting company with the other 
regional currencies (Robison & Rosser, 2000; Schwarz, 1999; World Bank, 1998b). This fall 
coincided with the announcement that Suharto was seriously ill and can be attributed to uncertainty 
over the presidential succession. 
The budget announced on January 6th precipitated the decline. It was perceived to be based on 
wildly unrealistic assumptions and drew extensive market, US and IMF criticism although later re- 
evaluations suggest that this criticism was misplacedl° (Radelet & Sachs, 1998a; Robison & Rosser, 
2000). 
A second IMF package was announced on January 15th and Suharto himself signed it publicly with 
Carndessus looking on1 . It failed to calm market nerves despite mild fiscal easing and the inclusion 
of even more extensive structural reforms including central bank independence, withdrawal of 
privileges for the national car project, elimination of cement, paper and plywood cartels, withdrawal 
of support for IPTN, removal of restrictions on investment in retail, elimination of monopolies in 
cloves, flour, sugar, soybeans and other basic commodities and the phased elimination of subsidies 
for fuel and electricity (Government of Indonesia, 1998). By the third week in January the rupiah 
was trading at Rp. 15,000 to the dollar (compared to 2,500 in July 1997). 
A package of reforms aimed at restructuring the banking sector and rescheduling the private debt 
overhang announced by the government on 27th January finally began to calm market nerves. It 
established the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and provided a blanket guarantee on 
the obligations of all domestic banks. At this stage no moves were made towards dealing with 
corporate debt (revealed, in early February when the figures had been worked out, to be about 
US$73 billion (Antara 6th February 1998). Indeed the government, with IMF support if not under 
IMF pressure, was insisting that it would `not get involved in negotiations and will not give any 
guarantee for corporate debts' (quoted in JP 7th February 1998). 
However, at this point political events that had been developing since the autumn began to move to 
centre stage. The crisis had boosted support for Megawati and Wahid and had begun, again, to add 
NU support for calls to end corruption and human rights abuses. 
10 Essentially the negative assessments fail to take into account the extent to which the Rupiah had already 
depreciated when making comparisons with previous budgets - see (Radelet & Sachs, 1998b) and (Radelet & 
Woo, 2000) 
11 The press photograph of this event with Suharto seated at a desk and Camdessus standing behind, arms 
folded, caused enormous offence throughout Asia. 
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Suharto's political vulnerability was most clearly demonstrated by Amien Rais' decision (announced 
in late September) to stand against him in the presidential election scheduled for March1998. After 
his expulsion from ICMI in early 1997, Rais had attempted to court more mainstream support by 
playing down his anti-Chinese and anti-Christian rhetoric. This initially isolated him from more 
radical Muslim support in KISDI, its sympathisers in the military grouped around General 
Prabowo, and radical elements of Muhammidiyah and ICMI without winning the support of NU 
(and the more moderate military grouping around General Wiranto) (Hefner, 2000; Mietzner, 
1999). However, as the economic situation continued to deteriorate in late November, 
Abdurahman Wahid (the NU leader) was becoming increasingly critical of Suharto. By January 
there were growing rumours of a Megawati-NU-Rais alliance (although it never ultimately 
materialised). 
Suharto responded in mid January by nominating Habibie as his vice-president. This re-created the 
split within the Muslim community and the military with conservative `regimist' Muslims seeing it as 
a further example of Suharto's commitment to the Islamic cause. He reinforced this move by 
beginning to suggest that the crisis was part of a Chinese conspiracy - echoing a book circulated in 
January 1998 entitled The Conspiracy to Overthrow Suharto' written by a think tank reportedly 
funded by `green' generals and two of Suharto's children. 
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This anti-Chinese move was evident in the arrest, on 23rd January, of Sofyan Wanandi ,a 
leading 
Christian Chinese businessman, on what appear to have been trumped up charges of a bomb plot. 
The head of the armed forces, understanding the signs, called 13 leading Chinese businessmen in 
January asking for `donations' to the government and Prabowo held a large meeting of sympathetic 
modernist Muslim leaders at KOPASSUS headquarters (Mietzner, 1999). 
Over this period, the inevitable effect of rupiah depreciation and inflation was beginning to 
translate into food price rises. Suharto initially succeeded in putting pressure on traders to provide a 
price freeze but this was dearly a temporary measure and there were growing concerns about what 
would happen when full price rises took hold (FT 25th January 1998, South China Morning Port 
(SCMP) 25th January 1998, AFX(AP) 4th February 1998). 
At around this stage food riots began to take place, particularly targeted at Chinese Indonesians 
who are responsible for a large part of rice distribution and retail (JP 4t' February 1998,14th 
February 1998, SCMP 15th February 1998). In keeping with the anti-Chinese shift government 
spokesmen suggested that food prices resulted from speculation in the rice markets and forced a 
further price freeze. This time, though, assistance was also provided by Pertamina price cuts (for 
fuel) and BULOG market operations (for rice) (JP February 5th 1998,6th February 1998, FT 21st 
February 1998) Government spokesmen also acknowledged that 'we will have to be very careful 
when it comes to the price of kerosene so the less privileged will not have to shoulder too huge a 
burden (Sudjana quoted in AFX(2 P)17th February 1998). As with later riots there was some 
evidence of deliberate provocation - rioters reported to the South China Morning Post that they 
had been paid for their participation (SCMP 18th February 1998). 
Heat was added to the protests when Suharto awarded a Jakarta water contract to a company 
controlled by his grandson UP 6th February 1998). 
At the same time, Suharto began to criticize the IMF openly calling for an `IMF plus' programme to 
address the continuing slide of the Rupiah (JP 18th February 1998, ASWf 2nd March 1998). He also 
invited Stephen Hanke of Johns Hopkins University to advise on the possibility of setting up a 
currency board12, apparently at the instigation of his eldest daughter rutut' and Peter Gontha, a 
prominent Indonesian businessman (ASWJ 10th February 1998). This provoked heated opposition 
from Fischer and Camdessus UP 14th February 1998 AW'SJ 17th February 1998) culminating in the 
delayed disbursement of US$5.5 billion in loans from the IMF, World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (Ariaweek 20th March 1998). 
By March 8th, Suharto was claiming that the IMF package could not be implemented because it was 
'unconstitutional' requiring a liberal economy which is not in line with the Indonesian constitution 
(Straits Times 9th March 1998) His daughter, even more forthright, argued that `if the funds sacrifice 
and degrade our nation's dignity, we do not want them' (Asiaweek 20th March 1998). 
12 For Hanke's account of this episode see (Hanke, 1998; Hanke, 2000). 
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Meanwhile, rioting and civil unrest were growing throughout the country. Given the tense 
situation, and the fact that Suharto had clearly garnered enough military and modernist Muslim 
support to ensure his election, Rais felt compelled to ask his supporters not to demonstrate. By 
mid-February, NU and Muhammidiyah had made statements which reluctantly supported Suharto's 
re-election and Megawati disappeared from the political scene (Mietzner, 1999). 
When it became clear that elite politics was not going to force a transition, action moved to the 
University campuses. Protests started in Yogyakarta and spread around Java with hundreds of 
thousands gathering on campuses. Demands focused on the price of basic commodities, the need 
for an end to Suharto's rule and a transition to democracy, and the elimination of corruption 
(Hefner, 2000; Schwarz, 1999). 
Suharto also began to lose his carefully won elite support as he tried to split the military by 
appointing Wiranto as head of the armed forces (to counter Prabowo) and failed to appoint any 
ICMI bureaucrats to his new cabinet in March. `Crony' influence in the cabinet (t included Tutut 
and Bob Hasan, head of the country's plywood cartel) also sent a message to demonstrators and the 
markets that he was not listening to their demands and was not ready to reform. Meanwhile the 
moderate Muslim opposition - Rais and Sasono - toured the campuses winning the sympathy of the 
students. 
The third IMF programme was negotiated in this tense atmosphere. The government argued that 
further reforms - and the proposed reductions in government subsidies in particular - posed a 
serious threat to social and political stability in Indonesia (AWSJ 16th February 1998, JP 20th March 
1998). The programme, negotiated between 17th March and 18th April, allowed the government to 
continue with subsidies on basic commodities until October (though initial price rises were to take 
effect on April 1) and to delay dismantling BULOG. The IMF also allowed the government to 
become more involved in debt negotiations. In return (or perhaps in the aftermath of his successful 
re-election (Haggard, 2000)) Suharto agreed to give up the currency board. 
While there were some moves to implement this programme (suggesting that some of Suharto's 
opposition may have been political posturing), it was soon overtaken by events. Suharto raised fuel 
prices sharply on 4th May for reasons that remain unclear. The IMF required the elimination of 
subsidies by October but there was no requirement for this sharp rise in early May - the risk of 
social unrest was, as we have already seen, well known in government circles. In any case, the rise 
triggered riots in Medan in which Chinese shops were burned and looted. 
They escalated over the next few days and when four students were killed outside Trisakti 
University in Jakarta on 12th May massive riots broke out all over the city. These riots were partly 
spontaneous, but there were also worrying signs of Prabowo's involvement. The military had left 
the city centre before the riots and black clad agentsprovocatears, widely identified as KOPASSUS 
units under Prabowo's command, were seen directing the violence echoing earlier unexplained 
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`ninja killings' in NU controlled areas of Indonesia in late 1996 (Hefner, 2000). Over 1,000 people 
were killed and large numbers of ethnic Chinese women were systematically raped. 
Frenzied political manoeuvring followed in which Suharto unsuccessfully stepped up his attempts 
to exploit splits within ABRI and the Muslim community (Mietzner, 1999). By 21st May it was dear 
that he no longer had any political support and he handed over power to Habibie. 
Habibie, whether by inclination or through political necessity, was anxious to promote himself as a 
reformer and set about implementing some aspects of the IMF programme. There was also a 
noticeable change of emphasis from the IMF, paying far more attention to maintaining social 
stability and protecting the poorest (Government of Indonesia, 1999, JP 26th June 1998). 
However, problems in implementation continued, particularly with attempts at banking and 
corporate sector restructuring (see section 6.5 below). Populist pressure for the redistribution of 
assets grew with the appointment of Minister for Small Business and Cooperatives Adi Sasono, 
champion of a `people's economy' based around a greater role for cooperatives and SMEs . There 
were also suggestions that assets seized by IBRA should be redistributed to pribumi or other 
measures taken to promote a Malaysian style ethnic redistribution policy13 UP 11thJuly 1998,17th 
July 1998,27thJuly 1998,10th September 1998,14thNovember 1998). Political stability was also in 
question with Habibie's position insecure and growing pressures for regional secession coupled 
with escalating religious violence. 
Habibie failed to obtain sufficient support in the general elections of 7thJune 1999 and splits within 
Golkar meant that the report on his term in office presented to the MPR in October was rejected 
(Bourchier, 2000). He was withdrawn from the presidential race and the presidency was eventually 
given to Abdurahman Wahid. Since then, implementation has continued to be haphazard and the 
Indonesian economy has yet to recover. 
6.3 The economics of the crisis 
In Indonesia the issues revolve around the relationship between patronage and market confidence. 
Was patronage the root of the Indonesian crisis or was it contagion? Did the IMF's structural 
reforms address underlying problems or trigger renewed anxiety? What does that say about the 
prospects for a market confidence based approach to crisis resolution? 
6.3.1 The IMF response 
The IMF account of the critic 
The press release put out by the IMF when the first Indonesian programme was announced on 5th 
November provides a useful summary of the IMF's view of the crisis'+. 
13 On the Malaysian approach see chapter 7. 
14 See also the fuller, but broadly consistent account in (IMF, 1997e). 
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Long-standing rigidities in the form of domestic trade regulations and some import monopolies 
impeded economic efficiency and competitiveness. At the same time, less transparency in 
decisions affecting the business environment and data deficiencies increased uncertainty and 
adversely affected investor confidence. In addition, large capital flows intermediated through a 
weak banking system exposed Indonesia to a shift in financial market sentiment... Prompted by 
large interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates, private companies 
had increasingly borrowed abroad to finance domestic operations, which in the context of a 
relatively stable exchange rate, were largely unhedged (IMF, 1997c). 
The `shift in financial market sentiment' was provided by contagion from the Thai crisis. It set in 
train a vicious circle in which domestic corporations scrambled to buy foreign exchange to cover 
their unhedged liabilities before an anticipated depreciation. This process itself put further pressure 
on the rupiah resulting in further depreciation in a downward spiral. 
Lack of sufficient information meant that foreign lenders were unsure which banks were or weren't 
good credit risks. As a result they were reluctant to roll over short-term debts exacerbating the 
problems. The fact that, although Indonesian banking regulations were in accordance with 
international standards, it was well known that implementation was poor added to uncertainty 
about the quality of banks' balance sheets. The history of politically directed credit and connected 
lending undermining commercial risk assessment made matters worse. 
Finally pre-existing structural problems in the Indonesian economy (trade regulations, monopolies, 
and lack of transparency) further undermined confidence in the economy's ability to recover. 
The IMF pmgammes 
The first IMF programme included the following measures: 
" Tight monetary and fiscal policies designed to provide incentives for the repatriation of 
capital and to prevent the current account deficit from growing wider due to capital 
outflows. Fiscal policy was to ensure a continuing budget surplus despite the `cyclical 
downturn'. 
This would be achieved by cancelling infrastructure projects, raising excise taxes and 
removing some tax exemptions. Expenditures on basic education, health and social 
services would be protected as would the special assistance programme for small villages 
which was to be increased under Repelita VII (the latest five year development plan). 
Measures to improve fiscal management by increasing the transparency of public sector 
activities would be introduced, enhancing the quality of governance. The government was 
also to bring off- budget activities (particularly the much abused `reforestation fund') 
within the budget to increase transparency. 
" The closure of 16 unviable banks and other measures to restore the health of the banking 
system. These measures were to include steps to `strengthen the legal and regulatory 
environment and establish strong enforcement mechanisms and clear exit policy'. For 
banks which were viable but in trouble, rehabilitation plans would be drawn up. 
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"A broad range of structural reforms including `the liberalization of foreign trade and 
investment, dismantling of domestic monopolies, allowing greater private sector 
participation in the provision of infrastructure, and expanding the privatisation program' 
(IMF, 1997c). Import and marketing monopolies were to be phased out and price 
restrictions removed for all commodities except sugar and rice. 
The privatisation of infrastructure provision would happen after `the establishment of a 
clear framework to guide decision making, to level the playing field for both domestic and 
foreign investors and thereby assure investor confidence'. New regulations on government 
procurement were to be introduced to further this aim. The privatisation programme 
would require similar reforms to establish `explicit criteria for determining whether an 
enterprise would be closed, restructured or privatised'. For those enterprises remaining in 
the public sector, performance targets would be publicised and reported annually to ensure 
efficiency. 
Tariff reductions were to take place for chemicals, steel/metal products and fishery and all 
non-tariff barriers were to be removed. There was also a promise to implement any WTO 
decision against the National Car ahead of schedule of the dispute panel ruled against it. 
Later a number of legal `governance' reforms were added to the programme including. a new 
competition law, provisions for better company registration and accounting practices, a consumer 
protection law, a law securing independence of Bank Indonesia and a new bankruptcy law. 
Overall, then, the strategy was designed to `restore confidence' or tempt foreign investors back by 
showing that the Indonesian government was willing to take tough measures to restore the 
economy to a `healthy' state. This seemed to require the government to address all the aspects of 
the economy that neo-classical economists would be unhappy with. 
6.3.2 Academic debates 
Causation - did cronyism cause the crisis? Or was it IiberaAsation? 
In Korea the suggestion that the developmental state was economically flawed was itself a matter of 
some debate. In Indonesia, there is no doubt that high profile monopolies; corrupt allocation of 
state infrastructure contracts; connected lending from banks to their associated corporations; lax 
prudential regulation and a general atmosphere of cronyism were economically undesirable. The 
question is which, if any, of these problems was actually responsible for the crisis. 
Given that, as in Korea, there was a large build up of short-term debt a strong culprit for the crisis 
is poor financial sector regulation. However, if in Korea there were questions about the 
inefficiencies of directed credit, in Indonesia a different explanation had to be found. Indonesia had 
radically liberalised its financial system in the late 1980s in a deliberate attempt by the technocrats to 
insulate credit allocation from state control Explanations therefore had to be based on too little 
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state control (in the form of prudential regulation and general legal enforcement) rather than too 
much. 
The existence of monopolies, trade restrictions and general inefficiency in the use of resources, 
either as a result of pure patronage or of Habibie's slightly more ambiguous industrial policy, fit 
better with the neoliberal rent-seeking paradigm but are initially less easy to blame. After all, these 
problems were certainly not disguised before the crisis, indeed they had been well documented for 
many years - during Indonesia's period of rapid economic growth. 
However, most commentators saw a shift in emphasis over the 1990s as patronage was increasingly 
narrowly distributed to Suharto's own family and long established allies. It is certainly true to say 
that this was a cause of growing political dissatisfaction in Indonesia, including growing frictions 
between Suharto and the technocrats. Whether or not it was also creating greater economic 
problems is difficult to assess. Many commentators initially viewed Indonesia as the most clear cut 
case of contagion in the region (McLeod, 1998; Pincus & Ramli, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998a; 
Radelet & Sachs, 1998b). The strongest argument for those that wish to blame cronyism for the 
crisis is that the central problem was growing doubt in the markets about Suharto's willingness to 
inflict costs on his cronies in order to induce economic recovery as he had been willing to do in the 
past (Soesastro, 2000). 
At the same time none of this corruption prevented substantial inward investment to Indonesia. 
Indeed the vast majority of foreign joint ventures involved partnerships with at least one first family 
connected venture. If the crisis is to be blamed on cronyism, foreign investors themselves have to 
accept some of that blame. 
Confidence versus debt restructuring 
Given the weaker links between market imperfections and crisis causation, the question of the 
extent to which IMF policies were confidence enhancing becomes more acute. For some, the 
inclusion of a large range of structural measures in the first IMF programme was like screaming fire 
in the theatre. Their very inclusion in the IMF programme turned them from non-essential, 
unpopular (from Suharto's point of view) reforms into essential (but still politically painful) 
preconditions for recovery as the markets were instructed to believe that they were at the root of 
the problems (McLeod, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998a; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b). 
For some of these authors, the emphasis on market opening suggested that these conditions were 
in fact little more than the price Indonesia was expected to pay for international assistance 
(McLeod, 1998). Indeed, where the Korean programme only mandated swifter implementation of 
previously agreed measures, the Indonesian programme included a wide range of policies that were 
wholly new (Soesastro, 2000). 
What the programme should have contained, according to these critics, was the narrow macro- 
economic measures that Suharto seems to have expected (see section 6.2) together with concrete 
proposals for corporate and banking sector restructuring (McLeod, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998a), 
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possibly combined with some kind of forced debt roll-over. This view receives some support form 
the sharp turn around in the exchange rate in Indonesia that, just as in Korea, took place once a 
government guarantee was provided in the context of moves towards debt restructuring in late 
January 1998 (Figure 6-1). 
Indonesia's slower recovery since then may be partly due to continuing political uncertainty and 
difficulties with implementation, but it appears to be most affected by the difficult process of debt 
restructuring (see section 6.5 below). 
The macro-economic effects of the IMF's choice of a market-based strategy (i. e. high interest rates) 
have also been criticised in Indonesia just as they have been in Korea (and indeed Thailand). 
In terms of the evidence, the positions are again difficult to separate in economic terms. Since the 
programme wasn't implemented it is difficult to know whether it would have been successful if it 
had been. The issues are far easier to see in political terms. Since it was fairly clear that Suharto 
wouldn't implement reforms that the IMF wanted (regardless of their economic credibility), what 
should the IMF have done? To what extent should IMF economic preferences give way to political 
reality? Would the IMF measures have been politically possible if Suharto hadn't opposed them - 
did they have any social support? Crucially, to what extent is it reasonable to see the IMF as 
responsible for Suharto's fall and how does that relate to IMF legitimacy? 
6.4 The politics of the crisis 
In Korea, the more democratic environment and the existence of state support led me to discuss 
the politics of the crisis largely in terms of a variety of social interests and the political appeals elites 
made to those social interests. In Indonesia, by contrast, the state under Suharto was never fully 
convinced by the case for implementation so social interests that might prevent programme 
implementation are less central to the debates - although they have an influence on the political 
rationale for elite scepticism. The politics surrounding negotiations and Suharto's strategic 
responses are far more important. 
In addition, because the programme wasn't implemented, questions about IMF legitimacy are raised 
more sharply and clearly. I will therefore bring these issues into discussion rather earlier than I did 
in the previous chapter so the significance of events can be understood in the context of broader 
Fund legitimacy. 
I begin with analysis of the reasons why Suharto initially seemed to favour IMF involvement, later 
turned away from the IMF programmes, and finally seemed to be turning back. I then go on to ask 
questions about the extent to which IMF behaviour can be seen as responsible and assess some 
alternative strategies. 
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6.4.1 Economics and interests 
If the starting point is non-implementation, the important issues concern how politically misguided 
the programmes were (since they clearly weren't implemented) and what the alternatives might 
have 
been? 
From this perspective it is dear that the IMF programmes were designed to cut to the heart of 
Suharto's patronage networks and that they harmed the interests of large-scale political business 
together with allied bureaucratic interests. 
In contrast over the longer term, to the extent that they succeeded in their aim of establishing a 
level playing field in the Indonesian economy, the programmes had the potential to benefit the 
large segments of the middle class that were increasingly mounting opposition to Suharto's rule 
during the mid to late 1990s. In the short term though, as in Korea, the IMF's macro-economic 
policies were likely to have a sharply negative impact on small businesses as high interest rates and 
bank closures triggered a collapse of the domestic credit system. 
The same factors would have a negative impact on the urban poor who would find themselves 
unemployed. 
For the rural poor the situation was different. The combination of exchange rate depreciation and 
freer inter-island and export trade could be expected to boost agricultural production. On the other 
hand, the poorest of the rural poor who were net consumers of rice were likely to be the worst hit 
of all. The rural economy's function as social safety net for the urban unemployed could also be 
expected to dampen any positive economic effects. 
Persistent food price riots, although perhaps partly stirred up for political purposes, demonstrate 
the limitations of early attempts to address social concerns as does, implicitly, the IMF's change of 
course after the May riots. The question of who was responsible though remains somewhat in 
doubt - to what extent did the IMF influence the lack of social provision 
(did it challenge Suharto 
on the issue, were logistical limitations considered, was the issue discussed at all given early 
optimism about a swift resolution? ). 
If Suharto bad been concerned about popular sentiment, then, the attractions of the programme 
would have had to be based on the expectation of rapid economic recovery and a particular 
concern for non-conglomerate middle-class support. Ultimately he does not seem to have been 
convinced that was the right strategic course of action. Securing elite support from his traditional 
business allies, the Muslim military and the more radical (in Islamic rather than political terms) 
corners of ICMI was more important. To the extent that he did try to rally popular support, it was 
through using the IMF as a scapegoat and appeals to pribumi economic nationalism: a strategy that 
he presumably felt was more politically logical given the nature of his sources of elite support. The 
political struggle in Indonesia at this period seems to have been a battle over the Muslim middle 
ground. Suharto seems to have decided that he had lost the reformist wing and that anti-Chinese, 
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nationalist appeals would win him more Islamic-radical support and ensure his military and elite 
alliances. 
6.4.2 Negotiations and the first three programmes 
The negotiation process for the first two programmes provides indications of the factors driving 
that choice. 
What information there is suggests that Suharto initially hoped the IMF could be used to perform 
very much the `catalytic effect' that it has been busily promoting over the 1990s. Indonesia had not 
run down its reserves in defending a currency peg like Korea and the president had already 
implemented a package of reforms in September that echoed the moderate part of the IMF agenda. 
There was no urgent financial need to turn to the IMF and at this stage (and indeed afterwards) 
most market analysts agreed that Indonesia's crisis was the clearest case of unjustified contagion in 
the region (Enoch et aL, 2001; McLeod, 1998). 
Reports in the press suggest that Indonesia had asked the IMF for a small, relatively low 
conditionality loan in the hope that it would boost attempts to enhance confidence (Soesastro, 
2000). In Suharto's words: 
We are not asking for money, as we already have policies ... we just need the IMF to look at 
these programmes as it has experience (quoted in FT 20th October 1998. See also FT 1001 
October 1998, JP 15th October 1998). 
However, the ultimate programme was far more extensive. The exact mechanics of the negotiations 
remain unclear. Schwarz (a veteran reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review in Indonesia) 
suggests that, contrary to rhetoric about what I have labelled the `new IMF, the Fund responded 
with 
a powerful mix of arrogance and ignorance... [and]... dismissed the advice of the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank both of which had a much larger presence on the ground 
(Schwarz, 1999,339). 
suggesting a largely IMF agenda. Kwik Kan Gie also argued that the negotiations for the third 
programme after Suharto's fall were the first time that Hubert Neiss (leader of the IMF missions) 
had spoken to non-government personnel - in this case mostly politicians. 
Other commentators point to the technocrats' enthusiasm for the first programme (Soesastro, 
2000). Riesenhuber's interviews in the Indonesian finance ministry persuaded her that, once the 
IMF had ruled out any direct engagement with the debt problem, the technocrats agreed with the 
Fund that some kind of structural reforms were the only remaining option to prevent capital 
outflows. They agreed to include a fairly wide range of reforms in the programme but none of them 
were performance criteria, leaving flexibility over the timescale for implementation (Riesenhuber, 
2001). The strategy appears to have been based heavily on faith in the strong version of the catalytic 
effect argument (see section 4.1.2 above). 
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What is fairly dear is that the bank closures were carried out at Fund insistence, possibly with a 
view to heading off criticisms of Fund bail-outs (Riesenhuber, 2001) and were the subject of 
considerable government resistance15. 
It was the failure of this first programme that heightened Suharto's animosity to the Fund, pushing 
him towards less orthodox policies. Later non-implementation - reversal of some of the closures 
and the reinstatement of previously postponed infrastructure projects - clouds the issue of why 
market confidence did not return. However, any faith in the strong catalytic effect produced by 
programme signature again looks misplaced. 
When it came to the second programme, negotiations were dearly going badly wrong. Suharto 
came under intense international pressure. He responded by insisting on negotiating the 
programme directly with the Fund and Bank, agreeing everything he was asked, but privately argued 
he was engaged in `guerrilla war' and had signed the programme to gain breathing space16. 
The Fund perspective was that Suharto's failed implementation was as much to blame as the bank 
closures for the failure of the first programme (Enoch et al., 2001; Lane et al., 1999). The solution 
was to procure an even more radical programme of reforms to demonstrate stronger government 
commitment to orthodox liberalism. Arguably, though, even from this perspective fund officials 
overplayed their hand. The very extent of the measures and the clear evidence of international 
pressure for their implementation may merely have undermined the programme's credibility'? 
(Radelet & Sachs, 1998a; Radelet & Sachs, 1998b)18. 
There was certainly considerable political naivety involved on the IMF's part, if not in believing 
Suharto would implement the first programme19, then at least in not being suspicious about his 
acquiescence in the second round of negotiations20. The Indonesian technocrats were apparently 
absolutely furious about the second programme. Wijoyo Nitisastro was reportedly so angry that he 
refused to speak with World Bank officials for months after telling them `we've been working with 
Soeharto for thirty years and now you are destroying everything' (Schwarz, 1999,341). On the other 
15 Personal interviews with officials involved in the negotiations Washington 2000, MIA October 1997. 
t6 (Riesenhuber, 2001) citing interviews with IMF staff and Indonesian government officials. 
17 Some foreign press reports at this stage also suggested that the programme could not be implemented eg. 
Evening Standard 20th January 1998. 
18 Arguably because this interpretation suggests that there was an alternative programme at this point that might 
have been implemented and restored market confidence, a contention that other authors question (Haggard, 
2000; Schwarz, 1999). 
19 Apparently, the Fund was initially working on the basis that, since Suharto claimed that the Indonesia economy as 
a whole was his principal concern and genuinely believed his childrens' businesses were good for that economy (as 
part of economic nationalist development), if he was convinced that they were in fact damaging he would be willing 
to sacrifice them. (Based on interviews with Fund staff cited by Riesenhuber, 2001). 
20 The most thorough available account of the second round of negotiations is provided by (Riesenhuber, 2001). 
Anecdotal references in other accounts such as (Schwarz, 1999), based on good contacts in Indonesia from years 
as a FEER reporter, and some hints in papers by the Indonesian technocrats (Soesastro, 2000) are generally 
consistent with Riesenhuber's account. 
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hand, it seems quite likely that the technocrats' early moves towards dismantling the worst excesses 
of corruption had, by this point, created an international political momentum of their own21. 
In any case, the prospects for implementation of the second programme may have been greater if 
the programme had been more successful technically - though how far Suharto would have been 
willing to go will remain a mystery. There is some evidence, though, that Suharto's attitudes 
hardened and his strategy shifted towards maintaining elite support (even at the cost of economic 
collapse) as time went by. 
I will discuss the implications of these issues further in section 6.4.3. For now, I want to finish my 
review of the negotiation process with Suharto by looking at the events surrounding the third 
programme. Here things become more difficult to understand. In the aftermath of Suharto's re- 
election, there seems to have been an about face towards programme implementation. That about 
face culminated in some concerted steps towards implementing the third IMF programme but was 
rapidly overtaken by chaos after the unexpected fuel price hikes. 
One possibility is that, seeing the situation slipping away from him and in the light of greater IMF 
willingness to address the debt issue, he was genuinely interested in working with the IMF at this 
point. Price rises could either be seen as a deliberate attempt to put pressure on the IMF for further 
concessions to calm the resulting social unrest22, or as an overenthusiastic demonstration of 
commitment immediately preceding further negotiations. 
Another more Machiavellian possibility is that Suharto expected a violent response to price rises 
but hoped that this would separate middle class support from working class animosity, renewing 
support for the militarily enforced status quo. Support here comes from the suggestion that 
Prabowo and the radical Muslim military were responsible for fanning the flames of the riots 
(Hefner, 2000). 
Finally, it is possible that Suharto simply underestimated the strength of popular and elite 
opposition growing around him and was not listening to anyone but his family and dose associates. 
6.4.3 Analysis and implications for IMF legitimacy 
In terms of securing implementation, the Fund's strategy for the second programme seems to have 
been the turning point: the point at which IMF policy is most questionable and issues of IMF 
legitimacy are raised most sharply. That raises pragmatic issues about what might have been 
implemented and more normative issues about Fund authority and the proper conception of the 
Fund's role. In particular, if one sees the IMF as partly responsible for Suharto's downfall, as many 
people undoubtedly did (Hanke, 1998; Hanke, 2000), questions about IMF authority are particularly 
significant. One way of exploring the implications of these questions is to compare the IMF 
21A huge procession of international (and particularly US) figures called or visited Suharto during the negotiations 
for the second programme. 
22 In terms of the logic of two-level games, imposing a very visible narrowing of the domestic 'win set' can 
strengthen negotiators' hands (Putnam, 1988). 
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approach with the alternative advocated by some economists (concerted debt roll-overs and less 
extensive structural reforms). 
Leaving causal explanations of Fund choices apart for now, there are two ways of just jng Fund 
interventions. Most fundamentally, technical authority is key. If one is convinced by the Fund view 
that Indonesian economic recovery was impossible without at least some degree of structural 
reform then there are better grounds for later policies that plainly attack the basis of Suharto's 
political power. If there is no technical alternative, if Indonesian failure could be expected to trigger 
further regional and global contagion, and the Fund's role is to enforce economically responsible 
behaviour at an international level there is arguably some justification for using all available 
resources to press appropriate policy on Indonesia regardless of the political consequences. 
Following on from that is a more political justification relying on emergent international norms of 
good governance. To the extent that the technical position is correctly characterised in those terms, 
Suharto was not acting in the interests of the Indonesian people or the world at large. He was 
retreating into policies favouring himself and a narrow elite at the expense of millions of 
Indonesians. The IMF response was to put as much political pressure on him as possible. The logic 
of the second programme is then that of my `third vision' for IMF engagement with civil society. 
The Fund would appeal to civil society by portraying the crisis as one of cronyism putting 
maximum political pressure on Suharto from below in the interests of good governance. At the 
same time, it would give him the opportunity to show both Indonesians and the markets a dramatic 
conversion to orthodoxy. 
The problem with this strategy, as subsequent events demonstrate, is that it is a very high stakes 
game, justifiable only on the basis of considerable technical conviction or perhaps popular support. 
The more one is tempted to doubt the IMF's technical position the more politically intrusive IMF 
intervention looks and, as we have seen, the technical case is not cast iron. We are left with 
genuinely difficult counterfactual questions about the IMF's role. 
Part of the debate revolves around the alternative administrative solutions to debt themselves, 
which we have seen remain contested even after reviewing the empirical evidence in Indonesia: 
would an administrative approach have worked and what would the international consequences 
have been? On the other hand those questions cannot be separated from debates about structural 
reforms. 
That is clear from the Fund position which is that, even if we imagine, for a moment, that this 
alternative approach would have worked to resolve the immediate crisis, Indonesia would in any 
case have ended up in the same difficulties again sooner or later in the absence of structural reforms 
(Fischer, 1998b). There are two points here: the first is that the debate is centrally about the 
consequences of departing from the IMF's vision of a proper market economy (arms length 
transactions, market discipline, the rule of law and transparency). The second is that, if we accept 
Indonesia 187 
the Fund view, the perception of the IMF's role involved suggests that it has a responsibility for 
more than simply crisis resolution. 
The first danger of that Fund argument is that, although there is some ambiguity, it can be 
interpreted to imply that the Fund had deliberately chosen a market-based solution because it would 
exert more pressure for structural reform. If that is (or is perceived to be) the Fund argument, then 
the notion of conditionality as being about securing crisis resolution as swiftly as possible without 
breaching the code of conduct takes on a far more serious meaning than might initially be apparent. That 
raises very significant issues about the justification for the IMF's Asian crisis interpretation of what 
the `code of conduct' might mean in the context of capital account convertibility. 
That is perhaps the most important message from the Indonesian crisis. The gap between the 
IMF's conception of an acceptable economic system and what existed in pre-crisis Indonesia is 
particularly great That is demonstrated in the sheer extent of legal and structural reforms that were 
eventually included in IMF programmes. If such measures are to be considered as compulsory 
international obligations, rather than desirable objectives, that has extremely serious implications 
for any state that aspires to emerging market status, unless of course it already conforms to IMF 
stipulations. 
That emphasizes the weight placed on IMF authority, on its technical and democratic justifications, 
particularly when, as we have already seen, there are reasons to doubt both kinds of justifications. 
The technical issues involved are very much those surrounding debates about rent-seeking that I 
discussed in Chapter 4. How secure is the connection between corruption inefficiency and market 
confidence in Indonesia? How much account should be taken of political stability? 
Politically, the issue is about whether Suharto had any right to govern in Indonesia and how much 
influence the IMF had on his departure. The IMF official position is that it simply insisted on 
necessary economic policies and that political events were not of its making. Unofficially, though, 
the Fund has also been willing to claim some of the credit for Suharto's fall. Given that side to the 
issue, it is important to explore the potential good governance justifications for Suharto's ouster a 
little further. First of all, the IMF did not expel Suharto. At most it provided ideological support, 
technical authority and potential financial incentives for opposition which in the end turned out to 
result in a political transition. It altered the nature of the strategic choices available to various 
Indonesian actors but did not actually attack Suharto directly. Suharto was already in political 
trouble or the IMF could not have removed him and he clearly made some ill-advised strategic 
choices during the crisis. That does not, however, remove the question of how one should assess 
the costs and benefits of the actions the IMF did take towards supporting the opposition. 
That is clearly an extremely complex question. I have already shown that the issues are deeply 
contested and have reviewed the evidence that is relevant in making a decision, I do not want to do 
anything further here in the way of providing answers. 
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What I do want to suggest, though, in keeping with my discussion in Chapter 4, is that there are 
grounds for arguing that appropriate assessment ought to be made on the basis of a comparison 
between Suharto's Indonesia and the possible alternatives rather than by comparing Suharto's 
flawed governance with some unrealistic ideal. That is the essence of the debate about alternative 
policies. 
To be fair to the IMF that was probably very difficult ex ante but since debates about IMF reform 
take place with the benefit of hindsight, it is worth exploring what events after Suharto's fall tell us 
about the feasibility of transforming Indonesia into a liberal market economy. That will not answer 
the question of whether or not it was essential to do so but it will help in evaluating what the 
realistic choices actually were. 
That is the task I want to carry out in the next section. Was it merely that IMF policies couldn't be 
implemented by Suharto (which would give support to good governance justifications) or whether 
there were more fundamental constraints at work? Was non-implementation a matter of insufficient 
`political will' as it is sometimes portrayed in Fund accounts or was there simply not enough social 
support for the IMF programme to carry it through? If so the pragmatic case, at least, for an 
alternative Fund strategy would be stronger. 
Here the reform experience under Habibie and Wahid is likely to be informative. Obviously, the 
situation had already changed significantly by the time Habibie came to power. The fourth Fund 
programme provided greater provision for social safety nets and measures directly addressing 
corporate and bank debt. If anything, that should have made matters easier for subsequent 
Presidents. In practice, though, implementation has not been entirely satisfactory. 
On the other hand, we also need to look at what the realistic prospects for the alternative approach 
might have been and take seriously the IMF's views on structural issues. Can the need for structural 
measures really be dismissed? 
6.5 Post-Suharto reform and implementation 
This section will review the information that is relevant to that choice. Was Suharto's lack of 
political will the only obstacle to implementation or were there other factors? What kind of political 
enthusiasm was there for the IMF agenda and which groups were able to offer resistance after the 
crisis? How easy would a solution based around debt restructuring have been and what might the 
resulting political economy have looked like? 
6.5.1 Populism and post-Suharto presidential policy 
Protests against Suharto made it clear that there is popular enthusiasm for the drive against 
corruption and arbitrary authority in Indonesia. 
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Post-Suharto politics, though, suggested that it is often allied with populist economic nationalism 
rather than with the kind of preferences for rationalist economic efficiency that the IMF supports. 
The alliance between political reform and economic liberalism is loose and fragile (Robison, 2001). 
Habibie 
Whatever Habibie's personal inclinations (and past performance suggests that they were not 
towards a pure free market), political realities required that he present himself as a reformer and 
some progress was made on the programme during his premiership. However, he was also in a very 
precarious political position, widely seen as representing continuity with the old regime and with 
tenuous political legitimacy having been handed the presidency by Suharto. His primary aim, 
therefore, was to consolidate his political power. 
The chosen method seems to have been through moderate appeals to populism spearheaded by 
Minister for Cooperatives and SMEs Adi Sasono. That should not perhaps be too surprising given 
Habibie's support base in ICMI and the tendencies towards economic nationalism evident within 
the organisation before the crisis. Sasono made very public calls for a people's economy (Ekonomi 
rakya/) by which he meant a system of special preferences for small (i. e. pribum: ) business and 
cooperatives. A variety of measures were proposed: extra credit provided by Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia; a public venture capital fund for SMEs, greater involvement of coops in forestry and 
food distribution, and at his most extreme the transfer of IBRA's acquired assets (most of the 
Indonesian banking system) to pribumi entrepreneurs and small businesses. The appeal of this sort 
of programme to the public, traditional Golkar supporters and Habibie's newer radical Muslim 
allies should be obvious. 
In the event the worst excesses of populist policy were restrained through a combination of IMF 
pressure and Habibie's concerns for a broader economic recovery. Nonetheless, populist issues 
triggered significant debate in the Jakarta Post and resurfaced during the election campaign in 1999. 
Megawati and W/ahid 
Economic policy was not at the top of the agenda in the election campaign (Linnan, 1999b), 
suggesting that the IMF programme's popular appeal lay in its attacks on big business and 
corruption rather than in its economic rationality. 
When economics was mentioned, announcements were often contradictory. A poll of the major 
parties published in Warta Ekonomi found Megawati's PDI-P most consistently in favour of limiting 
access to foreign investors introducing capital controls and boosting the role of government in the 
economy (reported in FT 13th May 1999). On the other hand Megawati herself told the South China 
Morning Post that she would not institute capital controls or ethnic redistribution but did see a need 
to deal with `the jealousies sown between the rich and poor' - something that Hubert Neiss (head of 
the Fund's Asia-Pacific department) acknowledged was a concern for all the major parties (SCMP 
19th May 1999). 
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During the campaign the Jakarta Post was happy to argue that `populist economic policies have been 
the dominant theme in the political statements of some major political parties, populist 
programmes are the most attractive among the people' (JP 21st May 1999). 
The IMF was certainly sufficiently concerned to send Neiss and Fischer to talk to Megawati. After 
the elections when it was clear that the PDI-P was the largest party, Fischer was photographed 
shaking hands with a smiling Megawati. An article in the Jakarta Post immediately questioned the 
implications for Indonesia's fledgling democracy given that the IMF appeared to have persuaded 
her to change the policies on which Kwik Kan Gie had been campaigning, including an exchange 
rate peg (JP ist July 1999): 
Even when Wahid (who has been a long term opponent of confessionalisation of politics) had 
taken power23, he said that he was happy with the broad thrust of the IMF programme but that he 
wanted to see more attention paid to the agricultural sector and the poor, something which Neiss 
quickly said he could accommodate (JP 5th August 1999). 
Indonesian leaders seem to have been content to go along with IMF policies since the economy 
was not the central issue in post-Suharto Indonesia. On the other hand there is less reason to 
believe that the IMF reform programme was top of the agenda or something that they were 
particularly keen to press forward24. 
6.5.2 Bank and corporate sector restructuring 
Once the exchange rate had begun to stabilise somewhat the most important issue in recovery 
involved restructuring the corporate and banking sectors. 
Banking 
Banking sector restructuring was completely delegated to IBRA. IBRA was responsible for. 
overseeing audits of all commercial banks in Indonesia; deciding which were to be dosed, merged 
or taken over, taking on non-performing assets and the assets of closed banks and maximising 
possible returns; recovering sums lent under BI's LLR operations; and overseeing payments under 
the governments' guarantee of the banking system announced in January 1998 (Enoch et at, 2001). 
The system was designed carefully with maximum safeguards to prevent political interference. 
IBRA was to be politically independent. Audits were carried out by overseas representatives of the 
Big 6 accounting firms. Explicit criteria were developed for deciding which banks would meet 
which fate. Nonetheless, according to IMF staff 
the experience of Indonesia indicates how poor governance undermines credibility in an 
otherwise well thought out restructuring strategy, and adds substantially to the costs of the 
strategy (Enoch et al., 2001). 
23 See (Meitzner, 2000). 
24 Space does not permit full justification on this point. Particularly during Wahid's presidency the IMF was evidently 
disappointed with progress and the Fund programmes tended to be subordinated to other issues, particularly 
political stability and the threat of secessionist movements. 
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Early problems under Suharto should not be particularly surprising given previous discussion. So, 
IBRA's first head was rapidly removed apparently for being too diligent. IBRA's first bank 
takeovers were also undermined by Suharto's insistence that they remain secret, undermining IBRA 
officials' authority and preventing any significant changes in bank management (Haggard, 2000). 
However, difficulties continued under Habibie. Most startling was the Bank Bali scandal. It 
emerged that difficulties in obtaining payments under the government's guarantee had enabled well 
connected officials to act as `facilitators'. They took a commission for ensuring that payments were 
made quickly. The company involved in the Bank Bali scandal was run by Golkar heavyweights and 
there were widespread reports that its commissions were being used to finance Habibie's election 
campaign (Enoch et al., 2001; Haggard, 2000; Hamilton-Hart, 2000). 
There were other more shadowy problems, though, that also suggested high-level interference in 
the restructuring process. There was a very long gap between the audit process and announcements 
of banks' fate (Haggard, 2000). At one point Habibie announced, without IBRA consultation, that 
particular banks would be first to receive recapitalisation, including Bank Lippo owned by the Riady 
family who were close Habibie allies(Hamilton-Hart, 2000). There were also delays fuelled by 
concern over recapitalising `Chinese' Bank Central Asia and by Sasono's attempts to allow pribumi 
preference to affect the process of asset recovery and disposal. More generally Habibie's Financial 
Sector Action Committee was able to exert more political influence over the operations of a 
supposedly independent institution than the IMF felt comfortable with (Enoch et al., 2001). 
In addition to these difficulties with political interference and outright corruption, which 
demonstrated the continuing direct influence of the established Indonesian conglomerates, IBRA's 
involvement in debt recovery ran into some of the broader institutional obstacles that also 
undermined the broader corporate restructuring process. 
Corporate r structuring 
The government, perhaps under IMF instruction, had been reluctant to become involved in 
corporate and banking sector bailouts from the start (Enoch et al., 2001; Hamilton-Hart, 2000). 
The banking sector guarantee eventually became inevitable but the government remained aloof 
from corporate sector issues. 
It did develop the Jakarta Initiative Task Force QITF), which was supposed to provide advice and a 
framework for debtor-creditor negotiations. It also introduced INDRA to guarantee corporate 
debts against further exchange rate shifts (following the Fiorra model used in Mexico). However, 
the INDRA guarantee offered little protection as it was introduced after the currency had hit its low 
point. The JITF offered few incentives for restructuring and no guidance on what appropriate deals 
might look like (Radelet & Woo, 2000). 
The situation was made more difficult by the inadequacy of Indonesian bankruptcy law. In the five 
years before the crisis only 120 companies had been declared bankrupt and the government 
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admitted that both Indonesian and foreign creditors had no confidence in it: A new bankruptcy law 
was introduced but the courts proved unable to implement it. 
In the new bankruptcy court, judges have handed down a variety of creative rulings consistent 
only in their uniform ability to frustrate creditors (I innan, 1999b). 
Linnan suggests that this was partly because there was a feeling that bankruptcy law was designed to 
favour foreign creditors at the expense of Indonesia debtors (Linnan, 1999a). It was also noticeable, 
though, that bankruptcy petitions were more likely to be successful against smaller rather than 
larger companies and corruption cannot be ruled out. Indeed the crisis revealed a greater crisis of 
confidence in the Indonesian legal system. IBRA's lack of success in obtaining bankruptcy petitions 
resulted in the appointment of a number of `ad hol judges from business and academia to hear 
bankruptcy cases. When the House of Representatives reviewed Supreme Court judges, only 17/46 
judges passed its `fit and proper' test. Apparently many failed because they would only accept `gifts' 
after they had delivered their verdicts (JP 26th July 2000, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000a)25 
In the absence of a credible legal solution, it was particularly difficult for creditors to conduct 
effective negotiations. Such negotiations usually take place `in the shadow of the law' but there were 
no legal decisions to provide guidance. In any case both creditors and debtors had incentives to 
avoid negotiations. 38% of Indonesian corporate debt was owed to Japanese banks (Radelet & 
Woo, 2000) who were not in a position to acknowledge debt write downs. Corporate managers 
either hoped that time would rehabilitate asset values or, having already lost all their equity, had few 
incentives for anything other than corporate plunder (Linnan, 1999b). 
The process was therefore painfully slow, greatly delaying Indonesian recovery. The issues were 
particularly difficult for IBRA though. As a public body it had to be particularly concerned about 
allegations of favouritism making negotiations especially difficult. There were difficult trade-offs to 
be made between swift resolution and the danger of cheap sell-offs either to foreigners or the crony 
conglomerates. This clearly unnerved the Indonesian parliament which moved to stop the sale of 
Bank Central Asia. Echoing the dilemmas in Korea, the IMF and World Bank were in favour of 
swifter resolution but were worried about the opaque negotiations that accompanied it (Robison, 
2001). 
Overall, the process suggests that the future of the Indonesian economy remained the object of 
political struggle. The political and legal system was not able to keep the power of the 
conglomerates wholly in check. In any case, at least under Habibie, it was by no means clear that 
political action was directed at creating an IMF style liberal market economy. Finally, even given the 
political will, the legal system was not up to supporting the barrage of legislation introduced in the 
course of the crisis. We have seen how this affected bankruptcy and debt restructuring but it was 
also a far wider problem (Lindsey, 2000; Siedjipto, 2000). At the same time the sheer difficulty of 
dealing with the debt problem casts some doubt on any sanguine view of the prospects for the 
25 For a review of difficulties with the Indonesian legal system and its implications for post crisis law reform see 
(Lindsey, 2000). 
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critics' approach to crisis. On the other hand an earlier solution to the debt problem might have 
prevented the crisis from becoming so severe. 
6.5.3 Social safety nets 
Finally, the development of social safety nets in the aftermath of the crisis was also difficult. The 
government was not accustomed to this sort of operation. It had limited figures on the exact nature 
of the problem2 making targeting very difficult There was also no infrastructure suitable for 
dealing with the distribution of social funds. 
Local government would normally have been the correct choice but Golkar's power structures 
extended down to the village level and there were serious doubts about the diversion of Funds for 
political purposes. The most visible contribution of Indonesian NGOs during the crisis was to 
draw attention to these difficulties and ask whether Funds were being diverted for political 
purposes. This was particularly obvious under Habibie, when calls for rreformari had spread 
throughout the country, placing particular demands on local government. 
In the end, the World Bank felt compelled to stop funding the social safety net programme around 
the elections for fear that its already damaged reputation27 would suffer further through allegations 
of political favouritism. 
Here again, we see the difficult issues raised by the need to work through a less than ideal state 
structure. Problems in implementing social safety nets are also important in wider discussions about 
the way in which IMF programmes are legitimated and the possibilities that might have been 
available to avoid political meltdown in Indonesia. The difficulties with the social safety net 
programme suggest that, although it is possible to argue that the Fund paid insufficient attention to 
these issues before Suharto's fall (there was a marked change of emphasis afterwards), it is not clear 
that greater effort would have prevented serious social problems 
6.5.4 Conclusions: the case for an alternative strategy 
The point of this section was to provide some indications of how the Indonesian crisis might have 
turned out differently. Were Suharto's personal failings at the root of things or were broader factors 
at work? What does that say about the IMF programmes and about the alternative approach (some 
form of administrative solution with a more pragmatic approach to structural reform). 
In fact the indications are very mixed. Indonesian leaders do not seem to have been radically 
opposed to the IMF's preferences but they were also not enthusiastic supporters. That was very 
damaging to prospects for the kinds of radical reform the IMF was seeking. Fund influence itself 
was used to limit later corruption. 
26 There was some indication that figures were, in any case, produced with political purposes in mind. In the early 
stages of the crisis estimates suggested catastrophic consequence which later failed to materialise, on both points 
see (Booth, 2000). 
27 Bank documents acknowledging the extent to which its Funds had been diverted in Indonesia over a long period 
of time came to right during the crisis, causing the bank much political embarrassment. 
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the IMF has been able to force the government to withdraw policies that do not conform to 
the overall programme, by withholding the disbursement of funds... curiously enough such 
IMF actions have not been criticized by the public. In fact, its actions were supported by the 
public and the media as well as by the leaders of the reformist parties. (Soesastro 2000,138) 
Some real progress was made and inroads were made into the power of the old Indonesian business 
families that were unthinkable under Suharto (Robison, 2001) but ultimately there was not enough 
political support for the IMF agenda to press through such radical reforms. Particular processes 
could be monitored by the Fund but overall: 
although the conditions attached to the use of IMF funds have provided reformers with a 
considerable source of leverage, the reform process has done virtually nothing to improve 
financial governance even though the reforms have brought changes to the law and upgraded 
the technical qualifications of those administering it (Hamilton-Hart 2000,109). 
That suggests that, if complete structural reforms were required to restore market confidence, that 
confidence would not have been forthcoming over even the medium-term. What about the 
alternative approach then? The evidence also undermines that view to some extent. Much of the 
debt in Indonesia was corporate debt involving complex and diffuse relationships between a large 
number of debtors and their creditors. The prospects for a corporate debt workout organised 
through the IMF were slim, particularly given the position of Japanese banks. The sheer scale of 
governance problems revealed in Indonesia also raises questions about how easily one can write off 
the structural reform agenda as unnecessary. 
There are two obvious conclusions. The first is that international investment in Indonesia before 
the crisis was certainly not taking place on the basis of any `normal' (in IMF terms) risk assessment 
procedures. Market discipline does not seem to work except through occasional bouts of violent 
punishment. The second is that smooth crisis rrsolution would involve making very difficult 
pragmatic choices. The Fund's principled stand was a very drastic solution and highly unrealistic in 
causal terms. On the other hand, available compromises would all have been unsatisfactory to some 
extent making them difficult to justify on the kinds of impersonal technical or legal principle that 
the Fund has previously claimed to maintain. 
6.6 Conclusions 
Indonesia 
The economic evidence is again inconclusive. As in Korea, market confidence did not materialise 
quickly. Corruption clearly was a problem in Indonesia but its relationship to crisis causation 
remains unproven. A good case can be made that governance issues contributed to political 
instability and therefore impeded recovery from December 1997 onwards. There is a question, 
though, about the extent to which the IMF created anxiety about governance by ('incorrectly) 
pointing to the influence of corruption in Indonesia's difficulties. Was the collapse of confidence in 
the political system that seemed to have taken hold by December partly of the Fund's own making? 
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If we do accept that corruption was an issue, there are difficult pragmatic questions about how 
much of an issue it was. In terms of broader debates about the IMF governance agenda it is also 
still possible to debate the extent to which corruption was fuelled rather than reduced by 1980s 
efforts at economic liberalisation in the context of a political system where the rule of law was weak 
at best. If getting the state out of the market will not resolve the problem it is harder to see what 
the technical solution should be. 
In other words, in Korea there were technical doubts about whether state-government relationships 
were the problem. In Indonesia there is less doubt that corruption was harmful but more room for 
doubt about the technical fix approach that the IMF hoped would resolve corruption problems. 
The possibility that a more administrative solution to the debt problem would have been more 
effective, reducing the importance of structural reforms is also raised in Indonesia by the relative 
success of the government guarantee in stabilising the exchange rate. However, administrative 
solutions would have been difficult in the Indonesian context because of the diffuse nature of the 
debt owed by a variety of different corporate groups and the importance of Japanese banks as 
creditors. 
It is probably fair to say that, at least from an IMF perspective centred on a wish to resolve the 
crisis through market-based means and a conviction that patronage was responsible for Indonesia's 
problems, the situation in Indonesia involved far more difficult political choices than that in Korea. 
That was principally because the gap between the Indonesian system of political economy and a 
system that the IMF would regard as safe for capital flows was so wide. 
At one level that simply serves to further underline the political aspect of IMF interventions. The 
political context of industrialisation in Indonesia and Korea was very different to that of 18th 
century Europe or America. In both Asian countries the business class was essentially a creation of 
the state. If in England or the United States liberal values were promoted by civil society itself in 
the form of a bourgeoisie rebelling against a more economically backward political order, in late 
20th century Asia challenging the authoritarian state would also require challenging the most 
powerful economic interests in the country. The separation between the technical prerequisites for 
industrialisation and liberal political preferences is more obvious. To create a liberal economy in 
Asia would require a considerable degree of creative destruction orchestrated by the state itself. 
Something that Kim Dae-jung (unlike the IMF) seems to have understood. 
In Korea a non-cbaebol owning middle-class of small business managers and professionals had 
already become far more powerful and assertive over the 1990s and was in a position to press its 
interests through Korea elections. That was simply not the case in Indonesia. The political task 
confronting the Fund was therefore far more challenging. 
What were the difficulties the Fund encountered in trying to meet that political challenge? How 
helpful were good governance and civil society engagement in that context? 
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Firstly, the Indonesian case makes it very clear that it is still states that must implement IMF 
policies. Public protest can go some way towards giving them further incentives to follow IMF 
advice but, at the end of the day, such pressure has its limits. States must be the ones to 
legislate 
and control macroeconomic policy. Even implementing social safety nets, though, is impossible 
where the relevant state infrastructure is not in place. Lack of state support therefore puts the 
IMF 
in a very difficult position. The comparison with Kim Dae-jung's assistance in Korea is instructive. 
Even within the state, though, there are potential problems. In this case the relationship between 
Suharto and the technocrats was evidently difficult He seems to have placed total faith in them on 
the first programme and to have lost all faith in them by the second. The Indonesian situation is 
unusual but it does point to the gap between agreement with the technical financial arms of 
government and sovereign consent, which seem to be a common issue in IMF negotiations. 
In terms of domestic opposition or support for the programmes, Suharto was providing little 
assistance and to that extent the relationship between the IMF and civil society was important. 
However, all the Fund could do was put pressure on Suharto from below by providing programmes 
that appealed to popular sentiment. If Suharto chose to ignore that pressure the Fund was largely 
powerless. 
In any case it is not possible to negotiate with `civil society' as a whole. Someone has to be 
responsibly for converting civil society preferences into an appropriate programme in some way. 
They have to choose which messages from civil society are to be taken seriously. That is normally 
the purpose of politics and government. One way of seeing that, perhaps, is to observe the way 
post crisis experience suggested that there was clear popular support for some aspects of the IMF 
programme but not for others. There was support for attacks on corruption and cronyism but not 
for a wholesale reworking of Indonesian society on the basis of liberal norms. If anything there was 
greater support for a populist, economic nationalist agenda in which a form of state intervention 
favouring big business would be replaced with a more `democratic' form of state intervention to 
help the poor. Arguments about civil society then, can conceal the way in which some choices need 
to be made about which civil society views are important and which groups are to be listened to. 
In the absence of a state-civil society relationship in Indonesia that the Fund could build on, it will 
have been difficult for the Fund to judge the kinds of policies that it would be politically possible to 
implement in Indonesia. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that a lot of (at least reasonably) 
technically competent legislation was passed without a great deal of implementation on the ground. 
The lack of social support in Indonesia for the Fund's liberal agenda is another important factor in 
preventing implementation. 
That analysis points to the genuinely difficult dilemmas the IMF faced in Indonesia. If state 
assistance was likely to be essential but Suharto could not be expected to cooperate what choices 
were actually open to the Fund? The principle alternatives were either not to lend at all or to adopt 
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a more pragmatic solution to Indonesia's problems based on greater acceptance of the political 
realities on the ground. 
Not lending was politically problematic given the increasingly systemic nature of the Asian crisis. 
The risks of contagion were very severe and the social consequences for ordinary Indonesians 
would be politically difficult to ignore. 
What might a more pragmatic solution have looked like? That, of course, depends on one's views 
about the necessity of the structural reform agenda. It is at least possible to argue, on the basis that 
the Fund agenda involved a certain amount of overkill, that a strategy directed at civil society which 
was inevitably going to create animosity from the Indonesian state was politically doomed to failure. 
The Fund's choice to adopt an approach along the lines of the third vision I set out in Chapter four 
was unlikely to be wise from the point of view of implementation, particularly when, as I argued 
above, it was not entirely clear that the claim to speak on behalf of civil society was wholly 
convincing. 
The Fund was claiming to implement a strategy that followed the wishes of both civil society and 
the financial markets even if it was rejected by the state but in fact both claims were open to some 
doubt. I have discussed division within civil society already. Even that market-based part of IMF 
authority though was open to the charge that the Fund was in fact respecting the will of its major 
shareholders as much as the markets. If state assistance is vital for implementation, one conclusion 
that could be drawn is that a more pragmatic approach with more limited structural reforms, 
perhaps supported by an administrative solution to the debt issue may have had a better chance of 
success by being more accommodating to the Indonesian state. 
The principle problem with that path is that it would have involved making very explicit 
concessions to Indonesian political conditions. That would be problematic for the IMF's broader 
claims to technical legitimacy and equal treatment - it would set a precedent that acknowledged that 
the IMF's good governance agenda was not technically essential. Once technical authority was 
compromised, it would be dear that decisions about the kinds of political compromise that needed 
to be made were very much political decisions. For the reasons I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 the 
Fund's claims to that kind of political authority are distinctly limited. In any case, as we will see in 
Chapter 8, politically, once governance issues had been raised it would have been very difficult to 
deal with the crisis in that way since Congress would have seen that kind of intervention as a clear 
case of bailing out a dictator with public money. 
Indonesia suggests a number of difficulties then for the Fund's new agenda where the country in 
which it is to be implemented differs significantly from the economic models on which Fund 
reasoning is based. If the state is opposed to a programme the chances of implementation are poor. 
There is little point in agreeing a perfect programme that stands little chance of implementation. 
The question then is whether it is better to press for political change through civil society 
engagement or to be more accommodating to the state in the hope of securing implementation of a 
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`second best' programme. That suggests that very political choices are being made: ultimately that 
comes down to the argument I was making about the nature of the Fund's governance agenda and 
the concept of rent-seeking. A comparison of a rent-seeking society with an economic ideal is easy 
to make. Comparing it with a system of political economy that there is a realistic chance of 
introducing is far more difficult and harder to see in purely technical terms but, if the IMF's new 
agenda is to continue, it is a choice that it will be difficult for the Fund to avoid. 
The alternative, of course, is a radical change in the Fund's agenda involving an acceptance of 
greater political limits to market discipline - something I will discuss further in Chapter 9. 
The crisis country case studies 
Where do those conclusions and the conclusions from the Korean chapter leave us in terms of the 
questions I set out at the end of Chapter Four? 
The economic evidence is not wholly compelling either way. It is dear that the IMF's market 
confidence strategy was not particularly successful but it is still possible, at least, for the Fund to 
argue that non-implementation was at the root of the difficulties. How necessary the structural 
aspects of the Fund programmes actually were remains hotly disputed. Politically, there was some 
support amongst sections of the elite in each country for the Fund's technical agenda but that 
support was stronger and deeper in Korea than it was in Indonesia. 
On the basis of the case studies, though, it is very difficult to ignore the political implications of the 
Fund's new agenda. At one level, given the technical controversy, the Fund's strongest arguments 
for its interventions in Asia are in fact political ones about the authoritarian and corrupt nature of 
Asian states. That was certainly the aspect of Fund policy that was easiest to sell to broader society 
in both countries and it is difficult to object to the statement that the swiftest recovery took place in 
the country with the `best' governance. 
At another level, though, it is also clear that it was only part of the Fund's agenda that was popular. 
Nationalist resistance to fire-sales in Korea and the rise of populist policies in Indonesia suggest 
that there was also a strong desire to retain some kinds of political management over economic 
affairs. The Fund was not only dismantling one kind of institutional arrangement (designed to 
facilitate various kinds of intervention in the market), it was also attempting to create another kind 
whose democratic (if not technocratic) credentials were also limited. 
In terms of the multi-level relationships involved the appropriate conclusion is that the Fund's 
technical market-based agenda, dictated largely by its principal shareholders but with some support 
from financial bureaucrats in developing countries remains firmly in charge. The Fund is then 
willing to cooperate with whichever political groups are most sympathetic to that agenda. Seen in 
that light, civil society and good governance have some role to play in legitimating Fund 
programmes but flexibility is distinctly limited by the overall institutional framework within which 
consultation takes place. That inevitably means that the scope for enhancing Fund legitimacy 
through greater civil society engagement will also be limited. The realistic prospects for 
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implementing the Fund's new agenda are therefore questionable where the requisite social 
conditions are not in place. 
In Korea they were in place and the elected Korean government supported programme 
implementation. There was some political resistance but the programme was broadly successful. In 
Indonesia, the IMF was left with very difficult choices and the programme was largely a failure. 
Even in Korea, though, the ad hoc and uninstitutionalised nature of the relationships surrounding 
Fund negotiations left considerable room for doubt about who was `really' in charge. The lack of 
institutional reassurances provided by the system of programme negotiation meant that it was 
possible for domestic political actors to portray the programme as imposed even when (at least if 
the Fund is to believed) large parts of it were not in fact - sending worrying signals about the 
contribution IMF decision-making systems make to Fund legitimacy. 
There are a wide range of conclusions that might be drawn from all this depending on one's 
interpretation of often deeply contested technical and political issues. Perhaps the best way to 
illustrate that is to set out two extreme positions that tend to call attention to each other's 
weaknesses. 
At one extreme, from a critical perspective, the suspicion is that the structural reform agenda was 
either. never really necessary in the first place; only in fact necessary in the context of a 
commitment to free capital flows and market-based solutions to financial crisis; or even only 
necessary in the eyes of the Fund's leading shareholders who have an interest in market opening in 
Asia. There is considerable technical doubt about those issues and the Fund's institutional 
structures, biased toward creditor and investor countries, provide little additional reason for 
confidence. That is particularly important where technical performance was poor. Engagement with 
civil society sounds like a good idea but, in a context of a pre-fixed Fund agenda, looks more like an 
attempt to harness domestic political resources to the cause of securing implementation of the 
Fund's agenda. In Korea that may have largely corresponded with popular wishes but there is no 
guarantee that the Fund's agenda would have been any different if it had not. For onlooker 
developing countries, then, it may send dangerous messages despite successful performance. 
At the other extreme, it is possible to conclude that Asian country governments should have been 
under greater political pressure to implement the `right' policies. In Korea, Kim Dae-jung was 
doing his best and the results were positive. In Indonesia Suharto's self-interested political agenda 
disrupted implementation and market confidence and created politically uncertainty that was deeply 
damaging to ordinary Indonesians. The IMF's solution is therefore a stronger framework of peer 
pressure in favour of the `right' policies in normal times to prevent crises and a continuing 
insistence on existing Fund policies. 
I have explored the evidence and arguments behind these different positions in some depth now. 
Of course what matters for Fund political legitimacy is the lessons that were in fact drawn by key 
political actors in other countries less directly affected by the crisis and the extent to which those 
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conclusions led to effective political challenges to Fund authority. It is those questions we will 
address in the next two case studies. 
201 
7 Malaysia 
The crisis country case studies reviewed in Chapters 5&6 provide valuable information about the 
circumstances in which it will be possible to implement an IMF programme and about the political 
nature of IMF interventions. They also suggest arguments that could be raised challenging IMF 
legitimacy but leave open the issue of the ways in which those arguments were in fact raised and of 
factors affecting their credibility. 
The Malaysian case is important because Malaysia suffered a similar crisis to Indonesia and Korea 
but ultimately adopted a very different method of crisis resolution: capital controls rather than an 
IMF-style market based approach. Malaysia's alternative strategy for crisis resolution therefore has 
the potential to shed further light on the issues raised by the previous two chapters. Was the 
Malaysian approach effective? Could the Malaysian solution have been adopted in other countries? 
Does it offer a viable economic alternative to the IMF's market based approach? What were the 
political determinants of the Malaysian approach and what were the political consequences? 
However, ultimately more significant than the existence of arguments that could threaten IMF 
legitimacy is the extent to which theses arguments actually are raised in practice. Who raises them, 
and how much political support can they expect to receive? That is the second way in which the 
Malaysian case is instructive. Mahathir and other Malaysian leaders were in fact highly critical of 
IMF intervention elsewhere in Asia and raised criticisms at Board of Governors' meetings and in 
other international fora. Two questions follow. what part did perceptions of Fund programmes 
elsewhere play in triggering or justifying the resulting dissent; and how credible were the criticisms 
raised to other actors within the IMF? 
The second question can only finally be answered in Chapter 9 but both questions raise issues that 
will be discussed in this chapter. The credibility of Mahathir's position will partly be bound up with 
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the apparent reasons for his dissent. Those reasons will also help us to understand the significance 
of the other Fund programmes within a Malaysian context. 
The main purpose of this chapter, then, is to understand why Malaysia ultimately opted for a 
different method of crisis resolution: what the politics of that decision were. That will give us 
further insight into the politics of the new conditionality. It will suggest what is likely to drive 
dissent to the IMF agenda, provide a basis for assessing how widespread that dissent may be, and 
indicate the implications of dissent for IMF legitimacy and IMF reform. 
7.1 The state and development in Malaysia 
Officially, state intervention in the Malaysian economy was predominantly concerned with 
advancing the economic prospects of the indigenous Malays (known as bumiputera or sons of the 
soil) relative to the more prosperous Chinese population in the interests of national unity. This 
system, like those in Indonesia and Korea, underwent significant change with liberalisation in the 
1980s. By the time of the crisis, there were growing questions about the extent to which it had 
degenerated into mere patronage in support of authoritarian politics but the issue remained 
unresolved, 
It is an important one though because key issues in the international and domestic debates 
surrounding the capital controls revolve around their relationship to policies of ethnic 
redistribution and to Mahathir's authoritarianism. We therefore need to understand the historical 
relationships between ethnicity, politics and the economy in Malaysia before we can understand the 
significance of crisis debates. 
Post-independence Malaysian politics has been dominated by a coalition of ethnically based political 
parties under the leadership of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). 
Prior to independence, slightly less than 50% of the Malaysian population were bum putera with the 
remaining 50% made up of the families of those encouraged by the British to emigrate to Malaysia 
primarily from China (37%) and India (12%) (Ratnam, 1965,2)2. There was little integration 
between ethnic groups. The Chinese were originally involved in urban-based tin mines, Indians in 
self-contained plantations and most Malays engaged in peasant agriculture. 
By independence in 1957, only one in five city dwellers was a Malay, and most of those were 
employed by the government (Ratnam, 1965). The Chinese, on the other hand, had branched out 
into a range of activities with particular dominance in small to medium scale trade. The working 
class was also predominantly non-Malay. In terms of capital ownership, European companies 
controlled 60% of Malaysian output while the remaining 40% was almost wholly in Chinese hands. 
Europeans owned 83% of the lucrative rubber plantations with 14% of the rest owned by the 
1 As with many such ethnic designations, in practice (particularly since Sabah and Sarawak were incorporated into Malaysia) a number of groups with different genetic and historical origins are included in the term buiniputera. 
21n 1996 these figures had become 61%, 30% and 8% respectively (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). 
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Chinese (Putucheary, 1960, xiv-xvi; Yeoh, 1987 cited in Gomez & Jomo, 1999). The only area 
where the pattern was reversed was in the higher reaches of the bureaucracy which were an 
essentially Malay preserve since the British regarded the Malays as the legitimate rulers of the 
country (Roff, 1967, Ch4). 
Politically there was a strong Malay elite with little popular political mobilisation. UMNO was very 
much a product of this political and economic vulnerability. It was formed by Malay aristocrats in 
1946 in opposition to early British proposals for a Malay Union. Key concerns were that the plan 
involved the grant of citizenship to all permanent residents (including non-Malays) and that it 
would undermine the position of the traditional Malay Sultanate. Though initially an elite-led party, 
UMNO soon gained popular support for its Malay nationalism. However, despite its likely electoral 
dominance3, UMNO's economic weakness and British concerns over handing over power to a 
single communal based party meant it would be unable to govern alone. 
The solution was an alliance with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The British had 
encouraged Chinese business leaders to form the MCA in 1949 in an attempt to undermine Chinese 
support for the Malayan Communist Party (which was later banned). It was fundamentally a 
bourgeois party interested in protecting Chinese business interests. In crude terms, a bargain was 
struck in which Malays would dominate politics in exchange for an agreement that Chinese business 
would not be undermined by the state. A third party, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) also 
joined the Alliance when it became clear that, given the limited popularity of a multi-ethnic 
platform, its multi-ethnic aspirations would be best served by joining a coalition. 
Ethnic Tensions 
The Alliance government, elected in 1955, instituted a number of measures to advance Malay 
interests. Scholarships and educational grants were set up. Positive discrimination was practised in 
public service employment and the award of various licences and permits. Two public enterprises 
were established to assist with rural development. Some measures were introduced to promote 
import-substituting industrialisation, particularly tariff protection under the Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance of 1958. However, in keeping with the bargain struck between UMNO and the MCA 
and with previous British policy, the government ran a largely laissez-faire open economy. Much of 
the benefit of tariff protection accrued to foreign companies and this may have been partly the 
result of Malay fears that Chinese capital would benefit from a greater stress on domestically owned 
industry (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). 
There was significant economic growth during this period but it resulted in increasing intra-ethnic 
inequality. The income of the top 10% of the population increased by 51% while that of the lowest 
40% declined by 13% (Snodgrass, 1980). There was growing dissatisfaction in all ethnic groups that 
the parties they expected to fight for their interests were failing to do so. The MCA and MIC were 
seen as successful at granting patronage in the form of Malay political support to well-to-do 
members of the Indian and Chinese communities while neglecting poorer non-Malays. UMNO, on 
30nce the citizenship issue had been conceded, the Malay population formed 80% of the electorate (Ness, 1967). 
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the other hand, was not pursuing its redistributive goals fast enough to satisfy the Malay 
community. The (temporary) incorporation of Singapore and the need to review the use of English 
as the official language 10 years after independence increased the tensions. 
In the 1969 election both non-Malay opposition (particularly Gerakan and the DAP (Democratic 
Action Party)) and the Muslim Malay PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) made significant gains. The 
jubilant celebrations of DAP and Gerakan supporters triggered racial riots in which at least 196 
people were killed4. 
The New Economic Policy 
The government response was two-fold. The Alliance was broadened to include some of the 
opposition parties including Gerakan and the PAS and was re-named the Barisan Nasional 
(National Front). The UMNO-led Barisan Nasional has governed ever since. Secondly, the new 
Barisan Nasional government adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) designed to "reduce and 
eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing opportunities for all 
Malaysians, irrespective of race" and "accelerat[e] the process of restructuring Malaysian society to 
correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function". More specifically the government set three targets to be achieved by 1990: a 
reduction of poverty from 50% to less than 20%; restructuring of employment so that, in all sectors 
and occupations, it reflected the racial composition of the country, and restructuring of corporate 
ownership so that at least 30% would be owned by bumouteras (Malaysia, 1976). 
In terms of policy influence, the second and particularly third targets were most significants and 
resulted in a large increase in state intervention in the economy. This included increased provision 
of infrastructure, the growth of state development corporations (particularly Petronas the state oil 
company), and state owned corporations ('including HICOM - the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia). A number of `bumoutera trust agencies' were set up to hold shares managed by the state 
on behalf of the indigenous population. These were intended to: act as a form of forced savings 
scheme to accumulate capital for bumouteras; spawn new economic projects in strategic sectors 
which could be divested to bumrputeras; and create human resource and technology spill-overs into 
the wider economy (Gomez & Jomo, 1999,32). Discretionary dual pricing of shares also allowed 
some bumouteras to acquire shares at par value or at a nominal premium. Finally the Industrial 
Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 provided for a compulsory bumiputera quota of 30% ownership for 
all non-exempt companies (the most noticeable exemption being export-oriented companies, and 
therefore most of the foreign companies operating in Malaysia). 
40fficial figures probably underestimate the number of Chinese killed (Crouch, 1996). 
5Though the poverty target has been broadly met, observers argue that this is not the result of particular 
government efforts (Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Jomo, 1989) The OPP2, published in 1991 suggests that the Gini 
coefficient in Malaysia declined from 0.513 in 1970 to 0.445 in 1990 but Gomez & Jomo point out that the report 
doesn't show that this was the result of government intervention. In fact official data suggest that the greatest 
reduction in inequality took place during the 1984-1987 recession. Hal Hill suggests that similar reductions in 
inequality may be taking place during the current crisis at least in Indonesia as urban middle-class occupations are 
worst hit (Hill, 1999). 
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The resulting provision of infrastructure combined with tight labour regulation, tax incentives, 
partial exemptions from bumiputera shareholding requirements and the creation of free trade zones 
encouraged the move to foreign-financed export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) which had begun 
in the late 1960s. This move was well timed, with developments in the international division of 
labour encouraging TNCs to out-source production. 
Although these EOI industries improved the Malaysian balance of trade, there was concern at their 
high import content and lack of backward-linkages with the rest of the economy. As a result Prime 
Minister Mahathir began a second stage of ISI in the early 1980s with measures to promote heavy 
industry through HICOM and the promotion of the Proton national car project. 
Privatisation and liberalisation 
It soon became clear that public enterprises were performing poorly and the state was 
overburdened. At the same time, neo-liberal influences were at their height in the multilateral 
institutions. Mahathir began to argue that public enterprise had been a temporary vehicle to 
promote a bumiputera property-owning class which should now be weaned from its dependence on 
the state. Privatisation would accomplish this, ease state budget constraints, and help to foster a 
new breed of Malay rentier entrepreneurs who would eventually form the basis of an internationally 
competitive industrial community (Gomez & Jomo, 1999, Chapter 4). 
From the mid-1980s, state corporations were sold off, licences were issued to firms to compete in 
sectors which had been public monopolies and infrastructure projects were contracted out. Many 
assets held under Malay `trusteeship' were redistributed to Malay entrepreneurs as a reward for 
performance and to promote their advancement (Khoo, 1992). 
The first half of the 1980s was a time of economic difficulties for Malaysia. The combination of 
commodity price shocks and the over-extended public sector produced an economic downturn. 
The government response was a combination of reduced state spending6 (of which privatisation 
was a part) and more general fiscal retrenchment. While this was successful in balancing the 
national budget, it intensified the recession which reached its low point in 1987. During the 
downturn, ethnic tension and factionalism within UMNO increased. 
In the face of recession the government embarked on further liberalisation including a partial lifting 
of NEP requirements first for export-orientated foreign capital and later for domestic (Chinese) 
capital. This coincided with a depreciation of the ringgit which made Malaysia an attractive 
destination for North East Asian relocation in the wake of the 1985 Plaza Accord Qomo et al., 
1997). The result was an investment surge that revitalised the economy and had a powerful impact 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Money Politics and Malayria Inc. 
The growth of state involvement in the economy and the attempt to redistribute wealth to the 
bumiputera community under the NEP also had political consequences. As state economic activity 
6Development spending was halved between 1983 and 1987 (Khoo, 1992). 
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increased, there was more scope for the distribution of patronage. Business opportunities were 
granted to bumoutera business people (or simply to politicians) who were expected to reciprocate 
with political and financial support for UMNO. Those who were successful in business were 
rewarded further, resulting in some meteoric ascents to positions of wealth and political power7. 
The resulting dose relationships between corporate and political power increased the prevalence of 
money politics `blurring the distinction between corporate and political power' (Gomez & Jomo, 
1999). 
The advent of privatisation began to change the nature of state-business relationships. The state 
withdrew from direct participation in the economy. In its place, large conglomerates sprang up 
which competed for state infrastructure contracts and licences to enter sectors that had previously 
been public monopolies (such as utilities and telecommunications). 
Since assets were often divested (and contracts awarded) to `those who come to us with good ideas' 
as Mahathir put it (Khoo, 2000a, 222), these corporations were still beholden to the state to a 
greater or lesser degree. At the same time, as they began to represent a larger share of the economy, 
and as the state became dependent on them to build Malaysian infrastructure, they became 
increasingly powerful. Given the dominance of FDI in manufacturing for the export sector, there 
were also concerns that the conglomerates were concentrated in sectors which could benefit from 
patronage and political connections (manufacture for protected domestic markets, finance, 
property, resource extraction, telecommunications, etc. ) rather than in more `productive' activities 
(Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Jesudason, 1989; 1989; jomo et al., 1997). 
The situation was further complicated because political parties themselves became involved in 
business. UMNO set up Fleet Holdings in 1972, which rapidly acquired companies including 
Renong BhD, a huge corporation with interests in construction, financial services and the media. In 
response to UMNO's dominance in the corporate world, and to NEP policies generally, the MCA 
also became involved in business via a `corporatization movement'. The clearest manifestation of 
this was the establishment of Multi-Purpose Holdings BhD - an investment company owned by an 
MCA-owned co-operative. It grew phenomenally between 1975 and 1983 but then entered a swift 
decline amidst scandal in the mid-1980s (Gomez, 1999). UMNO claims to have divested its 
business interests since 1992 but there is still speculation that key political/business figures such as 
Daim Zainuddin the ex-finance minister hold shares on trust for UMNO. 
It wasn't just that business was penetrated by politics. Increasing amounts of patronage also led to 
fighting over spoils within UMNO. Gomez &Jomo (1999) argue that UMNO was 
increasingly torn between its own financial needs, the ambitions of those ostensibly acting on 
behalf of the party, and its obligations as `protector' and `patron' of Malays desiring to 
accumulate. 
7See for example the description of Daim Zainuddin's career in (Gomez & Jomo, 1999,52-56). 
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During the post-1985 recession tensions within UMNO came to a head with a tussle for party 
leadership culminating in the split of 1987. While some commentators have interpreted this as 
merely a fight over personalities and control of patronage (Shamsul, 1987), others argue that it 
reflected a response to the changing nature of economic management in the 1980s. Khoo (1992) 
argues that the rebel party lead by Musa and Razaleigh represented smaller Malay businessmen and 
middle ranking bureaucrats. These groups stood to lose by the re-orientation of the economy away 
from state accumulation in favour of the Malays towards a more market-friendly strategy under 
which patronage was distributed to a narrower group of entrepreneurs through privatisation. In 
other words there was a growth party (headed by Mahathir) and a redistribution party supporting 
Musa and Razaleigh (see also (Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Khoo, 2000a)) The growth party was 
eventually victorious and, with economic recovery, UMNO presented a united front - at least until 
the onset of the crisis. 
From NEP to Wasan 2020 
These changes in state-business relationships and moves from redistribution towards growth and 
from public to private sector industry were accompanied by a gradual change in the official vision 
of future development. This vision was codified in 1991 in Mahathir's announcement of lVasan 
2020 (Vision 2020) and the publication of the National Development Policy (NDP) and the 2nd 
Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) to replace the NEP. 
While objective 9 of the 8 major goals of Wasan 2020 is `an economically just society with inter- 
ethnic economic parity' the fostering of an `integrated and harmonious Malaysian nation' heads the 
list of goals. Milne & Mauzy (1999) argue that the new attitude to ethnic redistribution can be 
characterised as a shift from concerns with `quantity' towards concerns with `quality'. More 
attention will be paid to the qualifications of bumiputeras given special training and focus will be on 
creating a commercial and industrial community rather than on wealth redistribution per se. The 
NDP also pays more attention to poverty and intra-ethnic inequality with a particular focus on 
`hard-core' poverty. 
It also re-emphasises Mahathir's move to more neo-liberal policies in its stress on the role of the 
family in welfare provision and on the role of the private sector. In terms of the new emphasis on 
growth, the other central part of Vision 2020 is for Malaysia to achieve developed country status 
through accelerating industrialisation, growth and modernisation. The extent to which economic 
practice will change to reflect the new vision is unclear but the vision at least gives an indication of 
the intended direction of development policy in Malaysia before the crisis. 
Gmups b. )passed by the NEP and Wasan 2020 
While the NEP clearly benefited elite Malay business interests, other groups were less fortunate. 
Both foreign and domestic non-Malay businesses were particularly affected by bumiputera ownership 
and employment quotas imposed under the ICA. The state used its resources to take over large 
numbers of foreign-owned firms and, with more reluctance for political reasons, some Chinese 
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corporations. The increasing domination of some economic sectors by state-run business also 
caused concerns Qesudason, 1989). 
However, Chinese business was politically weak and foreign businesses reluctant to interfere in 
what they saw as political issues Qesudason, 1989). They were prevented from uniting due to 
conflicts of interest. Chinese business leaders hoped (vainly) to steer public enterprises into areas 
controlled by foreigners Qesudason, 1989,128-132) while foreign business benefited from the 
state's preference for granting pioneer status to foreign rather than Chinese capital as part of its 
EOI drive. 
Rather than seeking political power, the Chinese response tended to be more covert. There was 
considerable capital flight (estimated by Morgan Guaranty at US$12 billion (Khoo, 1995)). Chinese 
businesses also moved into increasingly short-term investments offering quick returns in the non- 
tradable sector such as property and finance Qesudason, 1989,163-4; Yoshihara, 1988). Later, some 
larger Chinese corporations formed political alliances with influential Malays (Gomez, 1999). This 
became particularly significant with privatisation in the late 1990s and Mahathir's gradual move 
from the NEP to Waran 2020. 
It is important that, though Chinese political power has always been subordinate to that of the 
Malays, there are still constraints on the government's promotion of Malay interests. The 
continuing structural power of Chinese capital could not be ignored. In addition, in periods of 
political turmoil the BN has still relied on Chinese votes. This was particularly clear in the 1990 
elections when Semangat `46 (the offshoot of UMNO which appeared as a result of the split in 
1987) was likely to split the Malay vote. Significant concessions were made on long-standing 
(though often symbolic) Chinese concerns such as greater freedom to visit China and the 
unbanning of Chinese cultural expression such as lion and dragon dances (Mahathir even attended 
a lion dance competition). The government also adopted a much more sympathetic tone at least on 
the difficult question of education (Crouch, 1996,124). 
The modifications of the NEP in the late 1980s and early 1990s had narrowed the range of 
bumoutera beneficiaries. Reduced state involvement in the economy and the shift towards 
privatisation had reduced the range of patronage available and the importance of minor civil 
servants. The stress on big business and patronage through the award of privatisation contracts had 
reduced opportunities for smaller businesses with less lobbying ability. It had also created conflicts 
between smaller businesses who acted as sub-contractors to the more politically well-connected 
fines (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). 
As I noted at the beginning of this section, less specific attention was paid to poverty reduction. 
While poorer Malays as a group had benefited from the NEP through greater chances of social 
8 There were a number of issues which had been debated for some time. Quotas at Universities, English language 
education, Mandarin speaking primary school teachers, forced Islamic prayers etc. (Crouch, 1996). 
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mobility, less had been done for rural communities (though there were considerable advantages in 
the form of patronage to be had from UMNO support in rural areas)9 
Electoral Politicr 
Malaysian politics have been dominated by ethnically based parties since independence. The Barisan 
Nasional has formed the government in Malaysia since 1969. The description of Malaysian political 
economy outlined indicates the nature of this alliance. The majority Malay population and the fact 
that the rural (mostly Malay) electorate has a disproportionate share of the vote has meant that 
UMNO has always been the strongest partner in the coalition. Government policy has clearly 
favoured Malays. However, while re-distributive policies have dominated economic management, 
the need for economic growth (and perhaps for wider government legitimacy) has meant that 
attacks on non-Malay business have been constrained within grudgingly accepted limits. 
The inclusive nature of the BN coalition, along with the continuing importance of communal 
politics, has made it difficult to mobilise an effective opposition. The obvious base to mount an 
opposition under these circumstances is to pursue ethnic interests more enthusiastically than the 
relevant party involved in the BN compromise. So the principal Malay opposition is the Muslim 
PAS which, before the mid-1980s, based its support on being more Malay nationalist than UMNO. 
It then moved in a less Malay but more explicitly Islamic direction with the creation of an Islamic 
state as a key priority'O but has since retreated from this position slightly in an attempt to broaden 
its support base. The main `Chinese' opposition party, the DAP, has pursued more recognisably 
liberal policies demanding equal treatment irrespective of race - but this can also be seen as pushing 
Chinese interests more effectively than the MCA. 
This has made the task of forming an opposition coalition with sufficiently widespread support to 
challenge UMNO particularly difficult'. While the DAP and PAS can now both claim to be in 
favour of equal treatment for different ethnic groups, PAS varying commitment to an Islamic state 
is a clear disincentive to Chinese voters, particularly since Malay numerical superiority would make 
the DAP a junior partner in any. coalition. The structuring of politics around ethnic issues has also 
made it difficult to articulate more class-based issues. In particular, labour has been severely 
controlled and has never played a significant part in politics12 partly because the labour movement 
has been fragmented along ethnic lines (Crouch, 1996; Jesudason, 1989)13. 
9 (Crouch, 1996,39) reviews some of the relevant literature. 
'°This move was partly the result of a younger group of party leaders who entered PAS via the Muslim youth 
movement (ABIM) set up by Anwar Ibrahim and who began to criticise UMNO's ethnic chauvinism as anti-Islamic. 
Under their leadership, PAS gained control of the Northern state of Kelantan. Mahathir used this as an opportunity 
to call their bluff by daring them to introduce Islamic law in the state (Jesudason, 1996). Feeling pushed into a 
comer they did so - though enforcement of many provisions has been less than enthusiastic - increasing the 
concerns of non-Muslim Malaysians about PAS' intentions . II For a particularly good treatment of this issue see (Jesudason, 1996). 
12For more details see (Crouch, 1996). 
13 It is also noteworthy that the MCA has always been a bourgeois party and UMNO's support is split between 
business and the Malay peasantry - reducing the importance of labour to both major segments of the BN coalition. 
So Gomez & Jomo (1999) argue that the Barisan Nasional is essentially an elite coalition. 
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There has been an increasing tendency to use authoritarian means to control dissent. The media are 
tightly controlled (Milne & Mauzy, 1999). The state has powers under the Internal Security Act to 
detain without trial. Although these are usually used to diffuse ethnic tension, it is noticeable that 
those connected with opposition parties have been more likely to be detained (Crouch, 1996). 
There are also significant questions over the independence of the judiciary14. Government media 
control, already significant at election time, is enhanced by outlawing mass political rallies (which 
had been the principal avenue through which opposition parties could make their views known in 
advance of elections). 
Nonetheless, as we saw in the last section, the government cannot be wholly unresponsive to 
threats from opposition parties. Increasing factionalism within UMNO has allowed some views to 
be articulated that do not correspond with those of Mahathir. However, the overall system can, at 
best, be described as a semi-democracy. 
Summary and conclusions 
The Malaysian system of political economy defies simple characterization. There has been 
considerable state intervention in the economy, but state policy has always been dearly pro- 
business. Intervention has been primarily motivated by attempts at ethnic redistribution but has 
also successfully promoted impressive economic growth (albeit less than in some other countries in 
the region). On the other hand, growth has been uneven, with a foreign-dominated high technology 
export-oriented sector and a largely separate sector oriented at domestic production and owned 
principally by domestic capital. 
The political system has been formally democratic since independence but one single party has led 
every government. This has partly been the result of growing authoritarianism and the control that 
the government has been able to exercise over media, patronage, and the coercive resources of the 
state. On the other hand, UMNO has also been popular (at least until recently), receiving votes 
from a wide spectrum of the Malaysian population. 
Politics in Malaysia are still primarily ethnic. The government has always involved a broad 
consociational coalition of ethnic groups, but with UMNO wielding disproportionate influence. 
This influence has been used pragmatically to keep ethnic discontent within certain boundaries. The 
ethnic basis of politics has also masked the elitist nature of the ruling coalition with (for example) 
little place for the representation of labour within government. However, populist rhetoric and an 
extensive patronage network used to distribute benefits to supporters down to village level has 
allowed the coalition to maintain broad support. 
However, societies are never static and the nature of the Malaysian political economy has its critics. 
The pervasive presence of patronage and the inefficiencies this has produced in the economy have 
long been criticised by academics (Gomez & Jomo, 1999), NGOs (particularly Aliran) and 
14 During the UMNO split, a court ruled that, as a result of a legal technicality, UMNO was not a valid legal 
organisation. This enabled the rebel faction - Semangat `46 - to attempt to seize UMNOs assets in the courts. At 
this point Mahathir intervened to remove the attorney general in an attempt to ensure a sympathetic hearing. 
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opposition politicians (notably Lim Kit Siang of the DAP). Some Muslim groups have also argued 
that ethnic discrimination is un-Islamic. Equally, Mahathir's increasing authoritarianism has not 
gone unnoticed. Times of economic stress have revealed the extent to which political-economic 
bargains struck within Malaysian society depend on continuing economic growth. Finally, Vision 
2020 demonstrates some gradual moves away from inter-ethnic redistribution and towards a more 
orthodox liberal political economy, at least at the level of rhetoric. 
IMF intervention elsewhere in Asia attacked state involvement in the economy. Debates about 
crisis resolution in Malaysia were strongly coloured by the policies the IMF had adopted elsewhere 
so debates over the crisis were about the relationship between redistributive policies, market 
discipline, and foreign investor sentiment. 
7.2 The Crisis in Malaysia 
Malaysia, like other countries in the region, showed signs of asset price bubbles by early 1997. 
Bank Negara (the central bank) responded by restricting lending for property and share purchases 
in March. This triggered a gradual fall in the Kuala Lumpur stock Exchange (KLSE). By late May, 
when the Thai Baht was coming under serious attack, analysts in Malaysia and overseas began to 
question whether other economies in the region including Malaysia might be under threat. At this 
point, consensus was that Malay property companies were less indebted than their Thai equivalents. 
Malaysian banks were less dependent on collateral lending to the property market. It was also felt 
that the Malaysian system was more cohesive's and that the government had more control over the 
economy. The fall in the KISE was thought to be driven by foreign investors (contagion) who 
would return when they recognised variations within the region (FT 24th May 1997, New Straits 
Times (Nn) 19th May 1997). 
By late June, concerns were focusing on the trade deficit which was expected to rise further as bank 
Negara raised interest rates to defend the ringgit (F121st May 1997). The trade deficit attributed to 
a loss of competitiveness as full employment drove wages up faster than productivity and other 
currencies in the region depreciated16. Finally, on 15th July, the Ringgit was allowed to float. 
At this stage, Mahathir was touring Europe to encourage investment in Malaysia's high profile 
Multimedia Super Corridor project. Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister, had been left to 
run the country in his absence. Anwar's response was the orthodox one of supporting raised 
interest rates while pointing to Malaysia's sound fundamentals and arguing that the problems would 
be iemporary'7 (NST 11th July 1997). Mahathir returned at the end of July and began to argue (with 
t5 If the going gets rough in Malaysia, the strong are likely to come swiftly to the aid of the weak (fT21 June 1997) 
- there is some irony in this position given the attention which 'crony capitalism' was to receive later in the crisis. 
16 Presumably this could be expected to have knock on effects on the rest of the economy including in particular the 
property sector. 
'7A position echoed, at that point, by the Financial Times' editor Martin Wolf (FT 15th July 1997) 
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less orthodoxy) that the Malaysian economy was suffering from politically motivated speculative 
attacks by `a certain powerful American financier'ls (NST 22nd July 1997). 
Over the next few months perceptions of a rift between Anwar and Mahathir continued. The 
principal areas of market concern were: Mahathir's enthusiasm for large infrastructure projects 
(`mega-projects')19; Mahathir's continuing insistence that economic difficulties were the result of 
manipulative speculators rather than any problem with economic fundamentals20; the use of 
government controlled funds to prop up the KLSE; and unsuccessful attempts to regulate the 
market so as to prevent speculation. 
The first attempt, a restriction on lending ringgit over a certain value to foreigners, was designed to 
close the swap market in Singapore so that interest rates could be lowered. The result was a rise in 
value of the ringgit but accompanied by a compensating fall in the stock market (FT 5th August 
1997). The second involved changing stock market rules to prevent short selling of the 100 most 
valuable stocks on the KLSE. This was particularly unpopular with the markets, triggering a 
vitriolic response from analysts who claimed that it demonstrated a lack of commitment to the free 
18Referring, as everyone knew, to George Soros. 
"See for example NST23rd July 1997 FT22nd July 1997 FT23rd July 1997 NST19th August 1997. 
20See Mahathir, 1997; Mahathir, 1997a; Mahathir, 1997b etc. 
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market which would undermine Malaysia's credibility for years21. Since the measures coincided 
with Mahathir's attempts to use government pension funds and cash rich companies to prop up the 
KLSE, there was little immediate effect on the stock market. However, the fall did soon materialise 
and Mahathir was forced to concede defeat and delay some infrastructure projects (NST 6th 
September 1997). 
Meanwhile, Anwar made speeches to state governments urging restraint in project planning and 
defending his commitment to a balanced budget (NST 23, d July 1997). It was Anwar who 
announced attempts to restrict imports by placing penalties on goods available in Malaysia (FT 13th 
August 1997), Anwar was not present at the meeting where Mahathir announced that local pension 
funds would attempt to prop up the KLSE and it even became necessary for Mahathir to deny 
rumours that Anwar had resigned (FT In September 1997). It also fell to Anwar to calm the nerves 
of foreign investors after Mahathir's most high-profile attack on currency speculators at the World 
Bank annual meeting in Hong Kong. (Fl22nd September 1997). 
The contrast between Anwar and Mahathir was probably overdrawn by the foreign media at this 
stage. Anwar's eventual ousting in September (see below) probably owes more to struggles for 
power within UMNO, partly provoked by foreign media reaction, than it does to radical economic 
differences22. However, power considerations spilled over into economic differences, particularly 
on the issue of corruption, given the importance of business interests within the party. Perceived 
differences remain important though as they have coloured some foreign accounts of the Anwar 
affair and therefore market reactions to political events in Malaysia23. 
Despite promises of a realistic austerity budget, the measures which Anwar eventually announced in 
early October did not satisfy the markets. They were seen as part of a high-risk attempt to keep 
supply going in the hope that the country could export its way out of trouble. If the strategy failed, 
problems which would have to be resolved by demand compression would be much greater in 
future24. 
During November, two corporate deals were widely perceived as attempts by Mahathir to bail out 
companies that were politically connected. A reverse take-over of Renong by UEM was allowed 
despite the fact that it involved a breach of stock market rules. Later, the government agreed to 
21see for example the quotations cited in FT30th August 1997. 
22see for example Anwar's speech to the UMNO Youth Wing in which he daimed that the country was involved in 
economic battle 'no less significant than the struggle for independence' (NST5th September 1997) Anwar also 
made repeated calls for better regulation of currency trading (Ibrahim, 1997) while, as we will see in the next 
section, Mahathir was keen to show a continuing interest in capital investment in Malaysia. 
23 For an excellent extended discussion along these lines see (Funston, 2000). 
24see for example fT21st October 1997. 
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take-over the struggling Bakun dam project in a move that was widely seen as a bail out of Ekranu. 
The stock market fell rapidly in response. 26 
The Renong saga continued into January as Anwar attempted to revoke the waiver of stock market 
rules only to have it reinstated in January 1998. Other 'bail-outs' occurred throughout 1997 & 1998. 
The list includes an investment in Proton by the state oil company Pertronas, the merger of 
bedevilled former state Bank Bumiputera with Commerce Asset Holdings Bhd on terms favourable 
to the bank, the purchase of ailing Phillipino Steel by a Renong subsidiary and the transfer of its 
debts to Danaharta, the bail-out of scandal ridden Perwaja Steel by the state controlled Employee 
Pension Fund, and the purchase of Mahathir's son's shipping business by Petronas (for more details 
see the analysis section below). 
Presumably as a result of the failure of more accommodatory policies, a supplementary budget was 
announced on December 6th. This contained far more orthodox measures and was described as a 
"virtual IMF" policy. However, it was noted that Mahathir was not present when the measures 
were announced27. 
The economy rallied briefly in early 1998 but growing regional instability (particularly in Indonesia) 
and developments in the continuing Renong saga precipitated a further decline. The structure of 
the Malaysian political economy was increasingly questioned with concerns that Malaysia was not 
undertaking the sort of restructuring measures which the IMF had recommended in Indonesia and 
Thailand (FT 16th February 1998,18 February 1998,24 March 1998,25th March 1998). In 
particular, there was pressure to encourage investment by removing restrictions on foreign 
ownership of shares in Malaysian companies (FT 6th May 1998,23"' March 1998,25th March 1998, 
25th February 1998). There were also allegations of controls on the media aimed at hiding the extent 
of the crisis (FT 24th March 1998). 
In the run up to the UMNO General Assembly in June 1998 there was speculation that Anwar 
would bid for the leadership. While not actually contradicting Mahathir's policy line, he was willing 
to point out its dangers - corruption was a key concern at the heart of his differences with 
Mahathir. A speech given in Washington demonstrates this balance: 
there is no room for the rancid rhetoric of misplaced nationalistic sentiments and 
protectionists... However, their claims will gain legitimacy if the global community does not 
commit itself unequivocally to reforming the international finance regime.... we do recognise 
that state interventions in the economy are fraught with risks... Legitimate affirmative action 
policies can also degenerate into perverse patronage, creating a breeding ground for the rent- 
seeking activities of leeches' (NST 17th April 1998). 
"According to Lex in the FT, an example 'of the sort of crony capitalism and opaque market practices that suggest 
the government is more concerned with helping its friends than achieving an equitable environment for all' (FT21 st 
November 1997). 
26 see Haggard & Low 2000 for further details and the discussion in the analysis section below 
27He was at a meeting in Lankawi and, when questioned by the media. appeared less than enthusiastic about the 
measures. See also (Mahathir, 1998a; Mahathir, 1999a) where he claims that the policies were always against his 
inclinations. 
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Speculation was re-enforced by a speech by the head of the Youth Wing immediately prior to the 
assembly which was highly critical of corruption within the party and was widely interpreted as the 
first stage of an attempted take-over by Anwar. Particularly provocative, given the recent ousting of 
Suharto, was the adoption of the Indonesian phrase KKN (or corruption, collusion and nepotism). 
In the event, Anwar's conference speech called for national unity behind Mahathir. The debate on 
corruption was hijacked by Mahathir who claimed that all bumiputeras were his cronies and 
produced a list of all who had benefited from privatisation (including many who were campaigning 
for transparency). 
By June 26th, Mahathir's policy had triumphed. He announced that Daim Zainuddin would be 
appointed Minister of Special Functions, in charge of dismantling the virtual IMF policy' in favour 
of more accommodatory policy (NST 26thJune 1998). After that, a fiscal stimulus package was 
announced (7 billion ringgit for economic and social projects and 5 billion ringgit for construction 
(FT2nd July 1998)) and interest rates were lowered (FT 1st August 1998). 
The stakes were raised again when Mahathir introduced controls on short-term capital flows on the 
Ist September. This move was greeted by outrage in the markets: 
With capital controls slapped on many investors will not return to Malaysia for a decade or 
more, regardless of how attractive their asset values become. The capital account problems will 
be dragged out for many years. Any prospects of getting this crisis over with by "doing the 
right thing" have been shot (Bridgewater, 1998 cited in Wade & Venerosso, 1998b). 
The IMF was also unenthusiastic. Camdessus reportedly claimed that the controls were `dangerous 
and indeed harmful', while Stanley Fischer said they were a step backward and would bring no 
long-term benefit (International Herald Tribune 17th September 1998 and Reuters 11th September both 
cited in Wade & Venerosso, 1998b) 
A day later Anwar was dismissed from office. His dismissal and subsequent trial on charges of 
sodomy and corruption triggered unprecedented outrage. Mass vigils of up to 10,000 people were 
held outside his house in early September with protesters complaining about Mahathir's dictatorial 
behaviour and the lack of domestic press freedom (FT 11th September 1998). When access to 
Anwar's home was restricted, protests moved to the national mosque where they were broken up 
by police (FT 25d & 26th September 1998). Further protests materialized when Anwar was 
sentenced in April 1999. 
Shortly after the initial protests a Coalition for People's Democracy was formed from political 
parties, human rights groups and NGOs (FT28th September 1998). By mid-1999, this had also 
resulted in a political alliance between the DAP, PAS and the `National Justice Party' established by 
Wan Aziza Wan Ismail (Anwar's wife). However, despite significant gains for the PAS in Muslim 
areas, the Barisan Nasional easily retained its 2/3 majority in the November 1999 general elections. 
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7.3 The politics of the crisis 
Mahathir's stance on the crisis was widely perceived as a very public departure from the IMF 
approach. Some of his more outrageous speeches received particularly wide coverage, especially 
his 
running battles with George Soros that often had racist overtones. Nonetheless, an examination of 
Mahathir's speeches reveals a fairly coherent position on the role of the IMF that bears a strong 
resemblance to a number of more `respectable' academic accounts. 
Mahathir spent a good part of the 1990s boosting his image as a fighter for developing country 
interests and a key member of the non-aligned movement His position was therefore elaborated to 
a number of domestic and international audiences as the speeches referred to below make clear. I 
begin by outlining Mahathir's analysis of the IMF's role in the crisis in section 7.3.1. 
Both the IMF's position and Mahathir's are attempts to legitimate a particular policy position. 
Mahathir is keen to question the IMF claim that Fund policies reflect objective scientific truth 
about economic policy. He attempts to undermine the IMF's credibility and legitimacy by pointing 
to political motivations that are at odds with the Fund's public statements. At the same time, 
Mahathir's critics offer a similar analysis of his position. Section 7.3.2 is devoted to an analysis of 
this debate to assess the credibility of the rival claims. 
While the political issues are my primary interest, they rely on economic claims and it is therefore 
important to provide a brief view of the economics of the Malaysian capital controls (section 0). 
7.3.1 Mahathir's policy claims 
Mahathir argued from the beginning that the crisis in Malaysia was driven by speculators rather 
than economic fundamentals. Citing Camdessus' glowing endorsement of the Malaysian economy 
in June 199728, he argued that the crisis was caused by currency speculators who could profit from 
forcing devaluations and had no regard for the longer-term economic or social consequences of 
their actions29. The markets were not acting in a way that maximised social welfare. Currency 
speculation should therefore be regulated in the same way that other aspects of the market 
economy were regulated (Mahathir, 1997)30. 
Once the currency speculators had done their work, the IMF stepped in. It used the opportunity to 
attempt to push its narrow neo-liberal agenda. An IMF programme: 
does not guarantee our economic recovery. What is certain is that it will restrict our freedom to 
design and initiate new ways of stimulating foreign direct investments in our country and the 
implementation of new economic policies and strategies. Malaysia has always been innovative 
and that is why we have progressed (Mahathir, 1997c). 
28 See for example (Mahathir, 1997b). 
291n more extreme speeches he suggested that the attacks were initiated by a vengeful George Soros, upset by 
Malaysia's support for Myanmar's membership of ASEAN (NST23rd July 1997). In less extreme speeches he 
acknowledged that there were some weaknesses in Asian economies but that these did not justify the scale of the 
currency corrections which took place (Mahathir, 1 997d). 
300r again in his more extreme speech at the World Bank annual meetings in Hong Kong: currency speculation is 
'unnecessary, unproductive and immoral. It should be stopped. It should be made illegal' (Mahathir, 1997). 
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In particular, IMF policies would prevent any form of industrial policy, undermining the 
relationship between the state and the private sector that was key to East Asian success, and have 
disastrous social consequences in terms of bankruptcy, unemployment and poverty. The IMF's high 
interest rate policies would ensure that local companies would go bankrupt, and the only way to 
recovery would be to sell them to foreigners at fire-sale prices (Mahathir, 1998). This would be 
facilitated by the IMF's insistence on removing restrictions on foreign investment. In the Malaysian 
case this would clearly undermine the principles of the NEP which, Mahathir argued, was 
responsible for the political stability of Malaysia's ethnically divided society (Mahathir, 1998d). In 
later speeches this was often accompanied by references to the ethnic violence in Indonesia in May 
1998. 
The `markets' and the IMF then fed off each other, so failure to follow IMF policies was an excuse 
for further devaluation and capital withdrawal (Mahathir, 1998d; Mahathir, 1998e). The combined 
effect was an erosion of sovereignty (Mahathir, 1998b). 
We are also warned that these are powerful people. If we make noise or act in any way to 
frustrate them they would be annoyed (Mahathir, 1997), 
resulting in a concentration of power in the hands of capital: 
the advocates of the free market insist that somehow the punishment of these Governments 
through their people is justified because in the end there would be a free market and absolute 
freedom for the capitalists to make as much money as they can for themselves (Mahathir, 
1998c). 
So, for instance, the IMF wants to force governments to provide safety nets `to discipline the 
government so that it would use force to ensure employees accept being sacked' (Mahathir, 1998c). 
Not only was this an attack on sovereignty, it was an attack on democracy. States were no longer 
able to respond to the democratic demands of their populations without paying regard to the will of 
the markets (Mahathir, 1998). He also pointed out that' while they [the markets] require 
governments to be open and transparent, they themselves will remain shadowy and their operation 
dosed to inspection' (Mahathir, 1998b). There was a similar democratic deficit in the mechanisms 
of global governance. 
Mahathir argues that IMF and market interventionism is a response to the end of the Cold War. 
The welfare state was implemented to ensure that workers would not be attracted by the 
communist alternative. Once the Cold War was over, the situation changed from one in which 
workers could do no wrong to one in which capitalists could do no wrong (Mahathir, 1998). In his 
more radical moments, Mahathir argued that this intervention was a new colonialism which risked 
that 
people will think of regaining control over their economies. They will regard this as a new war 
of liberation. Even if they want to avoid violence, violence must come as the new capitalists 
disregard the signs (Mahathir, 1998) 
In response to allegations of corruption, cronyism and bail-outs of favoured companies, Mahathir 
again appealed to the rationale for the NEP. He argued that, once one accepted the need to 
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distribute wealth to bumouteras, the rest simply followed. Spreading wealth too thinly would not 
create capitalists with sufficient resources to compete in the global economy. Given these 
considerations it was inevitable that particular individuals would benefit substantially. Whoever had 
been given these opportunities, Mahathir argued, would have been labelled a crony by foreigners 
(unless, of course, contracts and licences were granted to foreigners). He added that many 
incompetent bumiputeras had been allowed to fail and that additional contracts had been given to 
those who had demonstrated their business ability (Mahathir, 1998e)31. In fact, as we saw above, the 
net had been spread widely. 
In relation to bail-outs Mahathir again suggested that all countries protect some companies which 
they regard as too important to fail. What was distressing foreigners, Mahathir claimed, was that 
they had not been able to buy up assets at fire-sale prices as they had in the rest of Asia. 
Nonetheless Mahathir was often careful, particularly in front of investor audiences, to stress that 
Malaysia was in favour of continuing its open economy and business-friendly traditions (Mahathir, 
1998e). In the 21n century `trade and productive investment must be the arteries, the veins, the 
tissue, the muscle and bone of our global prosperity'(Mahathir, 1997b). Malaysia was still anxious to 
encourage capital inflows for `productive purposes' (Mahathir, 1997q Mahathir, 1997d). 
`Globalisation can be good... just as capital flows can be good if regulated'. It was just that markets 
have `no sense of commitment and responsibility' (Mahathir, 1997b) or `morality' (Mahathir, 
1998d) and require regulation. In the same way that anti-trust legislation was instituted in response 
to the realisation that monopolies were harmful, a similar realisation about currency trading and 
hedge funds could lead to their better regulation (Mahathir, 1997). 
Finally, Mahathir (unsurprisingly) pointed to the success of the currency control measures that were 
adopted. He takes pleasure in citing predictions that appeared in the wake of the imposition of 
currency controls and contrasting them with later assessments of Malaysia's performance. So, for 
instance, the IMF's World Economic Outlook 1999 conceded that `economic performance at least 
to date has been broadly similar to that of the other countries' and Joseph Stiglitz added that FDI 
had not been adversely affected and that the lifting of controls in September 1999 had not 
disturbed the market (Mahathir, 1999e). Morgan Stanley analysts had commended Malaysia on 
using controls `properly' and acknowledged that they had reduced vulnerability to external shocks 
(Mahathir, 1999a). Mahathir added that this had been achieved without: having to `kowtow to 
anyone', sacrifice full employment, expel migrant workers, reduce school enrolment, decimate the 
middle class, slaughter Malaysian entrepreneurs, suffer blood on the streets, sell off businesses at 
fire-sale prices, or go into massive foreign debt to the IMF or anyone else, etc. (Mahathir, 1999a; 
Mahathir, 1999c; Mahathir, 1999d, Mahathir, 1999e). 
"Note the parallels with Mustaq Khan's arguments discussed in chapter 4 (Khan & Jomo, 2000). 
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7.3.2 Interests 
Mahathir was keen to point out that the choice of IMF policy solutions tended to favour particular 
political interests. Financial orthodoxy would be particularly attractive to foreign financial interests. 
The IMF solution was to provide foreign capital with strong profit-based incentives for remaining 
in Malaysia. More generally, it favoured financial interests over the real economy with the likelihood 
of significant levels of corporate insolvency. If this were combined with an easing of restrictions on 
foreign investment in Malaysia it would offer considerable opportunities for foreigners to purchase 
Malaysian assets. 
In some of his later speeches, particularly to non-aligned leaders, Mahathir also suggested that 
bumoutera businesses had been particularly badly hit by the crisis. Easing foreign investment 
restrictions would hamper attempts to redress the balance in the interests of NEP priorities and 
would strengthen Malay-Chinese and foreign business at the expense of the bumouteras. 
Mahathir suggested, conversely, that Malaysian policies served the interests of all Malaysians. 
Arguably capital controls enabled the government to pursue an economy wide recovery based on 
fiscal and monetarystimulus32. This prevented all Malaysian business from suffering unnecessary 
insolvency and therefore protected jobs and livelihoods. It also allowed the government to pursue 
expansionary fiscal policies without provoking capital flight. 
However, just as IMF policy involved a mixture of economic rationality and what could be 
interpreted as political purpose, Mahathir's policies were also designed for particular groups. While 
IMF policy tended to favour foreign interests, Mahathir's railing against speculators, attempts to 
control the market and capital controls clearly favoured domestic interests. In addition, as we have 
seen, there are long-standing concerns about corruption in Malaysia. Foreign and Malaysian 
observers were particularly concerned with bail-outs of politically well connected companies (see 
p13). 
Foreign observers (and academics) have attributed much of the fall in the stock market in early 
1998 to market concerns over government favouritism towards individual companies (particularly 
Renong). Bail-outs undermined foreign investors' confidence in the government's commitment to a 
market economy based on a level playing field. It was also argued that, if poorly managed 
companies were not allowed to fail, the economy could be saddled with bad debts and 
uncompetitive corporate groups for years to come - market discipline would be undermined33. 
Many suggested that Mahathir's more outrageous remarks (particularly his speeches in Hong Kong 
and Chile) resulted in instant stock market plunges. While anecdotal evidence suggests that 
investors with local knowledge at least tended to be more concerned by his actions than his words, 
Mahathir himself accepted and even seemed to relish this view. 
32Rather than a recovery based on attempts to attract more foreign capital which would inevitably favour foreign 
interests. 
33 FTMay 1998. Most commentators cited the example of Japan. 
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For many Malaysians the issue was also one of the way in which public funds were 
being used to 
assist particular private interests. The use of capital from the Employees Pension 
Fund and 
Petronas to bail out economically fragile politically connected companies had a direct impact on the 
livelihoods of less well connected Malaysians. Smaller businesses found themselves outside the 
shrinking net of UMNO patronage and, at the same time, hit by the withdrawal of 
foreign capital. It 
is not surprising, under these circumstances, that Mahathir's overtly nationalist responses to the 
crisis, combined with perceived favouritism towards big business damaged his support amongst 
sections of the middle class. 
These concerns created additional support for proponents of more traditional liberal policies. 
Technocrats in Bank Negara, government bureaucrats who had seen their influence decline with 
the growth of political conglomerates in the 1990s and more traditional liberal middle class groups 
such as Aliran who had long been calling for cleaner, more transparent and accountable 
government are all in this category. 
Mahathir's policies were obviously, in part, an attempt to maintain his support with so called `crony 
business' interests. These include corporations whose owners have strong political links and other 
business groups who are probably actually owned by UMNO. But Mahathir's arguments that the 
web of beneficiaries was wider than narrow accounts of `crony capitalism' might suggest are not 
wholly unfounded. 
As he points out, IMF policies would have struck at the heart of NEP redistribution policies. The 
list of beneficiaries that Mahathir produced at the UMNO General Assembly makes clear that these 
policies have benefited wide sections of the business community. There is no doubt, either, that 
they have a wider symbolic importance in terms of Malay nationalism. Mahathir's railing against 
foreign speculators can also be seen as an appeal to this nationalist community (and a classic 
populist blame shifting tactic). 
With the exception of Mirzan Mahathir's shipping business, the major rescued companies all 
served some wider social purpose in addition to merely enriching their owners. Renong was 
involved in a wide range of important Malaysian infrastructure projects. Proton and Perwaja were 
part of a wider programme of technological upgrading. Phillipino Steel had originally been 
purchased by a Mahathir `crony' for foreign policy purposes. The use of private businesses to carry 
out public infrastructure projects is part of the worldwide drive towards privatisation which began 
in the 1980s. It does raise difficult issues but it is not confined to Malaysia as the growth of PFI 
projects in the UK demonstrates. On the other hand, the award of these sorts of contracts in 
Malaysia is rarely the result of transparent competitive tenders and is frequently part of the network 
of political patronage. 
In sum, the contrast between IMF policies and those adopted by Mahathir reflects both different 
conceptions of appropriate economic management and different sets of political interests. The 
credibility of Mahathir's response depends in part on whether one is inclined to view the NEP as a 
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cover for crony patronage or a source of Malaysian political stability. Similarly, the credibility of the 
IMF position depends partly on whether one is inclined to view the Fund as a stooge for Western 
capital or the bearer of rational liberal values. 
7.3.3 Conclusions 
If Mahathir's views can be regarded as convincing, they provide a dear challenge to the four aspects 
of IMF legitimacy that I have used to structure the thesis. They attack the Fund's emerging role in 
promoting capital account convertibility. Mahathir is keen to emphasise broad enthusiasm for 
market forces but argues that capital flows need to be regulated (implicitly also pointing to the 
absence of any legal agreement on capital account convertibility). The freedom of movement of 
capital should be limited in the interests of various social priorities and countries should maintain 
the option of introducing capital controls. He also attacks the IMF's institutional authority, 
questioning its technical credentials and its political neutrality. Finally, Mahathir's refusal to accept 
IMF conditionality at least raises questions about state consent (though of course Malaysia never 
threatened anything like a withdrawal from Fund membership). 
Of course there is a counter argument, relying particularly on the rent seeking paradigm I discussed 
in Chapter 4. Mahathir's policies are portrayed as a cover for corrupt support of powerful elite allies 
against the interests of the normal working class. Sometimes he is also portrayed as a xenophobic 
nationalist -a position lent some credibility by his more outspoken exchanges. Mahathir's 
authoritarian politics and support for `Asian values' are also connected with this type of account. 
These are very much the dimensions of the debate about IMF legitimacy following the crisis and 
the important questions which I will explore further in Chapters 8&9 concern the extent to which 
the two viewpoints have been capable of garnering political support. 
The debates themselves, though, are already interesting in illustrating what is at stake in the IMF's 
new role. Particularly interesting is the relationship between technical and political issues when 
trying to make the case for either viewpoint. 
So far I have looked particularly at the political debates since these provide the context in which 
economic questions need to be set. However, economic issues are dearly a very important part of 
the debate. The more the relative positions on economic causation can be given empirical support, 
the stronger the respective cases will be. Was the Malaysian solution to the crisis more successful 
than the IMF approach? Will it founder over the longer term as cronyism stifles economic 
efficiency? 
7.4 The economics of the crisis 
Mahathir and his ministers point out that their initial approach to the crisis closely followed IMF 
prescriptions (reflected in Camdessus' (1998) early endorsements) and go on to argue that. 
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The experiences of the affected countries thus far clearly demonstrate that the traditional policy 
prescription has not produced results. In the case of Malaysia, the combination of high interest 
rates and tight fiscal policies further distressed economic activities and led to a contraction of 
the domestic economy (Mohamed, 1998). 
Adopting capital controls enabled them to resolve Malaysia's problems since theyT. 
provided the stability required for recovery measures to be effective. What is perhaps most 
significant is that the economic recovery was achieved with minimal social costs to the most 
vulnerable segments of society (Mohamed, 1998). 
The question is whether this assessment is shared by more objective academic economists and by 
the IMF. 
7.4.1 Controls and economic recovery 
As we have seen, initial market reactions were highly negative. The suggestion was that Malaysia 
would suffer a massive decline in investor confidence and, once controls were removed, portfolio 
capital trapped in the country would be rapidly removed. There were also concerns that the 
controls would be ineffective and that to the extent that they did offer protection, Malaysia would 
use them to bail out politically well-connected companies at the expense of longer-term economic 
stability. 
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In fact, the emerging consensus amongst economists is that they have been something of a non- 
event 
The pattern of economic performance in Malaysia since the emergence of the crisis has in 
many respects been similar to that of other countries in the region. This makes it very difficult 
to disentangle the impact of Malaysia's capital controls from broader international and regional 
developments (IMF, 1999b, 9). 
The virulent criticism at the time controls were implemented now looks rather foolish. The IMF's 
assessment strongly endorses the controls' effectiveness, accepts that `the authorities have pressed 
ahead with bank and corporate sector restructuring' and that `the reduction in interest rates that 
accompanied the controls helped to contain the increase in non-performing loans of the banking 
system'. It argues that this is because the controls were comprehensive, well implemented and 
widely supported by the domestic business community. The ringgit was fixed at the lower end of its 
real value and the country continued to push ahead with economic reforms(IMF, 1999b, 8-9). 
The rapid outflow of capital expected once the controls were lifted in October 1998 failed to 
materialise (Athukorala, 2000; Haggard, 2000; Herald-Perkins & Woo, 2000). Some analysts argue 
that FDI has been marginally slower to recover but the differences are slight and could be caused 
by other factors (notably sales of assets as part of the restructuring process elsewhere) (Athukorala, 
2000). 
On the other hand, Mahathir's claims about the controls' effectiveness also look to be somewhat 
overplayed. Recovery has not been any faster than elsewhere in Asia and other countries, too, had 
begun to lower interest rates and boost fiscal spending in late 1998, without the shield of capital 
controls (see Figure 7-2). 
For those sceptical of capital controls, doubts revolve around the extent to which the reflation that 
the controls have allowed has merely removed a problem of temporary illiquidity, or alternatively, 
has allowed Mahathir to bail out poorly-managed firms either directly (Renong, UEM etc. ) or 
indirectly (Herald-Perkins & Woo, 2000). It is no surprise that this debate has political dimensions 
with opposition leaders, particularly in the Chinese DAP, inclined to cry `foul', and the government 
defending its record. The Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce and Industry remains 
concerned that `there does not seem to be enough strong action against those people who were 
responsible' but broadly endorses the capital controls (Khoo, 2000b). 
For those who are more positive, the possibility that reflationary policy would have triggered capital 
flight cannot be dismissed. This is particularly important given the political instability in Malaysia in 
autumn 1998 following the dismissal of Anwar (see below). Again, these writers tend to refer to the 
Indonesian experience (Athukorala, 2000). 
The most compelling defence of capital controls is mounted by Ethan Kapstein and Dani Rodrik. 
They start by pointing out that (contrary to accepted wisdom about the possibility of capital 
controls in the face of modern financial markets) the controls were effective in separating domestic 
Malaysian interest rates from international market rates. They go on to argue that a comparison of 
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Malaysian performance with that in Indonesia and Thailand in September 1998 innapropriate. Thai 
and Indonesian policy was already sustainable prior to the turn around in stock markets. Malaysia 
still faced offshore ringgit interest rates of 20-40%, a depreciating exchange rate, and declining 
reserves: `pressure on the ringgit reached its peak just before the Malaysian authorities decided to 
implement capital controls' (Kapstein & Rodrik, 2001,6). Many felt that it was heading for a crisis 
and would soon be visiting the IMF. 
If the counterfactual used to evaluate the controls is the response to IMF interventions at the 
beginning of the crises elsewhere, a year earlier, Malaysian performance looks a great deal better 
than Korea's, even when efforts are made to control for easing of international interest rates and no 
adjustment is made for the fact that Malaysia received no IMF funding. 
7.4.2 Controls, social stability -a special case? 
The second claim the Malaysian authorities make is that the controls allowed Malaysia to recover 
without the social instability experienced elsewhere in Asia (presumably referring particularly to 
Indonesia). Certainly, the crisis had a lower impact on unemployment and poverty. The question, 
though, is whether that was because Malaysia adopted heterodox policies or because it was in a 
better position to start with. 
For those who accept the consensus position of a rather limited effect for the controls indications 
are that Malaysia's earlier strength is probably the correct interpretation. Particularly importantly the 
Malaysian government had introduced prudential controls limiting banks' overseas borrowing to 
sums covered by their reserves. Malaysia's exposure to unhedged short-term foreign debt was 
therefore much more limited. The crisis was largely driven by a domestic asset-price bubble 
concentrated in the property and equity markets (or alternatively by an unwarranted correction in 
such asset prices driven by speculation). Malaysian corporates had a tendency to obtain loans on the 
basis of the proceeds of shares in subsidiaries and to guarantee these loans with the shares as 
collateral leaving them highly vulnerable to stock market shocks (IMF, 1999b). 
In short, Malaysia's resilience was largely the result of better prudential regulation prior to the crisis, 
so capital outflows were concentrated in the equity markets and the impact on the banking sector 
was therefore largely indirect through corporate failures. 
A corollary is that the controls were not tested against the kind of rapid outflow of capital that took 
place in Indonesia and Korea. This was partly because they were applied quite late on when capital 
flight was probably decreasing. It was also because Malaysia's international exposure was less 
significant in the first place. At their worst, though, they were not disastrous. 
Those who are convinced by Kapstein & Rodrik's account will again be more positive about the 
effect of controls. Malaysian banks may have looked relatively sound but few banking systems 
could withstand the kinds of exchange rate shocks that took place in Indonesia and Korea. If that 
was what Malaysia was facing without the controls, Mahathir's claims look more convincing. 
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7.4.3 Conclusions 
The most significant conclusion is that the markets' (and indeed the IMF's) initial claims about the 
likely effects of Malaysian capital controls were simply wrong. There is no evidence that using 
controls to control capital outflows has disastrous economic consequences. More controversially, 
there is some evidence that it is a very effective strategy, though it wasn't tested against rapid capital 
outflows in 1997. 
Despite limited negative economic effects, IMF public statements though tend to remain negative, 
even when IMF analysis was rather more balanced. So Fischer's view that 
I believe that the controls introduced a year ago are not a good way to operate in the 
international financial system, particularly for a country anxious to attract foreign investorsM 
(Fischer, 1999b). 
is not particularly well supported by staff studies which merely express loosely related concerns 
over the extent to which there is sufficient market discipline in Malaysia (IMF, 1999b). 
7.5 International Politics, Malaysia and IMF legitimacy 
In Chapter 4, I argued that the crisis case studies (Indonesia and Korea) were interesting for IMF 
political legitimacy in two ways. Firstly they spoke to the political limits to the IMF's chances of 
implementing the new conditionality and secondly they fed into more direct debate within the Fund 
about crisis reform. 
Malaysian events and Mahathir's response to the crisis raise both these issues. Firstly there are 
issues about the causes of the Malaysian decision to avoid the IMF and introduce capital controls: 
how much was it a reaction to the `failure' of IMF policies elsewhere and therefore a decline in IMF 
legitimacy? Secondly, there are questions about the consequences of Malaysian policies: the extent 
to which Mahathir's speeches and the Malaysian example undermine the IMF's attempts to 
legitimate its policies to a wider audience. 
7.5.1 Causes of Malaysian policy 
On IMF performance influencing Mahathir's policy choices, what can be said is that criticisms 
made of the IMF's actions elsewhere clearly provided ammunition when he sought to justify his 
approach. That is clear from the speeches quoted earlier. The fact that Malaysia tried an IMF style 
approach initially but subsequently changed course is also strong evidence. One of the strongest 
empirical conclusions emerging from Chapters 5&6 was that the IMF's hopes of enhancing 
market confidence over the short term were misplaced. Additionally, the nature of IMF 
34 The speech was made at a conference that Mahathir also addressed. Kohler seems to have a slightly more 
positive view. He warns that controls become more problematic over time but explicitly accepts that the controls 
were not the disaster that had been expected. His comments were connected to an acknowledgement of Fund over 
enthusiasm for capital account liberalisation (Kohler, 2000). 
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interventions elsewhere in Asia - limiting state control over credit allocation - was certainly a 
central motivation behind Mahathir's decision to avoid IMF tutelage. 
On the other hand it was obviously not the only motivation. This sort of decision is the result of a 
number of factors, particularly, as I have pointed out throughout, political factors. It is the 
interaction of IMF policy preferences with the pre-existing political economy of crisis countries that 
is key. Mahathir's concerns may not have been shared by other countries where state intervention 
was less politically important. Equally, other countries might not have been in a sufficiently strong 
position to avoid IMF conditionality. 
Overall, how much pause for thought Malaysia's decision to avoid IMF assistance ought to give the 
IMF is unclear. On the worrying side, Mahathir was put under considerable pressure to go to the 
IMF by the financial press and there don't seem to have been any legal impediments (Athukorala, 
2000). He chose not to do so because he believed that the costs of IMF intervention outweighed 
the benefits. On the other hand, Malaysia might have tried to avoid the Fund irrespective of the 
Indonesian and Korean experiences and Malaysia's decision may not be echoed by large numbers 
of other countries. The relevance of the Malaysian message depends on the responses of other 
countries to future IMF conditionality and the extent to which Malaysian objections will receive 
enough international support to affect reform debates - issues I will look at further in Chapter 9. 
7.5.2 Consequences of Malaysian policy 
The second issue concerns the importance of Malaysia's policies in terms of demonstration effects 
and Malaysia's public advocacy of an alternative position on the crisis as a whole. 
International advocacy 
In terms of advocacy at IMF meetings, the Malaysian position has been highly consistent and rather 
more moderate than press accounts of Mahathir's 1997 performance might suggest (Ibrahim, 1997; 
Mohamed, 1998; Mohamed, 1999). 
Malaysian ministers have not wholly denied domestic aspects of crisis causation but they have been 
particularly keen to stress that there were also international causes which need to be addressed in 
the context of debates about a new international financial architecture. 
They have been particularly concerned about hedge funds which, they argue, should be forced to 
disclose their trading positions and be subjected to tighter supervision. They have questioned the 
extent to which increased transparency (the IMF approach) is enough to deal with financial 
volatility. Instead, they have suggested that the IMF should provide better regulation of 
international markets and abandon moves to include capital account convertibility in its Articles. 
They have also questioned the process of reform, pointing to limited developing country 
membership of the Financial Stability Forum and G20 processes. No ASEAN countries were 
originally members. 
On the Malaysian capital controls, they have stressed that they were a temporary measure to 
provide some breathing space for necessary reforms, not a substitute for them. Many other 
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countries had taken similar measures in the past including, for example, in the aftermath of the 
ERM crisis in 1992. 
Initially, Mahathir's and Anwar's (Ibrahim, 1997) criticisms were dismissed as blame shifting. 
However, as the Malaysians were keen to point out, international opinion changed significantly 
towards their point of view during 1998 (see for example the changes in IMF policy in Korea and 
Indonesia in early 1998 noted in the two previous chapters) and particularly in the wake of the 
LTCM disaster (Ibrahim, 1997). 
I will examine broader responses to these issues in chapter 9. For now it is sufficient merely to 
point out the ways in which Malaysian leaders took up some of the academic criticisms at IMF 
debates I reviewed in Chapter 4 and presented them at the international level. Mahathir also took 
his message to the non-aligned movement, the Commonwealth and other fora. 
Demonstration effects 
How much did the demonstration effects of Malaysian policy strengthen or undermine the 
government position, affecting Mahathir's national and international credibility? 
That clearly depends on contested interpretations of the underlying economics. In the section on 
economics, I concluded that Malaysian controls did no noticeable harm, undermining any claim 
that the IMF provided the only technically viable solution. On the other hand, the case is still open 
on whether they are transferable to other contexts. 
Given that the economics is contested, questions about the political consequences of alternative 
courses of action become highly relevant. 
The IMF is supposed to allow countries maximum flexibility to adjust without breaching the code 
of conduct. Capital controls are certainly not outlawed by the Fund's Articles. If we accept the 
consensus position that the capital controls were not particularly different in effect from policies 
elsewhere in Asia, that at least suggests that there are few good economic reasons for outlawing 
them. 
The principal remaining objection is that they may prevent necessary structural reforms. Again, 
then, the debate looks to be as much about political economy as about methods of crisis resolution. 
Fund assessments of Malaysia ask whether structural reforms have been sufficient, suggesting that a 
more expansionary approach may have prevented the failure of unsound Cimplicitly crony) business. 
Of course, how one feels about these issues will depend on one's technical views about the 
importance of `market discipline' and on the rationality of financial markets. More locally, though, it 
will also depend on attitudes towards the NEP. The most difficult questions concern the extent to 
which it is still necessary, given that many of its aims have been satisfied (see for example (Herald- 
Perkins & Woo, 2000)) and the extent to which it has degenerated into a patronage machine for 
UMNO (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). 
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Now the fact that these questions are raised, again, underscores the extent to which the new good 
governance agenda, responsible for much of the IMF programmes' local popularity in Korea and 
Indonesia, is also a political agenda. Under the post-war sovereignty regime that Jackson questions 
(see chapter 2) such `interference' would have been regarded as deeply problematic. Countries 
simply would not have accepted that it was reasonable to expect them to give up so much. Under 
the evolving new sovereignty regime, some technical and ethical considerations can override 
arguments about sovereignty. 
Are issues of cronyism and the NEP amongst such questions? After all, it is clear from Malaysian 
political debates that Mahathir's views are no more unassailable than those of the IMF, even within 
Malaysia? Or is the fact that Malaysia is a democracy sufficient to override these concerns? In 
particular, are they considerations that should legitimately be decided on political criteria or is there 
an overriding technical, or perhaps ethical / liberal, rationale? 
The dose connection between the imposition of controls and the subsequent treatment of Anwar 
Ibrahim clearly gives cause for concern. The verdict of the Malaysian electorate does not allay this. 
UMNO lost a great deal of support. However, the shift was largely by Malay voters moving their 
allegiance to the Muslim PAS. Mahathir, anticipating this, waged a scare campaign suggesting the 
dangers of ethnic unrest and the imposition of an Islamic state. Chinese voters responded by 
moving from the DAP to the MCA, offsetting the shift so that overall UMNO did no worse than 
in 199035. 
The issue though is whether these kinds of issues are ones that the IMF should have the right to 
make decisions about. 
7.6 Conclusions 
Yet again, economic issues surrounding the crisis are inconclusive. A case can be made for the 
superiority of capital controls but it is contested. It is clear that the markets' dire prophecies were 
highly inaccurate. It is too early to tell whether Malaysian long-term competitiveness will be 
damaged and, in any case, the counterfactual issues are likely to be sufficiently complex to prevent 
any particularly persuasive evaluation. 
The contested nature of the NEP adds a potential new dimension to debates about rent-seeking 
and corruption. Again, it is very much a political as well as an economic issue and, regardless of 
official rhetoric, is impossible to separate from economic evaluations of the Malaysian experience. 
Mahathir raised a range of issues that challenge IMF legitimacy. He began by attacking the IMF's 
technical credentials, emphasising successful heterodox policies in Asia's past and accusing the IMF 
of closing off potential heterodox solutions in the future. He then went on to accuse it of political 
35 For a more extended debate on the importance of the Anwar affair for Malaysian politics see (Khoo, 2000b) and 
(Funston, 2000) 
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bias in favouring markets over states, capital over labour, and international creditors over local 
debtors. He stressed the social and political aspects of the debate about policy in Asia and used the 
IMF's poor performance in Indonesia and Korea to justify his claims. 
The congruence between Mahathir's views and the kinds of potential logical challenge that I raised 
in Chapters 2&3 should be noticeable. The argument is explicitly that Fund interventions should 
be seen as political rather than technical. It is also clear that what swung the balance towards 
making that criticism was a collapse of confidence in the welfare enhancing effects of capital 
inflows: based on the experience elsewhere in Asia the bargain between capital inflows and policy 
reform I discussed at the end of Chapter 3 started looking less attractive. On the other hand, 
Mahathir was not challenging the virtues of market economies perle, he was merely calling for 
better regulation of capital flows in the interests of domestic social and political priorities. The 
parallels with the arguments made in the run up to Bretton Woods should be readily apparent. 
How credible is this line of attack likely to be to outsiders? What kind of support might Mahathir 
expect to attract from other developing countries? 
That will partly depend on perceptions of the strength of the contested economic arguments: 
capital controls versus market confidence; market rationality versus market panic; lack of market 
discipline or lack of state regulation; corruption or industrial policy. On the other hand interests will 
play a part in determining propensity to accept particular arguments. 
For states that do not have ambitions towards industrial policy there may be less advantage in 
attacking the IMF's structural agenda. As we saw, the advantages of various forms of industrial and 
redistributive policy were very much a matter of debate even in Malaysia. For other emerging 
markets there may even be advantages in blaming such policy in an effort to reassure the markets or 
even their own populations about their own economic credentials. Distance from immediate crisis 
(or even proximity to it) may affect the positions adopted within the Fund. Closeness to a crisis 
may mean that the financial personnel who set policy on these issues within the Fund may be under 
less pressure to consider the domestic political consequences of Fund policy in a crisis situation. 
Countries close to crisis, on the other hand, may have strong incentives to distance themselves 
from the patterns of corporate governance blamed for Asian problems. 
As well as the influence of domestic politics on these kinds of debates, the economic views 
themselves may of course be subject to change over time. The policies of the 1980s and 1990s mark 
a sharp break with those of the 1960s and 1970s and, in the aftermath of the Mexican, Asian and 
now Argentinian crises there is always the possibility of a change of views. 
On capital controls or other forms of debt resolution involving greater costs to creditors, the issue 
remains one of balancing short-term gains against potential long-term costs for market access. 
On better regulation of international finance and more developing country participation in 
decision-making processes, though, there is the potential for greater solidarity. On the other hand, 
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for low-income developing countries with little access to private finance, many of the issues are 
largely irrelevant at the moment. 
From a lender perspective the issues will be very different and Malaysia may chiefly be a concern 
because Mahathir's reactions signal potential difficulties in securing future programme 
implementation. I will look at those issues further in the next Chapter. For now, though, it is worth 
pointing out that Western media reaction was to portray Mahathir as an authoritarian maverick with 
eccentric views about the markets and an unpleasant style of political management - so many 
Western readers will have been surprised by my review of Mahathir's speeches in section 7.3.1. 
Here Mahathir's apparent political motivations for adopting unorthodox policies become very 
important. The ability to portray NEP policies as a combination of corruption and xenophobia is 
helpful in undermining Mahathir's credibility, just as Mahathir's ability to point to Fund pro- 
Western and pro-capital bias strengthens the political force of his arguments amongst some 
audiences. The fact that there was considerable domestic political debate about the appropriate set 
of policies for Malaysia, with an apparently more IMF friendly path supported by more liberal 
Malaysians including Anwar makes it more difficult to press the arguments that do exist in favour 
of Mahathir's approach. 
I have made an effort to do that here. I do not wish to deny the difficult aspects of some of the 
more dramatic speeches. Accusations of a Zionist conspiracy under Soros are hard to defend and 
did little for Mahathir's Western credibility. On the other hand the actual arguments he presented 
are harder to reject and potentially present significant threats to IMF orthodoxy. The question is 
whether they attracted sufficient political support to change IMF policy. 
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8 The United States 
The previous case studies have suggested that IMF interventions were heavily influenced by the 
United States. In Korea there were allegations of unwarranted US influence on negotiations around 
the structural aspects of the programmes. In Indonesia there was also evidence of direct US 
pressure on Suharto to implement the second programme. Those interventions were important in 
the politics of implementation and I will investigate the evidence for them and the reasons behind 
them in this chapter. 
However, we also saw in the introduction that the Fund's role in Asia was the subject of heated 
political debates. This chapter will investigate the diversity of US political positions on the Fund 
and the ways in which those perspectives were able to influence subsequent US policy. 
IMF legitimacy is still important in the United States. However, in the context of a lender country, 
the issues are very different. Primarily, IMF policy is interesting to the US for the kind of 
environment it provides for US corporations and financial interests to work in. It is not likely to 
have a great deal of impact in terms of restricting the United States' ability to conduct its own 
domestic economic policy. 
The key issue, from a US point of view, is whether the contributions the Fund makes to that 
environment justify the costs of US involvement both directly in terms of quota contributions and 
less directly in the restrictions it places on US ability to exert bilateral pressure to further its foreign 
economic policy goals. 
Additionally though, as I suggested in Chapter 4, there may be strategic issues about the extent to 
which IMF intervention is a cause of resentment overseas and to which that intervention is blamed 
on the US. Non-implementation may heighten these concerns. Was there a perception of a need to 
secure the IMF's wider legitimacy in the aftermath of the crisis or merely to defend it against 
domestic criticism? What does that tell us about the issues concerning IMF flexibility that were 
raised by the crisis case studies? 
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In this chapter I am interested in investigating the forces that determine what 
form US oversight of 
IMF regulation is likely to take. Which issues are important? What kinds of results will 
be regarded 
as proof that IMF membership is valuable? How does the US seek to 
influence Fund policy and 
who has the greatest say on the form that influence will take? 
Issues of influence over Fund policy in the US are also important because reform 
debates put the 
Fund under pressure to become more transparent and accountable. That is often thought of 
in 
terms of accountability to developing countries but increased transparency, at least, must also result 
automatically in greater accountability to developed country citizens. If wider publics 
become 
involved in scrutinizing the Fund's role in developed countries, what can we expect the outcome to 
be? Obviously the details will be different in different developed countries, just as they were for 
different borrowers. The US is chosen, partly because it is the most powerful nation in the Fund 
and partly because the nature of US democracy means that debate over the Fund 
is carried out 
relatively transparently. 
Elite level debate in the United States was particularly noticeable because the crisis coincided with a 
request for a quota increase that had to be passed by Congress. In this chapter I use Congressional 
debates to investigate the domestic influences that drive US Treasury input into IMF policy and to 
explore the influence these have on US preferences for reform of the IMF and the international 
financial architecture. 
8.1 Institutional environment 
My main focus in the thesis has been IMF conditionality and I have already devoted some attention 
to the institutional relationships between the Fund and developing countries in that context. An 
understanding of the importance of US debates now requires further information on the 
institutional links between the Fund and United States so that we can understand how different 
actors in 1ender countries can hope to influence IMF policy'. 
8.1.1 Overview 
The United States has two formal sources of influence over the IMF, its Governor (and Alternate) 
and its Executive Director (and Alternate) who are appointed by the President with Senate 
approval. 
Day to day oversight of Fund operations is the responsibility of the Executive Director (who, 
during the period reviewed here, was Karen Lissakers). She reports to the under the International 
Monetary Affairs department. The Treasury supplies her with an economic advisor, three technical 
assistants and two administrative assistants at the Fund (Geithner, 1998)2 as well as support from a 
' Of course institutional relationships and political cultures will vary between countries but the US example will at 
least give some indications of what one might expect to take place elsewhere 
2 Geithner was the Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs in 1998 and now works for the Fund's policy 
development and review department 
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department based within the Treasury itself. The Treasury, in turn is accountable to American 
citizens through oversight by their elected representatives in the House (Senate and Congress) and 
through presidential elections. 
In practice Congressional oversight is only exercised when the Executive needs Congressional 
permission for an amendment to the Fund's Articles of Agreement or, more commonly, for an 
increase in the US quota3. At that point, Congress tends to grant permission only subject to a list of 
matters that it expects the US Executive Director to promote using his/her 'voice and vote' during 
Executive Board meetings -a tactic that will be discussed further below. 
Treasury oversight, on the other hand, is continuous and the position of the IMF offices in 
Washington probably means that the US Executive Director is held more closely accountable than 
any other. Thomas Dawson, an ex US Executive Director and now head of External Affairs at the 
Fund advised the House Banking Oversight Subcommittee that, in exercising its oversight it should 
lay it on Treasury not on the poor US director' (House Banking Oversight Subcommittee, 1998 
106). Treasury also consults with the Department of Commerce and the US Trade Representative 
(USTR) to ensure that the Executive Director is aware of any ongoing US trade issues. Unlike in 
the UK, for example, where DFID has a clear input into IMF policy, USAID is not involved in 
IMF policy making, the position being that the IMF is `not a development institution'4. 
8.1.2 Achieving US purposes within the IMF 
Within the IMF, the Executive Director's job is to attempt to ensure that Treasury policy (as 
influenced by Congress and USTR) is, as far as possible, implemented by the IMF. Testimony given 
by Treasury officials to the Congressional committee charged with IMF oversight suggests that she 
does this by a combination of means. Since, as we saw in chapter 2, most decisions are made by 
consensus and formal votes are rarely taken: 
the US must engage in coalition building to obtain the necessary support for its views on most 
issues. This is accomplished through a variety of channels including frequent contacts with the 
Management, staff and the Offices of Executive Directors, either individually or in groups. 
These efforts are often supplemented by contacts with the home governments of member 
countries, including within the G7 framework, other multilateral fora and bilaterally (Geithner, 
1998). 
In other words, formal Executive Board discussions are only one of the fora in which the US 
Executive Director tries to exercise her influence. 
The board discussions themselves can be quite fluid and lively; however much of my work is 
done behind the scenes through informal meetings and discussions with other Directors, with 
management and with senior staff (Lissakers in (House Banking Oversight Subcommittee, 
1998,24)). 
3 The right of Congressional veto on these issues was enshrined in the original legislation authorising US 
membership in the IMF. The absence of Congressional oversight at other times was confirmed in confidential 
interviews with activist Congressmen and with Jim Orr of the Bretton Woods Committee. See also Thomas Dawson's 
testimony to the House Subcommittee on Banking Oversight (House Banking Oversight Subcommittee, 1998,105- 
6). 
4 Personal communication from USAID external affairs. 
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Geithner, responsible for international affairs at the Treasury, went on to outline the US strategy 
for implementing issues of concern to Congress that were not generally regarded as `economic' 
such as labour rights and the environment and which had limited support from other country 
representatives. Here pressure is put on IMF staff to carry out research into the `economic' aspects 
of these issues (their effect on other economic policies, consequences on trade, investment and the 
balance of payments etc. ). Pressure is placed on the Managing Director to raise the issues in public 
fora and discussions take place with other Executive Directors initially informally. Only then are 
issues brought up in public discussion or reviews of country programmes (Geithner, 1998). 
8.1.3 Treasury and the administration 
The Treasury is largely in control of the USED's input into Fund policy. 
High-level Treasury officials are appointed by the President as part of his administration and are 
accountable to the White House. They only have to account to Congress for IMF policy under 
particular circumstances (see below). 
Since US administrations are made up of outsiders rather than career politicians, there is a tendency 
for Treasury officials to come from business or academia (the principal resources of economic 
talent). The circulation between academia, Treasury, Wall Street and the IMF has led many to 
complain that the Treasury, particularly under the Clinton administration, has been too willing to 
have its policy driven by Wall Street preferences (Bhagwati, 1998; Bhagwad, 2001). 
In keeping with a broader trend in Western countries since the late 1970s, respect for economic 
expertise and a preference for insulation from `political interference' in economic management has 
led to increased respect for the `expertise' of Treasury officials. Andrew Baker has argued that there 
is increasingly a self-reinforcing consensus within the G7 around a particular set of economic 
policies centred on free capital flows, flexible exchange rates and monetary policy that is 
independent and largely directed at inflation targets. Sound monetary and fiscal policies aimed at 
medium term piice stability ensure a broadly appropriate exchange rate through the reception they 
receive in the markets. Exchange rates are largely a demonstration of the markets' verdict on 
domestic macro-economic policy. That kind of perspective casts the Treasury role very much in 
terms of a particular kind of relationship with the financial markets involving modest opportunities 
for influence but, generally, a task seen in terms of ensuring that nothing is done to damage market 
sentiment (Baker, 2000). 
The kinds of argument around `market confidence' that I explored in debates on good governance 
are also evident in this kind of perspective on economic management in which decisions are to be 
taken by technocrats (who have close contact with the financial markets) rather than `politically' 
motivated politicians. Treasury dependence on market confidence for the cost of borrowing to 
fund an increasing US government deficit my help to increase this idea of dependence on market 
views. 
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That agenda is open to challenge were it conflicts with the views of more politically minded arms of 
government but, where the Treasury is left to itself, is likely to dominate policy approaches. 
8.1.4 Congress and the wider public 
As I indicated in the overview section, the principal powers reserved to Congress under the Bretton 
Woods Agreements Act relate to the approval of quota increases or amendments to the Articles of 
Agreement. Congress is also able to pass specific legislation directing the way in which the 
Executive Director should act in her role at the IMF. In practice it has tended to do so when quotas 
come up for review. 
Two important questions are raised here. The first concerns the effectiveness of such legislation in 
promoting Congressional preferences and the second concerns the sources of those preferences - 
what issues interest Congressmen and what kinds of incentives guide their interventions? 
I will discuss the practical effects of the legislation that was passed as a result of debates on quota 
renewal in 1998 below (section 8.4). For now it is enough to point out that legislation of this kind is 
a relatively blunt instrument and its effectiveness will largely depend on Congress's ability to 
monitor the ED's compliance and impose sanctions for non-compliance. This is particularly 
difficult since Congress cannot legislate for `results': the ED can only do her best to press 
Congressional preferences within the Fund's decision-making bodies. While, as I have already 
suggested, the US exercises considerably more influence than its 17% of the vote would suggest, it 
cannot act alone and does not always achieve its goals. 
Although the scope for continuous oversight is limited, the need for periodic Congressional 
sanction of quota renewal can be a powerful lever. Legislation sends messages about Congress's 
preferences and therefore about issues that are likely to be raised when it is time for the next round 
of quota renewals. In a sense quota renewal has the same kind of influence as voting does in normal 
electoral politics. It does not provide a system of continuous oversight but it does mean that, 
periodically, Congressional assessments of past performance will become very significant. 
It may appear unlikely that Congress would refuse a quota increase outright, but it is not entirely 
impossible given recent difficulties in securing UN subscriptions. In any case, there is a real danger 
that Congress will pass obstructive legislation or cause embarrassing delays in authorisation. These 
dangers can be used to encourage Treasury concessions during the quota renewal process and to 
enhance Congressional control, particularly when new rounds of negotiations are pending. 
What drives Congressmen to engage in this kind of scrutiny and what form can we expect it to 
take? 
There has been a lot of debate about the significance and desirability of a more `activist' Congress 
on foreign policy issues. The US constitution is somewhat ambiguous about the division of foreign 
policy powers and the relative importance of the role of the Executive and Legislature has varied 
over time. During the 1950s there was a tendency for Congress to bow to Presidential leadership. 
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Particularly since Watergate and the Vietnam war, Congress has become less content to abandon 
differences `at the water's edge' (Lindsay, 1994). In relation to foreign economic policy, there have 
been similar fluctuations. In the 1950s, Congress tried to tie its own hands on trade policy by 
delegating much of its constitutional authority to regulate ` Commerce with foreign Nations' to the 
President. During the 1980s, this position too was partly reversed with more active attempts to 
legislate on trade issues (Bayard & Elliott, 1994; Destler, 1995). 
For some this has raised concerns that Congressmen have incentives that are counter productive 
for foreign policy. Particularly concerned are those who stress narrow electoral incentives. In this 
view, Congressmen tend to have parochial preferences based on the short-term wishes of their state 
electorate, preventing them from adopting a more thoughtful, long term, and national or even 
international perspective. 
Lindsay (1994) argues persuasively that this is an overly simplistic conception of Congressional 
behaviour. Obviously, (and usually appropriately) Congressmen will generally wish to avoid 
providing public support for policies that the majority of their constituents oppose. However, in 
practice, the majority of American citizens are simply not that interested in foreign policy issues. As 
a result, 
Rather than slavishly following constituent opinion, members of Congress try to accomplish 
their personal, policy and political goals subject to a constraint laid down by constituent 
opinion (Lindsay, 1994,34) 
Lindsay suggests that, although the strongest electoral incentives tend to favour silence on foreign 
policy questions (electoral ambivalence suggests that there is little to gain and much to lose) there 
can be other political advantages in pursuing personal foreign policy goals. Involvement in 
Congressional committees can be good for the career of a Congressman seeking higher political 
office. The importance of the `attentive public' - interest groups, particularly but by no means 
exclusively those with an ethnic basis (Jewish Americans, Asian Americans, African Americans), can 
make foreign policy a vote winner and can certainly mobilise campaign finance from interested 
groups. Taking a high profile stand on issues can gain media coverage, raising a politician's profile 
more generally. 
Committee posts can also be a route to advancement within the party and therefore to higher 
political office. They provide an opportunity to make a name for oneself within Congress. For 
those `policy entrepreneurs' who become involved in foreign policy issues for career reasons, 
electoral calculus remains important but largely in influencing the way those policies are presented 
in public. The line between policy preference and `pandering' to constituents can sometimes 
therefore be blurred by astute presentation of policy issues in ways that constituents can relate to. 
8.1.5 Summary 
Treasury policy is particularly key in determining US positions within the Fund. But Treasury acts 
within political constraints imposed by the wishes of the President, Congress and less directly, the 
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general public. Direct public influence on IMF policy is only likely on the back of very large 
political protest or concerted lobbying. Congress has more significance but only exercises 
intermittent oversight. Congressional interest could be driven by a number of reasons including the 
personal agendas of activist Congressmen as well as electoral incentives. 
Oversight of Treasury policy is difficult because it is hard to keep track of exactly what is being 
done. Lack of transparency in Executive Board discussions is one reason for this, but influence is 
also exercised informally in ways that are extremely difficult to monitor. 
8.2 Pre-Crisis US foreign policy 
Now I have set out the institutional nature of policy on the Fund I can turn to relevant pre-crisis 
policy preferences. We have already seen allegations that the US was key in driving the IMF's 
agenda in Asia. US foreign policy before the crisis is important in assessing those claims. If we are 
interested in the influence of post-Asia debates on US policies towards the IMF, pre-crisis policies 
will also provide a point of comparison. Finally, a short review of changes since the Cold War will 
give a guide to the overall place of foreign economic policy within more general US foreign policy 
priorities. 
What effect had post Cold War changes had on foreign spending? What were pre-existing goals for 
the Asian region? How much importance did the Clinton administration place on the IMF? What 
might it have been hoping could be achieved through conditionality? 
8.2.1 Foreign policy after the Cold War 
During the Cold War, overseas aid and foreign economic policy more generally had often been 
driven by strategic priorities. The Cold War came to an end during George Bush's presidency and 
the struggle began to determine and articulate a new vision for American foreign policy. Bush's 
preferred vision seemed to be one of America as a sort of `chairman of the board'. A US led 
multilateral approach with considerable (if distinctly inconsistent) stress on 
world order, peaceful adjudication of disputes under international law, the advancement of 
liberal democracy and market economics, the maintenance of liberal economic 
regimes... achieved through collective action (ideally associated with the United Nations) 
(Dumbrel1,1997,164). 
Unfortunately for Bush, this approach, particularly during the Gulf War, seemed to offer too much 
as well as too little. Too much in terms of the costs, both economic and human. Too little in that 
the demonic rhetoric Bush used to mobilise support against Sadam Hussein could not be matched 
with action - the outcome of the war was restrained by the limitations of international law and UN 
mandate, by US desire to retain Iraq as a counterweight to perceived continued threats from Iran 
and by limits to international cooperation. 
US public support for intervention in the Gulf was always limited. In the run up to the 1992 
election the full financial costs of the conflict were becoming apparent to a US population already 
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concerned at economic decline. At the same time, continuing difficulties in Iraq (attacks against the 
Kurds, refusal to allow access to weapons inspectors, etc. ) were becoming more apparent. 
In 1990, Congressional debates on the Food for Peace programme also made it clear that there was 
now considerable resistance to security justifications for aid. Congress made strenuous efforts to 
reduce Presidential discretion on aid allocation arguing that it was now time for greater democratic 
oversight to ensure that aid was used for a combination of global development and the 
advancement of US interestss. 
8.2.2 The Clinton administration 
Clinton's election campaign demonstrated a clear awareness of these issues. He came to power 
presenting himself as primarily concerned with a domestic agenda in general and, in particular, with 
the domestic economy. As we will see below, this was reflected in foreign policy. As Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher put it `I make no apologies for putting economics at the top of our 
foreign policy agenda' (Newsweek 6th March 1995). 
The second key plank of Clinton foreign policy was `enlargement'. Echoing the Carter 
administration's concerns for human rights, administration officials went on to argue that human 
rights could best be protected through democracy and (linking to the economic agenda) free 
markets. Key figures such as Warren Christopher, Anthony Lake and Strobe Talbott all publicly 
argued that promoting democracy and markets was not merely `idealist' but also represented the 
national interest6. 
Although this stress on liberal values was important in Clinton rhetoric, it is important to 
emphasize its limitations in practice - particularly in relation to the multilateral institutions such as 
the IFIs and the UN. Stephen Walt argues that 
President Clinton's handling of international institutions and multilateralism illustrates the 
central irony in his handling of foreign policy, namely the degree to which he departed from his 
initial idealism and embraced realpolitik ... Clinton may cloak US policy in the rhetoric of 
"world order" and general global interests, but its defining essence remains the unilateral 
exercise of sovereign power (Walt, 2000,79). 
Nonetheless, a tendency to use multilateralism where it is convenient and to abandon it when it is 
not in no way undermines the importance of liberal values in providing just cations for post Cold 
War foreign policy. It is also by no means a signal that economic imperatives are unimportant. In 
fact economics is crucial: 
Clinton's strategy is hegemony on the cheap because it is the only strategy the American people 
are likely to support (Walt, 2000,79). 
5 See also the more general discussion of the rise of good governance in Chapter 3. 
6 See also the quote from Strobe Talbot at page 75 above. 
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8.2.3 Foreign economic policy 
Trade 
Despite general US enthusiasm for multilateral trade liberalisation under the GATT, there have 
been growing undercurrents of dissatisfaction since at least the late 1970s. GATT was largely 
designed to reduce tariff barriers, particularly on manufactured goods. For a growing current of US 
opinion, the GATT's success in doing so revealed its own limitations. Particularly key were 
agriculture, originally excluded with some US enthusiasm, and services which had not been an issue 
when GATT was set up but which were now an increasingly important part of US business and a 
key sector targeted for exports. 
This dissatisfaction grew under the Reagan administration as what George Bush famously dubbed 
Reagan's 'voodoo economics' (high interest rates and loose fiscal policy) created an overvalued 
dollar and a corresponding trade deficit. Congress, unwilling to accept the macroeconomic causes 
of the deficit, tended to blame it on restrictive trade policies overseas and particularly in Japan. 
Initially reluctant to intervene, the Reagan administration came under increasing Congressional 
pressure throughout the 1980s. Eventually, in 1985 the administration responded with the Plaza 
accord to adjust the yen-dollar exchange rate and sector specific talks with Japan in 1985-6. 
However, given the inevitable lag between exchange rate adjustment and the emergence of new 
trading patterns, difficulties continued. 
The apparent failure of the Japanese surplus to respond to the sharp appreciation of the yen 
fed the growing body of opinion that Japan's fundamental institutions - its economic and 
political systems, even its culture - were themselves barriers to trade (Bayard & Elliott, 1994, 
23). 
In 1988, Congress implemented new trade legislation including the `Super 301' provisions which 
were designed to put pressure on the administration to publicly name countries that were 'unfair' 
traders. The legislation also made USTR's retaliation mandatory for breaches of international 
obligations and provided tight deadlines for action. Stronger provisions still, requiring a `results 
oriented' trade policy were defeated but resurfaced in the early 1990s. These developments 
demonstrated clear conflict between Congress on the one hand and the Executive on the other, 
with the Executive more inclined towards multilateral solutions. 
For those who were concerned by increasing signs of a bilateral rather than multilateral approach to 
trade pressed, particularly, by Congressional Democrats, Clinton administration rhetoric was not 
immediately reassuring. Key Clinton economic advisors had published books advising a `strategic' 
trade policy in response to growing Japanese competition in high technology sectors. So, for 
example, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Chair of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, 
described herself as a cautious activist on trade and had written a book arguing that barriers to trade 
in Japan were increasingly structural Effectively, the Japanese version of the developmental state in 
itself constituted a trade barrier. If the US was to win the growing battle for `competitiveness', she 
argued, the US either needed to provide more direct support for its own strategic industries or to 
prevent other countries from supporting theirs (Tyson, 1992). 
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Others, notably Jeffrey Garten and Theodore Moran, equated economic success with national 
security arguing that, in the new world order, economics was power. Trade issues should therefore 
be seen in strategic terms (Garten, 1992). This was echoed in Clinton's decision to set up a National 
Economic Council alongside the National Security Council in the White House. As key Clinton 
policy makers put it in a pre-election summary of ongoing Clinton policy: 
National security must be broadly construed to include both economic and geopolitical 
concerns. And in many circumstances economic policies may prove the best instrument for 
achieving geopolitical objectives (Bowman Cutter et aL, 2000,82). 
This `economic security' approach provoked stringent criticism from more orthodox economists 
and from traditional security analysts. For the economists, the overarching focus on trade policy, 
particularly in high technology, as the determinant of economic success was at best misguided and 
at worst dangerous in that distracted policy makers from far more important domestic problems 
such as low US savings (Krugman, 1994). The tendency to think in narrow nationalist terms and to 
pursue bilateral negotiations ignored the broader systemic implications for world trade and WTO 
negotiations. Short-term gains for particular US industries could have long-term implications for 
the economy as a whole (Krueger, 1995). 
For security analysts, the stress on economics was a dangerous reversal of priorities. 
Trade policy is seen not as a means to confront major geopolitical challenges and opportunities 
in former cold war adversary states such as China and Russia, but rather as a tool to grab 
markets share from allied states, such as Germany and Japan (Nau, 1995,4). 
In a World where geopolitical threats had clearly not vanished, an aggressive drive to maximise US 
market share risked alienating allies that were still all too necessary to US security interests. 
Obsession with the economy prevented the Clinton administration from articulating a coherent 
conception of strategic policy that could command the support of the American public (Sicherman, 
1994; Wolfowitz, 1994). 
In fact, both sets of criticisms perhaps run the risk of mistaking strident rhetoric for a more modest 
reality. During the early years of the Clinton administration there was considerable bilateral trade 
pressure on Japan - including a notorious dispute over car sales in early 1995 (Nau, 1995). Clinton, 
under Congressional pressure, also reinstated a rather watered down version of `Super 301'. On the 
other hand, the stress was on foreign market opening rather than on domestic protection. Major 
early successes included completing NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. Fairer criticisms are those 
that argue Clinton policy failed to overcome tendencies to be inward looking and perhaps over 
responsive to domestic interests, particularly those of multinational business and the financial 
sector. 
Trade in services and capital account opening 
Within this general approach to trade policy, a particularly important development was US pressure 
to encourage trade in services and particularly, for our purposes, financial services. 
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Congress had been aware for some time that the US economy was increasingly service driven and 
was particularly concerned that this comparative advantage was poorly served by the GATT regime. 
The Reagan administration had, unsuccessfully, tried to instigate GATT negotiations on services as 
far back as 1982. However, it was only in the aftermath of considerable deregulation of services 
markets outside the US during the 1980s that there was enough interest to put trade in service on 
the Uruguay round agenda. 
Introducing trade in services involved considerable challenges to the WTO framework: 
freer trade in services, including financial services, implies much more than free cross-border 
trade; it raises the broader issues of market access and, more generally, of doing business in a 
foreign country, which involves investment, regulation, and public and private anticompetitive 
behaviours (Dobson & Jacquet, 1998,76). 
Concerns about regulation were particularly key and it is clear that the US agenda on services 
liberalisation remained significantly out of step with views in both developing countries and Europe 
and was heavily driven by a number of US services companies - particularly the financial services 
industry under the leadership of American Express (Dobson & Jacquet, 1998; Hoekman & 
Kostecki, 2001). EU resistance eventually ensured that GATS would be based on a positive list 
system where countries could choose which sectors to include in the agreement. 
Financial services proved particularly problematic and negotiations had to be extended after the 
majority of the Uruguay Round had been completed and were only concluded at the end of 1997. 
The US agenda was driven by intensive Wall Street lobbying for market access, encouraged by the 
experience of deals with Korea and Japan that had been struck in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
under the threat of unilateral US trade sanctions. Access to Korean insurance markets had been 
obtained as part of the negotiations designed to stave off super 301 action against Korea in the late 
1980s. The US Primary Dealers Act of 1988 then forced government to press for `reciprocal 
national treatment' for the financial services sector and these issues were pressed in the `Structural 
Impediments Initiative' talks with Japan (Frankel, 1993). 
The GATS negotiations were dearly disappointing for the US. By 1995, the expiry of the first post- 
Uruguay Round negotiating deadline, the US administration began to argue that the inadequacy of 
developing country offers in multilateral negotiations suggested they should proceed on the basis of 
bilateral pressure. US financial institutions put considerable pressure on the US stressing the 
dangers of free riding7: 
They relied on pressure from the US government to lead to better offers and, should that fail, 
on denying MFN to punish developing countries and educe from them a wider degree of 
opening (Dobson & Jacquet, 1998,80). 
7 Since WTO commitments are provided on the basis of MFN, any US liberalisation would benefit all countries 
including those that kept their markets dosed. In fact, of course, it was unlikely that any developing countries had 
much interest in providing financial services to the US markets - one of the key reasons for developing country 
reluctance in the first place. However, US negotiators were concerned that, if US markets were opened now, there 
would be little future leverage when such negotiations were more possible. 
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While the EU felt that the offers that had been made established an important principle for 
agreement and promised further liberalisation in the future, the US was adamant. The government 
withdrew its offer and instigated a MFN carve out for the whole sector in June 1995. It was only 
in 
1997 that the US reversed course and an agreement was reached. 
By the mid-1990s, the trade concerns driven by perceptions of economic decline in the 1990s had 
become less significant in the context of a booming US economy. However, pressure from Wall 
Street on financial market access had not abated. Indeed, pressure for international financial 
liberalisation continued with moves towards financial sector liberalisation being driven through the 
OECD (abortive attempts to produce a multilateral agreement on investment), WTO (financial 
services and trade related investment measures) and IMF (calls to make capital account 
liberalisation an official Fund objective through an amendment of the Articles of Agreement). 
Economic policy in Asia 
East and South-East Asia played an important part in many of these developments in US foreign 
economic policy. The most high profile trade disputes of the 1980s and early 1990s were with Japan 
but Korea was also the subject of considerable US attention (Mo & Myers, 1993). By 1990, the 
Treasury was already reporting to Congress that 
until the Korean Government allows domestic banks to compete in a market environment, 
fully liberalizes its interest rates, and eliminates credit allocation and exchange controls, there is 
little likelihood of major advances in equality of competitive opportunity for foreign financial 
service providers in the Korean market (quoted in (Frankel, 1993,131)). 
More generally, in 1993, the Clinton administration set out a strategy to target economic relations 
with 10 Big Emerging Markets' (BEMs) that included Indonesia and Korea (Thailand was 
apparently just off the list (Stremlau, 1994))8. The BEMs were seen as regional leaders in both 
economic and strategic terms. Promoting US engagement and economic involvement would ensure 
US influence facilitating the `convergence of bilateral interests and values in order to achieve greater 
mutual domestic prosperity and security'. It would also help to promote the institutionalisation of 
developing countries into multilateral fora. 
The chosen countries were seen as regional leaders economically. There were also potential strategic 
interests. Involving them in the global economy and international institutions would help to turn 
them into positive examples for their respective regions. Economic engagement was also intended 
to be a channel through which pressure could be exerted towards human rights and political 
liberalisation to provide positive, successful, pro-Western examples. Issues about Indonesian 
human rights had already been raised in the context of the debate. 
Perhaps more importantly, these countries were seen as potential consumers of key US exports: IT, 
telecommunications, healthcare, medical equipment, transport, power generation and financial 
services. A particular success of the approach involved a mission to Indonesia which won 
8 The strategy was set out in a Commerce Department report to Congress entitled 'Towards a National Export 
Strategy' announced on 30th September 1993. 
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significant contracts for US firms including a $2.5 billion undertaking for Mission Energy in East 
Java (Stremlau, 1994). 
The South East Asian countries were also important in the context of WTO financial services 
negotiations. Disagreements over the commitments submitted by countries involved in the crisis 
were, until the last minute, a crucial part of US objections to the proposed schedule. 
In terms of more specific issues, the USTR's annual Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers' for 1997 listed a number of concerns in Indonesia and Korea. 
In Indonesia issues were: BULOG's monopoly in imports of bulk food commodities and licensing 
requirements on other agricultural products; general barriers to trade in services (accounting, 
auditing, law); and restrictions on foreign ownership - particularly in the banking and securities 
industries. Particular highlights were the national car project and measures designed to restrict 
exports of unprocessed wood to encourage processing within Indonesia. 
In Korea, the list was longer - indeed the report took up 19 pages. Particular concerns with trade in 
goods centred on agricultural products (rice and citrus fruits - but also a wide range of other fruit, 
dairy and meat products), automobiles, cosmetics and steel. In services there was a high profile 
dispute over telecommunications access. 
Particularly relevant in the context of the crisis, the report was highly negative about access for 
foreign banks citing a `relatively non-transparent regulatory system' and 
high cost procedures and restrictions on ... financial activities which are more reminiscent of an 
emerging economy than of one of Korea's level of development..... From a company's point of 
view and despite its claims otherwise, the Korean Government has actually accomplished 
relatively little deregulation of practical importance in its controls over transactions involving 
foreign exchange, imports and exports. 
Finally, 
foreign investors' effective access to the Korean market continues to be highly conditioned by 
law and regulation, as well as by inexplicit administrative guidance and bureaucratic fiat (p247). 
Concerns were also raised about the periodic appearance of `anti-luxury' campaigns targeting 
Western goods. 
The congruence between these pre-existing US concerns and the content of the IMF programmes 
in Indonesia and Korea is very noticeable. 
Treasury views on international monetary economics 
The Treasury and G7 consensus on appropriate macroeconomic management that I discussed in 
section 8.1.3 is also an important influence. It was clearly demonstrated in the response to the crisis 
that took place in Mexico in 1994-5 where the stress was on improving transparency to encourage 
more effective and rational market discipline (Kenen, 1996). Baker argues that Treasury officials 
explicitly regarded the post-Asia agenda for reforming the international financial architecture as a 
more proactive extension of the post-Mexico approach (Baker, 2002). 
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8.2.4 Summary 
There is strong support for claims that IMF interventions in Asia reflected US priorities. 
Discontent with industrial policy in Japan and Korea had begun with concerns about American 
decline during the 1980s. As the economy picked up in the 1990s, these concerns were replaced 
with an enthusiasm at the prospects for financial globalisation. Clinton foreign policy was 
particularly focussed on economic issues reflecting the US electorate's post Cold War preferences. 
Pressure for `development' spending to have a social as well as strategic justification was also 
significant, particularly in relation to Indonesia, which had been the subject of some Congressional 
concerns prior to the crisis. 
The aspects of the programmes relating to macroeconomic policy and finance owed much to the 
sort of economic wisdom espoused by the Treasury but it also reflected a wider G7 consensus and, 
perhaps to a lesser extent, a consensus amongst the economics profession in the US. 
Finally, multilateralism was very much part of US rhetoric though, not surprisingly, there was also a 
tendency to abandon multilateral frameworks when they ceased to serve US interests. 
8.3 US response to the IMF's role in Asia 
If pre-crisis Treasury policy was so closely reflected in IMF programmes in Asia, why was there 
such an outcry in the US media following the crisis? How far did that outcry convert into policy 
debates in Congressional Committees? Which issues were important and what was it about the 
crisis that triggered concerns? Who had access to those committee debates and therefore direct 
influence on policy outcomes? 
8.3.1 Congressional debates 
Moral hatard, transparency and equity 
What made the press when Congress came to debate its reactions to IMF interventions in Asia, and 
therefore whether it would renew IMF quotas, was an emergent anti-IMF alliance between left and 
right wing Congressmen brokered by Bernie Sanders, an independent left-winger (F123«' January 
1998 (US edition), American Banker 15th January 1998). The issues that united the parties were 
problems with IMF transparency and accountability (the degree of control that Congress could 
exercise over the institution) and the view that IMF programmes had bailed out foreign lenders at 
the expense of US and foreign taxpayers (moral hazard). Despite this agreement, the concerns 
driving these issues were very different for left and right wing Congressmen. 
For right-wingers moral hazard was significant because the IMF was undermining the market 
mechanism, reducing incentives for debtors and creditors to negotiate settlements and enabling 
foreign investors to avoid penalties limiting their incentives for better risk analysis in the future. 
Concern about transparency and accountability was largely a question about the fact that US 
taxpayers' funds were being used without providing Congress with control over how those funds 
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were deployed. The underlying suspicion was that the IMF was a waste of money since US 
preferences (broadly access to markets for US traders and investors and remoulding those markets 
to make it easier for US companies to operate in them) were watered down by the multilateral 
nature of the IMF. 
We should not commit US taxpayer resources unless and until we can answer the question 'will 
it be used in a way which protects our national interest? '... the IMF is not an open institution. 
Some argue that the Treasury Department bureaucrats wield tremendous influence at the 
IMF... but that is insufficient accountability to the American taxpayer (Bachus in House 
Banking Oversight Subcommittee, 1998 at page 3)9. 
Of course, as Jim Leach the chair of the committee was keen to point out, IMF quotas are a loan 
not a gift. They earn interest and are a US asset. The costs are the difference between that interest 
and market rates, and the more limited liquidity of drawing rights in the Fund. 
Still, the headline sums involved in quota increases can make a powerful political impression. In 
addition, external support for the free market moral hazard views came from right wing think tanks 
such as the Cato Institute (Calomiris, 1998) and Heritage Foundation (Vasquez, 1998)], some 
economists (WSJ 27th August 1997,3, d February 1998) and figures associated with the American 
Enterprise Institute (Lawrence Lindsay gave testimony at the April hearings (Lindsey, 1998)). 
On the left, concerns about moral hazard and about IMF governance were driven more by equity 
considerations. Was it appropriate for US and Asian taxpayers to bail out large American financial 
institutions? Who would the IMF programmes benefit - powerful financial interests or labour and 
the poor? Was accountability to the Treasury going to provide comfort on those issues and was the 
negotiating process in developing countries likely to enhance developing country democracy? 
In keeping with broader left wing US enthusiasm for promoting international standards on labour 
rights and the environment, there were questions about why it was possible to force Indonesia (m 
particular) to set up an independent central bank but not to force it to implement core labour 
rights'O. Supporting witnesses here came from Asian NGOs (Bello, 1998) labour unions (Becker, 
1998), and left wing lobbies (Nader, 1998) and a number of Indonesian pro-democracy activists 
(see AFX(. AP) May 8th 1998). 
Although, as I will argue below, NGOs were not particularly active in lobbying on Asia, left wing 
Congressional concerns echoed pre-existing perceptions that Fund policies tended to hurt the poor 
disproportionately, which had been bolstered by a range of popular protest movements in the US 
during the 1980s and 1990s including, for example, the `Fifty Years is Enough' campaign around 
the Fund's anniversary in 1992. In interviews I conducted in Washington in autumn 2000, left wing 
Congressmen and Congressional staff argued that, on the whole, they would rather there was no 
Fund, but if that was unlikely they would at least press for more `positive' conditionality. Bernie 
9 See also comments by Saxton, 
10 See particularly the comments by Sanders and Frank in (House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 
1999) and (House Banking Oversight Subcommittee, 1998) 
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Sanders, for example, was also in the process of introducing legislation taking issue with 
conditionality in the HIPC initiative and a further bill calling for small scale 
human development". 
Security concerns 
The Administration had stressed the importance of engagement in the Asian region to show US 
solidarity with its Asian allies (see section 8.3.2 below). Some Congressmen supported this view 
but 
others (particularly Jackson, Bachus, Roach and Malpass) were concerned 
by negative reactions in 
Asia: 
I have been to Asia five different times in the last fourteen months ... And I am not saying 
I 
pick up a representative sampling of opinion, but I certainly hear and feel an undercurrent of 
anti-American, anti-IMF, anti-G7 backlash (House Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, 1999,130). 
At least one senator felt that the IMF had been instrumental in Suharto's fall (Locke, 2000). 
A 
number of Congressmen recognised that the IMF was closely identified with US 
interests and many 
of the witnesses (both right and left wing) confirmed this perception (Bello, 1998; Hanke, 
1998; 
Nader, 1998). Others, on the other hand, suggested (pointing to the ill feelings caused by early 
reluctance to get involved in Thailand (Connors, 2001)) that while there were risks to action, 
inaction was worse (Bergsten in House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 1998). 
Domestic effects and 'special interests' 
In keeping with more electorally minded interpretations of Congressional behaviour, there was also 
strong evidence that Congressmen were keen to connect issues to a domestic agenda. For those in 
favour of the IMF important points were the extent to which Asian markets were an outlet for US 
goods, the dangers continued currency depreciation implied for US jobs and the potential to use the 
crisis to reduce Asian export dependence and enhance US market access. For those against the 
question was why the administration could find money to prop up US banks while it couldn't find 
more to spend on medicare (Sanders) and why regulatory incentives encouraged US banks to lend 
to foreign governments rather than `small businesses in my district'. 
An entire hearing session was reserved for US industrial interests: Boeing Asia (Bracy, 1998), 
Micron Technology (manufacturers of DRAM chips) (Appleton, 1998), the American Forest and 
Paper Association (Moore, 1998), the American Farm Bureau (Kleckner, 1998), and IPSCO Steel 
Inc (Russo, 1998). The general perspective was to encourage IMF support but with concerns to 
ensure that it resulted in more open markets for their goods and did not involve `bail-outs' of 
competing firms. There was therefore a marked tendency to argue that corruption and crony 
capitalism had led to overcapacity and that the crisis was an opportunity to attack the unfair 
subsidies that had made it difficult to compete in Asia. 
Perhaps one of the more interesting contributions came from Becker, representing the unions, and 
particularly US steelworkers. His testimony was, at one level, concerned about the effects on union 
members in Indonesia and, at another, worried about job losses for his members as a result of 
II Sanders acknowledged that the legislation had no chance of getting passed but was introducing it to raise 
awareness. (These initiatives are documented on his website - httpl/www. house. gov/sanders). 
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currency depreciation. He didn't seem to be aware of the conflicts of interest involved in that 
position (Becker, 1998), a problem that affects anti-globalisation movements more generally. 
Technical criticisms of the Fund 
The technical issues I raised in Chapter 4 and have reviewed since also made their way into these 
Congressional debates, partly through academic witnesses but also via the versions that were 
published in the financial press which were taken up by various Congressmen and often placed on 
the record of Committee debates. 
The possibility of moral hazard; whether there was a need for greater transparency; the desirability 
or otherwise of pegged exchange rates; the appropriateness of initial IMF mandated fiscal policy; 
and the necessity of tight monetary policy for the resolution of capital account crises were all 
discussed, though a wider range of Congressmen felt able to contribute to some issues than others. 
The arguments different Congressmen took up were, unsurprisingly, chosen according to political 
perspective but the impact of the American academic economic elite is important. These expert 
economists lend credibility to politicians' statements and the fact that there was disagreement 
within the economics profession opened much of the space for subsequent political debate. 
8.3.2 The Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the Clinton Administration 
In the Chapter on Korea, I suggested that the US Treasury had been heavily involved in negotiating 
the Korean programme. It should be little surprise, then, that figures from the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve were strongly supportive of the IMF. A huge amount of effort went in to persuading 
Congress to agree the quota increase12. 
Early statements echoed IMF diagnosis of the crisis blaming domestic policy in Asia, particularly 
moral hazard and lack of transparency. Greenspan was particularly triumphant 
My sense is that one of the consequences of this Asian crisis is an increasing awareness in the 
region that market capitalism.. . as practiced in the West, especially the United States, is the 
superior model ... The IMF's current approach in Asia is fully supportive of the views of those in the West who understand the importance of greater reliance on market forces, reduced 
government controls, scaling back of government-directed investment, and embracing greater 
transparency (Greenspan, 1998b). 
Rubin was also keen to stress the potential advantages to the US, citing `critical economic and 
national security interests' in Asia and pointing out that `the recent IMF programmes in Asia 
involved significant market-opening and structural reform measures' (Rubin, 1998). Others were 
even less subtle talking about the IMF as a `battering ram for US interests' (Kanter, cited in Kapur, 
1998,115). The Treasury placed a short note on its website pointing out the extent of US Trade 
with various Asian countries. 
12 Baker quotes Treasury officials as saying that rasing with Congress took up 50% of their time rather than the 
normal 25% (Baker, 2002). A series of documents designed to explain to Congressmen why they should fund the 
IMF appeared on the Treasury website and officials addressed a We range of committees from banking (Geithner, 
1998) to agriculture (Rubin, 1998). 
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Congressional concerns about backlash in Asia were dealt with by stressing the extent to which the 
crisis itself, rather than the IMF, was responsible for political problems, so the IMF's intervention 
in Indonesia was 
a creative response to the crisis, not a cause. The IMF program did indude difficult measures, 
but implementing difficult measures is always necessary in restoring financial stability (Rubin, 
1998) 
On transparency and accountability, speakers emphasised the degree of control that Treasury was 
able to exercise over the Fund13. Various people in the Committee hearing suggested that the 
problem was not the degree of US influence but that some Congressmen had a problem with the 
way that influence was being exercised - echoing the concerns I raised in section 8.1.3. 
In relation to left-wing concerns, they pointed to pro-poor measures in IMF programmes (Rubin, 
1998, Lissakers, 1998) and argued that, whilst they had pressed for more movement on core labour 
rights, consensus had been against them (Geithner, 1998; Lissakers, 1998). 
Finally on moral, hazard, Treasury officials acknowledged the issue but stressed the difficult nature 
of the choices involved. Letting matters take their course implied a small but significant chance of 
serious consequences for the US economy (Greenspan, 1998b). More concerted efforts to involve 
the private sector such as work-out procedures or standstills risked impairing developing country 
market access and systemic instability as foreign investors became even more nervous of emerging 
markets than they were already (House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 1998). 
8.3.3 Beyond the Beltway 
The issue of IMF funding is not likely to arouse much interest amongst the American public as a 
whole but did raise concerns amongst a narrower attentive public. I have already discussed some of 
the views appearing in the financial press in Chapter 1,5 &7 and these give some indication of 
views circulating in the business and financial community. I have also talked about the range of 
interests that were invited to provide Congressional testimony (business groups, financial 
practitioners, labour representatives and some Southeast Asian NGO activists). 
It is perhaps worth noting, though, that there was little development NGO lobbying about the 
Asian crisis. This is one point at which it is important to re-emphasise the particular nature of issues 
involved in capital account crises. They are primarily issues about appropriate economic policy, 
though welfare effects are important. NGOs are better placed to contribute in debates over the 
PRGF and approaches to that and the HIPC initiative are clearly very different14. Nonetheless, 
13 Lissakers, Geithner and Dawson (an ex USED) all made this point (House Banking Oversight Subcommittee, 
1998). 
14 So, for example, policymakers involved in the debates couldn't tell me about any NGO involvement. Jean-Made 
Griesgraber, an experienced lobbyist on Fund issues now working for Oxfam US told me that she had not been 
involved at all. There was some suggestion that Friends of the Earth US had been involved in lobbying over deforestation in Indonesia but I uncover no further NGO input. Treasury officials also complained that they had 
found it difficult to get feedback for the upcoming conditionaGty review. On HIPC, pressure for debt cancellation 
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prior NGO views on structural adjustment remain influential in colouring Congressional debates n 
the Fund. 
The other major indication of the public mood on these issues was provided by the growth of mass 
anti-globalisation protests first at Seattle and then at other international economic meetings 
including the Washington annual meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions. This scale of social 
protest had not been seen in the US for many years and raised significant anxieties even within the 
Treasury. However, protests were difficult to interpret since the protestors came from a range of 
different groups with different aims from environment and labour groups to anti-debt development 
campaigners and its direct effect on political debates around IMF reform is hard to assess's. 
Perhaps indicative is a paper published by key Clinton aides in Foreign Affairs prior to the 2000 
presidential election. The article is called `New world, new deal: a democratic approach to 
globalisation'. It acknowledges an `emerging backlash against globalization in the United States' but 
blames it on domestic factors: `rising income inequality, job insecurity in a rapidly changing and 
harshly competitive environment, and a sense of powerlessness and uncertainty about the future'. 
The solution is `policies to sustain America's expansion and give Americans the tools they need in 
the global marketplace'. In practice that means lifelong education, health care and social safety nets. 
In other words the solution is largely a domestic one of paying more attention to policies that 
compensate for globalisation's ill-effects in the hope that that will head off pressure about more 
international issues (Bowman Cutter et al., 2000). 
8.3.4 Negotiations and legislative outcomes 
The debates in Congress went on through much of 1998. Those opposing the IMF had particularly 
strong incentives to raise the publicity of the debate and went to considerable lengths to attract 
media attention16. 
However, during interviews I carried out in Washington it emerged that there was never any real 
doubt that the quota increase would ultimately be passed'7. The Republican House leadership knew 
that the issue was very important to the Clinton administration18. On the other hand, delaying the 
issue was unlikely to do them much electoral damage19. They therefore raised continuous objections 
in committee debates and used their majority status to delay any vote on the floor of the House in 
the hope of obtaining concessions on other issues. Mainstream opinion in Congress, though, was 
apparently persuaded that bailing out Asia was good for American jobs and for more general 
organised through the Jubilee network has been enormously significant. Post-crisis attempts to raise the issue of 
debt workouts have attracted less public attention (see Chapter 9) 
15 For a variety of academic interpretations of the significance of events in Seattle see Millennium Volume 29 No1 
16 Confidential interview with staff reporting to key anti-Fund Congressman autumn 2000 
"A view expressed by pro and anti-IMF politicians, Congressional staff (committees and reporting to particular 
Congressmen)and Jim Orr at the Bretton Woods Committee 
'8 Clinton made this clear in his 1998 State of the Union address and other interviews 
19 Even the most committed anti-IMF Congressmen agreed, in author interviews, that their constituents weren't 
really interested 
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relations with the region, particularly in the context of an IMF programme that promised 
considerable market opening. 
Nonetheless, dissenting interests did need to be assuaged and the final legislation, passed as part of 
the broader 1999 foreign spending appropriations act, contained a wide range of issues for the US 
ED to address. Some of these measures were directed at safeguarding the wishes of existing IMF 
supporters20. So the legislation called for the IMF to promote market-oriented reform, trade and 
financial sector liberalization, independent central banks, anti-trust law, bankruptcy legislation, 
better financial sector supervision, and more privatisation. More specifically, it also called for 
`opening of markets for agricultural products, and an end to Korean credit for the steel and semi- 
conductor industries demonstrating the power of US industrial lobbies to influence Congressional 
debate. 
For sceptics on the left there were attempts to ensure that the IMF included core labour standards 
and environmental issues in its programmes. The Fund was asked `to the maximum extent feasible 
to discourage practices which may promote ethnic or social strife' (presumably a reference to 
Indonesia). The Fund was to prevent military expenditures and `show case' projects and encourage 
investment in human capital and social programmes to protect the neediest and promote social 
equity. Finally it was to tailor its policies better to country circumstances and `recognize that 
inappropriate stabilization policies may only serve to further destabilize the economy' (echoing 
macroeconomic criticism). 
Domestically significant, there were a number of measures designed to enhance the IMF's 
accountability to Congress, which was the key point of agreement between the various sceptical 
factions. Treasury was asked to provide regular reports to Congress on its success in promoting the 
objectives of the legislation and the USED was instructed to press for greater IMF transparency 
and release of further data. The legislation also established an `International Financial Institution 
Advisory Committee' to investigate the possibility of future reform of all three Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
The other key issue on which critics were united, moral hazard, also received attention. Here, 
though, the wording was somewhat contradictory, with some measures concentrating on involving 
creditors in crisis resolution and others on greater surveillance in the interests of prevention. The 
USED was to 'vigorously promote policies that aim at appropriate burden-sharing by the private 
sector' but when it came to details this included a mixed bag of proposals. Measures ranged from 
`intensified consideration of mechanisms to facilitate orderly workout mechanisms for countries 
experiencing debt or liquidity crises' at the anti-banking end of the spectrum to calls for better 
20 In fact, many of these provisions simply asked Treasury to press the Fund to do things it has always done 
anyway - their purpose seems to have been to draw Congressmen's attention to what the IMF does actually 
achieve. So, for example, the USED was to ensure that the Fund would 'promote policies and actions that will 
contribute to exchange rate stability and avoid competitive devaluations that will further destabilize the international 
financial and trade systems' (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1999 s. 610 (1) 
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surveillance and more information provision to the private markets at the other. It was noticeable 
though that the wording was mandatory for the prevention side but only required consideration of 
more anti-creditor measures (orderly debt workout mechanisms, sharing clauses in bond contracts, 
making the private sector pay for crises, and greater lending into arrears). 
At the end of the day, then, the IMF quota increase was passed with an enormous range of 
conditions attached that appeared to incorporate the concerns of almost all interested parties. The 
question, then, was what effect they would have in practice 
8.4 Outcomes and analysis: understanding Treasury policy 
after the crisis 
Treasury responses can be assessed on the basis of the various reports to Congress that the 
legislation required (US Treasury, 2000a; US Treasury, 2000b) and the views articulated by Larry 
Summers on necessary IMF reforms (Summers, 1999). 
8.4.1 Treasury policy after the crisis 
In the previous sections we saw that Congressional concerns included: the cost of the crisis; IMF 
accountability; and a variety of social issues. The legislation also mandated the establishment of an 
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission to report to Congress on reform of the 
Fund and the various multilateral development banks including the World Bank. 
The legislation designed to reduce costs of financial crisis included measures promoting both better 
prevention and less costly cure of financial crises. The prevention measures involved endorsement 
of the kinds of regulatory reforms the IMF had mandated in Asia such as better domestic 
bankruptcy legislation. They also included measures that followed very closely the stress on data 
provision and policy transparency that had been pushed after the Mexican crisis (Kenen, 1996) but 
this time with greater emphasis on surveillance over the capital account and financial sector. 
With Treasury support, those issues all became part of the IFA reform process. The IMF, together 
with a variety of other bodies set about establishing a series of `standards and codes' for everything 
from release of government fiscal data to international corporate accounting standards. With 
Treasury support, there were a number of moves to extend IMF surveillance to include Financial 
Sector Stability Assessments (FSSAs) and Reports on Standards and Codes (ROSCs) in an attempt 
to prevent future crises. The Treasury pressed hard for these to be published in the interests of 
transparency and market discipline (Summers, 1999) but, as we will see in Chapter 9, there was 
strong developing country resistance. 
When it came to the issues mandated for `consideration' though, progress was rather more limited. 
Specific proposals in the legislation included sharing clauses in sovereign bond contracts, more 
willingness to lend into arrears', and linking provision of assistance to the willingness of creditors 
to provide significant contributions and participate in crisis resolution. The Treasury reports to 
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Congress endorsed all of these as a good idea but did nothing to promote them. So, for example, 
there had been calls for collective action clauses in bond contracts after Mexico but it had become 
clear that developing countries would not implement them for fear that they would be penalised on 
cost, unless developed countries took the lead. The Treasury, however, refused point blank to 
consider suggesting such a move in the US: 
we have become convinced that it is not appropriate for the official sector to mandate the 
terms of debt contracts between countries and their creditors (Summers, 1999) 
On broader private sector participation in rescues, the Treasury insisted on 'voluntary market-based 
approaches' on a case by case basis, avoiding any formal requirements. It reiterated the standard, 
but contradictory, principle that `creditors should bear the consequences of the risks they assume, 
while not undermining the equally essential principles that debtors should honour their obligations 
and that the IMF should not encourage default'. cbid). It would only be in exceptional cases that a 
Korean type solution would be adopted and in more severe cases still that the IMF would consider 
lending into arrears, though this was not ruled out completely. Instead the focus was to be on 
encouraging better `dialogue' between debtors and their creditors. 
On IMF accountability there were some positive moves, particularly in the domestic context. The 
Treasury agreed to provide Congress with annual reports on the implementation of the new 
legislation, potentially providing Congress with more frequent opportunities to assess Treasury 
policy within the IMF. It also agreed to press forward with increasing IMF transparency. However, 
interestingly, this was largely converted into pressure for more release of IMF documents, 
particularly to the markets. What had started as a Congressional desire for more information on 
IMF deci. rion-making had become a reason to use the Fund as a supply of free data to the US financial 
markets in the interests of better market discipline. At the same time it was partly legitimated on the 
basis of good governance 
we are learning that transparency and the closely related issues of governance and corruption 
are fundamental to maintaining financial stability (Summers, 1999) 
On the need to prevent ethnic strife, ensuring fiscal policy was focussed on investment and on the 
appropriateness of Fund policy to the country concerned, the Treasury simply called attention to 
pre-existing Fund policy - the development of the PRGF and increased attention to social safety 
nets in Fund programmes. Though, to be fair, some Congressional opposition did seem to have 
taken limited note of the greater attention paid to safety nets by the Fund in the 1990s. If pressure 
didn't promote an immediate extension it at least sent strong messages that any retrenchment 
would be politically difficult. Treasury did seem to be pushing the Fund on labour and (to a lesser 
extent) environmental issues but that met with strong resistance from the Fund's developing 
country members who have long seen these issues as covert US protectionism. 
The IFIAC, mandated under the legislation materialised as a republican dominated committee of 
economists and policy makers under Alan Meltzer. The main motivation behind the report seems 
to have been to concentrate on reducing the costs of IMF lending and the amount of lending in 
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total (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, 2000). The report's aim was to 
refocus the IMF on the capital account equivalent of its original role, but without any attempt at re- 
establishing symmetry. The Fund should provide short-term, low conditionality assistance to 
emerging market economies, pulling out of its relationships with poorer countries. Lending should 
be at penalty rates to prevent IMF resources substituting for private Funds. Rather than relying on 
conditionality, countries would be asked to pre-qualify for assistance on the basis of compliance 
with a set of rigid rules. The OECD countries would be given the chance to opt out of surveillance. 
The administration rejected most of the proposals on the grounds that they were largely impractical 
(US Treasury, 2000c) but there was growing advocacy of more expensive Fund facilities with rates 
rising as the term of the loan increased to provide incentives for `graduation' (Summers, 1999). The 
Fund also adopted the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) which would work on very much the Meltzer 
principles. Countries with `good policies' could sign up for automatic access to a relatively 
expensive facility to protect them against contagion. 
Not directly related to the Congressional legislation, but reflecting broader criticisms of the Fund, 
the Treasury called for a readjustment of the IMF quota system to better reflect countries' true 
economic strength. It began to acknowledge more publicly that some short-term prudential capital 
controls on the Chilean model might be appropriate. Finally, it also called for efforts to focus 
conditionality more tightly. Although the logic that over extensive conditionality was problematic 
and potentially counterproductive seemed to have been taken on board, the impulse to pursue US 
policy preferences still seemed hard to resist. 
The basic principle is clear. programs must be focused on the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for restoring stability and growth. Intrusion in areas that are not related to that goal 
carries costs that exceed the benefits, and may undermine the legitimacy of the IMPS advice. 
But the stability of banking systems, issues of social cohesion and inclusion, and the capacity to 
enforce contractual arrangements - these will all, in many cases, be critical to restoring 
confidence, and they can and should be addressed as a condition for IMF support. (Summers, 
1999). 
8.4.2 Analysis 
There is a high degree of broad-based support in the US political establishment for much of the 
IMF approach. There is considerable overlap between IMF policy and the US free market, anti- 
government political culture. The idea of the developmental state that was of such concern to 
academics and some Asian leaders was barely even mentioned in Congressional debates. To the 
extent that country autonomy was an issue, it was debated in terms of possible social resentment 
for the outcome of policies that were perceived to be dictated by the United States. It was a matter 
of issues about security and implementation. Even left wing critics were more inclined to add new 
goals to IMF intervention than they were to question the range of its operations. 
Major objections came from the isolationist or free market right and the anti-globalisation left. The 
messages the US political elite took from the Asian experience were about: the financial costs of 
crisis and sometimes about how they were distributed; the social costs in direct welfare terms; and 
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some concern that the IMF was promoting a globalisation agenda. The possibility that various 
forms of government intervention (such as those associated with the developmental state) might be 
advantageous was not an issue. 
The preferred solution to the primary cost issue was to pay more attention to prevention since that 
would fit with everyone's preferences and was less costly to the US. 
On crisis resolution there was movement which, as we will see in Chapter 9, converted into modest 
policy shifts on the ground. The Korean approach was officially acknowledged as a possibility and 
even lending into arrears should be considered in exceptional cases, since there was a genuine 
collective action problem in debt negotiation. But the shifts were marginal and there was resistance 
to anything that looked like sanctioning debt standstills before they were more or less de facto 
operating. The IMF was not to be allowed to interfere in crises in a way that could be seen as 
increasing the power of debtors. The right wing lobby was also pressing for more expensive loans 
on the basis that countries might want to borrow from the Fund (despite overwhelming empirical 
evidence to the contrary). 
From the left, pressure revolved around concern for the poorest. However, it tended to be directed 
through the lenses of the Western left. The macroeconomic aspects of Fund programmes were a 
target but more concerted pressure was exerted on issues such as environmental degradation and 
labour rights. Although labour rights are important, in a country like Indonesia where enforcement 
is weak and the majority of the population are self-employed or work in the informal sector they 
can be exaggerated2l. There is significant danger that the real concern on the American left is over 
developing countries undercutting US jobs. Debates on the environment have also long been seen 
by developing countries as to do with a heavily consuming North attempting to transfer the costs 
to the South. The strongest issues of concern on the US left, then, turn out also to be issues on 
which there is greatest potential for conflict of interest between the Northern and Southern poor. It 
is therefore not clear how much prospect there is for a truly global anti-globalisation movement. 
Pressure for social safety nets and better investment in human capital is a more positive 
development. However, it is a difficult argument to make strongly at the Fund where the feeling is 
always that those are `development' issues and not the Fund's concern. 
More generally there is a tendency for `development' concerns in the North to be driven by NGOs 
who tend to distrust Southern states almost as much as Northern ones. There is little impetus to 
support Southern state autonomy. 
In any case, this left-wing pressure seems to have been difficult to translate into change in Treasury 
policy. As I said in section 8.1.4, legislative provisions are a relatively blunt instrument. Unless 
policies can be precisely specified, there is the danger that existing policies will simply be 
redescribed in more Congress friendly terms. This is particularly noticeable in relation to 
transparency but provisions about country appropriateness and avoidance of social strife were also 
21 See, for example (Pangetsu & Henytio, 1997) 
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met with Treasury assurances about the continuing importance of safety nets but little visible 
change in policy. 
Here again we see the importance of financial ministry contacts with the Fund in filtering domestic 
political concerns. Issues that attract particularly strong public support such as labour rights and the 
environment are capable of making an impact on policy but more marginal issues are relatively 
easily ignored. 
What is most striking about the final Treasury position is the extent to which it conforms with an 
expanded version of the responses to the Mexican crisis. Increasing recognition of the costs of 
financial crises was able to shift the debate at the margins (more discussion of crisis resolution, 
more acceptance of very limited capital controls, and the need to take into account a new set of 
crisis causes). Continuing pressure on pro-poor measures, labour and environmental issues may 
also make marginal differences and Northern NGOs clearly do have some leverage over Fund 
policy but the overall approach based on developing country reform to make emerging markets safe 
for investors remains the central thrust. 
8.5 Conclusions 
What we know about US foreign policy prior to the crisis provides strong supporting evidence for 
claims about US influence on the structural reforms in Korea and Indonesia. On the other hand, 
those measures were also congruent with pre-existing economic perspectives at the Fund. 
The Treasury remains solidly in command of US policywithin the Fund. The factors most likely to 
influence the Fund are therefore those most likely to influence Treasury. Economic opinion is 
important but so too are the views of Wall Street and the US financial markets. 
There is scope for Congressional influence at the margins but it requires concerted political 
pressure. Issues that spread into the domestic arena such as labour rights and the environment were 
able to influence a Democrat administration to some degree. Some concerns were also expressed 
about the negative economic effects of IMF programmes, particularly on the poor. 
Overall, though, indications about the likely effects of enhancing IMF accountability to wider 
interests than simply the Treasury are not wholly positive from a developing country point of view. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that one argument in favour of limited accountability was that international 
negotiators are more aware of the need for international compromise than domestic populations. 
There were few signs that Congress was considering how developing country governments would 
feel about being told to implement particular policies. They were more interested in making sure 
that the policies were `right', reinforcing the Fund's technocratic bias. 
Concerns about development (rather than simply US interest) were voiced but they were concerns 
driven largely by an NGO and often US-centric viewpoint. That coloured the kinds of issues that 
were raised. On the whole they were issues about ends rather than means - about the importance 
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of poverty or labour rights rather than about how such things could be achieved. In contrast, 
Mahathir's criticisms (for example) were more often about means - about the right to choose 
particular kinds of development policy. That meant that developing country states can expect little 
support for many of their goals. It also left the way open for the Treasury to use its claims to 
economic expertise to evade some of the intent of the legislation passed. Treasury reports could 
point to the wish to foster growth and the existence of social safety net programmes as answers to 
Congressional stipulations about programme appropriateness and poverty focus. 
In any case, those left wing approaches were very much the minority. Far more time was devoted to 
witnesses from American industry who were keen to promote more market opening - the farm 
lobby, the steel lobby, the paper lobby and the semiconductor lobby. There is no reason to expect 
that to change in the near future. 
That goes some way to explaining the limited final outcomes from the debates over IMF funding. 
There was broad based concern about the costs of crisis but the strength of financial and business 
interests succeeded in turning this into an issue about crisis prevention. While faith in the possibility 
of preventing crisis through more transparency and better policy persists it will be difficult to force 
movement on the issue of private sector bail-ins (despite the potential for that to be a issue on 
which Asian governments and the Western left might potentially unite). 
There is some evidence that concern about implementation and developing country resistance was 
filtering into Treasury positions - most obviously in calls for more tightly focussed conditionality. 
There was less evidence, though, of awareness of that issue in Congressional debates. My personal 
interviews with left wing Congressmen suggest that they would rather the IMF didn't exist at all but 
that, since it does, they see pushing for the `right' kind of conditions in addition to market based 
ones as the best available strategy. The overall dynamic, then, was one of ever increasing pressure 
for wider programmes. 
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9 Lessons, reforms and prospects 
The thesis began with three questions: what caused the Fund's post-Asia legitimacy crisis, why were 
subsequent reforms so limited and what does an explanation of that paradox tell us about the 
politics of Fund policy-making and the sustainability of post crisis reforms. We have now reviewed 
most of the evidence required to answer those questions with the exception of a review of the post 
crisis reform process. 
This chapter will draw together the lessons provided by the case studies about the reasons for 
challenges to IMF legitimacy and the extent to which those challenges were transformed into 
political pressure for reform. It will then review the reform process in that light, evaluate it and 
discuss the future prospects for Fund legitimacy. 
9.1 Lessons 
In Chapter 11 argued that analysing Fund legitimacy involved two stages: an exploration of the 
reasons the Fund could provide countries with for compliance with its policies and a more political 
examination of the strategic reasons particular key actors might have for challenging those reasons 
combined with the resources they could bring to support those challenges. I argued that the Asian 
crisis therefore needed to be seen in the context of wider debates about the changing nature of 
Fund legitimacy claims and that historical comparisons would help to illustrate the issues involved. 
This section begins with a reminder of the historical context in which the crisis took place. It goes 
on to explore the logical implications of the crisis in terms of IMF legitimacy claims and, finally, 
relates those logical debates to the incentives, interests, and political resources of particular actors 
to gain an understanding of the political nature of the Fund's legitimacy crisis prior to my 
discussion and assessment of the reform process in sections 9.2 and 9.3 
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9.1.1 The historical context 
As Louis Pauly (1997) has shown particularly clearly, it has never been right to conceive of the 
Fund as equivalent to a state, able to exercise coercive power to perform most tasks it feels are 
appropriate. States have always been reluctant to delegate power to the Fund although they have 
ultimately felt that it was necessary to do so in order to provide some political control over the 
international aspects of the global economy. The Fund's ability to influence matters has been 
correspondingly limited and dependent on state cooperation. Over time, developed country states 
have become increasingly unwilling to delegate that power and the Fund has become more 
concerned with helping middle-income countries adjust to international financial conditions than it 
has with regulating those conditions. 
Initially the Fund was created as a bargain between a creditor US and debtor European countries. 
The Great Depression and its consequences had concentrated the minds of the international elite 
on the potential economic and political consequences of unfettered market mechanisms. The Fund 
was designed to moderate the ill effects on countries most likely to have to adjust to international 
conditions - debtor countries - in the interests of preserving the legitimacy of the system as a 
whole. However, even in a context of post-War reconstruction, and later cooperation against a 
common enemy, there were distinct limits to how far creditor countries were willing to go to 
legitimate free trade and the monetary conditions required to support it. 
The experience of 1970s stagflation served to undermine the kind of Keynesian consensus (or in 
political terms the concept of `embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1983)) that underpinned the post war 
settlement. Industrial countries have become more tolerant of financial flows and more willing to 
adjust their economic management to financial preferences (Helleiner, 1994). That has created a 
very different international economic environment that the Fund has had to adapt to. 
Developing countries were not a party to the initial Fund negotiations and have never had enough 
political power to significantly affect these kinds of global trends. They have always been in the 
kind of debtor position that the Europeans faced in 1942 but without the accompanying political 
power. It is not surprising, then, that it has been easier to see Fund membership for developing 
countries as a choice from an unattractive set of alternatives rather than anything more enthusiastic. 
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that there were benefits relative to the historical 
alternatives. Adjustment has been consistently disruptive but, as we saw in Chapter 2, that has 
always been the case for developing countries. At least under the Fund regime there was the double 
screen of sanctioned devaluation and IMF financing to ease the burden even if there was a price to 
pay in terms of conditionality. The existence of an institution such as the IMF at least implied a 
political acknowledgement that adjustment was a global problem and held out the hope of causing 
some political embarrassment to states in control of the financial centres. 
Over time, however, the rise of international capital flows has made the bargains involved more 
problematic. Developing countries have lost any hope of attracting European allies in attempts to 
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ensure that the system remains one of reciprocal obligations (as they were able to do in the 1970s). 
The amount of finance the Fund provides is far less significant relative to the volume of 
international trade, let alone capital flows. 
The kind of financial volatility that Triffin argued was characteristic of `peripheral' countries' pre- 
War experience has gradually reappeared (see Triffin, 1964 and page 33 above). The responsibility 
to adjust to that volatility in developing countries cannot wholly be denied but, with the breakdown 
of the kinds of universal legal obligations that ensured some political regulation of financial 
relationships globally during the Bretton Woods period the burden is no longer shared in any 
significant way by developed countries. Historical experience suggests that while developing 
country policy may be better or worse at dealing with fluctuations in capital flows, those 
fluctuations are unlikely to disappear regardless of how well developing countries manage their 
econonues. 
The Fund response has largely been to come up with ever more elaborate policies that are regarded 
as essential for developing countries if they are to ensure continuing successful integration into the 
international financial system. In the 1980s, there was a disproportionate faith in markets' ability to 
regulate themselves and measures tended to concentrate simply on reducing state intervention. 
Failures in Africa and, more compellingly in Eastern Europe, led to a `rediscovery' of institutions 
within the economics profession, and particularly by development economists, in the run up to the 
Asian crisis. 
Immediately prior to the crisis, then, the Fund's role had evolved significantly from the one 
envisaged at Bretton Woods. Rather than providing political regulation of macro-economic 
relations between states, the Fund had become an intermediary between developing countries, 
minimally regulated international financial markets, and the states in which those markets were 
based. Since capital flows (unlike the current account) are responsive to a wide range of issues, the 
Fund's mandate in developing countries had expanded considerably and it was increasingly 
involved in regulating matters mithin as well as between states. 
Over the 1990s, this situation began to look particularly problematic. Shifts in economic 
knowledge and practice began to emphasise the need for the appropriate institutional management 
of economies at a domestic level. That domestic management was to take particular forms 
conditioned largely by the lack of any regulation over capital flows at an international level: a 
distinctly inconsistent position, in technical (if not political) terms. 
As I argued at the end of Chapter 3, this was highly problematic in the context of the relationship 
between the Fund's role and its institutional structures. Originally, the Fund's decision-making 
bodies had been designed to deal with narrow technical issues within the context of a framework of 
reciprocal legal obligations agreed between states. By the time of the crisis, it was dealing with a far 
wider range of issues in developing countries and Executive Board discretion seemed to be subject 
to few legal restraints. Executive Board authority, in turn, had become more problematic because 
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developed countries had the majority of votes but were highly unlikely to have to bear the 
consequences of decisions about conditionality. Board authority had always been less secure than 
legal rules agreed on the basis of sovereign equality but was now more suspect than ever. The Fund 
was therefore increasingly reliant on technocratic justifications for its authority, since it did not 
matter who made that sort of decision so long as it was correct. Paradoxically, at the same time, it 
was becoming increasingly involved in issues with significant social and political consequences that 
were in fact difficult to legitimate in this way. 
From a Fund point of view, that was an inevitable consequence of the need to adapt to a changing 
global economy. For all practical purposes, the position was simple: developing countries wanted 
finance and the Fund's job was to explain how to get it by harnessing market confidence. `For all 
practical purposes' was a fair description for the Fund itself to adopt but the authority of market 
discipline was ultimately the result of industrial countries' political choices to undo the Bretton 
Woods work of controlling capital flows. The Fund may not have been able to alter the situation 
but its leading shareholders could have. 
In terms of my four part conception of Fund legitimacy, then, at the eve of the crisis: 
1. The Fund's role had become less obviously advantageous to developing countries. The 
Fund provided some assistance in the event of crisis but fewer reassurances that crises 
would be reduced through international market regulation. Its policies were more 
domestically intrusive than they had been in the past. Developed countries were 
conscious of the costs of crisis resolution but less aware of the benefits they gained in 
terms of the legitimacy of the system 
2. The Fund's legal mandate no longer provided much support for its activities in 
developing countries: it had failed to keep pace with the expansion of conditionality 
and the adoption of a capital account agenda 
3. The authority of the IMF's decision-making bodies was increasingly only justifiable on 
the basis of their technical authority 
4. Consent to the Fund's legal framework continued to provide a baseline of legitimacy. 
Formal consent to Fund programmes was also an important factor but it was also 
undermined by the practice of government scapegoating, suggesting that consent had 
not really been freely given. 
In the absence of secure political or legal authority, Fund legitimacy was essentially based on two 
overlapping bargains: one with developed countries in which the need to provide finance was 
traded for the opportunity to secure trade and investment opportunities in emerging markets; and 
another with developing countries where the desire for rapidly increasing flows of private finance 
was traded against the danger of extensive policy conditionality. The first bargain was fragile 
because of the potential for non-implementation of Fund programmes and the second was fragile 
because the Fund's institutional structures did not provide much confidence that it would be 
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implemented fairly. Nonetheless, the combination of the promise of rapidly expanding capital flows 
and a high degree of convergence in economic understanding within academia, policy making 
circles, and developing country states seemed to be holding the bargains together prior to the Asian 
crisis. 
9.1.2 The crisis and the normative basis of IMF legitimacy 
For Mahathir at least, as we saw in Chapter 7, the crisis provided new information about the nature 
of the underlying bargains and suggested the need for a reassertion of political authority over 
market preferences. For others, favouring the status quo (Chapter 8), that is exactly the wrong 
conclusion to draw. 
The debates essentially revolve around the balance between the potential advantages technical 
decision-making has in its scope for objectively compelling authority on the one hand and the need 
for political control in the interests of legitimacy on the other. 
Over time, the Fund's role has shifted in the direction of technical reactions to free capital markets 
rather than political control over those markets. That has increasingly meant that the Fund assists 
states to adjust to capital flows: its technical authority is conceived in terms of telling countries what 
the markets want. The best justifications for that move are the utilitarian judgement that markets 
are welfare enhancing and the liberal judgement that state interference in the market should be kept 
to a minimum since markets can be a largely self-regulating sphere of individual freedom within 
liberal society untarnished by the problems of irrational political struggle. 
Paradoxically, what the markets want (if the IMF is right at least) is increasingly a particular kind of 
`technical' and `neutral' institutional regulation. This rediscovery of institutions in development 
economics though makes the self-organising freedom of the markets look a good deal less free than 
it might have appeared in the 1980s. The Asian financial crisis also dramatically illustrated the 
weakness of claims that the markets were rational welfare enhancers, even, as we saw in the 
introduction, to many market friendly economists. Indeed it caused a more general crisis in the 
technical economic consensus that had been so important in securing IMF legitimacy in the 1980s. 
Traditional crises respond to traditional medicine. We know how to diagnose them and how to 
treat them... the problem for the future will be how to cope instead with "high-tech" crises 
with a dominantly financial as opposed to macro-economic component.. . and it is much less 
obvious how to deal with these... problems (Eichengreen, 1999a, p3). 
For critics, those technical difficulties provided strong reasons for interpreting the Fund's technical 
neutrality as tainted with political bias. The crisis also showed how socially and politically intrusive 
I That claim ultimately relies on the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics which shows that, under certain 
conditions, free markets are welfare maximising. At least since Keynes, economists have acknowledged that various 
kinds of information problem raise questions about the applicability of the theorem in the context of financial 
markets. Until the crisis the consensus in the economics profession was that derogations from the relevant 
conditions were an unimportant peripheral problem. Since the crisis, that has been a harder position to maintain. 
For a dear presentation of the technical arguments, see (Stiglitz, 1994). For some more normative and ethical 
aspects see (O'Neill, 1998; Sen, 1987). 
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the imperative of adjusting to free markets could be, at least if the Fund was correct in its diagnosis, 
and the danger of crisis itself raised questions about whether the costs were worthwhile. 
For Mahathir the solution is to reassert political control over financial markets and domestic 
economic policy through: Fund retrenchment; greater regulation of capital flows in source 
countries, or failing that domestic capital controls; and /or greater developing country 
representation within the IMF. 
For the Fund and G7 it is to further strengthen the Fund's technical authority. Here interests or 
ideological conviction imply continuing faith in financial markets and the costs of flouting the 
markets are too high to contemplate. The problem in Asia was bad policy driven by politicisation, 
particularly authoritarian attempts to cling to power through patronage. 
Mahathir's position rests on a diagnosis of market failure, technical failure and IMF political bias. 
The Fund's, curiously, seems to rest most powerfully (though often implicitly) on liberal claims 
about the dangers of state intervention in the markets in limiting the potential for civil society 
resistance to authoritarianism. These are tied up with technical claims too about the negative 
efficiency consequences of rents and rent seeking, but as I argued in Chapter 4, the technical claims 
are far less compelling and, as we saw in Chapters 5,6 and 7, the arguments keep coming back to 
the explicitly political issues of patronage and corruption (or social and industrial policy depending 
on one's views). 
To me the blurred distinctions between technical, political and liberal based normative authority 
leave the Fund in a politically untenable position that springs from an inaccurate identity of 
democracy and liberalism. For the Fund, the fact that democracy and liberalism are both opposed 
to arbitrary authority makes them identical. Liberal preferences are therefore both economically 
necessary and politically desirable. In reality the relationship is far more paradoxical (Beetham, 
1999). Democracy does require elements of liberal support: without liberal rights such as freedom 
of speech and of association and, particularly, the independent basis of power that free economic 
power can provide, there is a danger that the state will become too powerful. In the economic sphere, 
though, there are distinct contradictions between liberal lairieZfairr preferences and the social 
aspects of democratic control. Democratic values need only suggest that a balance needs to be struck 
over how much the state regulates economic life. Ultimately that remains the position on both sides 
of the debate but the issue is where the balance should be struck. Mahathir accepts that markets are 
important but believes they need to be better regulated in the interest of other values and social and 
political goals. The US Treasury would acknowledge the right to political self-determination and 
democratic control but is also concerned to maintain market freedom. 
The desirable balance will depend on the productive benefits that a relatively free market economy 
provides relative to the social and political costs it imposes. That is a matter of values to some 
extent but is also about the costs and benefits demonstrated in practice: in terms of legitimacy it is 
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about the relationship between purpose and performance on one hand (hence the significance of 
economic debates about the crisis) and institutional authority on the other. 
The first aspect (technical benefits) is best assessed by technical experts while the second 
(evaluation relative to social and political costs) is best decided through democratic debate. The 
Fund's awareness of the importance of technical expertise is not wholly unfounded. Technical 
arguments have a role to play in making the arguments: in setting out the possibilities and the likely 
consequences of the available choices. 
On the other hand, ultimately markets serve society rather than the other way round. Where the 
limits of the `technical' are to be found cannot be determined from the technical side of the debate. 
Production is not an end in itself and other values remain legitimately important. How much the 
values of market freedom and economic efficiency are to dictate the nature of social life can only 
justifiably be a democratic and political decision. The solution is that technocratic decision-making 
needs to take place within a politically legitimate framework, both to limit technical authority and to 
ensure that it is not being used to cloak ideological and political interventions. There are good 
reasons for delegating some kinds of decisions to technical experts but the powers of those experts 
should be limited and they should be forced to account for their actions to politically legitimate 
authorities. As changes in the Fund's role have undermined the justifications for its claims to 
political authority, the Fund has lost that politically legitimate framework and its absence (at least in 
the context of the Fund's current role) is at the root of IMF legitimacy problems. 
Do the Fund's moves towards greater civil society engagement provide sufficient compensation 
then in the form of greater democratic input to programme determination? Again, the distinction 
between liberalism and democracy is important. The crisis case studies suggest that the Fund 
remains too ready to identify civil society interests with a limited state and a free market economy 
where, in fact, there was some evidence that civil society favoured at least some state intervention 
in the interests of what in both Indonesia and Korea is referred to as `economic democracy'. 
A footnote in the Fund's recent study on fostering programme ownership (which I look at in more 
detail in section 9.2) is particularly enlightening on the underlying confusion: 
The role of stakeholders outside government may in some instances be to promote narrow 
interests rather than the general welfare. The distinction between "vested interests" and "civil 
society" is critical but may be ambiguous or controversial (IMF 2001b, 20, note 7) 
A Fund policy discussion on relationships with civil society also attempts to grapple with the same 
issue by questioning how representative various kinds of NGOs in fact are (Dawson & Bhatt, 
2001). 
These IMF approaches essentially miss the point which is that civil society is not helpful for 
legitimacy because civil society groups are `representative' of the population. Representing `special 
interests' is what civil society groups do. Even the most `civil' NGOs represent special interests - 
those of the poor (or more cynically perhaps what developed country donors consider are the 
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interests of the poor). Space for civil society to articulate interests is important for legitimacy to 
ensure that voices are heard but, ultimately, those interests need to interpreted, evaluated, traded off 
against one another and converted into policy. That was what I meant when I said that there aas a 
tension between the popular and sovereign aspects of popular sovereignty back in Chapter 2 (see 
page 29). Legitimacy comes from the fact that the sovereign body that ultimately decides (usually 
the state) is itself (hopefully) legitimate and ideally accountable to those it serves. Civil society is a 
complement to legitimate institutional (state) power not a substitute for it. 
In Chapters 5&6I reviewed evidence that civil society input in practice aas confined within 
boundaries set by the IMF and perhaps (in Korea) the state. In Korea the extent to which the Fund 
rather than the Korean government was dictating policy remained unclear. Fortunately for the IMF, 
clear state support for the programme and skilful political management that stressed the aspects of 
the programme that would have broad popular appeal resulted in reasonably successful 
implementation. In Indonesia, Fund attempts to claim to speak for civil society against the state 
made implementation under Suharto highly problematic. Ile extent to which the Fund was 
choosing how it would interpret civil society preferences (if not simply imposing the will of the 
markets), combined with failure in implementation even after Suharto had been replaced suggests 
the limitations to a `civil society' based approach. Even in Korea, the chusboPs ability to question the 
politics of Fund interventions sent dangerous messages about the potential consequences of `civil 
society engagement' in other contexts. 
Ultimately, civil society engagement may, under certain circumstances which I aal discuss more 
fully in section 9.3 below, help Fund legitimacy. however, it is only as beneficial as the overall 
political framework within which it is operating. While the Fund's own political legitimacy is in 
doubt because developing country states are under-represented, greater civil society engagement 
will not ultimately resolve the Fund's difficulties because the Fund does not carry the political 
authority to do the job of interpreting civil society preferences. 
As we saw in Indonesia, if states are unwilling to implement programmes, civil society engagement 
can do little to help. Worse, there is a danger that attempts to use civil society pressure to persuade 
states of the political viability of Fund programmes has the potential to be highly 
counterproductive. Firstly, if the Fund appears to be interfering in the domestic political process in 
an attempt to secure state compliance that clearly it a violation of sovereignty. Secondly. I have 
argued that the most domestically persuasive aspects of civil society engagement in practice were 
the more political and less technical ones. There is considerable inconsistency in a position stressing 
technical authority as the reason why states should comply with IMP authority while using political 
justifications in an attempt to secure consent at a domestic level. Finally, if state responses to civil 
society pressure are restricted by the Fund's overall framework, encouraging civil society to 
articulate demands will put states in a politically difficult position. 
The potentially perverse effects of civil society engagement (from a Fund point of view) are 
particularly well demonstrated by responses to the financial crisis in Thailand. The crisis created a 
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wide movement championing 'localism' which received support even from the Thai king. World 
Bank attempts to involve civil society groups in monitoring social safety nets gave them a new 
political legitimacy and salience. These groups were able to instigate a high profile debate about 
what `good governance' should mean (or how it should be translated into That) with NGOs 
pressing an interpretation based on grassroots deliberative democracy and rural self-sufficiency2. 
For all these reasons, IMF attempts to interact with civil society are ultimately in contradiction with 
the institutional arrangements between states. Attempting to enhance domestic authority through 
governance conditionality and civil society consultation, beyond fairly narrow limits, risks 
undermining IMF relationships with states. The evidence from both Indonesia and Korea is that 
that is not a recipe for success. 
The conclusion must be that the Fund's loose emerging system of multi-level governance will not 
be adequate to legitimate the kind of power the Fund is currently exercising. If the Fund is to be in 
charge of interpreting civil society concerns, it will need to be securely accountable to developing 
country publics. Alternatively, if states are to be in charge of interpreting civil society concerns, the 
Fund will need to offer them sufficient flexibility to accommodate those concerns. If states are 
tempted to use scapegoating strategies to avoid that accommodation, the Fund will be in a better 
position to call them to account if the obligations it imposes are more clearly defined and have a 
more secure justification on the basis of either political neutrality or pre-agreed legal obligation. If 
creating such a political and legal framework is politically impossible, why should the Fund be 
confident that the policies it adopts on the basis of discretion have any chance of implementation? 
In short, the Fund's current agenda will remain subject to legitimacy challenges unless its 
institutions are reformed in a direction that provides better representation for developing country 
states. That is partly for normative reasons but it also reflects the pragmatic reality that states 
remain essential in implementing IMF programmes. 
The conclusion is very much the one reached by Peters and Pierre that I quoted on page 121 above. 
Loose systems of multi-level governance do not tell us enough about who is wielding power in 
what context to secure the legitimacy of the process where political and distributional issues are at 
stake. They are best confined to the kinds of technical issue and coordination problem that the 
Fund was originally intended to deal with. For more demanding roles, better defined systems with 
tighter legal frameworks are required. Otherwise, 
multi-level governance, while tempting and attractive in its informality and orientation towards 
objectives and outcomes rather than focused on rules and formal arrangements, could be a 
"Faustian bargain" in which core values of democratic government are traded for 
accommodation, consensus and the purported increase in efficiency in governance. (Peters & 
Pierre, 2001)3. 
2 See (Connors, 2001) and (Pasuk & Baker, 2000), where Chapters 5&8 provide discussions of high level political 
debate about good governance and the IGng's'Walking backwards into a kh/ang'speech respectively 
3 For similar conclusions see also (Hooghe & Marks, 2001) 
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9.1.3 The audiences for legitimacy claims and political pressure for 
reform 
In the introduction, I argued that politics and legitimacy were closely intertwined and that the key 
to understanding the relationship was to realise that legitimating arguments are designed to be 
persuasive to a broad audience but that what is politically important is how they play to particular 
actors at particular times in particular places. The normative arguments reviewed in the previous 
section are all very well then but what matters is not whether my analysis of the correct relationship 
between technical and political decision-making is correct but whether the consequences of what 
(to me) is a problematic position turn out to create difficulties for the Fund in practice. 
Were developing country onlookers sufficiently concerned by the nature of Fund interventions to 
offer resistance within the Fund's institutional structures? Did the level of dissent suggest to those 
favouring the status quo that future implementation was under threat? Did developed country 
interpretations of the crisis countries' experiences support that view or was the new civil society 
and good governance agenda deemed sufficiently successful to provide reassurance? If that was the 
conclusion that was drawn is it a stable one or are future crises likely to prove that it was mistaken? 
How did the political interests of relevant actors affect their propensity to adopt pro or anti-reform 
views and what does that tell us about the politics of Fund decision-making? 
On looking developing countries and dissent mithin the Fund 
We saw in Chapter 7 that Mahathir, at least, was willing to protest openly within the Fund's 
institutional structures and call for reforms in response to what he saw the Fund doing in 
neighbouring countries. For Mahathir the crisis demonstrated the Fund's pro-Western political bias 
and its willingness to interfere in domestic social and political processes both for economic reasons 
and in an attempt to secure programme implementation. That served the interests of the Fund's 
leading shareholders rather than the common good and, in more technical terms, tended to dose 
off opportunities for heterodox solutions to development problems such as those adopted with so 
much success by Korea and Japan. It was time to question the IMF's identification of the `technical' 
with the will of the markets. That is one explanation for Mahathir's personal attacks on Soros: they 
were attempts to re-personalise the `natural force' of the markets. 
What about other actors though? How much support did Mahathir receive from his developing 
country colleagues and how is that best explained? 
Mahathir certainly did receive some support but there were difficulties in establishing a unified 
front of opposition. Developing country reaction was mixed and less vocal than one might perhaps 
have expected. As Azizali Mohammed, G-24 coordinator, put it 
the sharp divergence in interests was reflected in differing approaches to financial architecture 
reform. The `emerging-market' members did not like the Group to take positions that most 
other members wanted to espouse (e. g., an international bankruptcy regime or a lender-of-last 
resort) for fear that anything that sounded radical might impair their access to private markets 
(Mohammed, 2001b, 4). 
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What factors might account for that? I reviewed the most likely explanations at the end of Chapter 
7. Other developing countries with different approaches to political economy may have been less 
threatened by IMF policy. As the consequences of Mahathir's anti-market speeches demonstrate, 
the desire for continued market access provides incentives for caution in criticising Fund policy, 
particularly around market sensitive issues such as mechanisms for the resolution of debt problems. 
In any case the fact that it is financial officials that are involved in Fund policy-making may militate 
against a full appreciation of the potential domestic consequences of Fund programmes, particularly 
since developing country EDs are relatively insulated from home governments because of the 
broad constituencies they represent. Mohammed notes a 
significant fault-line [between the G77 and G24 that] derives from the fact that the G-77 in 
New York is run by each country's Permanent Representative at the United Nations and 
reports to Foreign Ministers. The G-24 representatives at the political level are Governors of 
the IMF or the World Bank and are either Ministers of Finance or heads of Central Banks. The 
latter tend to be quite acutely aware that their pronouncements can affect their country's 
standing in private financial markets... central bankers tend to be perhaps even more `market - 
sensitive' than their Ministerial counterparts and both consider it essential to maintain 
credibility as an expert group (Mohammed, 2001b, 6). 
Developing country financiers shared economic training, then, may make them less critical of the 
Fund's liberal approach than the general public. In any case, liberal views may be quite widespread 
even within developing countries. We saw that it was only the costs of financial crisis that finally 
swung the balance away from more orthodox policy in Malaysia and that considerable sections of 
the Malaysian population continued to favour a more liberal solution. A range of political and 
technical views were possible (pro-democratic populist, pro-democratic and liberal, pro status quo 
etc. ). 
Although my research did not concentrate on the positions taken by other developing country 
officials, so comments will necessarily be fairly general, interviews with developing country 
personnel at the Fund suggest that the Latin American countries were particularly keen on market- 
based approaches to crisis resolution. That makes sense in terms of the factors I have suggested are 
important. Latin American countries had already undertaken a very public conversion to liberal 
economic management during the 1980s, in sharp contrast to the Asian traditions of economic and 
even broader political management. The threat of further financial withdrawals gave financial 
officials strong incentives to try to distance Latin America from the kinds of problems affecting 
Asia. So, for example, at an ODI meeting on the Asian crisis I attended in London, the Brazilian 
Ambassador to the UK was keen to stress the extent to which Brazil had already undertaken the 
kinds of reforms the Fund was urging in Asia. 
Nonetheless, despite a range of factors limiting developing country dissent, the crisis did trigger 
resistance to some aspects of the Fund agenda. As we will see in section 9.2, the continuing 
expansion of the good governance agenda and the absence of reciprocity in Fund regulation were 
both publicly challenged. That suggests that, even if developing country resistance is weakened in 
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areas where opposition will be market sensitive, it is likely to be easier to oppose the more political 
aspects of the Fund agenda. 
Crisis countries and the messages sent by the politics of implementation 
As I argued in Chapter 2, crisis countries themselves are usually in a poor position to influence 
Fund policy debates directly. However, the messages sent out by the crisis experience are 
important. 
In section 9.1.2, I argued that the Fund's authority claims looked problematic because: market 
confidence and finance failed to materialise; structural measures were politically intrusive; the 
Fund's relationship with civil society was more complex and problematic than it would like to 
acknowledge; and those relationships also threatened to undermine relationships with states. In the 
event, although policy implementation was broadly satisfactory in Korea, it was very weak in 
Indonesia. 
The comparison between Korean success and Indonesian failure I carried out at the end of Chapter 
6 suggested that the Fund's ambitious agenda would need a particular constellation of social forces 
if it was to be successful. As Richard Robison has put it in relation to Indonesia: 
Restructuring these regimes is no technical matter of policy fixes - of separating the `natural' 
market from the intervention of politics and vested interest or of better leadership and more 
clever policies. No less than any other, the neo-liberal agenda is embedded in coalitions of 
interest and power... [in Indonesia] the neo-liberal agenda has not been successful in 
assembling a broad and powerful political coalition (Robison, 2001,1 & 20). 
The evidence also suggested the importance of state cooperation in implementing programmes, 
further underlining the political nature of Fund interventions. Given the politics of industrialisation 
in East and Southeast Asia, an orthodox liberal market economy would not construct itself, it 
would need to be constructed as a political project. The implication is that successful 
implementation in contexts that are less favourable than Korea will require very skilful political 
management combined with a considerable degree of pragmatism. 
We have already seen the conclusions Mahathir drew from a broadly similar analysis. For him the 
conclusion was that the Fund was carrying out a deeply political agenda tainted with bias towards 
Western financial interests, masquerading as technical authority. That is significant because it 
triggered direct political pressure within the Fund and indirectly because Malaysian opposition 
suggests the potential for difficulties with programme implementation elsewhere in the future. 
In this section, though, I want to concentrate on the extent to which pro status quo interests are 
likely to share that kind of analysis. 
To a large extent, of course, they are not. If developing country finance ministers were not likely to 
pay a great deal of attention to the domestic political consequences of Fund policy unless closeness 
to crisis created more political oversight of EDs than was usual, Treasury officials in countries that 
never expect to borrow cannot be expected to be particularly sensitive. Their economic training 
militates against it as do their political interests. The need to head off attempts to enhance 
Lessons reforms and prospects 269 
developing country political control over the Fund gives Western governments incentives to 
continue trying to portray Fund interventions as technical rather than political since that reinforces 
arguments about weighted voting and, in any case, economists are simply trained to think in that 
way4. 
Still, although much of the radical literature on international economics stresses the 
disproportionate power of Western capital, the time and effort developed countries spend pressing 
their desired policies on the Fund should also emphasize how important the Fund's ability to create 
a good environment for international trade and investment is for them. Private capital markets 
don't disburse funds out of charity, they do it because emerging markets offer the potential for 
significant profits. The Fund's purpose is to legitimate open markets and that should therefore be a 
purpose valued by the developed countries. 
The systemic consequences of capital account crisis and the fact that the catalytic effect did not in 
fact materialise, regardless of the cause, should focus minds on the need to do better at reducing 
the costs of financial crisis. Mahathir's reactions, as much as the costs in developing countries, will 
have sent dangerous signals about the potential for a rebellion on capital account openness at least 
over the longer term. 
On structural policies, we have already seen how closely the Fund's policies corresponded to pre- 
existing US preferences, again suggesting likely enthusiasm for the status quo. However, even from a 
relatively self-interested point of view, there are also reasons for caution about expanding lists of 
conditions too far. There is little point in having the `right' programme if it will be impossible to 
secure implementation. In fact, if a programme is not going to be implemented, that returns 
considerable choice to the borrower government, which gets to choose which aspects of the 
programme it will ignore. 
For political purposes it was convenient to argue that non-implementation in Indonesia was about 
Suharto's inclination to devote more effort to maintaining his own political power than resolving 
Indonesia's economic crisis. The evidence though is somewhat different. Suharto seems to have 
been prepared to implement an IMF programme that was not too costly (the first programme) but 
was later put off by the failure of that programme to create market confidences. 
Even without particularly sophisticated political analysis about the potential for implementing the 
IMF's new `technical' agenda, it should be clear that the more expansive the Fund's agenda 
becomes, the more difficult it will be to implement and the more likely it is that political opposition 
will materialise. 
4 For a similar analysis of the structural constraints pressing the World Bank's management and leading 
shareholders to emphasise technical authority see (Wade, 1996) 
5 Of course, for those that see the problem as non-implementation of bank closures, rather than the closures 
themselves, that condusion might still be questioned. My response would be to point to the Fund's own 
acknowledgement of flaws in the bank closure strategies, leaked to the New York Times. 
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Of course that does raise very difficult issues. If one is convinced that the Fund's structural agenda 
is essential to support capital account openness and is in the best interests of domestic populations 
- that the problem is obstructive states and political leaders - the choice is really one between not 
lending (and risking contagion) or lending on a poor programme. However, even then a more 
pragmatic assessment of what is essential, rather than merely necessary, may enhance Fund 
legitimacy at the margins and result in a programme that is easier to get implemented. The stronger 
the normative and technical justifications the Fund can provide, as I have pointed out all along, the 
better the chance of implementation (though there are no guarantees). The failure of the market 
oriented approach to crisis resolution makes these issues all the more salient. 
In other words, even if the imperative of parsimony is something begrudged because it is seen as a 
response to the need to work with perverse and immoral states, it remains a compelling pragmatic, 
if not normative, response to the events in Asia. That is particularly so in the light of the evidence 
from the case studies suggesting that there is ultimately no alternative to working with developing 
country states. In any case, my analysis suggests that the need for parsimony is a conclusion that 
will only be reinforced over time as similar problems are discovered in different contexts: politically 
at least there are only so many developing country leaders one can condemn as wholly immoral or 
incapable. 
How much parsimony is required and how much alteration to current policies on financial crisis, 
though, will remain a matter for political debate and political struggle. Here relatively successful 
results in Korea and a tendency to see Indonesian problems as `political' and therefore beyond the 
IMF's control will be important in limiting change. The apparent success of civil society 
engagement in Korea and the political popularity of claims to have supported the Indonesian 
people against Suharto may mean that it will take longer before the limits to the civil society and 
good governance agenda are wholly appreciated. 
Of course, the Asian crisis was also particularly significant because the countries concerned were 
relatively powerful in economic terms and important strategically. That might imply that worrying 
messages will be easier to ignore in other contexts. However, the crisis also demonstrated how 
relatively isolated difficulties can escalate into systemic problems through contagion. That suggests 
that the problems will be hard to ignore indefinitely. 
If no more pragmatic compromise can be arrived at, and Fund policies cannot in fact be 
implemented, the conclusion must increasingly be that the world cannot be made safe for free 
capital flows. 
Developed countries, the status quo and domestic political challenges 
I reviewed the kinds of international factors that might influence developed country EDs in the 
direction of IMF reform in the previous section. What about the domestic political process? 
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Again, it is important to emphasize the dominance of Treasury officials in domestic political debate. 
We saw, in chapter 8, how challenging the Treasury's free market economic perspective is very 
difficult 
Concerns were raised very publicly in US debate. In particular critics on both left and right were 
worried about costs to the tax payer (although these were in fact car smaller than the debates might 
have suggested - IMF assistance comes as a loan not a gift). Congress felt that it was not 
sufficiently in control to ensure that it obtained value for money. For the free market right, the 
danger was in sending the wrong message to financial markets (though a less explicit reluctance to 
approve any foreign spending was also an issue). For the left the concern was that, since Fund 
assistance was basically seen as aid, it should not be helping the richest (financial institutions and 
conglomerates) rather than the poorest (usually seen incorrectly as labour) and the environment. If 
the Fund could ask for central bank independence, why not labour rights and environmental 
protection? 
Although these issues were raised in the media and gained credibility through backing from op-edr 
penned by highly respected economists, ultimately the nature of underlying interests meant that 
lobbying from US multi-nationals, domestic companies facing competition from "unfairly' favoured 
Korean businesses, and the US financial services industry was likely to have more political impact. 
That kind of lobbying was far more likely to re-enforce pre-existing Treasury preferences and was, 
in turn, given credibility by the Treasury's near monopoly of credible economic expertise within 
national political institutions. 
Of course all those interests still had a stake in effective crisis resolution and technical doubts about 
the effectiveness of the IMF's approach in Asia left room for economic debate about possible 
reforms to Fund policy. Economic challenges, then, do have significant potential to lead to Fund 
reform and the pragmatic issues raised in the previous section may also have been influential but 
there are also countervailing pressures. 
We also saw that the American left was not totally lacking in influence. However, the agenda 
promoted in Congress was driven by the kinds of approach championed by Northern NGOs and, 
perhaps also by the experience of social problems in the United States. Pressure for change on this 
front was therefore more likely to be in the direction of governance conditionality and civil society 
engagement than it was in the direction of greater developing country government autonomy in 
economic policy-making. The political nature of support for this kind of agenda both within 
Congress and in the context of Seattle style public demonstrations tends to mean that discussions 
about how best to harness the benefits of markets are unlikely. It is very important to note that 
there was almost no positive mention of the `developmental state' approach in political debate in 
the US. 
Instead, pressure from NGOs tends to concentrate on pressing particular values (poverty, inequality, 
environmentalism) rather than on putting forward concrete proposals for how these values are to 
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be realised (Kanbur, 2001). That makes it easier for the Treasury to subvert legislative intent by 
arguing that pre-existing policy does indeed serve those goals. On the other hand, there is some 
strategic logic to that kind of NGO pressure. If technical issues are unlikely to be changed, 
concentrating on more `positive' conditionality has a better chance of success to the extent that it 
does not undermine Treasury's own goals. In the light of my earlier arguments about the 
contradictions between a social and political agenda and IMF technical authority over states, 
though, again there are questions about how much scope there is for further movement on these 
kinds of issues. 
Left wing pressure, then, largely tends to favour issues that may be more popular with sections of 
developing country civil society than they will be with developing country states. However, there 
are still some potential areas for strategic alliance. In particular pressure for greater Fund 
transparency and political accountability can serve developing country interests to some extent. 
Just as there are differences between developing country responses to the crisis, there were also 
differences in developed country responses. Again, my research only permits some fairly general 
observations. However, it is worth pointing out that the US perspective on economic management 
is particularly liberal. European and particularly Scandinavian countries have a more interventionary 
social democratic tradition. That may well affect the intellectual environment within Treasury 
ministries. The traditional importance of development spending and development ministries within 
some of those governments may also imply a more developing country friendly tradition. Those 
cultural factors may also be related to economies where financial services are a less important part 
of the domestic economy than, for example, manufacturing concerns. 
Another factor is the institutional structuring of debate over these issues. In the US it was the need 
for Congressional approval of a funding increase that triggered domestic legislative debate. In other 
countries debates were less open to the public eye. In the UK for example, Fund policy is reviewed 
by a Treasury Select Committee. The implications are complex and difficult to specify in the 
abstract. For example, Clare Short's input to Fund policy may serve as a modest corrective to 
purely Euro centric views in the Treasury whilst in the US USAID has no input to Fund policy as 
the Fund `is not a development institution'. On the other hand, there is less scope for public input 
into the policy-making process. Within the Fund, though, public debate has important effects on 
US power. Congressmen were well aware that their public dissent could be used by the Treasury as 
a lever in Fund negotiations and more private debate in Europe reduces that kind of political 
opportunity. 
9.1.4 Conclusions 
The IMF's crisis of legitimacy sprang from a growing mismatch between its role and the nature of 
its authority. It's role had shifted from one of securing the legitimacy of market openness by 
helping states, globally, to exercise a degree of political control over financial markets into one of 
helping developing country states to adapt to the demands those markets were making on them. As 
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controls over capital flows were reduced and economic health began to depend on market 
confidence, the kinds of issues involved in adapting to the will of the markets were involving 
greater institutional change at a domestic level in developing countries while the Fund's institutional 
structures provided it with very limited claims to political authority over developing country states. 
The rapid increase in capital availability for emerging markets in the 1990s had given countries 
some reasons to accept the bargains involved but the crisis experience in Asia began at least to 
change that sanguine view. 
In section 9.1 1 argued that the kinds of interventions the Fund was involved in were increasingly 
difficult to evaluate in purely technical terms. The separation between economics and politics was 
becoming harder to maintain as markets became more demanding. It is not exactly that the IMF's 
current role contradicts state sovereignty (states retain an exit option and the kinds of regulation the 
Fund is demanding are in fact exercises of sovereignty), it is rather that the imperatives of 
adjustment to the international financial markets, as mediated by the Fund, puts pressure on states 
to exercise their sovereignty in a particularly narrow fashion. Since state sovereignty has always 
been justified ultimately in terms of efficacy, on the grounds that it is necessary in the interests of 
securing goals valued by domestic populations (Dunn, 2000), the narrowness of states' room to 
manoeuvre is threatening to their domestic legitimacy unless the economic benefits are readily 
apparent and widely distributed. 
States have increasing incentives to ask whether the restrictions placed on them by financial 
markets are really worth the benefits. Not only is adjustment more intrusive, financial flows 
themselves are more uncertain. The crises, after all, took place in countries that were previously 
regarded as good performers and the policies the Fund mandated to adjust to market preferences 
did not appear particularly effective at mobilising finance. Either that suggests that the Fund is 
doing a poor technical job (its policies were not appropriate to restore market confidence) or that 
the costs of adjustment are very high. 
Greater engagement with civil society in an effort to counter these concerns and attempts to point 
to the political-liberal, as opposed to technical, consequences of the Fund's preferred policies at a 
domestic level has had some success in diffusing the political problems involved in programme 
implementation over the short-term but is ultimately an unstable strategy. 
That is partly because of contradictions involved in the Fund's tendency to identify democracy with 
liberalism and partly because of the contradiction between using technical justifications for the 
Fund's authority over states and political justifications for its authority at a domestic level. 
If the Fund is to be more accountable to civil society, surely it should also be more accountable to 
developing country governments? A negative answer to that question must surely imply that the 
Fund and perhaps Northern NGOs are more reliable people to determine developing country 
politics than developing country governments. Put in those stark terms, it should be very clear that 
that is not an acceptable answer for a wide range of reasons (wrong incentives, limited knowledge, 
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narrow perspectives, no accountability etc. ). There may be situations in which the adequacy of 
developing country government is in doubt but there is ultimately no alternative to dealing with that 
situation through domestic political struggle (perhaps with external support). 
In more political terms, though, there are factors that stand in the way of a general acceptance of 
that pro-reform point of view. Those with greatest control over the Fund's institutions also have 
the strongest interest in maintaining the status quo. Internationally, developed countries have the 
largest voting share in the Fund and are least likely to suffer the political consequences of Fund 
programmes. Domestically, economically trained financial elites have greatest control over Fund 
policy. In any case conflicts of interest between different developing countries as competitors to 
attract finance make a united front difficult to achieve. 
Nonetheless, the logical and normative difficulties revealed in my analysis of Fund legitimacy do 
have direct political impact in that they explain some of the difficulties of programme 
implementation and account for public developing country complaints about the scope of Fund 
authority. Economic integration is a fundamentally cooperative activity and the opportunities 
emerging markets provide for developed country profit are not easily ignored. Even given 
imbalances in international political power, then, there are pressures operating on the Fund's 
leading shareholders to do something about Fund legitimacy in the wake of the crisis. 
Politically, though, the most immediate pressures do not necessarily press in the direction of greater 
flexibility for developing country states. The dominance of NGO interests goes some way to 
explaining the contradictions in the Fund's attitudes to civil society engagement. The dominance of 
developed country interests in the Fund means that it can be under more pressure to accommodate 
the views of Northern NGOs than it is to accommodate those of Southern states. That seems to be 
creating a dynamic of attempts to secure programme implementation through providing carrots to 
developing country populations in the form of more socially and politically (rather than technically) 
attractive policies rather than through amending the Fund's institutional structures in a way that 
would give greater voice to developing country governments. 
The same dynamic is also noticeable in the unstable articulation between technical and political 
aspects of the good governance agenda. The political aspects of the agenda such as transparency in 
policymaking and accountability play well with the NGO lobby and domestic society in developing 
countries and can also be explained to financial technocrats as measures that make policy more 
predictable and easier to assess for the markets. At the same time, technical measures such as 
market liberalisation and the publication of corporate accounting data can be portrayed to the 
NGO lobby as related to corporate accountability and the need to restrain state authoritarianism. 
There is a danger that this can be pushed too far though, straining the overlapping agenda and 
drawing attention to the tensions within the good governance concept. So, for example, the US 
Treasury's tendency to interpret Congressional demands for greater transparency in Fund decision- 
making as a call for more information release to the financial markets begins to make the strains 
particularly clear. 
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Although the contradiction between those approaches and the need for developed country state 
cooperation in implementation makes those moves politically unstable, they do have a certain 
political logic in the context of the Fund's current institutional structures. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that what was important about IMF legitimacy claims was how they play to 
key audiences. That discussion of the pressures favouring reform and resistance puts us in a 
position to discuss who those key audiences actually are. I argued that key audiences for legitimacy 
claims were those who were in a position to prevent the Fund from carrying out its purposes. 
We can see that there are in fact a number of audiences in that position in different ways. Executive 
Directors and, to a lesser extent Governors need to be persuaded to agree to Fund policy. That is 
important for lender countries to ensure continuing flows of finance and to borrower countries to 
ensure cooperation with conditionality. The better the level of consent to general obligations agreed 
in Fund fora, the more difficult it will be later to object to conditions imposed in the context of 
conditionality. 
The discussion of the case studies has made it particularly clear how crucial borrower country 
governments are as an audience if programmes are to be implemented. However, they have also 
suggested that, given the breadth of current Fund programmes, consent from finance ministries 
alone will no longer be sufficient to secure programme implementation. Beyond that, domestic 
populations in both types of countries are important but slightly less crucial. Their dissent is, to 
some extent, something that needs to be managed by governments but if domestic cooperation is 
threatened too much that will have an impact on governments' willingness to cooperate with the 
Fund. Domestic reactions then place a more indirect limit on legitimate Fund action. 
For many observers there is one final audience of what is often referred to as `international civil 
society': development academics, NGOs, and a variety of international protest movements. I am 
personally more inclined to see these groups as a particular kind of domestic interest since their 
influence comes most directly through the anxiety it causes domestic political actors. The 
significance of internationalism is in the extent to which the same message can be articulated in 
different contexts which is potentially important. Politically what matters is that the status of these 
groups as an `attentive public' can give them a disproportionate influence over Fund debates. For 
economists, that is particularly related to the Fund's concerns to secure its technocratic legitimacy. 
For NGOs it is related to their increasingly sophisticated advocacy skills which can have a 
significant influence on public opinion. 
The difficult question for Fund legitimacy and politics raised by this range of different audiences 
concerns where the balance is to be struck between financial stakeholders (and those that influence 
them) and stakeholders that can deliver implementation. That is not simply a normative question, it 
is also a pragmatic one about making sure that sufficient concessions are made to relevant actors to 
ensure that the institution continues to function. The Fund's institutional structures currently give it 
incentives to take more notice of finance providers and their domestic constituencies (including 
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Northern NGOs). The danger is that the result will be a tendency to be able to reach agreements 
within the institution that are not implementable outside it. That will be facilitated 
by the fact that 
representatives from implementing countries that are present are likely to be those with an 
economic and financial perspective that may be poorly suited to understanding the political 
implications of expanded Fund policy. 
Pragmatically, the actors who are able and likely to disrupt Fund programmes are unlikely to be 
sufficiently considered. Even if the resulting policies are in their interests they will have few reasons 
for believing that is so. In any case, the quality of Fund policies is likely to be impaired where 
practical considerations surrounding implementation are not taken into account. 
The question for the next section is the extent to which this mismatch between institutional 
incentives and the stakeholders whose cooperation is required has shaped the reform process and, 
therefore, whether or not that process has led to a more sustainable relationship between the 
Fund's role and its institutional makeup. 
9.2 Reforms 
The concerns about IMF authority reviewed in section 9.1 were principally about a form of 
technical authority that tended to see its role as simply facilitating the working of liberalised 
financial markets. For those inclined to challenge Fund legitimacy, pressures were therefore in the 
direction of reasserting political control. 
Looking back to the original model of the Fund created at Bretton Woods, we can imagine that 
taking place in a number of ways. Firstly, the Fund's original mandate was relatively tightly defined 
and legally enshrined in the IMF's Articles of Agreement. The crisis suggested that exactly what it 
was or was not reasonable for the Fund to do was no longer clear. A legal framework backed up by 
state consent would therefore be one potential way to bolster Fund legitimacy, particularly if it went 
some way to placing obligations on non-borrowing countries to promote global financial stability. 
Part of the Fund argument for the necessity of its structural reforms was that market confidence 
would not return without them: there was in fact little practical room for political choice about the 
extent of the Fund's mandate. The eventual need for borrower country guarantees and the 
Malaysian experience suggests that various kinds of non-market approach to crisis resolution could 
help to restore the scope for political choice. 
The second form of political control originally involved in the Fund's mandate concerned the 
voluntary nature of conditionality and states' right to negotiate and ultimately reject Fund 
programmes. How much freedom of choice states are actually given remains difficult to determine 
since negotiations go on behind closed doors. Nonetheless the uniformity of programmes in Asia 
and more public arguments in Indonesia suggest that there is not much room for flexibility. Given 
the arguments I made about the importance of state acceptance in programme implementation, 
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greater flexibility - essentially less demanding conditionality - provides another obvious avenue for 
exploration. 
In the context of conditionality, I argued that both good governance conditionality and civil society 
engagement had some potential to bridge the gap between finance ministry consent and popular 
acceptance but that they also risked undermining Fund legitimacy with state audiences. There were 
tensions that would need to be resolved through political debate. 
Finally, on the other hand, my analysis of relevant audiences for legitimacy claims suggests that 
there will also be resistance to change within the Fund. From the point of view of funding, the IMF 
will be most concerned with the opinions of a US Treasury (and perhaps other G7 Treasuries) that 
has considerable interests in keeping things as they are. The question for this section is how these 
political tensions are played out in the reform process and whether the resulting reforms are likely 
to be adequate to revitalise Fund legitimacy. How much has evidence of political strain succeeded 
in persuading dominant players of the need to move towards more robust political authority over 
financial markets at a domestic and international level? 
9.2.1 Reform debates 
Codifying the Fund's mandate: ruiveillance, standards and codes 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Fund has made an effort to codify some of the new areas that it 
has started to regulate, providing a closer relationship between conditionality and a broader set of 
permanent international obligations. 
However, from a developing country point of view, there are two difficulties with this process as it 
currently stands. Most fundamentally the new codes are `soft law'. They have not been developed 
on the basis of negotiation between sovereign states. Instead they have been developed by a series 
of `experts' under the supervision of the IMF and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). The vast 
majority of these expert bodies involve no developing country representation at 06. That raises 
obvious questions about whether the resulting codes are in fact appropriate and implementable at a 
domestic level (Pistor, 2000) and certainly about whether appropriate attempts have been made at 
prioritisation given the sheer costs of implementation for developing countries and given the other 
pressing claims on their resources (Rodrik, 1999; Rodrik, 2001b). 
In terms of policy content, it is perhaps unsurprising that the main thrust of the regulations has 
been to encourage developing countries to adapt themselves to the ways in which Western financial 
markets are accustomed to doing business. It has not looked anything like Mahathir's hopes for 
greater international control over those markets. 
G24 ministers and sympathetic economists (Akyuz, 2000; Mohammed, 2001a; Ocampo, 2001) have 
argued that while the codes do address acknowledged weaknesses in developing countries, they fail 
6 The nearest the FSF membership comes to developing countries are Hong Kong and Singapore and, indirectly, 
representatives from the Fund and Bank. Standard setting bodies include the Basle Committee, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee, and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions none of which have 
any developing country representation. (see httpl/www. fsforum. org) 
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to deal with the underlying instability in the sources of international finance. Particular targets have 
been Mahathir's old enemies the hedge funds and currency traders (G24,1997; G24,1998) but 
there is also considerable emphasis on the adverse consequences of swings in the G3 currencies7. 
In terms of the original conception of the Fund, it is interesting that the issue of adjustment 
continues to be related to the broader framework of international financial management suggesting 
that the issue of symmetry continues to hold out potential for enhancing Fund legitimacy. In that 
connection, developing countries acknowledge the contribution G7 interest rate cuts during 1998 
made to crisis recovery but note that the IMF played no part in ensuring that this took place and 
that it provides no guarantee that such help will be forthcoming in the future (G24,1999; Ocampo, 
2001) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the overall process remains controversial and that has had an impact 
on the status of the new codes, which remains unclear. The G24 have repeatedly insisted that they 
remain voluntary and only form part of surveillance where countries choose to adopt them. The US 
clearly wants to see them made compulsory and to have the results published for the benefits of the 
financial markets. 
Some within the G24 believe that, once the codes have been elaborated, they will become a de facto 
standard in any case and market discipline at least will effectively make them compulsory for 
countries wishing to attract significant private finance. There is little publicly available data on how 
much the markets in fact use IFI data so this concern is difficult to evaluate and the situation may, 
in any case, change over time if the ROSC process proves successful. Some of the issues about 
information use prior to the crisis, though, suggest that the markets (at least in the past) have not 
always taken much notice of such public sector data and a survey of US emerging market Fund 
managers provides modest indications that this may not have changeds. 
Suspicion that political agreement on a new legal framework will be difficult or impossible to obtain 
has led the Fund into pragmatic attempts to create a code on the basis of technical authority. There 
are two obvious disadvantages. The first is that the resulting code does not command the same 
kind of political authority that it could have obtained through a more satisfactory process of 
negotiation and the second is that there are few guarantees that the codes that result will be 
appropriate in developing countries since those best placed to decide have had little input in their 
formulation. 
For the more sceptical, this reliance on `soft law' replicates a pre-established pattern involving 
Every major developing country financial crisis has been preceded by significant exchange rate misalignments 
(Akyuz, 2000). In Asia it was swings in the yen-dollar exchange rate that were implicated (see section 4.1.1 
above). 
8 See also (Mosley, 2001). In a survey of emerging market Fund managers in the US, Mosley found that very few 
were more than vaguely aware of the IMF's flagship SDDS paying much more attention to the private brokerage 
houses and the international financial press. However, a survey of bond traders would have been more useful in 
relation to the SDDS and her information from credit ratings agencies suggested greater awareness. 
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the deliberate cloaking and minimisation of the role of law by States in monetary matters - 
especially in developed countries. This is manifest through the elaborate constructions of soft 
law rather than firm law that characterise IMF jurisprudence (Qureshi, 1999) 
On the other hand the codes demonstrate an awareness of the need for a global legal framework if 
Fund legitimacy is to be secured. They also present, potentially, the starting point for developing 
countries to push at the logic of that in a direction of more symmetry over the longer term, though 
the political obstacles are enormous. 
Bailing in the private sector 
Since the costs of crisis were such an important issue in triggering debate, one might have thought 
that this was an issue around which there was greatest potential common interest in a solution 
placing more pressure on private creditors to take losses. Neither developed nor developing 
countries wish to meet the costs of private sector bail-outs. 
The magnitude of the crisis did trigger significant debates about these issues and there was broad 
acceptance (even from the financial markets) that something needed to be done to promote more 
orderly debt workouts9. The problem was in coming up with any universally acceptable agreement 
on what exactly that something should be. 
There appears to have been a debate between one view emphasising the need for international rules 
about this issue and another arguing that, since every case was different, a `case by case' solution 
had to be adopted. Interestingly the fault lines were not between creditor and debtor countries but 
cut across that division. There was a preference in Canada and some European countries for more 
rules, a presumption that if Fund resources over a certain level were required private sector 
involvement would be mandatory (Mohammed, 2001a). The US was strongly opposed. Amongst 
the developing countries, Asian countries were more likely to favour rules while the Latin 
Americans (particularly Argentina) preferred a market-based solution. Similar divisions were evident 
on the question of sharing clauses in bond contracts. Such clauses were not uncommon in bond 
issues under English Law already and the UK, Canadian and German governments have all issued 
such bonds since the crisis but the US has refused to follow suit. 
The debate, of course, revolved around the potential effects of more concerted solutions on 
assessments of emerging market risk and therefore on the costs of emerging market finance. Since 
Argentina's entire development strategy was based around an attempt to reduce bond prices 
through removing government discretion over economic policy making (Rodrik) it should be no 
surprise that the Argentinian authorities were keen to minimise any potential ill effects. To the 
extent that subsequent problems were already brewing (see below) that position may also have 
reflected pre-existing concerns about the costs of government borrowing. 
A European concern with rules may reflect a greater general willingness to see regulation of 
financial markets in Europe. Differences, then, were about pmeived national interests mediated 
9 See for example comments by Robert Gray of HSBC recorded in the transcript of the UK Treasury Select 
Committee's review of Fund policy 18th Feb 2000 (available on the House of Commons website) 
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through a variety of technical economic perspectives as much as they were by some kind of more 
objective `national' interest as a lender or borrower country. Concerns for global economic stability 
were important as well as merely the short-term interests of powerful financial markets. 
Of course the nature of country experience, though, will also provide incentives to view matters in 
one way rather than the other. One high-level South-east Asian financial policy maker, for instance, 
told me confidentially that the `Malaysian option' now looked quite attractive to him. 
Overall, though, once the G7 had decided on a solution that lay closer to the case-by-case end of 
the spectrum there was never going to be a sufficient developing country consensus to push 
through a different policy. Even if the middle-income countries had been united (which they 
weren't) HIPC countries did not have sufficient interest in the issue to stick their necks out. 
By late 2000 the Fund position was to all intents and purposes identical to the US Treasury position 
set out in Chapter 8 (though the position has changed significantly since then - see section 9.3 
below). That solution does involve a willingness to officially acknowledge the possibility that 
concerted debt roll-overs, like those in Korea, might be necessary under certain circumstances. The 
Fund has also accepted the need to extend its policy of lending into arrears at the margins but, 
overall, it is clear that those are to be regarded as exceptional solutions and that the decision is to 
made on a `case by case' basis. 
Here the central problem is the structural power of capital. Developing countries need resources 
and attempts to ensure more stable and sensible flows of capital will inevitably mean more 
expensive capital too. Over the long term that may, nevertheless, constitute good policy, at least for 
the most creditworthy, but it is going to be a hard decision for domestic financial elites to make 
when they are closest to IMF ideology and to the domestic financial institutions with most interests 
in a continuing flow of Funds. When everything looks rosy there is little incentive even for 
emerging markets to push this issue. It will take more crises before anything more substantial is 
done. 
Conditionality and ownership 
Since Horst Kohler became Managing Director in mid-2000, the Fund has undertaken an intensive 
review of its conditionality. There was already an acknowledgement, in the face of intense 
economic criticism and recessions in Asia, that early fiscal policy had been mistaken (Boorman et 
aL, 2000; Lane et al., 1999). However, the Fund initially mounted a fierce defence of its structural 
policies (Fischer, 1998b). 
By the time of the conditionality review, though, there was a growing acknowledgement of unease 
over the rapid expansion of the Fund's mandate: 
Such flexibility and responsiveness is undoubtedly encouraging but at the same time, it is 
important to safeguard the effectiveness of the institution and the legitimacy of its activities by 
ensuring that the IMF's activities are well prioritised and focussed in areas where the IMF has a 
mandate and expertise (IMF, 2000b). 
IMF programmes had a tendency to contain: 
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Structural conditions [which] are no doubt useful but, [in relation to which] it is debatable 
whether they are important for the restoration of confidence and needed to be dealt with at the 
height of a crisis (IMF, 2001c). 
Although G24 working papers do not necessarily reflect the views of the G24 ministers, it was 
significant that research had been commissioned on the expansion of conditionality (Kapur & 
Webb, 2000). A series of G24 communiques later questioned governance conditionality and Horst 
Kohler admitted that 
The appropriate scope and depth of structural conditionality in Fund programmes has been 
raised consistently in my discussions with member country officials (IMF, 2001a). 
In response, the Managing Director issued an Interim Guidance note on Structural Conditionality in an 
attempt to streamline conditions. It revolves around the 
Presumption that structural conditionality will be limited to a core set of essential measures that 
are macro-relevant and in the Fund's core area of responsibility, with a broader approach 
requiring justification based upon the specific country situation (IMF, 2001a, pars 2). 
On the other hand, conditions that are macro-relevant but not critical can still be included if a case 
is made and conditionality that falls outside the Fund's expertise may still be adopted with World 
Bank assistance (paras 7,9,11). The main difference between these guidelines and the pre-existing 
1979 ones is that the explicit acknowledgement that structural conditionality will exist allows the 
Director to emphasize the need to provide explicit macroeconomic justifications for it when it is 
included in programmes (para 6). 
The fact that the issue is being acknowledged, then, is important but how much difference the 
guidelines will make in practice remains to be seen. Past experience provides reasons for scepticism: 
I talked about the fate of the guidelines issued in 1979 above'0. ' 
Further indications of IMF concern come from a recent internal consultation document on 
fostering ownership that was recently reviewed by the Executive Board (IMF, 2001b). 
It suggests the possibility of recruiting staff with a broader social science background in an attempt 
to attain a better understanding of `domestic heterogeneity'. Resident representatives and more 
continuity on country desks might help awareness of these kinds of issues. Appropriately trained 
staff should be more willing to engage in public debate in an effort to put the Fund's views across, 
particularly where they conflict with those of government or key stakeholders. 
Wider participation can be advantageous where it results in wider acceptance of the need for 
reform. The Fund's job is to strengthen the hand of pro-reform factions: 
10 See also Summers' comments on conditionality on page 254. As Evans and Finnemore (2001) point out, the 
staffs response to suggestions in the external surveillance evaluation suggesting that surveillance should focus 
'only on the core areas of exchange rate policy and directly associated macroeconomic policies' was to argue that 
this 'ran counter to the demands of IMF members and the international community for more emphasis on 
interactions among macroeconomic, structural and social policies' 
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A common feature of many successful cases is that the authorities will initially resist 
undertaking difficult reforms but, by the time the programme is approved they will embrace at 
least the major components. 
Failures on the other hand take place when the government as a whole never buys into policies that 
`some of the authorities agree'. In other words the Fund is becoming increasingly aware that 
finance 
ministry consent, alone, is not enough and that there needs to be engagement with the 
highest 
levels of government from the start. 
There is some acceptance that civil society consent is also important. However, the concerns about 
civil society's representativeness and the danger that particular disaffected groups might capture 
debates continued to temper Fund enthusiasm. The report ultimately emphasizes that 
Members of the IMF are sovereign states and the right of the authorities to implement 
economic policies of their own choosing should not and cannot be abrogated. 
On conditionality, staff should be more open to 
Programmes that differ from the staffs preferred options as long as the objects of the 
programme are not compromised. 
Greater effort should be directed at building negotiating capacity in borrower countries and the 
staff should at least ensure that they present a number of different alternatives in programme 
negotiations. 
The tension between political and technical aspects of Fund authority is particularly evident in these 
documents. The Fund is struggling with the issues I explored in section 9.1.1 and their political 
manifestations. There is an enthusiasm for greater domestic debate and civil society engagement 
but that is tempered with a continuing insistence on the primacy of the state and by concerns that 
disaffected groups may be able to use the democratic process to push their own agenda. My 
interviews with officials within Fund External Relations suggested that there were groups that 
`could not be reached' in discussion (Dawson & Bhatt, 2001). 
That suggests that, at one level, the Fund is anxious to respond to NGO pressure, particularly in 
developed countries while, at another, it knows that this plays badly with developing country states 
and has the potential to raise awkward questions about Fund political authority". It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that civil society involvement in practice tends to be relatively limited and that this 
is leading to some dissatisfaction, as rhetoric and reality remain some distance apart. The Fund 
commissioned external evaluation of ESAF, which covers a rather wider range of countries than 
the current study, suggested that civil society groups are far from convinced by the IMF's overtures 
(see IMF, 1998, particularly the case study on Bolivia). The report writers came away with the 
impression that ownership was still seen in terms of persuasion rather than genuine dialogue. Other 
academic research has come to the same conclusion: 
1 (Dawson & Bhatt, 2001) also provide some indications of Board members' views on these issues. 
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It does seem that, on the whole, achieving `consensus' has, for the Fund, not meant building 
new understandings out of different points of view, but bringing the notional `owners' round to 
an unaltered Fund position (O'Brien et aL, 2000, p188) 
I ending 
In terms of lending facilities, the agenda has been very clearly set by the right wing US concerns 
raised in the Meltzer report. The Fund has adopted a Contingent Credit line which is supposed to 
increase market confidence by enabling countries to sign up for a fast disbursing credit line if they 
are willing to commit to a series of relevant policies. In fact no country has yet signed up. That 
seems to have been partly because of the cost of the facility and partly because, despite pre- 
qualification, disbursement would not be automatic. The Fund has already eased the terms once in 
an attempt to drum up clients but the initiative continues to show embarrassing signs of insufficient 
consultation. 
Under US pressure, the Fund has also changed the charging structures for its facilities with interest 
rates that increase over time to prevent long-term reliance on Fund finance. That move was met by 
bitter resistance from developing countries and the post-communist countries (suggesting the 
potential for interesting political alliances in the future). Increases still went through but at a lower 
level than originally planned. 
Developing countries have pressed for a greater willingness to use the SDR as a source of 
international liquidity in the face of contagion, indicating greater faith in an injection of liquidity 
than in any solution to debt restructuring that is likely to emerge from the IMF process 
(Mohammed, 2001a). However, G7 countries remain resistant. 
Other institutional rrformc 
In addition to the standards and codes process and further discussion of civil society engagement, 
there have been some minor reforms of the IMF's institutions. Most potentially significant is the 
establishment of an independent evaluation office. The independent evaluations carried out in the 
late 1990s were commendably critical of aspects of the IMF's role and seem to have had some 
impact on Fund thinking. The report on ESAF has been particularly influential on subsequent 
discussions of ownership of Fund programmes. If the EVO can continue in this tradition it could 
be a valuable institution. 
Although it has no formal power and there are obvious questions about the extent to which its 
findings will filter into policy change, the IMF's self-perception as a neutral technocratic institution 
could potentially provide the EVO with significant influence. It will be difficult not to respond to 
the opinions of respected economists and financial officials selected by the Executive Board. 
A further review of Fund quotas is also about to commence and the Fund has commissioned a 
number of papers on possible ways to reform quotas. However, the approach remains strongly 
wedded to the idea of weighted voting. The proposed changes are about adjusting the weights to 
make them more rationally justifiable (which would probably lead to a modest increase in Asian 
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countries' votes) rather than on enhancing basic votes (see page 66 above) or on some more radical 
reform. 
9.2.2 Analysis and assessment 
The post-crisis reforms demonstrate an awareness of the significance of the kinds of normative 
issues that I raised in section 9.1 but do not go a very long way towards dealing with them. 
Most notable is a general unwillingness to contemplate any solution that involves revisiting the legal 
framework under which the Fund operates. The standards and codes are soft law and there have 
been no moves towards altering the Fund's fundamental institutional structure. Where institutional 
issues are discussed the focus continues to be on enhancing the Fund's technical authority, rather 
than on acknowledging its political role. 
The prominence of arguments based on the need to work within rather than attempt to alter 
market preferences has been heavily influential in both the standards and codes process and debates 
over better methods of crisis resolution, although there have been modest movements towards an 
acceptance of capital controls and the potential for more administrative solutions but only at the 
margins. 
The greatest impetus towards reform is in the way conditionality negotiations are to take place. 
Some of the statements coming out of the Fund are positive. The idea that countries should be 
presented with choices by Fund staff is an interesting one. An acknowledgement that more efforts 
need to be made in the direction of parsimony is also to be welcomed. However, part of the reason 
why those are the issues that can be discussed is that, fundamentally, they are not subject to any 
kind of regulation. That means that there are no legal safeguards to ensure that any real change 
takes place and no institutional factors to change the underlying incentives for the Executive Board. 
If the problem is a temptation for developed country states to press for ever more extensive 
conditionality, little has been done to actually restrain them from continuing to do so. Of course 
what happens in practice will need to be assessed over time but previous efforts at restricting 
conditionality in this way have been less than successful. 
There has been little movement away from the loose and unstructured multi-level relationships that 
I argued, in section 9.1.1 were problematic for Fund legitimacy. Since such negotiations continue to 
take place within a framework that favours developed country interests, it is unlikely that the 
solutions will resolve the problems with Fund performance as far as developing countries are 
concerned. Even if the Fund did do a good job much of the time, the absence of any politically 
convincing institutional framework would still provide little reassurance and leave the Fund very 
vulnerable to performance failures. 
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9.3 Assessment and Prospects 
In the previous section I argued that the Fund's response to demands for re-establishing political 
control had not been particularly accommodating. Before examining the reasons for that - which 
will suggest significant obstacles to future radical reform at least in the short term -I want to 
suggest, largely for rhetorical purposes, what a more acceptable solution might involve. 
The thrust of the argument in section 9.1 was that an ideal solution would involve a considerable 
rethink of the relationships between states in order to provide greater Fund political accountability, 
particularly to developing countries. That would need to involve a reform of voting rights within 
the Fund12. It might also involve separating strategic control from day to day oversight of staff. 
Conditionality is currently only formally reviewed after programmes are negotiated. Before 
negotiations, political control is very ad hoc tending to favour the Fund's better-resourced principal 
shareholders. Executive Board overwork and a staff tendency to prefer to resolve issues before 
presenting them to the Board add to the problems. One might imagine a more political body 
exercising a more strategic role, perhaps with a more egalitarian voting system to balance the 
Executive Board's economically related voting weights and technical management of day to day 
matters13. That political body could hold its deliberations more publicly since such general policy 
considerations could not be described as market sensitive. If that raised developed country 
concerns about developing country dominance too much, one solution might be to build in a 
tighter set of legal rules for Fund operation. 
Of course there are two obvious objections. The first is that all this fails to deal with the issue of 
civil society and the second is that such measures are not politically feasible. 
My problem with trying to use some kind of direct civil society engagement through the Fund is 
that I find attempts to secure political reform through international engagement very problematic. I 
can understand the temptation to deal with unpleasant regimes in this way. However, it is actually 
very difficult to do so: political change must ultimately come from within. In any case a Fund with 
dubious political legitimacy is not a good institution to use for these purposes. What gives the Fund 
the right to decide what an appropriate regime should be and why should anyone be confident that 
the decisions it makes will centre on the interests of developing country citizens rather than its 
leading shareholders? For me calls for the Fund to deal with poor governments are most 
appropriately seen as a reflection of an already over-extended role in developing countries for what 
was once designed to be a narrowly focussed economic institution (something I will discuss in more 
detail shortly). 
If the Fund's overall political legitimacy was on a sounder footing that might ease the problems of 
potential state-IMF collusion in any case. A clearer legal framework for the limits of Fund 
authority, and more transparent decision-making would make it clearer what was demanded by the 
12 For some detailed proposals see (Gerster, 1993a; Woods, 1999) 
13 That conception is a far more politically minded adaptation of suggestions made in (De Gregorio et al., 1999) 
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Fund and what kind of political pressure should be exercised to reform Fund policy. It would solve 
the problems of blurred accountability even if it would not eliminate power imbalances. That may 
be the best service that can be done for civil society in pursuit of more satisfactory influence over 
Fund policy. at least it would be clear who to lobby, who to blame, and what the right strategy was 
for political struggle. At the moment lack of transparency over the relative influence of the Fund, 
states and other donors makes those issues very difficult 
In connection with the need to justify policy better and to clarify who is making it, some aspects of 
the Fund's current policy on engaging with civil society are also to be welcomed. A greater 
willingness to provide public justifications for Fund decisions can only enhance the quality of 
domestic debate and civil society's ability to hold states to account in the domestic context. A Fund 
outreach initiative involving training Southern NGOs in economics is a particularly valuable 
initiative, at least in theory. To the extent that `civil society engagement' translates into genuine 
flexibility in negotiations with states in order to limit the social ill-effects of Fund programmes it is 
also to be welcomed but states must remain in charge. It is difficult to justify social and political 
interventions dictated by Northern (rather than Southern) NGOs even if they are dictated with the 
best intentions. 
The question of political feasibility is more problematic. The previous two sections showed a 
number of factors that work against this kind of reform. There is a mismatch between Fund 
incentives to adapt to the preferences of economically trained institutional insiders and politically 
motivated outsiders. More fundamentally there is a mismatch between the representation of 
countries in control of Fund finance and those responsible for implementation. The Fund has 
shown some inclination to deal with the first problem, under pressure particularly from Northern 
NGOs, but less inclination to deal with the second. 
The present system has short-term pragmatic advantages. The `epistemic community' of 
economists makes internal agreement easier and prevents the institutional paralysis often seen at the 
UN. Domestic political debate may genuinely be poorly suited to reaching international agreements 
and the requirement for technical expertise may, to some extent, militate against democratic control 
of economic policy making. However the danger is that internal consensus will not translate into 
appropriate and implementable policy on the ground unless there is greater pressure both to force 
economists to justify their decisions in politically comprehensible terms and to take into account 
practical political and technical problems existing in developing countries. 
If those who are supposed to be persuaded by the Fund are not in a strong position to make their 
views felt within the institution they may begin to engage in forms of political action outside it that 
the Fund finds hard to controL 
As I have already argued, the civil society and good governance approach to these problems is 
superficially appealing too. It is calculated to diffuse pressure in the Fund's most powerful 
shareholder countries. It also avoids the need to renegotiate the Fund's legal framework since the 
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interactions involved are already ad hoc and poorly regulated in legal terms. However, it fails to 
consider sufficiently the importance of states as key audiences for IMF legitimacy claims and key 
actors in programme implementation. It also obscures rather than illuminates the limitations 
imposed by the framework within which civil society negotiations take place. It is the legitimacy of 
that framework which ultimately determines the contribution that civil society engagement can 
make to Fund legitimacy. 
These political difficulties may mitigate against institutional reform but the whole point of my 
discussion of Fund legitimacy so far is that the Fund's institutional arrangements remain politically 
unsustainable if the Fund is to carry out the role it currently envisages. The Fund's current 
legitimacy problems, and their practical political consequences, are not just going to go away and 
current attempts at reform are inadequate to overcome them. 
If institutions really cannot be reformed (and perhaps even if they can) there is a need for the Fund 
to reduce its role in developing countries. Is a narrower role any more feasible than a more 
politically legitimate Fund though? The Fund and some of its supporters have tried hard to press 
the case that its interventions are essential (Eichengreen, 1999b; Fischer, 1998b). However, the 
evidence of this thesis casts doubt on that strong position. The crises seemed to be resolved most 
effectively by government debt guarantees, concerted roll-overs or capital controls. Although the 
markets asked for structural reforms the evidence that they actually responded to them was less 
strong. In any case, the Fund position is predicated on the assumption that free capital markets are 
technically essential, a position which is less secure even within the economics profession than it 
might have looked before the crisis. 
Limits to what seems to be possible in terms of enhancing the Fund's political authority in 
developing countries and the case study messages about the importance of tailoring economic 
policy to very specific local circumstances all press toward a more restricted role for the Fund (and 
other IFIs), 
not as an institution devoted to harmonization and the reduction of national institutional 
differences, but as an institution that manages the interface between different national systems 
as Dani Rodrik as put it in the related context of the WTO (Rodrik, 2001b, 45). 
That may imply less complete financial integration which may, in turn, involve some costs to 
developing countries in terms of the costs and availability of finance, but that may still be a price 
worth paying. 
At the present time, though, this solution too is not currently on the table as we have seen. 
Over the longer term my analysis suggests that pressires for reform will be impossible to ignore. In 
the short term, though, what are the more pragmatic prospects for reform suggested by the analysis 
so far? 
The most likely pressure for reform will come from more financial crises and their social and 
economic consequences. The political analysis in this Chapter has suggested that the Fund's 
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technocratic self-perception makes it most responsive to technical failure and changes in economic 
perspectives. That connects with the fact that it is not in developed countries' financial interests for 
the emerging markets to collapse. Although Krueger denies that the experience in Argentina has 
had any influence (Krueger, 2002b), the coincidence between crisis in Argentina and the Fund's 
announcement of discussions of a new debt restructuring mechanism14 is distinctly suggestive. 
We can also expect the political unrest triggered by crises to have an international political impact, 
especially where they continue to be dealt with by deflationary attempts to attract further financial 
flows, again Argentina is suggestive of the possibilities. Here Northern NGOs do have a role in 
putting pressure on their governments over the negative social consequences of unfettered capital 
markets. 
If further crises create political pressure, though, how can developing countries capitalise on it to 
maximise reform? If, as I have suggested, economic debate will continue to dominate within the 
Fund, coming up with alternative economic solutions and proposals that are technically robust will 
be particularly important. Here, the G24's research programme has a role to play and there are 
strong arguments in favour or pressing for richer member countries to contribute funding to 
expand it's. On similar lines, there are also grounds for arguing that the Fund should be offering 
more research support to developing country Executive Directors who are typically under 
resourced (they serve more countries and have fewer support staff than their developed country 
counterparts). 
Evans and Finnemore point to the problems springing from the unstated assumptions of the 
economics profession itself and argue that these are particularly problematic in a context where 
Fund staff, without a single exception, have received their graduate training from academic 
institutions in the industrial countries. They argue that one solution would be for the Fund to take 
on more mid-career recruits from developing country governments whose practical hands on 
experience of local problems may have created a more diverse outlook (Evans & Finnemore, 2001). 
Although I have been somewhat sceptical about direct NGO participation in Fund decision- 
making, if the practical reality is that Northern NGOs have a disproportionate influence over the 
Fund there may be some strategic mileage for developing country governments (perhaps through 
the G24) in attempting to forge areas of common interest. There are some signs of increasing 
NGO sophistication on financial issues in the aftermath of the jubilee 2000 initiative and there may 
be issues over which genuine partnerships can be formed. In any case, at the least, greater 
engagement between high profile internationally active Northern NGOs and developing country 
governments would give the developing countries an opportunity to educate NGOs about some of 
their more macro-level concerns. 
" For details see (Krueger, 2002a) and (Bossone & Sdralevich, 2002) 
'5 Perhaps by analogy to the modest moves towards technical and legal assistance for developing countries within 
the WTO. 
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If the dramatic institutional changes I suggested above are impossible then some more modest 
moves such as enhancing the level of basic votes (Gerster, 1993a; Woods, 2000b)or at least 
increasing the number of African Executive Directors (which wouldn't require a change in voting) 
would be a very modest shift in the right direction (Evans & Finnemore, 2001). 
None of these changes though is ultimately more than a modest move in the right direction. What 
is ultimately possible in terms of more fundamental reform will sadly depend on the outcome of 
further crises. 
290 
10 Conclusions 
The thesis set out to determine what the IMF's crisis of legitimacy in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis would tell us about IMF political legitimacy more generally and the politics of IMF 
policy making in particular. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that legitimacy was about the extent to which the justifications an institution 
could provide for continuing compliance with its policy preferences were sufficiently convincing to 
key political actors to ensure that it could continue to function. Legitimacy is a matter of degree and 
the logical strength of legitimating arguments is difficult to untangle from strategic political factors 
when trying to account for political compliance. It should not surprise us if an institution continues 
to function despite discrepancies between the justifications it provides and its operation in practice 
or even problems with the logic of its justifications. However, the less credible justifications appear 
the more problematic institutional compliance procured through legitimacy rather than coercion 
will be. We shouldn't expect institutions' normative arguments to be wholly compelling but there is 
a degree of convergence between normative and practical political legitimacy 
As an international institution with limited coercive resources of its own to draw on, the IMF has 
particularly good reasons to be concerned about the strength of the arguments it can use to 
persuade actors to cooperate. 
Unfortunately, the IMF's interventions in Asia seemed to trigger unprecedented levels of public 
opposition to the Fund's role. That implied that its legitimating justifications were weak and in need 
of rethinking but the reforms that ultimately materialised in the wake of the crisis were decidedly 
limited. That could either be because the public criticisms offered of the IMF were not sufficiently 
politically problematic to cause political change or it could signal a failure to deal with the 
underlying problems. 
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Understanding which was the case has involved an analysis of the reasons behind challenges to the 
IMF's legitimacy in response to events in Asia and of the political pressures that were, in practice, 
brought to bear in the direction of reform. 
Fundamentally, the Asian crisis caused a crisis of IMF legitimacy because it played to pre-existing 
problems with IMF authority. A gradual surrender of global political authority over financial 
markets, the collapse of symmetry in relationships between the Fund and its shareholders, a decline 
in relative funding and the failure of Fund legal frameworks to keep up with institutional changes 
had all undermined the political aspects of the Fund's authority. At the same time, its policies in 
developing countries, which were increasingly justified on technical grounds, were becoming ever 
more politically intrusive. 
Prior to the crisis, technical economic consensus, the promise of increasing capital inflows and a 
lack of clarity over what exactly the Fund's new agenda would entail initially limited the political 
difficulties involved. The crisis was significant because it provided new information on the nature 
of the underlying bargains. It demonstrated a failure of Fund performance in stimulating capital 
inflows and a failure of market performance which, between them, seriously questioned the 
rationale behind ever more extensive economic and institutional adaptation to market preferences. 
Since the basis of remaining Fund authority was largely its ability to assist developing countries with 
that adaptation, the Fund's authority began to look very weak. 
In normative terms, the debates revolved round the appropriate balance between political control 
and technical authority based on market rationality. The strongest case against the Fund built on 
technical and market failure, the strongest defence on political failures in Asia. 
In political terms, financial instability stemming from the crisis and political and social difficulties 
with implementation put pressure even on developed country financial elites to rethink the Fund's 
role to some degree. If policies cannot be implemented there is little point in putting them in 
programmes. Developing countries also protested within the Fund's institutions, with Mahathir in 
particular calling for a reassertion of political authority over the markets, but some were more vocal 
than others. 
Arrayed against this pressure for change there were also powerful forces that tended to favour the 
status quo. The influence of conformity within the economics profession was one factor. Another 
was that developed countries are in charge of the Fund but face few incentives to consider the 
political consequences of the policies they promote. That is a consequence of both structural 
position in the international economy and the limits to domestic political debate over these issues. 
Even some middle-income finance ministers suffer from this incentive mismatch because crises are 
only periodic, insulating them from the difficult political questions involved in the Fund's new 
agenda. 
Generally, then, there is a mismatch between the actors with most influence within the Fund and 
those with the greatest ability to resist Fund policies. That served to limit dissent within the 
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institution but also meant that reform was uneven and did not appear to be adequate to remove the 
danger of future legitimacy problems. 
The Fund's preferred solution to its legitimacy problems seems to be to leave institutional 
structures largely as they are, reform policy at the margins and attempt to 
forge greater informal 
links between institutional insiders and institutional outsiders. That preference, in turn, can be 
explained politically. There are significant political obstacles to fundamental reform 
but there is an 
awareness that something needs to be done. The most vocal pro-reform lobbies 
in the Fund's 
principal shareholders are Northern NGOs (or those influenced by them) who tend to support the 
idea of more `positive' conditionality and greater accountability to an NGO community. 
The problem with that strategy is that attempts to alter these informal aspects of Fund relationships 
do not deal with the fundamental institutional obstacles to greater Fund authority. They say nothing 
about which groups will finally prevail in the event of conflict and the suspicion, not unnaturally, 
is 
that the answer will continue to be the Fund's developed country clients. 
The idea of civil society involvement is particularly ambiguous politically. Discussions have tended 
to be insufficiently clear on the fact that civil society views are always in need of interpretation. 
Fund (and outside) accounts talk about how `representative' various civil society groups are but that 
is merely to emphasise that the ultimate decision-making institution is having to choose between 
different political interests in coming up with a decision. 
I have argued that a politically effective solution will therefore involve accepting that there is no 
alternative to more fundamental institutional reform, giving a greater say to developing countries 
and forcing the more economic parts of the Fund's management to talk with more politically 
minded officials. If that reform is impossible, then the only other viable solution to the Fund's 
legitimacy problems is Fund retrenchment. 
The Fund has been anxious to argue that retrenchment is impossible or at least prohibitively 
expensive in terms of market access. However, the evidence of the thesis suggests that that is not a 
wholly accurate view. The technical case that Fund structural policies were essential for crisis 
resolution was not entirely compelling. The unexpected success of Malaysian capital controls 
presents a particularly clear challenge. 
If neither of these solutions is adopted, the IMF's legitimacy problems will not simply go away. The 
increasing demands that adjustment to the needs of financial markets are making have pushed the 
Fund's agenda in ever more politically intrusive directions. Under the Bretton Woods system, those 
kinds of demands were deliberately moderated by a degree of political control exercised over 
financial markets. The Fund's original role was partly to provide space for that kind of political 
control in the interests of legitimating integration with the international monetary system. The 
resurgence of liberal orthodoxy in the 1980s and 1990s and enthusiasm for the potential benefits of 
globalisation has made it harder for some economically trained officials to appreciate the need for 
that kind of legitimation. In any case the political climate is very different to that of 1942 and 
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developing country governments do not have the same resources as their post-was European 
counterparts when it comes to pressing for more protection against the less benign effects of 
market integration. 
However, the need to respond to free capital flows, itself a consequence of developed country 
political choices, has forced the Fund into very intrusive interventions in domestic political 
economies in an effort to stipulate appropriate forms of institutional regulation at the domestic 
level. The political nature of those interventions seems to me to be an unavoidable fact. That fact 
may go some way to explaining the ways in which the boundaries between technical justification 
and justifications based on liberal norms have started to be blurred in Fund rhetoric and practice, 
particularly in relation to good governance and civil society engagement. 
However, as technical imperatives (at least as the Fund currently interprets them) start to close off 
the range of potential domestic political solutions, the strength of liberal justifications for free 
markets based on their self-regulating apolitical nature are increasingly threatened. The more 
`appropriate' forms of political and institutional arrangements are to be restricted on the basis of 
the requirements for participation in global capital markets, the greater the danger that liberalism 
will undermine the more normative aspects of its appeal based on democracy and freedom, 
especially if technical performance is ultimately poor (Hawthorn, 1999). In a sense that is a 
restatement of Polanyi's classic argument that purely liberal economic management undermines 
itself and will ultimately force a resurgence of political control in the interests of social stability 
(Polanyi 1957). 
My interpretation of events, then, is that the solution to the gap between apparent difficulties with 
Fund legitimacy and the extent of ensuing reforms owes more to insufficient reform than to an 
overestimation of the problems. 
The Fund's current institutions, combined with continuing fears about market reaction to attempts 
at reasserting political control, have succeeded in limiting direct political pressure for reform in the 
short term. The relative success of Korea, interpreted in terms of `good' policy rather than 
conducive social conditions, has made it easier for some to be sanguine about the minimalist 
reform agenda. Over the longer term, though, the danger is that, if the incentives to resolve issues 
within the institution are not sufficient, the alternative will be institutional paralysis or solutions that 
take place outside it. 
Over the long term that might mean moves towards greater regional cooperation. The swap 
agreements established between Asian nations in the wake of the crisis are a modest indication, 
with the scotched proposal for an AMF being a more ambitious version. 
That is perhaps an optimistic scenario. A pessimistic one involves the temptation for developing 
countries to either leave the Fund or simply refuse to borrow. The historical experience of 
unregulated developing country relationships with financial markets is sufficiently gloomy to make 
that a very unattractive option, which is part of the explanation for continuing developing country 
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engagement with a less than ideal IMF. On the other hand the experience of the Great Depression 
should be a reminder that even the threat that such an option might be considered should be deeply 
worrying to developed country governments. More worryingly, nationally, there may be more 
examples where pre-existing political processes are decisively rejected. The unwillingness of anyone 
to govern post-crisis Argentina, the rise of the far right in Europe and disengagement from the 
political process in industrial countries more generally raises the possibility of more dramatic 
follow-ups to Seattle-style demonstrations. 
Those are perhaps unduly pessimistic scenarios but they do emphasise the point of thinking about 
these issues in terms of legitimacy. Realist writers tend to think solely in terms of material power 
and emphasise the dominance of leading industrial states. However, economic cooperation is not 
ultimately something that can be coerced. Liberal attempts to portray international markets as a 
sphere characterised largely by mutual interest are too optimistic. However, there is no denying that 
developed and developing countries still need each other's willing cooperation. Thinking about 
relatively unaccountable institutions in terms of legitimacy emphasises that they will find it 
increasingly difficult to function when those in power have insufficient incentives to consider how 
their policies are to be justified to those whose cooperation they require. It provides pragmatic as 
well as normative reasons for reform. 
The argument presented here, then, is that problems with the weakness of legitimating arguments 
put a sort of structural strain on the Fund's institutions as they stand. There is nothing forcing 
immediate change and the Fund's current institutions are designed in a way that will tend to make 
Fund management blind to the factors that do suggest a need for reform but the underlying 
problems suggest that the present situation is also unstable. 
If some more drastic solution is required over the longer term, what does the analysis of Fund 
policy-making suggest about potential reformist strategies in the short-term? The dominance of 
developed country influence in the Fund suggests that developing countries might wish to seek 
social allies in developed countries. However, my analysis of debates in the US suggests that this 
will be difficult. Much of the anti-globalisation and even NGO agenda fits poorly with the wishes 
of developing country governments. There are particularly stark conflicts of interest when it comes 
to issues such as labour rights and the environment. In a sense the problem is that such NGOs are 
themselves a `special interest' group and are less well equipped to articulate a compelling broader 
development strategy. 
The macro-level of debate within the Fund and the importance of technical authority both suggest 
that what is needed is a collaborative effort by developing countries and advocacy NGOs to 
elaborate a technically compelling alternative conception of economic management to that put 
forward by the IMF. There is a need to meet technical complacency within the centres of financial 
power with articulate technical opposition. Unfortunately the left is still struggling to articulate any 
such compelling alternative conception (though there are a few promising attempts around such as 
(Unger 1995)). NGOs, too, are only just beginning to acquire the expertise to debate international 
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economic issues, though the debt campaigns orchestrated by Jubilee 2000 have done much to raise 
broader public awareness of the politics of international finance. Still mobilising popular political 
pressure around technical economic debates remains a daunting task. However, just as I have 
argued that there is ultimately no alternative to reasserting political control over the Fund, there is 
also no alternative over the longer term to enhancing the quality of democratic debate over 
technical economic issues. 
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